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Oh Kang-ho: Analysis of the intelligence prediction of the Inchon landing in the War Room of the General Staff Department

author:Xiaoyun lucA

Hikiko:

This article is drawn from Wu Kanghe's "On the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea", and the original title is "The Role of Intelligence Support for the Inchon Landing." The War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea was a war of local aggression in which the United States participated in the largest, most mobilized countries, and most fiercely fought after World War II. This war witnessed the first time that our army directly confronted the US military with modern weapons and equipment, and the Chinese People's Volunteers demonstrated their national and military prestige with their own blood and lives, and successfully fulfilled the glorious task of defending peace and defending the motherland. Now, let's take a closer look at the U.S. military's intelligence support experience in the Inchon landing, and reveal the key role of intelligence in correctly judging the enemy's actions.

Body:

After the outbreak of the Korean War, the Korean People's Army (KPA) was once overwhelmed, crossing the "38th parallel" to liberate Seoul within three days, liberating more than 90 percent of the territory of the DPRK in more than two months, and forcing the US and ROK troops to retreat to the Daegu and Busan areas of the Nakdong River. However, while the Korean people were jubilant, Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission were not optimistic about the situation, knowing that the more important it was to take precautions. Under such a war situation, the War Room of the General Staff Department closely followed the development of the war in Korea and, based on the intelligence and information it had, judged that the US military might carry out an amphibious landing operation on the Korean Peninsula, and Inchon might be the largest landing site. This judgment is based on six bases and is summarized as follows:

Oh Kang-ho: Analysis of the intelligence prediction of the Inchon landing in the War Room of the General Staff Department

Main force formation: MacArthur gathered the main forces of the US and South Korean forces on the beachhead in the Busan Delta, but the more than 200,000 troops neither withdrew nor reinforced the front line, and temporarily held Busan. This kind of left-behind posture aroused a high degree of vigilance in the War Room of the General Staff Headquarters, which believed that there might be a hidden strategic intention of the US military.

Reserves do not move: The two U.S. divisions in Japan serve as strategic reserves and are strong in combat, but the South Korean army is in trouble, and these two divisions show no signs of reinforcement. It is worth noting that one of the divisions is the Marine Corps, suggesting that the intentions of the US military may be more complex.

MacArthur's Experience: MacArthur was known for his landing operations in World War II, and the capture of Nidoro and Luzon showed that he had the courage to take risks and might once again carry out unexpected and surprising moves, even if the terrain was treacherous.

Distribution of North Korean military strength: The main force of the Korean People's Army has been fully committed to the Pusan area, and the rear is empty, and the US military should have this information. This provides an opportunity for the US military to choose to carry out landings elsewhere on the Korean Peninsula.

Geographical advantages: The Korean Peninsula is about 1,000 kilometers long from north to south, and only 150 kilometers from east to west at its narrowest point, which is suitable for the implementation of division tactics. Incheon, on the other hand, has a unique geographical location as the outer harbor of Seoul and is also a strategic location. Despite the steep terrain, it was an ideal landing location for U.S. troops.

Psychological Analysis of the Enemy: The optimistic atmosphere of the Soviets and Koreans about the war situation may have given the U.S. military a glimpse of their mentality, and the U.S. military's redeployment of forces from the Mediterranean and Pacific to the Korean Strait increased the signs of a landing operation. The War Room of the General Staff therefore believes that the US military is likely planning a larger conspiracy.

After analysis and judgment by the War Room of the General Staff Headquarters, they came to the conclusion that it was possible for the US military to carry out an amphibious landing at Incheon, and the landing time might be selected on 15 September. In a timely manner, this situation and judgment were reported to the friendly countries, and the Central Military Commission also ordered the border guards to step up preparations for entering the DPRK.

Sure enough, in the early morning of September 15, 1950, under MacArthur's personal command, the U.S. military dispatched more than 70,000 troops, supported by more than 300 ships and more than 500 aircraft, to launch a landing in the Inchon area, which was the most unfavorable for the Korean People's Army. After successfully occupying Incheon, the U.S. forces launched an attack in the direction of Seoul, cooperating with the U.S. and ROK forces on the other side of the Nakdong River, forming a north-south flank attack on the Korean People's Army. The Korean People's Army suffered heavy casualties and eventually retreated north along the mountain pass, losing all its efforts. The Chinese border guards quickly accelerated the pace of preparations for the war.

This historical review shows us that correct intelligence analysis and judgment played a key role in warfare. The keen insight of the War Room of the General Staff and the comprehensive analysis of various information provided valuable time and initiative for China's counterattack on the Korean battlefield. The success of the Inchon landing demonstrated the high level of strategic planning and execution of the US military, and also made us realize the indispensability of intelligence support in modern warfare.

