Several telegrams about Li Lisan

1. The Comintern addressed the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China

Comrade Li Lisan did not want to respect the facts at all, because there was no real Soviet government in the Soviet areas, there was no real Red Army, and in other parts of China there was no mass mobilization of the proletariat in the industrial centers and cities, and there was no strong agitation among millions of people in the countryside. All this will happen only if the Communist Party implements the right policy, but it has not yet happened. However, the imperialists now have the equivalent of 10 divisions in Hankow alone, and no less in Shanghai.

In this case, there is no significant opportunity to capture large cities. Calling on the workers to stage armed insurrections in the big cities of Hankow, Shanghai, Peking, Mukden and so on now (as Li Lisan had hoped) is the most pernicious form of adventurism.

We have repeatedly advised the Politburo to resolutely abandon such plans. It is necessary to concentrate all forces without hesitation for a day to form a strong, well-armed, kulak-ridden Red Army that is genuinely under the leadership of the Communist Party, and to establish even one or two really firm strongholds for it in the areas already occupied, without being keen on trying to expand the Soviet base areas at once. It has long been pointed out in our instructions that the formation of the Red Army cannot be carried out peacefully, but only in the course of the fighting, but this is completely different from the forcible occupation of the fortified central cities of the country, which are now clearly beyond our means. Our task now in the practical preparation of a national insurrection is to rely on the real Red Army to establish and consolidate the Soviet Government in China, at least in a region where there is a guarantee of life, and which can mobilize the masses in the countryside and industrial centres in a victorious struggle against the counter-revolutionary Kuomintang and imperialism with its revolutionary programme and practical measures aimed at protecting the interests of the workers and peasants.

Instead of carrying out a blind adventurist movement in Shanghai, Hankow, etc., it is necessary to immediately mobilize the whole Party and all the revolutionary workers to carry out vigorous and subtle work in the following areas: to dismantle the army of the warlords, to prevent the movement of their troops and equipment, to organize, first of all, the economic and political struggles of the proletariat – strikes, demonstrations, etc., and at the same time to widely disseminate among the broad masses of workers and peasants in the non-Soviet areas the Soviet Government, its programme and its practical measures.

To insist that the workers only want to carry out armed insurrection and not to do anything else is but a "left" hypocritical cover for their own passivity, for their inability to mobilize them in struggle around the daily interests and needs of the working masses and to integrate this struggle with the tasks of the Chinese revolution. At present, under the leadership of the Communist Party, the launching and organisation of economic struggles and strike movements in some of the large industrial cities are the most important and direct support for the Soviet districts and are real preparations for the success of the upcoming decisive revolutionary battle against the landlord bourgeoisie and the imperialist forces. The incomprehension of the requirements of the present situation is also manifested in some advanced socialist measures in the programme of the Soviet government and in some erroneous proposals concerning the agrarian question such as collective farms, state farms, etc. The postponement of the decisive battle with the imperialists is now advantageous to the Soviet Government and can depend to some extent on its ability to adapt to the situation.

The Executive Committee of the Comintern held that all resolutions and directives previously drawn up in full agreement with the delegation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China were still valid. Comrade Li Lisan must come here as soon as possible.

The Executive Committee of the Comintern endorsed the actions of its delegation and insisted on the immediate restoration of the normal leadership of the Party, the trade unions and the Komsomol. The contents of this telegram and the July Theses, as well as the telegram of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, were conveyed to all the members of the Central Committee and the district committees.

Executive Committee of the Comintern

(Zong 17, Table of Contents 162, File 9, pp. 14-15, 17-19.) Typescript, recorded as original, signature as genuine reproduction, appendix as copy. ）

II. Stalin's telegram to Molotov

(Excerpt)

(August 13, 1930)

Sochi, August 13, 1930

Secret

The tendencies of the Chinese are absurd and dangerous. In the current situation, holding a general riot in China is simply nonsense. The establishment of a Soviet government was the policy of insurrection. But not in all of China, but where it is possible to succeed. The Chinese, in their rush to capture Changsha, have already done stupid things. Now they want to do stupid things all over China. This must not be tolerated.

(Typescript of documents from the collection of the Center for the Preservation and Documentation of Modern Russian History, copy.) ）

3. Letter from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern (August 25, 1930)

August 25, 1930 in Shanghai

To the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Comintern

The Politburo discussed in detail the report on the decision of the Executive Committee of the Comintern on the China question made by Comrade Wu Hao (Zhou Enlai), who had returned not long ago, unanimously agreed with the instructions of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and pointed out that in the past two years, especially in the past six months, the Central Committee has indeed worked in complete accordance with the line of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and there has been no difference between the Central Committee and the line of the Comintern on the political line. After listening to Comrade Wu Hao's report and explanations, the Politburo fully agreed with the Comintern on the question of tactics against the imperialists, the question of armed insurrection in Wuhan and Nanking, the question of the base areas of the Soviet movement, the question of the movement to the big industrial centres, and the question of the conference of representatives of the Soviet regions. By not correctly interpreting the telegrams of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, the differences that had existed in the past on these questions were now gone. By adopting resolutions, the Politburo must unswervingly carry out all the instructions of the Executive Committee of the Comintern and wage a resolute struggle against all attempts to set the political views of the Politburo or a member of the Politburo in opposition to the line of the Comintern. After the arrival of Strakhov and the receipt of the resolution of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, the Central Committee will draft a resolution on the observance of all the instructions of the Comintern and send it to the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and it will also be sent to all the grassroots Party organizations for discussion. Since it was necessary to resolve all current political issues during this time, the Politburo asked the Executive Committee of the Industrial International to allow Comrade Li Lisan not to go to Moscow. Also in view of the special importance of the present situation, the Politburo could not send some comrades, especially Comrade Li Lisan, who, in accordance with the instructions of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, should go to the Soviet districts and the Red Army to carry out leadership work.

The Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued to Zhongfa

4. The Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to the Comintern

Telegram from the Executive Committee

(August 27-28, 1930)

August 27-28, 1930 in Shanghai

After listening to the report of Moskovin (Zhou Enlai) and discussing it, the Politburo agreed with the resolution of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. There was no disagreement between the Central Committee and the Executive Committee of the Comintern on the political line. On the basis of Moskovin's report on the military insurrection, the imperialists, the Wuchang and Nanking uprisings, the Soviet base areas, and the Congress of Soviets, the Central Committee fully agreed with the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

Since all political issues can now be resolved here, we ask that Li Lisan not be summoned to Moscow. Every member of the Politburo was now in great demand in the Soviet districts and in the Red Army.

(Quanzong 495, Table of Contents 19, File 242, p. 80.) Typescript, copy. ）