The silent "new retail": Xiaomi's offline channel reform failed

Interface News Reporter | Wu Yangyu

Interface News Editor | Wen Shuqi

Since the second half of 2020, Xiaomi has kicked off the most radical offline channel reform in history.

At the beginning of the change, Xiaomi took Henan as a base and polished a set of "Henan model", and its core step is to simplify the business model and organizational structure. Xiaomi wants to eliminate the multi-level agent model of thick weaving and directly correspond to store retailers.

At that time, Xiaomi's offline business, which had not been valued in many years of development, could only be described as "chaotic": there were many types of channels, serious internal friction in different channels, uncontrolled management of cargo rights and price rights, and separate battles between regions... The "Henan model" made this scattered sand see the possibility of cohesion - in July of this year, the model was pushed to Shandong, and in August, the whole country launched the replica.

In December of the same year, Xiaomi adjusted its strategy to start the second process of change. Its goal is no longer limited to itself, but to seize the moment to turn the situation around. It began to recruit Huawei's large channel vendors for the industry, and decided to counterattack OPPO and vivo - according to estimates, to achieve this goal, Xiaomi needs to open 30,000 stores.

At this point, Xiaomi began a year of high fighting. At the end of January 2021, Xiaomi Home opened thousands of stores at the same time, and continued to crush offline at the frequency of thousands of stores per month. By the end of October, the number of Xiaomi Home stores exceeded 10,000. Not only Xiaomi's chief trader in China, Lu Weibing, but also Lei Jun also posted for these milestone nodes many times amid the cheers of rice fans.

In addition to the surge in the number of stores, Xiaomi has also injected the name of "new retail" into this reform journey. The "new thinking" of using e-commerce to do offline, the "new model" of online and offline integration, and the "new tools" represented by retail pass are all the most confident Xiaomi-style "new retail" in Lu Weibing's eyes, which is different from friendly businessmen.

However, nearly three years have passed, Xiaomi Home has already entered the bottleneck of expansion, and the number of stores hovers above the level at the end of 2021. Some of the stores that opened in the rush have been closed one after another in silence.

More importantly, these stores failed to successfully serve Xiaomi's high-end strategy, let alone fundamentally promote Xiaomi's sales in China. Xiaomi's imaginary new retail magic night did not come as scheduled.

This huge offline channel reform has finally fallen silent, and Xiaomi has to sink down to accept the spur and torture of reality.

From "sailing" to "stranding"

Xiaomi's offline channel reform began with an experiment in Henan in June 2020. As one of the provinces with the largest shipments in the country, Henan is quite valued by Xiaomi. The experiment upgrades the "authorized store" in the urban area to a "specialty store", and if the effect is good, this can help Xiaomi increase the profit margin by 4-5 points and get a higher GMV (total transaction value) per store.

Authorized stores and specialty stores differ in mode and geographical coverage. The authorized store is small in scale, mainly in counties, districts and townships, and partners buy out the goods at one time and then sell them to consumers themselves, and Xiaomi's participation in operation is low; The scale of the specialty store is larger, mainly in the urban business district, the partner pays a certain amount of payment (similar to a deposit), Xiaomi provides long-term direct supply and rebate, and has high participation in operation. The essence of upgrading from "authorization" to "monopoly" is that Xiaomi hopes to strengthen the unified management of urban stores and improve efficiency.

The channel reform derived from this experiment was named "Project Sail". In January 2021, this plan was officially rolled out to the whole country on a large scale, and had a huge impact on the abandoned "franchise store" model channel providers, which was quite a bone scraping and cure.

Starting from the Yangfan Plan, Xiaomi went through three Henan surveys, and during this period, it summarized the Henan model with "simplifying the business model and organizational structure" as the core.

Tang Li, an early Xiaomi executive who has left, told Interface News that in 2019, Xiaomi's offline strategy is still "grid operation". To put it simply, Xiaomi distributes stores in a city to different grid merchants according to a grid, Xiaomi is responsible for supply, grid merchants are responsible for management, and the former rebates the latter.

Behind this model, Xiaomi, which has tasted the sweetness online, has always been afraid of its heavy asset investment in opening stores, managing and investing in people, and this model was quickly overthrown internally.

