In the year of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, in addition to fierce offensive and defensive fighting on the front line, the two sides have actually not stopped attacking each other's targets in depth of the country. In this regard, due to the military superiority of the Russian army, both the model and quantity of long-range strike weapons invested are unmatched by the Ukrainian side. However, although the Russian army has advantages in equipment, it still exposes some shortcomings in practical application.
Sea, land and air cruise missiles are all on the battlefield
According to statistics released by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense on January 3 this year, the number of various types of high-precision missiles put into use on the battlefield since the start of the war has reached 4,347 (anti-tank missiles and other small missiles are not included in the statistics), of which the number of long-range cruise missiles has reached 1,275, mainly including 5 models. They are the 9M728 land-based cruise missile equipped with the Iskander-M system, the Navy's 3M-14 "Caliber" ship-launched and submarine-launched cruise missiles, and the Aerospace Forces' KH-101 air-launched cruise missile and KH-555 air-launched cruise missile. Air-launched KH-22/32 anti-ship missiles and land-based P-800 supersonic anti-ship missiles have also been used by the Russian military to attack land targets, and nearly 352 of them are used, but these two missiles are not counted as long-range cruise missiles.
The Russian Iskander-M launched 9M728 cruise missiles to attack targets in Ukraine.
The land-based 9M728 cruise missiles are launched by the Iskander-M system, because the development era is still in the period when the United States and Russia abide by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the treaty stipulates that the range of land-based cruise missiles cannot exceed 500 kilometers, so the official Russian propaganda range of the missile is 490 kilometers. Its guidance method has not been disclosed, but according to the characteristics of the belly of the projectile and the antenna of the projectile, it is speculated that in addition to inertial guidance, 9M728 should have contour terrain matching correction and GLONASS satellite navigation correction, the strike accuracy is said to be 30 meters (test launch results on May 29, 2007), and the warhead is equipped with a 480 kg high-explosive warhead.
The Russian "Thug M" class small missile ship launched 3M-14 to hit Ukrainian targets.
Radar seeker flat slot antenna in the wreckage of the 3M-14 missile.
The 3M-14 "Caliber" cruise missiles put into the Ukrainian battlefield by the Russian Navy are mainly launched by the "Thug M" class small missile ships, the 11356R missile frigate and the "Kilo" class submarine. The aerodynamic design of the missile is similar to that of the 9M728, but it is not limited by the INF Treaty, so it has a range of about 2,000 kilometers and can be launched from the Black and Caspian Seas to attack the Ukrainian capital Kiev and western cities. In addition to inertial guidance and Gnonas satellite navigation correction, the guidance method of the missile also has radar terminal guidance. Its propaganda strike accuracy is also within 10 meters, and the warhead is a 450-kilogram high-explosive warhead. As of January 3 this year, the Ukrainian army counts that the Russian Navy has launched 591 3M-14 caliber cruise missiles since the start of the war, which is the largest number of long-range cruise missile models put into the battlefield by the Russian army.
KH-101 air-launched cruise missile.
The remains of the KH-101 air-launched cruise missile found by the Ukrainian army.
The air-launched KH-101 cruise missiles and KH-555 cruise missiles are mainly carried and launched by Tu-95MS strategic bombers and Tu-160 strategic bombers. Among them, KH-101 is a new generation of stealth air-launched cruise missiles of the Russian army, its projectile body does not adopt a cylindrical body design, the engine is an improved TRDD-50A twin-rotor turbofan engine, and the installation method is to follow the old KH-55 telescopic lower hanging design. The missile is very large, with a launch weight of more than 2.2 tons, a range of 5,000 kilometers, and adopts inertial guidance plus contour terrain matching correction, regional digital image matching correction and Gnonas satellite navigation correction, and has high strike accuracy.
The remains of the KH-555 air-launched cruise missile found by the Ukrainian army.
