At the opening ceremony of the Asian Games last month, the leaders of Syria, Assad and his wife, became the focus of attention on the domestic Internet. Although Syria is only a small country in the Middle East, its key position in the geopolitical conflicts in the Middle East in recent years, as well as Assad's own legendary experience, has given the Syrian state and its president a long-term attention in Chinese key political circles.
Bashar al-Assad was a graduate student in ophthalmology in London in 1994. As the second son of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, especially an authoritarian ruler with a military dictatorship and small groups as a ruling network, Bashar al-Assad's status as a second son has always been somewhat subtle. Fortunately, he has a good big brother who is quite popular, and he avoids the tragedy of brotherhood.
Bashar al-Assad's older brother, Basile al-Assad
Basile al-Assad trained at the Soviet Military Academy, participated in special forces, commanded armored units, and excelled in parachuting and equestrianism. Syria's future heir also knows politics well, forming intimate relationships with Arab rulers early on under his father's paving. Had it not been for the Jan. 21 crash, Bashar al-Assad might have ended his life as a skilled ophthalmologist.
However, impermanent fate is always elusive. Bashar al-Assad was urgently recalled to China as the new legal heir. A doctor has disappeared, and a new ruler is about to enter the stage of history.
Assad in internal and external difficulties
For all classical rulers, inheritance was a complex craft. The change of heirs is one of the most difficult issues. This means not only the establishment of new centers of successive power, but also the redevelopment of the heirs' ruling skills. Historical experience has proved that mistakes in succession can lead to dynastic turmoil and even collapse. From Zhubiao to Toyotomi Hideji, the fate of the heir is tied to the dynasty.
Returning to Syria, little Assad was quickly placed in the military department for an internship. By 1998, the elder Assad had directly assigned Assad Jr. to deal with Lebanese-related issues, honing his ability to deal with delicate situations. Assad Jr. did show some political dexterity. With full use of his father's power, he managed to squeeze out the then Syrian Vice President Huddam Hudam as a potential contender.
The only problem is that the old Assad is running out of days and drove west in 2000. So much so that Syria had to amend its constitution to lower the age of presidential election from 40 to 34 in order for Assad Jr. to meet the criteria.
The death of the elder Assad has made many forces ready to move. As a ruler who studied in the West, Assad Jr. was once seen as a possible enlightened leader; Even many people began to tout Assad Jr., believing that the democratization of Syria would be completed in his hands. The 99ers Declaration is an emblematic manifestation of this.
In 2001, Bashar was awarded the "Legion of Honor" created by Napoleon
Assad's early performance after his accession to the throne seems to echo these touts. He not only freed hundreds of political prisoners, but also allowed new spaces for free speech. The 2000-year-old campaign has been dubbed the Damascus Spring (in a sense, it can be regarded as the prehistory of the Arab Spring). By 2001, when Assad Jr. discovered that the movement was beginning to endanger his weaker core of rule, he quickly turned around.
The problems of Syria's internal and external political structure were amplified in the years that followed. On the internal front, in addition to the democratization mentioned above, Alawite is also an important issue.
The Alawite faith of the Assad family is a branch that split from Shiitism. But there are also many differences between the teachings of Alawite and Shiites, with strong mysticism. There are voices in both Sunni and Shia who doubt whether Alawites belong to Islam, which has led to Alawites often being suppressed throughout history. It was not until the French colonial authorities included the Alawites as a class of warriors in the ruling system that the ecological niche of the Alawites was changed. (Another one classified is the Druze faction, which today has a significant proportion of Druze officers in the IDF.)
The Alawites eventually succeeded in translating control of the army into domination, creating a situation in which a minority Alawites ruled the majority of Syrian Sunni Muslims. This situation of antagonism is clearly an inducement to political instability. Assad Jr. lacked the political allegiance that had been forged by the elder's long-term ruling ties, forcing him to rely more on the sectarian support of the Alawites. This eventually created an Alawites-dominated Damascus elite that alienated other interest factions.
Relations with Lebanon are Syria's main external issue. Since entering Lebanon in 1976, Syria has become the de facto suzerainty, with full control over Lebanon's internal and foreign affairs, and Lebanese politicians who oppose Syria are regularly assassinated. The death of former Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri in a 2005 bomb attack became a powder keg that detonated the rule of the Syrian suzerainty.