Tang Li recalled that Lei Jun found that if he wanted to promote the grid model, more than half of the company's manpower would not even be used. This is about the same as he thinks the grid model is too asset-light. At that time, Lu Weibing joined Xiaomi not long ago, and Xiaomi's offline channels began to refer to the latter's thinking.

As an important undertaking of this transformation, in the second half of 2020, Huawei's chip supply event suddenly occurred, creating a window period for China's smartphone market, and the industry structure may usher in dramatic changes. 

Almost at the same time, Xiaomi raised its offline business to an unprecedented height, and with the "Sail Plan" and "Henan Model", it opened a year of high fighting for offline channels in China.

In 2021, Xiaomi opened stores wildly, and many departments were saddled with KPIs for the scale of stores.

Before a new Xiaomi Home can land, the branch needs to submit a report that includes an analysis of the location, customer flow, and sales and profit estimates, and stores of different sizes must meet the corresponding profit targets before the project is allowed. But at that stage, even if the analysis report was not detailed enough, as long as the people in the branch thought it was feasible, the people at the headquarters basically did not raise any objections. 

"At most, the new retail department approves contracts for 100 stores a day." Xu Tian, who works in the new retail department in China, remembers that "I didn't have time to look at all the details, and maybe even simply checked whether the contract name and organization code were correct." ” 

Soon, near the end of 2021, the number of Xiaomi Home stores exceeded 10,000. This year, because of the completion of the KPI of 10,000 stores, the new retail department obtained the performance evaluation of S (the highest level).

It was also at this time that the drawbacks of blind expansion began to appear. "It is equivalent to the original area may have only one store, but now it has become three or five stores, not necessarily every store will sell well." Zhang Chi, who is also in Xiaomi's new retail department, said.

This has become a problem that has plagued offline stores, and some stores that cannot bear to lose money have successively applied for closure. According to the interface news reporter, in the past year, the number of Xiaomi Home stores closed is about 400 to 500, "the overall sales since the establishment of the store is lower than expected, the loss is large" is one of the most common reasons for the closure application letter.

A specialty store that opened in Guangxi Province at the end of 2020 was supposed to expire at the end of this year, but submitted an application to close at the beginning of the year. The estimated sales scale of this store at the time of construction was 400,000 yuan per month, but the average monthly sales before the closure was only 160,000 yuan, only 40% of the expected. Its break-even point is $250,000, and after including comprehensive costs, the store has a net loss of $8,000 a month over the past year, totaling $110,000 as of the time of filing.

Zhang Chi said that many stores that applied for closure were initially estimated to sell 500,000 yuan per month, and may eventually sell up to about 200,000 yuan, "In fact, if you don't meet your estimate this year, basically you won't be profitable." ” 

The accelerator that was pressed to the bottom suddenly loosened. At present, Xiaomi Home has a total of about 10,600 stores, including more than 300 directly operated stores, and about 5,000 specialty stores and authorized stores. This scale is not much different from the end of 2021.

Xu Tian said that there are now dozens of new stores every month. "Now quite a few stores have been rejected by the headquarters at the signing stage." "Because people finally have the energy to look at the contract carefully," he said. ”

For the reasons for the slowdown in the opening of Xiaomi stores, different Xiaomi people have given almost the same answer. First, the offline stores meet the standards of the limited points, full of them, "we only have two places to open, one is communication street, the other is shopping mall, after the country is opened, these numbers are limited." One of the employees said. Second, because some stores did lose money, Xiaomi took the initiative to slow down.

They also mentioned that the original store opening KPI prompted front-line people to relax standards due to pressure, and the emphasis on "quantity" was greater than "quality" in the implementation process.

"It's just the choice of play." Jiang Ye, a middle-level in Xiaomi China, concluded, "Whether to fight a blitzkrieg or advance steadily, it is actually difficult for Xiaomi to have a second answer, because time is precious." ”

The reality of Xiaomi mode

The Xiaomi model in Xiaomi's eyes is to "the life of the mobile phone market", but in reality it is constantly bumpy.

At the beginning, Xiaomi's expectation for the store model was to eliminate the pressure of the backlog of partners to a certain extent. Because the partner in this mode only needs to pay a deposit (returned at the end of the cooperation), the purchase and delivery are directly supplied by Xiaomi without having to bear the payment. In theory, this is good for rapid expansion, but in reality, it does not play a completely positive role.