End:

The War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea was a great victory for our army, and the experience of intelligence support for the Inchon landing was a valuable experience accumulated by the Chinese army in the war. The importance of intelligence is becoming more and more prominent in modern military affairs, and correct intelligence analysis and judgment can provide the military with strategic initiative and determine the outcome of a war. We should draw lessons from this period of history and continuously improve the military's intelligence analysis and strategic decision-making so as to better safeguard national security and the people's interests. In today's world, military security is still a topic of great concern, let us all pay attention to military dynamics, defend peace, and defend national dignity.

Hikiko:

This article is drawn from Wu Kanghe's "On the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea", and the original title is "The Role of Intelligence Support for the Inchon Landing." The War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea was a war of local aggression in which the United States participated in the largest, most mobilized countries, and most fiercely fought after World War II. This war witnessed the first time that our army directly confronted the US military with modern weapons and equipment, and the Chinese People's Volunteers demonstrated their national and military prestige with their own blood and lives, and successfully fulfilled the glorious task of defending peace and defending the motherland. Now, let's take a closer look at the U.S. military's intelligence support experience in the Inchon landing, and reveal the key role of intelligence in correctly judging the enemy's actions.

Body:

After the outbreak of the Korean War, the Korean People's Army (KPA) was once overwhelmed, crossing the "38th parallel" to liberate Seoul within three days, liberating more than 90 percent of the territory of the DPRK in more than two months, and forcing the US and ROK troops to retreat to the Daegu and Busan areas of the Nakdong River. However, while the Korean people were jubilant, Mao Zedong and the Central Military Commission were not optimistic about the situation, knowing that the more important it was to take precautions. Under such a war situation, the War Room of the General Staff Department closely followed the development of the war in Korea and, based on the intelligence and information it had, judged that the US military might carry out an amphibious landing operation on the Korean Peninsula, and Inchon might be the largest landing site. This judgment is based on six bases and is summarized as follows:

Main force formation: MacArthur gathered the main forces of the US and South Korean forces on the beachhead in the Busan Delta, but the more than 200,000 troops neither withdrew nor reinforced the front line, and temporarily held Busan. This kind of left-behind posture aroused a high degree of vigilance in the War Room of the General Staff Headquarters, which believed that there might be a hidden strategic intention of the US military.

Reserves do not move: The two U.S. divisions in Japan serve as strategic reserves and are strong in combat, but the South Korean army is in trouble, and these two divisions show no signs of reinforcement. It is worth noting that one of the divisions is the Marine Corps, suggesting that the intentions of the US military may be more complex.

MacArthur's Experience: MacArthur was known for his landing operations in World War II, and the capture of Nidoro and Luzon showed that he had the courage to take risks and might once again carry out unexpected and surprising moves, even if the terrain was treacherous.

Distribution of North Korean military strength: The main force of the Korean People's Army has been fully committed to the Pusan area, and the rear is empty, and the US military should have this information. This provides an opportunity for the US military to choose to carry out landings elsewhere on the Korean Peninsula.

Geographical advantages: The Korean Peninsula is about 1,000 kilometers long from north to south, and only 150 kilometers from east to west at its narrowest point, which is suitable for the implementation of division tactics. Incheon, on the other hand, has a unique geographical location as the outer harbor of Seoul and is also a strategic location. Despite the treacherous terrain, it is for these reasons that the KPA may overlook this area, and MacArthur, an adventurous general, is more likely to choose it as a landing site.

Grasp of the psychology of the North Koreans: At that time, the North Korean people and the Soviets were full of confidence in the situation of the war, and this mentality provided favorable conditions for the US military to carry out a larger conspiracy. At the same time, the US military transferred naval and air forces from the Mediterranean Sea and the Pacific Ocean to the Korean Strait, showing signs of landing operations.

Through these evidences, the War Room of the General Staff Department judged that the US military might be planning a larger conspiracy, reported it to the leaders in a timely manner, and promptly informed its allies. Such keen insight and scientific and comprehensive analysis of various information provided valuable time and initiative for China's counterattack on the Korean battlefield.

Sure enough, as expected, at 5 o'clock in the morning of September 15, 1950, MacArthur personally commanded the US military to dispatch more than 70,000 troops, supported by more than 300 ships and more than 500 aircraft, to launch a landing in the Inchon area, which was the most unfavorable area for the Korean People's Army. The successful Inchon landing not only demonstrated the U.S. military's high level of strategic planning and execution, but also made us realize the indispensability of intelligence support in modern warfare.

End:

Looking back at the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea, the intelligence support experience of the Inchon landing became a valuable experience accumulated by the Chinese army during the war. Correct intelligence analysis and judgment are becoming more and more prominent in modern military affairs, which can not only provide the military with the strategic initiative, but also directly determine the outcome of a war. We should profoundly understand from this period of history and continuously improve the military's intelligence analysis and strategic decision-making so as to better safeguard national security and the people's interests. In today's world, military security issues continue to attract much attention, let us pay attention to military developments, defend peace, and defend national dignity.