In the late Ming Dynasty, political corruption and heavy tax burdens plagued the common people, while natural and man-made disasters exacerbated social instability and pushed the empire to the brink of collapse.
It is in this historical context that Li Zicheng emerged. He proposed policies such as equal distribution of land, exemption from grain tax, and three-year exemption from taxation, which won tremendous support among the oppressed people. Despite this, Li Zicheng and his Dashun regime failed to leave a long-term footprint in the long river of history and became a short-lived historical phenomenon.
1644: A turning point in Chinese history and the struggle for imperial power
The year 1644 marked a major watershed in Chinese history, as it saw the reign of three different emperors: Emperor Chongzhen of the Ming Dynasty, Emperor Shunzhi of the Qing Dynasty, and Li Zicheng of the Great Shun.
Li Zicheng, in October of the previous year, had led a rebel army to capture Xi'an, and then quickly took control of a large amount of territory in the northwest of the Ming Dynasty. The Ming Dynasty was already in turmoil at this time, and Li Zicheng intended to replace it. At the beginning of the new year, he established his own regime in Xi'an, changed the Yuan to Yongchang, and proclaimed himself the king of Xinshun.
In order to create a more glorious capital, Li Zicheng built a large number of buildings, strengthened and beautified the city of Chang'an. According to records at the time, he had a strong army, with 400,000 infantry and 600,000 cavalry, and had the ability to compete with the Ming and Qing dynasties.
In Li Zicheng's view, the Ming Dynasty was his main enemy. Decades of political corruption, economic decay, and military missteps in the Ming Dynasty, combined with constant incursions from foreign enemies, put the dynasty in jeopardy.
However, in April 1644, Li Zicheng's army approached Beijing with little hindrance. Emperor Chongzhen committed suicide under the pressure of the army, marking the end of the Ming Dynasty. Still, for Li Zicheng, the capture of Beijing was the beginning of his defeat.
The Qing Dynasty did not initially regard Li Zicheng as their main enemy, and the two sides originally held a common animosity towards the Ming Dynasty. Even when Li Zicheng was still in Xi'an, the Qing Dynasty sent envoys to offer cooperation. However, after Li Zicheng entered Beijing, he did not hold peace talks with the Qing army, and missed the opportunity to gain time and prepare for war.
Lee's downfall can be attributed to four key mistakes that exposed his limitations and ultimately led to his failure.
Li Zicheng's Downfall: Greed and Limitations
Li Zicheng's first major failure was greed for money and fame, which reflected the inherent limitations of the peasant class. After the capture of Beijing, the Dashun peasant army quickly indulged in the glory and wealth brought by victory, and lost its previous fighting spirit and enterprising spirit.
Li Zicheng himself indulged in extravagant pleasures, drinking and carnivaling with his subordinates in luxurious palaces every day, lacking in-depth thinking and coping strategies for the changes in the situation. At that time, the remnants of the Ming Dynasty still had an army of 500,000, and the Manchu nobles in the northeast were also eyeing it. If either side takes action, Li Zicheng's luxurious and comfortable life will not be sustainable.
Li Zicheng once proudly said: "Shaanxi is the country of my parents, and wealth returns to my hometown, how can Beijing compare with Xi'an." This reflects his attitude towards Beijing: not as the foundation of his own regime, but as the object of plunder. At the suggestion of Niu Jinxing, he distributed beauties to officials, and connived at soldiers to plunder palace maids, and even some soldiers went outside the city to rob people's daughters.
To make matters worse, his troops had no bottom line when it came to demanding property, and even tortured Wu Sangui's father, Wu Xiang, to extort wages, and plundered Wu Sangui's concubine. This incident directly triggered Wu Sangui's anger and made him disregard the national righteousness and embark on the road of betrayal.
Li Zicheng's subordinates were not much better than him. Niu Jinxing was arrogant in Beijing, soliciting customers everywhere, and became his own power group. In the process of recovering the stolen goods, Dashun's law enforcement officials abused their power, prompting many people to flee, laying a hidden danger for the later rebellion.
Li Zicheng's political blind spot: misjudgment of the situation
Li's second major failure also lies in his misreading of the political situation. After becoming emperor in Xi'an, he failed to properly govern his territory and instead attacked Beijing. Although he commanded hundreds of thousands of troops at the time, when he actually entered Beijing, there were only about 80,000 troops left.
The occupation of Beijing posed a major defensive challenge for Li Zicheng. The remnants of the Ming Dynasty fought back in various places, and Li Zicheng had difficulty consolidating and developing his newly acquired territory. His troops consisted mainly of peasants and horse thieves, and were more adept at mobile warfare than defending cities.
Beijing's easy conquest made Li Zicheng's self-confidence inflated, and he mistakenly believed that the world was easy to master. Strategically, he sent only a few thousand troops to garrison the key Shanhai Pass, greatly underestimating the threat posed by the Manchurian Iron Cavalry and Wu Sangui outside the Guanguan, which was a major mistake in his military strategy and laid the groundwork for his later defeat.