"They [partners] show the feeling that although they are doing this business, they obviously know that they don't have to bear this risk themselves, and they may naturally not care so much about the quality of the business." Xu Tian believes that the store model has also weakened the motivation of partners to sell goods, as well as a more rigorous judgment of the category structure when purchasing.

For specialty store channel vendors without inventory pressure, Xiaomi's management method is to do target traction. Jiang Ye said that the company will evaluate customers from the two core indicators of business volume and number of stores, and if the target is not achieved, the customer level will be downgraded the next month. The impact of downgrade involves taking priority as well as rebate points. Basically, for each higher level, the rebate can increase by 1-2 points. 

At that time, Xiaomi's approach in the specialty store model was "business scarcity, store encryption", that is, to keep regional merchants as scarce as possible and promote it to open more stores. From this perspective, Jiang Ye believes that partners may relax their focus on one or two stores to some extent. "In business, for customers, he thinks about comprehensive profits." Jiang Ye said.

Almost everyone who talks about the Xiaomi model will mention four words, "no motivation" - channel providers have no motivation, operators have no motivation, and salespeople have no motivation. The participants in all the links in the middle cannot find a reason to "work hard" for Xiaomi because of insufficient interests.

It is understood that the highest profit point of Xiaomi partners is about 15 points (15%), the deduction of personnel incentives is about 12 points, and the percentage of 10 points is also more common, which is a low level in the industry.

The weak incentive makes Xiaomi have to suffer a "dumb loss". In hypermarkets such as Dixintong, the sales staff at the counter have the role of shopping guides. In the case of friends subsidizing 30 yuan to 50 yuan per person, and Xiaomi has no subsidy or very little subsidy, this kind of shopping guide behavior will almost not point to Xiaomi in the end. This is a common storyline offline, and it seems extremely easy to understand internally, because those users who go to Xiaomi, based on their understanding of the Xiaomi brand, many complete the purchase online.

"Xiaomi won't let you lose hundreds of thousands, but it won't make you a lot of money." A large channel provider who has undertaken Xiaomi's offline business in the southwest region for many years said, "Only those with strong operational capabilities can break even, but if the cost is slightly higher, basically (every month) will lose thousands." ”

Low profits are doomed to the low cooperation of partners, which leads to Xiaomi's resistance to varying degrees even if it wants to improve service quality, but it involves increasing costs.

Zhang Chi said that in Xiaomi, even pushing an insurance of one or two thousand yuan a year to partners is very difficult. In the year of heavy rain in Henan, many Xiaomi stores were flooded, and these losses needed to be borne by the company. The new retail department then launched a $2,000 "property risk" purchase request to partners. This arrangement, which Xiaomi regarded as simple and reasonable, was rejected by many partners.

"Xiaomi didn't let them make a profit that they could not mind at the cost of these two thousand." In Zhang Chi's view, this is the fundamental reason for the partner's lack of cooperation. Until now, even if the team tried to push it, the national insurance coverage rate was still around 85%, compared with only about 30% at the beginning.

In fact, after shouting out the new retail strategy, Xiaomi's support and inclination for offline channels are obvious to all. Jiang Ye said that once encountered a shortage of inventory in a certain month, many orders of Xiaomi can only be sold negatively (meaning that the user has paid, but because there is no inventory, it can only be accepted for limited delivery), and if there is inventory in place at this time, the sales operation department will give priority to assigning it to offline channels. "Customers (dealers) are investing real money, and you definitely have to support people first." He said.

But the results are obvious, and this is not enough to mobilize the enthusiasm of channel vendors.

The "paradox" of premiumization

Lei Jun once put forward such a requirement for the mobile phone department: the mobile phone backplate should use the best, but also the cheapest. This is internally jokingly called the "Lei General Paradox".

Such a "paradox" can be seen everywhere in the process of Xiaomi's high-end, including its offline business.

In fact, Xiaomi's motivation to vigorously do offline business, in addition to expanding shipping channels, there is also a very important point in order to serve its high-end strategy, to fight a "price segment dislocation war" dominated by online low-end and offline high-end.

Jiang Ye believes that Xiaomi's high-end itself has to fight against the label of "cost performance", and to weaken this user's mind, there are at least four aspects to be ruthless: product positioning, channel distribution, marketing, and user service. 

