On May 21, 2023, local time, Hiroshima, Japan, on the last day of the G7 summit, the President of Ukraine attended the G7 summit on Ukraine. In the clockwise direction in the middle of the front row: Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, US President Joe Biden, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, European Council President Charles Michel, Italian Ambassador to Japan Gianluigi Benedetti, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, French President Emmanuel Macron. Visual China map
The G7 summit was held, and the G4 summit in Australia was cancelled. What does this mean? The author's interpretation is: At a superficial level, the "four-nation summit" has become a "sub-meeting" of the G7 Hiroshima summit. Some countries still pursue the Cold War mentality, are keen on confrontational diplomacy, build or strengthen various small courtyard walls, openly abandon the market economy that has always been advertised, and instead promote a "small courtyard economy" and build different diplomatic circles "inside and outside the wall". This is against the current, and the result is either to the detriment of others to oneself's own detriment, or to harm both oneself and others.
The characteristics of the multipolarization of the international pattern have changed from "zero-sum game among several major powers" to "competition and cooperation among different civilizations". The world has entered the Era of Civilization-based competition. It is necessary for major powers and major civilizations to change their way of thinking as soon as possible, abandon the old confrontational and exclusive thinking, and move towards cooperative and compatible thinking.
Small discussion of the "Quartet"
Judging from the history of the evolution of the "Quad" (full name "US-Japan-India-Australia Security Dialogue"), it was launched to coordinate humanitarian relief operations in the United States, Japan, India and Australia after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. In 2007, during a visit to New Delhi, then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe proposed the establishment of a "four-nation security dialogue," but shifted the mechanism's main goal from coordinating humanitarian relief operations to "countering China's growing influence in the Indo-Pacific." The mechanism was shut down at the end of 2007 with the withdrawal of Australia. The main reason for Australia's action is that the new Rudd government focuses on strengthening relations with Asian countries, especially China, and hopes to develop APEC into an "Asia-Pacific Community", so that Australia can not only avoid being marginalized in East Asia, but also change from an "APEC advocate" to an "APEC advocate", so as to continue to benefit from the booming East Asian economy, continue to act as a "coordinator of East-West relations" and "bridge between East and West".
The United States has contracted its strategy in recent years. Unfortunately, the financial crisis created by Wall Street in 2008 affected the global economy, developed economies were generally hit hard, and the ability and desire of the United States to lead the world were significantly reduced, and the neoconservatism and isolationism aimed at changing the world on the American model receded. The Obama era began a global strategic contraction, and when he first took office, he tried to implement "Sino-US co-governance", that is, China and the United States jointly governed the world economy and even world affairs. The policy proposal was made by former Secretary of State James Baker and is sought after by some prominent scholars. However, this proposition of the US side has not been accepted by China. The Obama administration's shift to "pivot to Asia" and "rebalance to the Asia-Pacific" strategy has the potential implication that with China's rise, the power imbalance between Asia and the Asia-Pacific region has become "out of balance", and since China is unwilling to further integrate into the U.S.-led system, the United States can only build new regional power blocs to "balance" the "power imbalance" caused by China's rise. This is a typical manifestation of Anglo-Saxon strategic thinking: the British pursued a policy of "continental balance of power" in Europe for hundreds of years, which was used by the Americans all over the world after World War II. Since the Obama era, the United States has used it in the Asia-Pacific region and even the so-called Indo-Pacific region. The Obama Doctrine flaunts "Do Not Do Stupid Things" (DDSS), which is mainly manifested in the global strategic contraction and the strengthening of the "forward presence" of the US military in the Asia-Pacific region, especially East Asia. Trumpism is a new form of isolationism, which diplomatically manifests itself as "going it alone." The main feature of Bidenism in diplomacy is "to act with allies but not to the bottom." The three administrations have made the thinking of "long-term strategic competition with China and outcompete" clear and operational.
Background to the resurrection of the "Quartet". It was in 2017 under Trump that the Quartet was reactivated, with advocates of Japan and Australia, plus India and the United States. The relevant background is:
(1) Shinzo Abe is a leader with both strategic thinking and administrative ability, and China's re-emergence is a "major change unprecedented in a century" for Japan, which means that the relationship between the two countries has returned to the historical normal of "strong in China and weak in the day", and the era of Japan's leadership in Asia (such as the economic geese flying model) has passed. If Japan is to continue to play a leading role in Asia and balance China, it must have new ideas, which are mainly manifested in the following: First, on the one hand, it uses China's economic and trade relations on the one hand, and on the other hand, it builds an economic mechanism that excludes China, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is the starting point. This is the reason why after Trump's withdrawal from the TPP, Japan vigorously promoted the implementation of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).