Despite the lack of direct evidence, the Lebanese public directed its anger at Syria. In the face of growing backlash and international pressure, Assad Jr. announced the withdrawal of troops from Lebanon, ending three decades of Syrian military intervention in Lebanon.
Gritting his teeth Assad
Assad Jr., who is in internal and external trouble, has given more interest groups a sniffing of opportunity. It's just that no one expected that this opportunity did not come from Syria in the first place. On December 17, 2010, Bouazigi, a mobile trafficking vendor, was regularly harassed by Tunisian police. The police seized his goods for lack of permits. Only this time, Bouazigi did not choose to swallow his anger, and after asking for goods to no avail, he impulsively tried to end his life by self-immolation.
One stone stirs up a thousand waves. Bouazigi's death quickly resonated with the Tunisian public, which eventually led to the exile of then-Tunisian President Ben Ali. The protest movement, later known as the Arab Spring, quickly spread throughout the Arab world.
In March 2011, some Syrian students publicly spray-painted anti-Assad graffiti on the walls, "Your turn, doctor." Syrian authorities quickly arrested the student involved. However, under the game of many forces, the protests quickly expanded, eventually leading to armed clashes between the army and the protest crowd.
In an effort to ease the protests, Assad's government announced the lifting of the state of emergency, which had been in place for nearly five decades, in addition to releasing some political prisoners and removing the governors involved. Instead of calming the situation, the concessions of the Assad Jr. government led to the expansion of protests; Senior members have also begun to defect or leave the government. As the number of civilian deaths and injuries rose rapidly during the crackdown, the international community began to publicly demand Assad's ouster. The opposition at home has also begun to rapidly build up its own armed forces, occupying large swathes of Syrian territory. The Syrian civil war is on the verge of eruption.
Little Assad, at the beginning of the civil war, was at his darkest moment. In the domestic opposition continues to grow, all he can rely on is the political-military group with the Alawite as the core; Internationally, Western society has generally turned to recognize the legitimacy of the Syrian opposition, and even many Arab countries have jumped ship, and other foreign powers are basically watching coldly. For a moment, the question for international observers was only how long Assad Jr. could last.
Surprisingly, little Assad supported it with amazing resilience. In April 2013, he finally managed to stop the opposition offensive, and the war reached a stalemate. ISIS's entry into Syria further complicates the civil war. ISIS's radical ideology does not fully coincide with Syria's diverse opposition; This has led to the need for the opposition to cooperate with ISIS against Syrian government forces, while also needing to be on the lookout for ISIS's backs.
This eventually provided space for a counteroffensive by government forces. While the opposition was busy fighting ISIS, Assad's government Jr. even held new elections in government-controlled areas to add a new basis of legitimacy to itself.
In 2014, ISIS's growth in Syria finally changed the political calamity of the civil war. The civil war has changed from a game between the two sides to a three-way fight, and the Arab countries led by the United States have also intervened in the growth of ISIS by means of air attacks. Of course, while fighting ISIS, the United States and Arab countries have also taken the opportunity to provide more support to the Syrian opposition. Increased cooperation within the opposition eventually translated into a series of military victories. Once again, the Syrian government is at stake.
In 2015, a new player Russia came out. Also under the banner of opposing ISIS, Russia officially intervened in the Syrian civil war at the invitation of the younger Assad government. Once again, the scales that had tilted in favour of the opposition faltered. On the other hand, with Trump's election, American power began to shrink in Syria, while Turkey replaced the United States as the main supporter of the opposition in northern Syria.
Unlike the United States, Erdogan has no interest in annexing Syria, and the creation of a buffer zone in northern Syria is his demand. Although Russia supports the Syrian government, it has no intention of clashing directly with Turkey. Nor is the Syrian government army strong enough to defeat the Syrian opposition, which is protected by the direct participation of Turkish forces.
Finally, in 2019, the Syrian parties formed a relatively solid line of actual control, and the intensity of the civil war began to decline. Although the Syrian civil war is still not over, the resolution of the civil war is increasingly turning to political and diplomatic games, and the decade-long war has entered a long-term stalemate.
Assad in the new geopolitical situation in the Middle East
Little Assad can support to this day, and changes in the extraterritorial situation are indispensable conditions; His own strong will is also the key to the ultimate support. With the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war and the geopolitical struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Assad Jr. is once again in a new outlet. The advantages for Assad Jr. are mainly manifested in the following two aspects.