From the bright side, Xiaomi has put a lot of effort into product strength, fast charging chips, Leica cooperation, product concept "from performance leadership, to experience priority". Judging from a series of product evaluations such as Xiaomi 12S and Mi 13, these efforts have also received positive feedback from word-of-mouth improvement, and began to lead Xiaomi to gradually get out of the haze of the Xiaomi 11 series.

However, in several other dimensions, Xiaomi's high-end and offline business seem to have entered a chaotic ensemble.

Channel profit distribution is still the old problem, Xiaomi's shortcoming that is difficult to improve in the short term. Jiang Ye said that one of the core of doing offline is to form a joint force with partners to jointly promote high-end models, but Xiaomi is difficult to pay the cost behind this.

According to the reporter, the rebate of Xiaomi's high-end models is only 2-3 points higher than the low-end (still about 12-15 points), which is not enough to form a joint force from the general level of the industry. "If you want to drive partners, at least 5-6 points higher, and double the profit." Jiang Ye said. In addition, Xiaomi's commission incentive for offline personnel is also insufficient, and selling a high-end machine may only take twenty or thirty yuan more than a low-end machine.

In terms of marketing investment, Xiaomi's strength is different. Many respondents have the same feeling, Xiaomi's offline space for eye-catching billboards is limited, which is a reality in front of consumers.

In addition, the cost trade-off for the flagship store is also a proof. In May 2022, Xiaomi's new retail department set a fancy to a store on Shanghai's East Nanjing Road, one of the most prosperous streets in the fashion city, and wanted to turn it into a flagship store. This matter has been almost unanimously recognized within the department, and the project has been pushed to the deposit link, and even the renovation schedule has begun to be pushed. But this decision was pushed down by Lu Weibing in the final stage, even if it would make Xiaomi pay an additional 4 million yuan in liquidated damages. At the same time, one selection point in Beijing's Wangfujing business district was also rejected.

"The input-output ratio is not good." This was Lu Weibing's answer at that time. In addition, it is not allowed to build two-story stores, because the second floor is difficult to drain and the area will be wasted. 

"Mr. Lu and Mr. Xiaoyan below (Wang Xiaoyan, who has just been promoted to president of China) are simply two operational bosses who are very cost-conscious in their heads." Bai Fan, another employee of the new retail department, said, "If you usually go shopping, you can also feel that Xiaomi's stores and Apple's and Huawei's stores are completely in two orders of magnitude." ”

"How can this be high-end?" He asked rhetorically with a tone of incomprehension.

Equally important in offline stores is the sales literacy of front-line personnel. After the launch of the retail pass, store staff added a "morning reading" task. Before opening the store, each person takes turns reading the selling points of each category every day, recording voice and using the system to identify the punch card. Xiaomi strengthens the memory of employees in this way.

However, the complexity of Xiaomi's product system is difficult to establish a complete understanding only by "early reading", and macro and systematic personnel training is more basic and important. In this matter, it is also difficult for Xiaomi to increase the frequency. According to the reporter's understanding, Xiaomi currently has about 3-4 trainers in one province, and 4-6 in larger provinces, taking turns to go to different cities and county stores to train front-line personnel. In other companies, such a ratio may be a city with one trainer.

To add insult to injury, Xiaomi's revenue and profit scale in 2022 both declined, contributing to large-scale layoffs at the end of the year. Interface news reporters learned from different sources that this layoff led to a reduction of about 50% of the staff in front-line stores.

Sales declined, and the first reaction of enterprises and channel providers was to "reduce people". As far as maintaining the health of commercial life is concerned, this in itself is understandable, but Xiaomi should see the risk of "drinking and quenching thirst" behind this. Bai Fan pointed out that if a 200-square-meter store only has 3 or 4 sales staff, it will be difficult to entertain a little more people, and the user's experience level in the store may further decline.

In December 2020, Xiaomi launched the second Henan survey and put forward clear reform goals for offline business: from the original plan of 3-5 years to become the first in China, accelerate to three years to be the first in China, and increase the market share from 10% to 30%.

Two years on, progress towards this goal has not progressed. Canalys data shows that from 2021 to 2022, Xiaomi's market share in the Chinese mainland smartphone market fell from 15% to 13%. It is not the worst performance in the past two years, and OPPO and vivo have fallen even slightly more. The lost market share of Huawei, which they once tried to eat, ended up in the hands of glory.

What if only in terms of premiumization? Has Xiaomi's offline transformation really driven the sales of high-end machines? 