Second, values are another area in which Japan is strong, and in 2006, through the mouth of then Foreign Minister Taro Aso, he proposed the concept of an "arc of freedom and prosperity": an arc that starts in Southeast Asia and travels through Central Asia to Central and Eastern Europe, supporting countries that share Japan's "same values."
Third, in the political and security fields, after Abe returned to power in 2012, he proposed to build a "democratic security diamond" between the United States, Japan, India, and Australia, so he actively promoted the revival of the quadrilateral mechanism. But at the time, the United States was busy advancing the rebalance to the Asia-Pacific and had limited interest. Around 2015, after years of debate, the US government and opposition reached a consensus, clearly identified China as a comprehensive strategic competitor, and hoped to expand the object of wooing from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific, coupled with Abe's good personal relationship with Trump, Abe's idea of reviving the four-party mechanism was accepted by Trump.
(2) Although Australia is the largest country in Oceania, it is a country with a particularly poor sense of security and a particularly strong dependence on the United States for security. The Solomon and China police cooperation agreement, which is more than 2,000 kilometers away from Australia, is also regarded as a security threat by Australia, which shows that its security psychology is fragile, surpassing that of South Pacific countries such as New Zealand and Papua New Guinea, which are far inferior to Australia.
It is difficult for the average person to understand this psychology in Australia. Australia's security before World War II depended on Britain, and after World War II, it relied on the United States to provide security guarantees, valued its alliance with the United States, and participated in all the wars led by the United States after World War II. After the Cold War, Australia had a closer relationship with China during the Labor Party administration. After the Liberal-National coalition in 2013, the "Asia-Pacific community" advocated by the Labor Party has become a thing of the past, and Australia's values have become increasingly "Anglo-Saxon". On the one hand, it will continue to strengthen its economic ties with East Asian countries, especially with China, its largest trading partner; On the other hand, in order to cope with China's rising comprehensive influence in the Asia-Pacific region, it is felt that it is no longer enough to strengthen the traditional US-Australia alliance system, and new mechanisms must be built to deal with the "multiple challenges" of non-traditional and traditional security. Therefore, since 2010, a group of well-known Australian scholars have advocated the revival of the US-Japan-India-Australia Security Dialogue Mechanism. The Liberal-National Government adopted this recommendation when it came to power.
(3) In the new century, India-US security cooperation has been significantly strengthened, especially in the Indo-Pacific region, but India has refused to establish a base for the US military in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and insisted on leading the Malabar military exercise held in the Indian Ocean. After India's current Prime Minister Narendra Modi came to power, he promoted Hindu nationalism internally, and economically promoted the Gujarat model, which he once ruled; Diplomatically, the predecessor's "look east" has been developed into "act east", strengthening relations with ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea, emphasizing the influence on South Asia and the Indian Ocean in terms of security, and vigorously exaggerating the impact of the so-called "string of pearls" strategy on the Indian Ocean, but in order to curb Australia's influence in the Indian Ocean, and in order to reduce "stimulation" to China and develop relations with China, it is hesitant to revive the "quadrilateral mechanism". The Doklam incident occurred in June 2017 and the "Quartet" was revived in November.
After the Galwan Valley conflict in 2020, India agreed to Australia's participation in the Malabar military exercise (Japan has been invited since 2007) because it believes that the need to "balance China in the Indian Ocean" has outweighed the consideration of "restricting Australia and avoiding excessive provocation of China".
(4) Trump applies business logic to national governance, emphasizing the primacy of U.S. domestic interests and American interests. He has little interest in U.S. leadership in the world, is willing to engage internationally only on limited issues, and wants allies and close partners to contribute more. In the Indo-Pacific, different mechanisms need to be built in order to outcompete with China. The Quartet thus takes on new value.
The "quadripartite mechanism" goes against the mainstream of the times. When the Quartet was revived in 2017, it was the directors of the departments who participated in the meeting. It was upgraded to ministerial level in 2019 and head of state in 2020. The topics covered range from security to the economy, politics, the coronavirus pandemic, and more. However, it is difficult to implement the various declarations, agreements and other supporting measures reached. "Thunder is loud and rain is small" has become a prominent label of the "quadripartite mechanism", and this year it has further changed to "thunder and rain are small".
