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preface
In the early days of the full-scale war of aggression against China, there were serious differences between the Japanese emperor, the government, and the military on whether to expand the war or "peacefully" resolve the dispute between the two countries.
Hirohito briefly supported the "no-enlargement policy," but soon turned to war to force peace, in an attempt to force the Chinese government to surrender by force.
Briefly supported the "no expansion policy."
In dealing with the Lugou Bridge incident, Hirohito did not firmly support the expansionists or hardliners from the beginning, and he briefly supported "not generous."
Before the Lugou Bridge Incident, Ren had the idea of compromise. In his "Monologues", Hirohito mentioned that in the summer of 1937, the confrontation between Japan and China on the North China issue became increasingly acute, and the star appeared in a state of imminent elapse.
For this reason, "I feel that I should do something to buy the association," and he specially summoned War Minister Moto, Sugiyama, and Chief of Staff Kaninmiya to ask them for their opinions on China and seek measures to buy the association.
Of course, the reason why Hirohito wanted to compromise at this time was not that he realized that the root cause of this confrontation was Japan's aggressive behavior or self-justification, but that he was afraid of interference and conflict with the British and American powers.
After the Lugou Bridge Incident, both Japan and China initially treated the incident as a local incident. The Japanese side initially established a "policy of not expanding" and "the Nanjing government had no intention of directing events to war", and Song Zheyuan even bent and repeatedly avoided concessions. However, out of their own concerns and needs, both sides have also made preparations for peace and war.
Especially on the Japanese side, the enlargement faction clearly has the upper hand and is actively preparing for war under the guise of "no expansion." Hitoshi also followed the incident closely, and although he did not prevent the Guards cabinet from expanding the situation, in fact, he was very disgusted with the "arbitrary action" of Muta and others, who were directly responsible for the expansion of the Lugou Bridge Incident, and considered it an "inappropriate and inferior method."
According to Ren himself, he had considered asking the Guards to buy the alliance with Chiang Kai-shek, but because he felt that the army's opinion was not in agreement with him, he did not say anything about compromise. In fact, until the occupation of Shanghai in November 1937, the Japanese authorities still considered November to be the "crisis point" of the sudden outbreak of the Japanese-Soviet war, and "officials and central officials, including Tianzhong, were worried about whether the Soviet Union would join China to attack Japan."
It was precisely because of the lack of sufficient confidence in the expansion of the situation that Hirohito actually preferred and supported the "no expansion policy" at the beginning of the incident. On July 14, while the Chinese garrison in northern China was actively preparing for war, Hirohito's military attaché said in a letter to the Chinese garrison that the emperor was particularly worried that the incident would expand.
For this reason, it is hoped that all units of the Chinese garrison will "cautiously deal with the "provocations" of the Chinese side. Because the Chinese side actively fulfills the armistice agreement signed by the two sides.
On the night of July 20, Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary issued a statement at Hirohito's behest, saying that the Agreement on the Settlement of the North China Situation had been established on the 19th, and that the Japanese Government had decided to follow the established "non-expansion" policy and take appropriate self-defense measures sufficient to monitor its implementation.
Therefore, when the Army Osugiyama requested three additional divisions to be sent to North China on the 21st, Hirohito did not cut them. On the 22nd, the General Staff Headquarters had to suspend mobilization.
Soon turned to war to force peace
In the course of Japan's invasion of China, in order to seek maximum benefits at the lowest cost, Hirohito "often said that he would put forward a peaceful proposition while intimidating," that is, making full use of war and the two means to pursue peace through war and achieve the war goal as soon as possible.
Therefore, although Hirohito approved an attack on the Chinese army on July 27 due to the Langfang and Guanganmen incidents, he did not completely turn towards the enlargers, and his real goal was to pursue peace with war and force the Chinese government to surrender as soon as possible.
In the end, it turned to an active main battle
With the establishment of the all-out government of China and the continuous military victories, Hirohito's attitude toward China's main war became more and more resolute; he even ignored the suggestion of the military department to continue peace talks with China, actively supported the Guards cabinet's hard-line policy toward China, and finally closed the door to peace talks between Japan and China and chose a road of no return to expand the war.
It is generally believed that Japan and China entered a period of full-scale war after the Lugou Bridge Incident and the "August 13 Incident." Therefore, Chinese historians also usually regard the Lugou Bridge Incident as the starting point of China's all-out war of resistance. In fact, as far as the Japanese side is concerned, from the outbreak of the Lugou Bridge Incident to the attack on Nanjing, its strategic goal of aggression against China has undergone a process of gradual expansion and upgrading.
Since the Japanese authorities believed that November 1937 was the "crisis point" of the sudden outbreak of the Japanese-Soviet War, and Hirohito was also worried that the Soviet Union would unite with China to attack Japan, Japan's strategic focus before that was only war readiness against the Soviet Union, not only did it not have the goal of completely destroying China, but also had no operational plan for occupying Nanjing.
However, after the Japanese army occupied Shanghai and other places, and confirmed that the United States and Britain would not intervene and that a war crisis against the Soviet Union would not appear, the Omoto authorities arrogantly claimed that the Japanese-Chinese "peace talks" could not be resolved "easily" under the previous conditions, indicating that Japan's war objectives would escalate again. At the end of November, Japan established a base camp in the palace and established a wartime system.
On December 1, the Japanese cabinet threw out the "Guidelines for Resolving and Handling the China Incident," which was a program for comprehensive control and enslavement of China and reduced China to a Japanese colony.