A data obtained by the interface news reporter from Xiaomi shows that in the direct store and specialty store channels, the proportion of Xiaomi's high-end models (more than 4,000 yuan) sales in the past two years has indeed increased significantly, accounting for an average of 13%-14% per quarter in 2022, and only less than 10% in 2021.

But if you include the authorized store channel, the situation is probably not so ideal. News from large channel providers in the southwest region shows that in the past year, Redmi's share of its channel sales has increased from 75% to 82%, "Xiaomi's high-end models have obvious fatigue." This is how the strong businessman feels. 

In the book "Xiaomi Entrepreneurial Thinking", Lei Jun once wrote how he sold Kingsoft Software in stores and won the top spot on the day. Today, Xiaomi Home may be worth his experience.

Cost reduction, efficiency increase, service

At the end of 2021, after the small goal of opening 10,000 offline stores was completed, the team in charge of operation finally realized that stores are one of the company's most important assets. Around the same time, Lu Weibing said at the Xiaomi investor conference that retail stores need a 12-month maturity cycle, which is the so-called one-year "store maintenance period".

As a result, Xiaomi's offline transformation in 2022 began to pay more attention to cost reduction and efficiency increase.

One of the directions of "cost reduction" is to control the consumables in the store. For example, the gift box that Xiaomi randomly comes with needs to be returned when the user returns it, but in the past it could only be manually controlled, inefficient and omission, which only became an internal monitorable online system in March 2022, on the one hand, the recovery rate was improved, on the other hand, if the user does not return, it will make up for Xiaomi's cost in the form of a deduction. The cost of gift boxes is often around 100 yuan, and Xiaomi has a very considerable cost reduction figure after the system is launched.

There are also various ways to "increase efficiency", and in all projects, there is one action that is not painful in the eyes of employees, that is, Xiaomi Home "takes takeaway". In March 2022, Lu Weibing posted on Weibo, saying, "Meituan searches for Xiaomi Home, and the new product arrives in half an hour at the earliest!" At that time, this project had been piloted for nearly half a year, covering more than 3,000 Xiaomi homes. In September of the same year, the service was put on the Ele.me platform. 

Its effect is to provide convenience to users and improve the efficiency of the delivery process. But from the point of view of actual benefits, the essence of this matter is "left hand to right hand", and Xiaomi cannot win any increments through this project.

According to the reporter, the revenue from channels such as Meituan Ele.me will account for nearly 20% of the sales of Xiaomi Home (referring to offline channels) in 2022. "The people in charge of the convergence business think that this part is all incremental, but we feel that this is what Xiaomi Home should be." Bai Fan said.

Whether this part of the business brings profit increment is still unknown, in addition to channel fees occupy a certain cost, Xiaomi also has to bear 50% of the delivery fee.

One year's cost reduction and efficiency increase was thus labeled "Schrödinger" by employees. "In fact, the cost has been reduced, but it is difficult to say whether the efficiency has gone up." Bai Fan said.

Among Lu Weibing's dismantling of all the goals of offline reform, one goal is Xiaomi's high-end "sales and service integration" (sales and service integration) that can never be bypassed.

"The essence of the problem of sales and service integration is Xiaomi's unprofessionalism." Jiang Ye said. As we all know, Xiaomi's after-sales service system is formed by third-party service providers, in the past, many maintenance points were independent, not in the same place as the store, users bought in A but had to run to B to repair, which hurt the user experience.

Not only that, due to the use of third parties, Xiaomi's repair service supply is not so stable. There was once a Xiaomi user who applied for after-sales and dialed the phone to find that the mobile phone repair engineer on the opposite side was delivering takeaway. The user asked when he could help him fix his phone, and the answer was after ten o'clock at night. He asked if anyone else could help fix it, and the engineer replied that there were only two people in the area at present. This later became a typical case of Xiaomi's internal investigation and after-sales service.

Xiaomi is actually very clear that it has shortcomings in after-sales service. After cutting into the high-end market, Lu Weibing had a meeting with the general managers of service providers, who proposed to do exclusive customer service and special line answering for high-end users, and Lu Weibing responded to the effect of, "First understand those basic service experiences, and then talk about this set of high-end things." ”

In order to improve the quality of after-sales service, Xiaomi has also built its own system to connect to all service providers, so that the service process can be monitored and evaluated. At the service provider conference, Xiaomi also proposed to give more money for each list to make engineers live better. "But we analyze to analyze, in fact, in essence, Xiaomi has diluted all profits, and there is simply not enough money to improve any service system." Zhang Chi said.