It is no longer an era of "two big countries each pulling together a group of small brothers for all-round confrontation", but an era of multi-civilization competition, and economic and social development is the universal aspiration of all countries. The United States' approach based on the Cold War mentality of building small walls to exclude and suppress countries that are not welcomed by the United States, and forcing other countries to take sides, is difficult for even its allies to accept. On the issue of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, most countries in the world refuse to take sides with the United States (especially when it comes to sensitive military and security issues), including India in the "quartet". For the United States' pursuit of comprehensive strategic competition with China, more countries are reluctant to choose sides, including India, the Philippines, South Korea, and even Australia.
Due to the biased implementation of the Liberal-National coalition government under Morris, China-Australia relations have fallen to rock bottom. After the Labor government led by Albanese came to power, it no longer acted as the vanguard of the United States in suppressing China like the previous government, and was committed to promoting the relaxation of relations with China. The economic and trade relations between the two countries have improved, and business travel and international student exchanges have increased sharply. Against this backdrop, it is also necessary to cancel the Quartet summit for appropriate reasons in order to send some kind of signal to China on sensitive security issues.
Biden's little calculations and age. It should be noted that Biden only participated in the G7 summit held in Hiroshima from May 19 to 21 on the grounds of "solving the domestic debt ceiling problem", and canceled the trip to the South Pacific after that, but the earliest debt default in the United States was in early June, and before Biden went to Hiroshima, the two parties were close to reaching an agreement on debt negotiations, and the matter was not so urgent. This shows that Biden believes that the trip to the South Pacific is relatively minor. His message is likely to be: "To be the first US president to visit Papua New Guinea"? Forget it; "After the three-hour official visit to Papua New Guinea, the leaders of the United States and India and the leaders of 18 Pacific island countries will hold the 'Indo-Pacific Forum' summit, which will highlight the importance that the United States attaches to the South Pacific." Forget it; "Next visit to Australia, and the Sydney Quadripartite Summit"? "Anyway, Albanese and Modi will go to Hiroshima, let Fumio Kishida find a place, let's talk there, friends."
It cannot fail to mention the aging of political leaders in the United States. Obama was 47 when he was elected president and 56 when he left office, but eight years later, his black hair is gone, and gray hair is visible. Trump and Biden, who are likely to be candidates of both parties in the next election, will be 78 years old by the time next year's presidential election begins, and the latter is 82 years old and has poor physical strength and memory. The South Pacific is the farthest region on Earth from the United States, and completing a round trip between Washington and Hiroshima, Japan, in four days is already a challenge for octogenarians. If you add another four days to complete the Hiroshima-Papua New Guinea-Sydney-Washington trip, doctors generally consider it unreasonable and it is best to cancel. The question is, how can the United States, which prides itself on having a lot of talent, not be able to elect a young and powerful presidential candidate? Political polarization is only one of the reasons.
G7 Hiroshima Summit Discussion
The G7 Hiroshima summit featured nine heads of state for a group photo, a phenomenon that has been going on for years. The two more people are the President of the Council of the European Union and the President of the European Commission. These two participants illustrate: China, the United States and Europe constitute the three poles of the world economy, and although four of the G7 members are from Europe, Germany, France, Britain and Italy are no longer enough to represent Europe in terms of political economy.
The G7 has long been an important forum for discussing international political and economic issues outside the United Nations. The G20, established after the 2008 global financial crisis, not only took over the G7's function as an economic issue, but also became the main body for discussing global economic issues. The new challenges facing the international economy should be discussed and corresponding measures formulated under the framework of the G20. The G7 focuses on political issues. After the Crimean crisis in 2014 and Trump's trade friction with China in 2018, the role of the G20 in global economic issues declined. The G7 has also played a limited role under Trump. After Biden took office, diplomacy shifted from Trump's "going it alone" to "pushing allies and partners to act together." As a result, the role of the G7 has increased, with discussions ranging from political economy to climate change.
This shows that the United States is no longer a world leader, but a "small group leader", keen to delineate diplomatic circles based on cultural similarities, political values, etc. And this circle must endure the political tricks of the United States and the wayward temper of its leaders.
Comment on "Special Guest Representative". "Invited delegates" seem to have become the norm when functional, regional international organizations meet. These delegates sometimes become official delegates to certain meetings, such as the Quad meeting in Hiroshima during the G7 summit.