In this way, Japan finally established the goal of a war of total conquest of China. In line with this, on this very day, Hirohito issued the order to attack the Chinese capital Nanjing, and began a military offensive aimed at the total destruction of China. With the establishment of the Japanese authorities' strategic goal of all-round annihilation of China and the capture of Nanjing, the Japanese Government's conditions and attitude toward peace talks have undergone great changes.
The day after the occupation of Nanjing, this cabinet meeting re-examined Chiang Kai-shek's note to Japan on the terms of peace. At the meeting, Foreign Minister Hirota believed that today, when a lot of blood was being sacrificed, it was difficult to agree with such minor conditions.
Riku Sugiyama also stressed this point, and Prime Minister Konoe agreed. "Unless the conditions for peace are set very strongly, our people will be dissatisfied, and the soldiers in front will be dissatisfied." In this way, on December 21, the Japanese cabinet reached a more urgent "Reply to the German Ambassador to Japan on the Matters of Japan-China Peace Negotiations," which laid down nine basic conditions for peace talks.
This "Reply" complements the "Guidelines for Resolving and Handling the Incident in China" and is a programmatic document officially put forward by the Japanese authorities aimed at the comprehensive conquest of China.
However, the Japanese government's tough stance on China was opposed by the General Staff Headquarters. At that time, "the operational authorities of the Duomou Headquarters strongly advocated that the capture of Nanjing would be over and that the Manchurian side would be strengthened in armament---- And the cabinet itself is sincerely looking forward to the complete punishment of the Nationalist government through a protracted war.
Although it adopts an attitude of peace and war, the General Staff Headquarters is actually only the main peace, and the cabinet has always opposed it. Out of consideration for the preparation for war with the Soviet Union, the headquarters opposed the expansion of the war against China, lest Japan be trapped in the quagmire of the Chinese battlefield and could not extricate itself, so it insisted that "the Chiang Kai-shek regime must make peace with it while it still has the ability to control all of China," but the recent cabinet refused to do so.
Whether or not to make peace with China will determine the future of the war between Japan and China. On this major issue of principle, the government and the military department naturally want to get the support of heaven. In this way, Hirohito's attitude became the decisive factor in the direction of the war. Because of his contempt for China in his bones, coupled with being washed away by military victories like the Guards, Ren began to actively fight against China.
Therefore, in handling the differences between the government and the military ministry this time, Hirohito supported the guards cabinet, which was in charge of the war. In order to coordinate the conflict between the two sides, on January 11, 1938, Japan convened a joint meeting of the government and the base camp, in which Hirohito personally participated. The plan of the government of Fushimi Palace, chief of the General Staff and Fushimi Palace, chief of the military command, and all other members, decided on the "Fundamental Policy for Handling the Chinese Incident."
It stipulates that if the Chinese side does not accept Japan's request for peace, Japan will not regard it as a negotiating partner in the future. The General Staff Headquarters had hoped that Hirohito would stop the hard-line plans of the Konoe cabinet, but the cunning Konoe took advantage of his special relationship with Hirohito to advise Hirohito not to take a position the day before the meeting.
As a result, Hirohito did not say a word at the meeting. This is not only to get rid of responsibility, but also to not give the military department any chance. In the end, it was the hardliners who had the majority that prevailed. It can be seen that it was precisely because of the manipulation of the guards and the cooperation of Hirohito that the attempts of the military commanders and factions were frustrated.
At that time, Hirohito, who had become an active leader in the war against China, was very dissatisfied with the General Staff Headquarters' vigorous efforts to advocate peace. To this end, he questioned the Chief of Staff, Gongyuan Gong; "Why is the General Staff Headquarters in a hurry to stop the war with China in preparation for dealing with the Soviet Union, when there is really a danger that the Soviet Union will send troops?"
To the answer of the official just in case, Hirohito told the guard; "In that case, wouldn't it be better not to have a conflict with China in the first place?" The real meaning of this sentence is that since we have already provoked trouble with China, we must persist in working to the end.
In order to get the cabinet to withdraw its orders, the headquarters proposed that the Governor-General Ikin-gu should meet the emperor before the Prime Minister's Guard, but Hirohito, perhaps thinking that he would overturn the decision already made, refused on the grounds that he had agreed to meet with the general manager first. And when it was decided to send a large number of troops to North China after the Lugou Bridge Incident, Hirohito did not even listen to the advice of the Minister of Internal Affairs and first met with the Chief of Staff, and only then with the Prime Minister.
This time, sensing the Governor's intentions, he avoided listening to his opinion first, but listened to the Prime Minister first. This shows that Hirohito has clearly chosen the government's line of war and rejected the line of the General Staff headquarters.
It can be seen from the above that although Hirohito attached importance to achieving the goal of war by "peaceful" means, when the goal of total destruction of China was established, especially after the occupation of Nanjing, Hirohito, like the guards, became active in the war, supporting the cabinet to close the door to Japan-China negotiations, thus dragging the two countries into the abyss of long-term war. Hirohito's responsibility for this is obvious.
《References》
Hu Xiaoding, Jia Baobo, Emperor Showa monologue. Trends in the study of world history,
WANG Jianlang. The war and choice of the Nationalist government after the Lugou Bridge Incident. modern history research,
By Herbert Bix. Xiangyi Hirohito and the war of convenience. WANG Liping,SUN Fanping, trans. Beijing. Xinhua Press