When Wu Sangui regained control of Shanhaiguan, Li Zicheng still did not fully realize Wu Sangui's strength. In his rush to fight, he eventually suffered defeat. These mistakes reflected Lee's shortcomings in understanding and responding to the political situation, and became one of the key factors in his collapse.
Li Zicheng's failure: lack of scientific leadership and decision-making
Li's third major failure is the lack of effective and scientific leadership decisions. Despite the internal and external difficulties, Li Zicheng has the ability to adopt the right leadership style.
When he first entered Beijing, he issued the "Edict of Tranquility" to strictly uphold military discipline and take strict measures against soldiers robbing on the streets, showing his understanding of the importance of military discipline.
These measures won the hearts of the people for a time, and made the Dashun army quite popular in the early days. However, as the war progressed and the territory expanded, the cost of maintaining the army became a major challenge, and problems began to emerge. In the process of recovering the stolen goods, the law enforcers of Dashun began to indiscriminately hunt down and torture the former court officials and gentry, injuring innocent people, causing the people's views on the peasant army to gradually change.
In particular, those landlords and squires who had originally defected to the peasant army to save their lives and property were eventually faced with the fate of losing their property and were dissatisfied. When the peasant army was strong, they could only swallow their anger, but Li Zicheng was unaware of these potential grievances.
When Li Zicheng's army was defeated, the generals from all over the country saw the opportunity to rebel and began to pursue the troops and officials of the Dashun regime. Even the poor peasants who had been exploited by the Great Shun no longer responded to the call of the peasant army. Li Zicheng's deficiencies in leadership and decision-making eventually led to the collapse of his regime.
Li Zicheng's strategic mistake: failing to hold Beijing after Shanhaiguan
After the Battle of Shanhaiguan, Li Zicheng's fourth major defeat was that he did not hold on to Beijing. At that time, he did not expect that Wu Sangui would introduce the Qing army.
After the defeat, his first reaction was to withdraw to Beijing, because as the capital of the Ming Dynasty, Beijing was not only a political symbol, but also a recognized political center for the world. At that time, holding the capital meant that the foundations of the regime were still alive.
Historically, the Qing army penetrated deep into the interior three times, but failed to occupy Beijing for long. The Ming army was able to hold out in Beijing, and the Qing army could only retreat after plundering. If Li Zicheng had taken this as a reference, he could have chosen to establish a foothold in Beijing, at least for the time being.
However, Li Zicheng did not choose to stick to Beijing. After a brief occupation, he was busy "chasing stolen goods" and did not implement effective statecraft to appease people.
As a result, he lost the support of the people of Beijing and former Ming officials, while also abandoning the capital, which symbolized the legitimacy and stability of the regime. The short-sightedness and missteps of this decision not only weakened his regime, but also paved the way for his eventual collapse.
The short-lived Li Zicheng: Lessons and Reflections of History
Li Zicheng's brief reign became a footnote in Chinese history, showing the cost of missed opportunities. The Qing army, with the assistance of Wu Sangui, captured Shanhaiguan almost without hindrance and entered Beijing without any hindrance. Li Zicheng's hasty escape after the Battle of Shanhaiguan further paved the way for the Qing army's victory.
Both of these unexpected victories were caused by Li Zicheng's strategic mistakes. His subordinates, such as Li Yan and others, put forward reasonable suggestions, but Li Zicheng did not take them. If Li Zicheng had been able to adjust his aggressive policies in due course, the situation might have been different.
Li Zicheng's troops, initially a peasant army that revolted for survival, had a strong will to fight. Li Zicheng once put forward strict requirements for military discipline and created a well-disciplined team. However, after entering Beijing, the attitude of this army changed, discipline gradually loosened, and the soldiers began to covet comfort.
In the crucial Battle of Shanhaiguan, Li Zicheng's troops had become obsessed with plundering and were fearful when fighting. After the defeat, this indiscipline became even more pronounced, and the army fell apart.
Li Zicheng's defeat was not only a strategic mistake, but also due to the conservative small-peasant mentality of his troops and the lack of advanced leadership ideas. Once they fall into the temptation of "wealth", it is difficult to avoid the problems of competition for power and profit, and insensitivity to it.
At the historical juncture of the alternation of the Ming and Qing dynasties, Li Zicheng, Emperor Chongzhen and the Qing army were all facing historical opportunities, and the key was who could seize the opportunity to make the right choice.
Emperor Chongzhen was clever and self-destructive, while Li Zicheng lost his accurate judgment of the situation due to a temporary victory, and finally lost the support of the people and the political power.
Between 1948 and 1949, Mao Zedong profoundly learned the lessons of history. After the three major battles commanded by Xibaipo and won victories, he reminded the leading cadres not to follow Li Zicheng's example. He stressed the need to be humble and cautious, knowing that one should not give up the struggle after entering the city.
When Mao Zedong entered Beijing on March 25, 1949, he once again recalled Li Zicheng's history, drew lessons from it, and made sure that the mistakes of the past were not repeated.