The expanded Hiroshima summit also brought about eight countries, Australia, South Korea, India, Brazil, Vietnam, Indonesia, the Comoros (on behalf of the African Union) and the Cook Islands (on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum), as well as Ukraine. The host country, Japan, invited not only advanced economies with similar values such as Australia and South Korea, but also emerging industries such as India, Vietnam, Brazil and Indonesia, as well as representatives from African and Pacific island countries, with the aim of making the summit more impactful, especially for countries in the "Global South". After all, the G7's share of global GDP has fallen from 62% in 1976 and 65% in 1995 to 44% in 2021. In the 18 months leading up to the summit, Japan's prime minister made 16 trips to India, Africa and Southeast Asia to try to prove to those regions that there were alternatives to Chinese and Russian money and power. Inviting Ukraine to participate in the conference has become a "regular operation" for the United States and Western countries to hold meetings, nominally providing political support for Ukraine, but in fact making the Russian-Ukrainian conflict continue.
Talk about "American exceptionalism" and its "double standards". The "quadrilateral mechanism" summit, which has been in operation for many years, has suddenly become a "breakout session" of the G7 summit this year. But Americans just insisted, "Rule of law but me." A famous Australian professor told me in 2018: America can be an exception, but other countries are no way. I thought to myself: These "exceptional powers" include, but are not limited to, the following: secret surveillance of the leaders of allied and partner countries, long-arm jurisdiction over these countries, huge fines on large banks and enterprises in these countries, the use of military bases in these countries, non-participation in the International Criminal Court, withdrawal from the International Court of Justice, "listening to the United States" over "practicing American-style democracy", "listening to the United States" while being able to control the domestic situation and prevent the United States from "changing horses". Because "Australians" are accustomed to American leadership, feel that American leadership is acceptable, and if the United States does not lead, they will feel insecure and even masterless.
There are countless double standards in U.S. behavior, such as talking about democracy at home and not abroad; stipulating that the building of independent defense forces in Europe cannot affect NATO's role in Europe (i.e. former US Secretary of State Albright's "3D"); Asian countries cannot have their own free trade zones and have their own regional currencies (for example, at the Chiang Mai Conference held after the Asian financial crisis in 1998, Japan's proposal to issue an "Asian dollar" was vetoed by the United States); Asian countries must voluntarily restrict exports to the United States when they have a trade surplus with the United States (typical of Japan's automobile exports to the United States in the 1980s), otherwise the United States has the right to impose punitive tariffs; When the United States had its own comparative advantages, it vigorously advocated "market economy" and "globalization", and now advocates the construction of exclusive supply chains that it can control; After the 1998 financial crisis, it opposed the control of foreign exchange outflows in Malaysia, South Korea and Taiwan, and when Wall Street created a global financial crisis in 2008, the US government used taxpayers' money to support large enterprises and financial companies on the grounds that "too big to fail"; In the face of the rise of emerging markets represented by China, the United States feels that the market economy is unfavorable and "unfair" to the United States, and must implement state intervention to achieve "fair trade"; In the absence of evidence, on the grounds of so-called "national security", crack down on Chinese companies with technological superiority and force allies to follow suit; Establish a "chip quadripartite alliance" (chip4) for high-tech products such as chips; For nickel, cobalt, lithium and other mineral resources related to "economic security", establish a small club of "mineral security partnership" in order to control these resources and products in the hands of "democratic countries".
American behavior and its cultural roots
The background of American values is Protestant-Catholic values, which is the same as that of Europeans. Since the Renaissance, Europeans have promoted their local knowledge and values outward, turning them into "modern knowledge" and so-called universal values, and Europe has become the center of the world. After World War II, this center became the United States. After the Cold War, the United States confidently became the "new Rome", capable and qualified to Americanize the world, and proposed to build a "liberal international order" to this end. Politically, neoconservatism has taken hold, and the Greater Middle East's democratic transformation program has emerged. The "Chicago School" became popular economically, and the Chicago boys became the "architects" of economic reforms in both transition and emerging countries. Diplomatically, the United States vigorously promotes globalization, and Americanization is globalization, because the United States is a model of the world.
And 911 and the ongoing global campaign against terrorism have not made the United States and the world safer. The 2008 global financial crisis proved that the United States is not the engine of the world economy, but a major cause of its suffering. The United States also lacks the interest and ability to continue to promote globalization, and can only implement strategic contraction and the rise of new isolationism. From the Obama Doctrine, to the Trumpism, to the Bidenism (which National Security Adviser Sullivan believes is two: enhancing the United States' own strength, investing deeply in allies and partners, and working with them to address challenges), it reflects a circle diplomacy that strengthens cultural and political identity and emphasizes Protestant-Catholic values: America first, Anglo-Saxon countries on the inside, major allies in the middle, and close partners on the outside (Ukraine now belongs to this layer). Generally, partner countries are outside the circle and depend on the situation to determine whether it is a diplomatic inducement or a threat. In addition, there are opponents and enemies, which must be suppressed or even eliminated.