The KH-555 cruise missile is a Russian improved version of the Soviet-era KH-55 cruise missile, and its guidance system has been upgraded in addition to replacing the nuclear warhead with a conventional one. The guidance configuration is said to be basically the same as that of the KH-101, and it is also equipped with terrain matching correction, digital area image matching correction and satellite navigation correction. In addition, in order to increase the range of the projectile, an external conscavenge fuel tank is specially designed, which can be installed on both sides of the projectile body. However, its range without a fuel tank is also 2,500 kilometers, which is more than enough to hit targets in Ukraine, so the Russian army can remove the external fuel tank to reduce weight in the use of the Ukrainian battlefield.
What targets did Russian cruise missiles hit?
The Russian military's cruise missile attacks are mainly concentrated in the selection of targets, including military targets, industrial targets, energy targets, transportation targets and people's livelihood infrastructure. However, because each wave of missiles can be used is limited, they do not attack all targets at once, but focus on a certain type or types of targets at regular intervals according to the course of the war. For example, in the first few days of the war, the vast majority of the Russian army's cruise missiles were concentrated on attacking Ukrainian military targets, and the Ukrainian army's air bases, high-level command posts, defense departments, ammunition depots and key military camps were attacked.
At the beginning of the war, Russian cruise missiles hit the Ivano-Frankivsk airfield in western Ukraine.
After entering March 2022, the Russian military's cruise missile attacks began to increase attacks on television facilities, industrial infrastructure, military factories, oil depots and infrastructure used for propaganda while hitting military targets. In the following April and May, Russian cruise missiles reduced their attacks on military targets and began to focus on industrial facilities and railway infrastructure, especially in the west, near the Polish-Romanian border. In June and July, the Russian army reduced its attacks on railways and began using cruise missiles to focus on Ukrainian industrial facilities. After August, the focus of cruise missile attacks changed to infrastructure, but until October 2022, the targets did not include local energy supply facilities.
Russian KH-101 air-launched cruise missiles flying over Kiev.
After entering October 2022, the Russian army began to focus on attacking energy supply facilities throughout Ukraine, and on October 10, it organized the first large-scale cruise missile strike against power supply facilities throughout Ukraine. In the following months, power plants and substations in major Ukrainian cities were hit one after another, and according to official Ukrainian statistics, from October 2022 to February 16, 2023, the Russian army organized a total of 15 waves of large-scale cruise missile attacks specifically targeting Ukraine's energy supply infrastructure. As a result, Ukraine's national electricity and tap water supply have been greatly weakened, the normal operation, production and people's lives of various industries have been greatly affected, and Ukraine's war potential has been further weakened.
Deficiencies in the use of cruise missiles
From a purely military point of view, although the Russian army's continuous cruise missile attacks have achieved many results, it has indeed weakened Ukraine's industrial production capacity and war potential, but it has also exposed many shortcomings in use.
The first is that the use of cruise missiles in the firepower assault at the beginning of the conflict is seriously insufficient. According to the usual practice, on the first day of the war, the Ukrainian army received insufficient early warning and preparation, troops and important targets have not been evacuated, at this time the largest missile attack can achieve the greatest damage and results. However, on the day of the war on February 24, the Russian army used only more than 60 long-range cruise missiles, and they were scattered to hit multiple targets, which led to a very insufficient overall strike effect. For example, although several air bases in western Ukraine have been hit, each base has only been assigned a few missiles, and it is not a concentrated attack on fighters on the tarmac that have not had time to evacuate, and some of the missiles have been divided into several missiles for attacking the runway. This led to the eventual failure to paralyze the airport runway or concentrate the Ukrainian fighters on the ground, so that they have maintained their ability to sort. Compared with the Russian army, the "Desert Fox" strike launched by the US military against Iraq on December 16, 1998, launched a total of 415 cruise missiles in 70 hours, and the overall assault scale was much larger.
At the beginning of the war, the base of the 39th Tactical Aviation Brigade of the Ukrainian Army was attacked by only 7 missiles, of which 4 missed.
The second deficiency is the insufficient blow to transport hubs, which led to a steady flow of aid into Ukraine by rail. The Russian cruise missile strikes on railway infrastructure were only briefly carried out in April and May last year, while there were no focused strikes on road infrastructure in the western region, especially bridges in the western region. As a result, Ukraine's railways and roads connecting Poland and Romania have not been interrupted, and most of the weapons and materials that NATO and European countries have assisted Ukraine have been transported to Poland first, and then imported into Ukraine by rail and road by land, and the other part is transported from Romania to Ukraine. If the passage of foreign materials is not cut off, the Ukrainian army can be continuously replenished, which is one of the important reasons why it was able to launch a large-scale counterattack last year.
