Japan's defense spending has reached a new high, and the "peaceful country" is no longer peaceful

【A Glimpse of the World】

Original title: Japan's defense spending has reached a new high, and the "peaceful country" is no longer peaceful

Sun Wenzhu

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According to the Japanese government's Defense Force Rearmament Plan, which was revised at the end of 2022, Japan's total defense budget will reach 43 trillion yen over the next five years, and defense spending will be increased to 2% of GDP by 2027, achieving a "fundamental improvement in defense capabilities." The continued sharp increase in the defense budget means that Japan is increasingly deviating from the "peaceful nation" line it has adhered to since the end of World War II, and this will inevitably bring new variables to regional security.

On December 22, Japan's cabinet finalized the draft budget for fiscal year 2024, in which the defense budget reached 7.95 trillion yen (about 55.8 billion U.S. dollars), an increase of more than 16% from the previous year and a record high.

According to the Japanese government's Defense Force Rearmament Plan, which was revised at the end of 2022, Japan's total defense budget will reach 43 trillion yen over the next five years, and defense spending will be increased to 2% of GDP by 2027, achieving a "fundamental improvement in defense capabilities."

The continued sharp increase in the defense budget means that Japan is increasingly deviating from the "peaceful nation" line it has adhered to since the end of World War II, and this will inevitably bring new variables to regional security.

Enhance military capabilities in all aspects

Judging from the specific content of the defense budget, the focus of Japan's national defense strategy in 2024 is to improve offensive capabilities and build an all-round military force that is "both offensive and defensive", so as to make up for the "capability shortcomings" caused by the traditional idea of "focusing on defense" and gradually move towards the goal of "military power".

The first is to build a so-called "counterattack capability against enemy bases" with a focus on missile forces. The defense budget for the new fiscal year plans to spend about 1.2 trillion yen to enhance missile defense capabilities, including the purchase of US "Tomahawk" cruise missiles and domestically produced long-range attack missiles, the early deployment of these missiles to enhance "defense capability outside the defense zone," and the construction of two warships equipped with the "Aegis" anti-missile system.

In addition, Japan will purchase a new batch of 15 F-35 fighters from the United States. Under the guise of "counterattack," what Japan actually wants to develop is an offensive capability capable of carrying out preemptive strikes, and then use this to "deter" its opponents, take the initiative to create a security environment favorable to itself, and further clarify the trend of "switching from defense to offense."

The second is to strengthen the armament of the southwestern islands to pave the way for intervening in the "state of affairs." The budget plans to allocate about 600 billion yen to strengthen logistics capabilities, build three new landing ships, purchase 17 transport helicopters, and establish a new combined army, navy, and air transport force to quickly deploy personnel, equipment, and supplies to the southwestern islands in an "emergency."

The third is to set up an "integrated command" to enhance the capability of rapid response and joint operations. Japan plans to establish a permanent military-led organization in fiscal year 2024 to achieve "seamless response to changing situations" through unified military command of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and to optimize coordination and communication between the Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.

Fourth, it is necessary to strengthen research and development of military science and technology. Japan will follow the example of the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to set up the "Defense Innovation Technology Research Institute" to integrate military and civilian scientific research resources to jointly explore cutting-edge military technologies in the fields of space, cyber, electronics, and unmanned warfare, and to develop "epoch-making defense equipment." Japan will also continue to cooperate with the United States in the research and development of hypersonic weapons and with Britain and Italy in the development of sixth-generation stealth fighters.

It is still difficult to secure financial resources

In the long run, one of the goals of Japan's "fundamental improvement of defense capability" is to vigorously develop the military industry, break through the current decline of being difficult to open up the market and relying on government subsidies, and realize the "positive cycle" of "innovation and breakthrough, high profitability, and profit accumulation", and then inject new vitality into the Japanese economy on the basis of "self-hematopoiesis."

On the same day that the defense budget for the new fiscal year was decided, the Japanese cabinet also revised the "Three Principles for the Transfer of Defense Equipment" and the guidelines for its implementation, further relaxing restrictions on the export of weapons and equipment. The new policy not only allows Japanese companies to export weapons parts and components to patent-granting countries, but also allows them to export finished weapons of destruction that are directly used in warfare, and even conditionally ship these weapons to third countries. On the same day, the Japanese Government announced that it would sell back the Niss-made "Patriot-3" anti-aircraft missiles to the United States, and had begun to explore the possibility of selling 155-mm artillery shells to the United Kingdom.

Obviously, in the face of the sharp increase in demand for weapons and equipment due to the Ukraine crisis, Japan is eager to "join in" and get a piece of the pie, and it is also willing to abandon the "peaceful persona" that it has been operating for decades.

In addition, the new policy also allows Japan to export important parts such as fighter engines to "countries that have cooperative security relations", and can also carry lethal weapons on exported rescue and transportation equipment, paving the way for further expansion of the equipment export market in the future.

However, at least for a considerable period of time, Japan will still have to rely on huge financial inputs to enhance its military strength and develop its military industry. Faced with the huge budget gap caused by the "doubling" of defense spending, the Japanese government has not yet come up with a clear solution. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida prefers to secure fiscal resources by raising taxes rather than issuing additional defense bonds, so as not to worsen Japan's debt-ridden finances. However, in the post-epidemic era, Japan's economic recovery is sluggish, the depreciation of the yen and high prices have led to the embarrassment of many Japanese people's lives and business difficulties. In the face of uncertain fiscal revenues, the sharp rise in defense spending has already aroused criticism in Japan.

Or it may become a source of chaos in Asia

Japan's "self-unties" and attempt to get rid of the constraints of its pacifist constitution and the principle of "exclusive defense" to become a military power will bring more uncertainties to the security of the Asian region.

On the one hand, Japan's substantial increase in its defense budget and the reorganization of its armed forces will undermine the original military balance in Northeast Asia, aggravate the "security dilemma" between Japan and its neighboring countries, and even trigger an arms race, causing serious security risks.

On the other hand, Japan seeks to exaggerate regional tensions, hype up the "crisis of the international order" to make a breakthrough in its military strength, and use ideological ties such as "common values" to win over "like-minded countries" and try to enhance its presence and influence in the field of international security.

(The author is an associate researcher at the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, China Institute of International Studies)

Source: China Workers' Daily