On May 19, 2023, local time, Hiroshima, Japan, during the G7 summit, (from left to right) European Council President Michel, Italian Prime Minister Meloni, Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau, French President Emmanuel Macron, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, US President Biden, German Chancellor Scholz, British Prime Minister Sunak and European Commission President von der Leyen took a group photo during their visit to Itsukushima Shrine. Visual China map
American-style circle diplomacy can also be seen at the G7 summit. When the nine leaders were loosely lined up to take a group photo, at first each leader smiled and raised his right hand to wave, except for French President Emmanuel Macron, with his right hand in his pocket and a serious face, showing Macron's "misfit", maverick and loneliness in this circle. As the leaders walked in two rows, the leaders of "old Europe" France and Germany, the leaders of Italy, who were Catholic countries with France, together with the president of the European Council Michel, fell "naturally" in the back row. In the middle of the front row is the handsome Canadian leader Trudeau, to his left is Biden, and to Biden's left is host Fumio Kishida. To Trudeau's right is von der Leyen, who is known to be pro-American and has recently overshadowed Michel, and on the far right is British leader Sunak. Several in the front row, in addition to the hosts, are either the leaders of the Anglo-Saxon countries, or pro-American politicians from the Protestant country of Germany. And the center of the photography is obviously Biden, because under the lens Biden shows the front face, and Trudeau is the side. As the saying goes, people are divided into groups, and on this occasion, getting close to or estranged from someone is part of body language and reflects emotional distance.
In the era of civilization competition, the overall strength and influence of the Protestant-Catholic civilization circle is declining, and the strength and influence of other civilizations are rising. Tolerance and cooperation are the mainstream, exclusion and conflict are tributaries. Gang formation, strengthening conflict and confrontation is an echo of the inherent defects of Christian monotheistic values, belonging to vortexes and countercurrents, which have a greater negative impact on the global political economy than positive influences, and inviting Ukrainian President Zelensky to participate in the G7 working meeting on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is a manifestation of strengthening confrontation. However, the US-led G7 is unlikely to change the mainstream trend of the world towards inclusiveness and cooperation. This is a judgment and a belief that remains to be tested by time.
summary
The G4 summit or the G7 summit is at best a gathering of several giants. The feast has dispersed and the lights have been extinguished. This year's "Dinner" featured eight countries invited to the G7 summit to participate in the expanded meeting, which is Japan's expansion of influence in the "Global South" through the host country; At small gang gatherings, whether taking photos or walking, the traces of circle diplomacy are obvious: the United States is still in the C position, and France is slightly marginal and lonely; Octogenarian Biden made a slightly far-fetched excuse to turn the four-nation summit into a panel discussion session of the G7 summit; a poorly staffed "sub-party" was held for Zelensky (the Italian Prime Minister has already returned home); The further military support for Ukraine announced at the meeting is equivalent to continuing the flames of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, benefiting the US and Western military enterprises, and benefiting the Ukrainian people, world economic development and the prospects for peace between Russia and Ukraine.
In the era of civilizational competition, competition and cooperation among civilizations will become the main characteristics of the multipolarization of the international pattern, with tolerance and cooperation being the mainstream, and exclusion and conflict being tributaries. The United States, whose subjective will to intervene in international affairs and its objective strength tends to decline, has changed from a global leader to an ordinary power, no longer a confident global leader, but an experienced coordinator of international affairs. It is keen on circle diplomacy, constructing exclusivity mechanisms to suppress unpopular countries according to the degree to which cultural and political values resemble itself. The two world wars declared the obsolescence of European diplomatic concepts and practices, put an end to Europe's legitimacy and ability to lead the world, and demonstrated the inherent and deep flaws of Protestant-Catholic civilization within the framework of modernity. The current approach of the United States continues to demonstrate this deficiency, depleting its strength and potential, but unable to stop the mainstream of the era of inclusiveness and cooperation. If it fails to adjust its diplomatic approach in reflection (which is difficult, but it has to be done) and continue with current thinking and practice, the United States will become the "post-World War II Europe" of the 21st century.
"Civilization Coopetition" is a column by researcher Xue Li of the Institute of World Economics and Politics of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. In an era when "civilizations tend to be involuted, and different civilizations compete and cooperate", this column will use this as a keynote to explore different topics in "international strategy" and "Chinese diplomacy".