In addition to insufficient strikes on the import channels of foreign weapons in the western region, the Russian cruise missiles are also insufficient for traffic strikes in the central region. Video from June last year showed that the Ukrainian army was able to maneuver the Caesar vehicle-mounted artillery detachment on a large scale by railway. And the war report released by the Russian army itself also shows that a large amount of ammunition and weapons of the Ukrainian army is also transported from the rear to the transit station on the front line by rail.
In June last year, the M80A infantry combat vehicle aided by Slovenia arrived in Ukraine by rail transport.
The third deficiency is that the Russian army's pre-war cruise missile reserves are not enough, resulting in too weak each wave of cruise missile assaults. From the statistics of each cruise missile attack of the Russian army, most of them are launched 60 to 70 per launch, the lowest wave is only more than 30, there are not many large-scale strikes of more than 100 at a time, the damage to many important targets is not enough, and the strike cycle has to be lengthened. This allows the Ukrainian army to quickly restore some industrial production capacity, for example, in the second half of last year, the Ukrainian front-line artillery could also receive a batch of the latest production of 152mm shells in Ukraine, which proves that Ukraine's domestic military production has not been completely destroyed, and the Ukrainian Ukroboronprom group confirmed in December last year that they have restarted the production line of 120mm mortar shells, 122mm and 152mm grenades.
In December last year, 152-mm shells were newly produced at the plant of the Ukrainian Ukroboronprom Group.
Russia began to improve cruise missiles
In addition to the lack of use, last year's strike operation also exposed some problems in the performance of Russian cruise missiles. One is that guidance accuracy needs to be improved, because some cruise missiles fail to accurately hit the target. In addition to the KH-101 and KH-555, other cruise missiles rely more on satellite modification, but the Ukrainian army has obtained some satellite navigation signal jamming equipment from NATO and deployed it around the city of Kiev, which has reduced the accuracy of some cruise missiles. In addition, the performance of the KH-101 and KH-555 area image matching correction system is not enough, which also affects the strike accuracy, so it needs to be improved.
A downed Russian KH-101 cruise missile.
In addition, there are still shortcomings in the performance of insufficient anti-interception capabilities, but this is also a common problem of cruise missiles in various countries. Because cruise missiles fly slowly, generally around Mach 0.7, once the defender has sufficient early warning and interception preparations, the probability of shooting down is still relatively high. Because the Ukrainian army has received the help of NATO's early warning network, it has repeatedly issued a national cruise missile attack warning after the Russian strategic bomber took off. At the same time, under the notification of NATO early warning aircraft over Poland and Romania, the flight path of some cruise missiles was also predicted, so it also successfully shot down some of the cruise missiles of the Russian army.
Russian cruise missiles hit by Ukrainian air defense missiles.
After a year of strikes, the Russian army itself gradually discovered some deficiencies in the cruise missiles in its hands, so in the new batch of cruise missiles produced, it was also immediately improved. According to the Ukrainian military's research on the wreckage of a new batch of Russian cruise missiles, the latest KH-101 cruise missile put into the battlefield by the Russian army has been upgraded, mainly because the abdomen has been replaced with a new regional digital map matching correction system, replacing the original rotating single camera with three cameras, and the imaging speed is faster, while adding L-504 chaff jamming bomb delivery devices to the head of the missile to counter the Ukrainian army's radar-guided air defense missiles. In addition, the onboard computer has also been upgraded, and the overall guidance accuracy and anti-interception capabilities have been improved.
The upgraded KH-101 cruise missile of the Russian army has added L-504 chaff jamming bomb delivery devices on both sides of the head.
Throughout this year's conflict in the Russian army's cruise missile strike operations, although many achievements have been achieved, but the weakening of Ukraine's national strength and military strength has not achieved the effect that the Russian army wants, and its use on the battlefield and the technical improvement of cruise missiles in the later period are worthy of in-depth study by relevant domestic institutions.