The first is the decline in the willingness and ability of the West to intervene. On the one hand, with the strengthening of internal crises in Western countries, the importance of domestic political issues is rising, which reduces the desire of Western countries to intervene abroad and increases the cost of foreign intervention; This has further reduced Western support for the Syrian opposition.
On the other hand, the refugee crisis of 2016 was inevitably traced back to the Syrian civil war. More and more European countries are realizing that they are more likely than the United States to bear the negative externalities of intervening in the Middle East. This is one of the reasons for Europe's softer response to the Israeli-Hamas conflict.
The second is the normalization of relations with Arab countries. The initial motivation for most Arab countries was to prop up a Sunni-dominated Syrian state. The problem is that without a massive increase in input, the Syrian opposition lacks the strength to shake up little Assad's position, and the equation of political calculation begins to change.
One of the results of Arab support for the Syrian opposition has been the increased influence of Iran in Syria. With the Saudi-Iranian rivalry already at the heart of the new Middle East's geopolitics, it is profitable to avoid pushing Syria further into Iran's arms. This is one of the reasons why the UAE and Bahrain have revived their embassies in Damascus. This engagement eventually translated into Saudi Arabia's invitation to Syria to participate in the 2023 Arab League summit and the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Syria was readmitted as an Arab country, breaking the international isolation it faced.
Changes in the international situation have also had some adverse effects on Assad Jr. The Turkish establishment of a buffer zone in northern Syria is one of Syria's main problems. First, countries inside and outside the region lack the will to help Syria intervene directly. On the one hand, due to the Russian-Ukrainian war, Russia's strength in the Middle East has been weakened; Coupled with the fact that Turkey has become a key economic corridor for Russia to circumvent Western sanctions, it is clear that Russia will not help Syria retake the northern buffer zone at this time; On the other hand, Iran, the main supporter in Syria, has no intention of working with Saudi Arabia and Turkey at the same time, for the sake of Syria.
Second, the northern buffer zone is nominally ruled by the Syrian opposition, which will always be the sword of Damocles of the Syrian government, and the legitimacy of Assad Jr. will always linger in the shadows, repeatedly held by the Turks. It follows that for quite some time, Assad Jr. may be forced to accept the existence of a buffer zone and will not be able to fully unify Syria.
Of course, for Assad Jr., national reconstruction may be his top concern. The decades-long civil war has caused at least hundreds of billions of dollars in real damage to Syria, and the cost of reconstruction is extremely enormous. The "generosity" of Russia and Iran cannot fill the huge gap.
In this context, Syria's announcement of joining the mainland's Belt and Road Initiative in 2022 is not such a strange question. Especially given the fact that Russia and Iran themselves are financially strained, only the mainland is the biggest savior for Syria's reconstruction. The growing relationship with China has become the source of Assad's second visit to China in the past 19 years. This eventually translates into a meme on the Chinese internet where Lingyin Temple opens the main entrance of Lingyin Temple for the little Assads.
The Syrian civil war is still not completely over, but the pattern of the Syrian civil war has been temporarily set. Assad Jr.'s visit is both the result of the mainland's growing influence in the Middle East and the actual geopolitical needs of Syria itself. By strengthening relations with China, Syria can not only make up for the lack of Western isolation to a certain extent, but also rebalance the influence of Russia and Iran on itself and enhance its united front value in the political game.
For Assad Jr. himself, this is a brutal geopolitical game with no end. Perhaps not just Assad, but for rulers of all countries, geopolitics is a game that must be played even if they do not want to. Even though the game is brutal, there aren't even any clear rules.
This is an innate attribute of politics. The Middle East has been one of the points of stress in the post-World War II geopolitical plate. This makes it more unstable than other sectors.
Although the unipolar era dominated by the United States has produced many evils, tax American does provide some relatively stable rules for the international order. It's just that there is no way to truly translate this rule into universal values in the heart of the United States.
As a global empire, the United States is increasingly shouldering the burden of global governance costs. The question now is that we do not yet know what the next or new international order will look like.
Therefore, no matter how cruel it is, for all players, the geopolitical game in the Middle East must continue. In any case, the complete reunification of Syria is still a distant matter. It's just that we don't know, will he miss another world line where his big brother is not dead now?