In fact, partners may want to embed services into Xiaomi Home more than Xiaomi users.

"What Xiaomi earns is actually the money of value-added business (referring to mobile phone insurance, film and other services)." The aforementioned strong businessmen in the southwest region told Interface News. "Xiaomi's advantage is in the best position in the mall, the key is to embed the business in the aftermarket, and it is necessary to leave customers in the store for 30-40 minutes before they can speak." He said.

When the finger is pointed at genes

"Xiaomi Home will not do a good job no matter who does it." Tang Li, who has been involved in Xiaomi's offline business, said, "Because this model is wrong. ” 

Xiaomi's offline model actually wants to cut all unnecessary links, save the cost of profit extraction in the agency model, and if the operation is efficient enough, Xiaomi at the top of the chain and the channel vendors at the end can make money.

That being the case, efficient operations are key. In the early stage of change, this required a lot of manpower and material resources to build an intelligent system to achieve the purpose of Xiaomi's "saving people", but at present, Xiaomi does not have enough execution to do this.

Zhang Chi mentioned that in the process of gradually rolling out stores, the new retail department has a team that wants to create an intelligent distribution system. Theoretically, it is a set of algorithms that recommend the categories and quantities that need to be purchased in the next week/month based on the data changes of each store. Such a project requires a lot of R&D talent and product managers, and due to internal indecisiveness, it took nearly two years for Retail Pass, which appeared in 2021, to have this function.

In overseas offline channels, the digitalization process is slower. An employee of the International Department told the interface news reporter that there are currently more than 30,000 Xiaomi overseas sales points, of which, with the opening of the high-end strategy, Xiaomi will increase tens of thousands of overseas positions (points with more retail investment) from 2021 to 2022, and the overall investment in rent, materials and other items will reach hundreds of millions of yuan.

The aforementioned intelligent functions have not yet been launched in overseas retail locations. In fact, Xiaomi's overseas information digital retail system was only established in the second half of 2021, and preliminary refined management can be carried out by 2022. Before that, Xiaomi International employees could only rely on Excel, shared documents and other tools for data management.

For efficient operation, Xiaomi also believes that under the Xiaomi model, the headquarters will have greater control and control over retailers to open stores.

"It's possible in theory, but it's not very practical in practice." Jiang Ye said. For example, the turnover of interchange inventory will only be smoother between the same commercial stores, and cross-commercial transfer will face the problem of "difficult human feelings", which is a matter that must be operated by manpower. The lubricant in this is that the ownership of the product belongs to Xiaomi, and in financial logic, Xiaomi can indeed borrow goods across businesses, but offline, "maintaining customer relationships" is a higher priority.

Whether you want to eliminate the middleman or gain more trading power, the "original sin" of the Xiaomi model is actually that its profit model cannot support it to choose other more expensive paths. All the reasons why Xiaomi can't do offline points to its genes.

The story goes back to 2018, Lei Jun held a Xiaomi 6X conference at his alma mater Wuhan University. On this day, what shocked the outside world more than the product was that Lei Jun officially announced that "Xiaomi's comprehensive net profit margin of hardware will never exceed 5%." ” 

Although the high-margin Internet business can be a cash cow, Xiaomi, which adheres to the hardware gross profit guidelines, still dances in shackles. The low profits caused by the business model have created resistance to the development of all aspects of the offline business, prompting the latter to eventually fail to meet the original expectations.

In 2022, Xiaomi ushered in its first year of decline since announcing results. In the annual report, Xiaomi rarely updated its business strategy and decided to "pay equal attention to scale and profit". Xiaomi wrote that since the establishment of the group, it has always put scale first, and now the group has entered the next business cycle, and will increase profits to the same important position as scale.

There are many reasons for this decision, and the ups and downs and failures of offline business must be one of the lessons, but where is Xiaomi going to find the key to unshackling?

"To change the fundamental problem of Xiaomi, there is no solution." Tang Li said, "To do this, unless Lei Jun changes his worldview." ”

(The interviewee asked that Zhang Chi, Xu Tian, Bai Fan, Jiang Ye, and Tang Li be pseudonyms in the article; Interface news reporter Lu Keyan also contributed to this article. ）