Recently, many US media have published articles accusing Iran of continuously promoting nuclear capacity building, calling on the Biden administration to take more severe punitive measures against Iran in 2023. It is true that the negotiations to resume the JCPOA in Vienna in 2022 have been interrupted, but the reasons for the delay and eventual failure of the JCPOA are very complex, and the root cause is the interference of US domestic politics in the Iranian nuclear issue. In 2023, due to the combined effect of various factors, the prospects of the Iranian nuclear issue will be even more unoptimistic, and even the prospects that the international community least wants to see.
On November 10, 2019, local time, Bushehr, Iran, the Iranian flag was photographed at the official opening ceremony of the second reactor held at the Bushehr nuclear power plant. People's Visual Infographic
Domestic political interference in the United States is the main obstacle to resolving the Iranian nuclear issue
There have always been strong anti-Iranian political forces in the United States, mainly three: First, political liberal forces hostile to Iran's Islamic regime. This force is the mainstream of the United States, they believe in "American supremacy" and "American exceptionalism", and they are hostile to the political systems of non-Western countries, including Iran. The second is the power of hatred against Iran based on the 1979 hostage crisis. Although more than 40 years have passed, some Americans still remember the abduction of U.S. Embassy diplomats by Iranians on November 4, 1979. Third, pro-Israel political interest groups in the United States. They highly agree with Israel's interests, do not want the United States and Iran to ease relations, and take various measures to try to undermine it.
The above three forces regard the overthrow of the current Iranian regime and the resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue once and for all as the ultimate demand, rather than solving the Iranian nuclear issue within Iran's existing political structure and preventing nuclear proliferation. In July 2015, US Democratic President Barack Obama pursued multilateralism in a rational and pragmatic style, and reached a "Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action" with relevant parties, that is, the JCPOA, but it was the above-mentioned domestic political factors in the United States that the development of the Iranian nuclear issue finally derailed.
Republican President Trump, who entered the White House in January 2017, has a strong pro-Israel complex, and Trump announced and finally withdrew from the JCPOA at the beginning of his presidency, resulting in Iran failing to enjoy the economic benefits of lifting sanctions under the agreement, and finally decided to reduce its obligations under the agreement, including installing advanced centrifuges, resuming enriched uranium production, and improving the purity of enriched uranium.
The Trump administration's withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear agreement has also greatly damaged the confidence of Iran and the international community in the ability of the US government to comply with the treaty. In April 2021, the Biden administration and relevant parties launched negotiations to resume the implementation of the Iranian nuclear agreement, and a clear demand put forward by the Iranian side was that the United States needs to ensure that it will not withdraw from the agreement again after the implementation is resumed. Given the bad precedent created by regime change in the United States, Iran's demands are legitimate. However, negotiators in the Biden administration made it clear that the Biden administration cannot provide guarantees for the next administration. This strange domestic political logic constitutes an important reason why it is difficult to make substantive progress in the Iranian nuclear negotiations. Although the Iranian side later lowered its demand that the United States take concrete measures to ensure that Iran could continue to benefit, the United States representative still refused.
In fact, not only the regime change, but also during the term of the same administration, the United States has failed to take constructive measures on the Iranian nuclear issue because of bipartisan political interference. Even after the Obama administration reached an agreement with the parties in July 2015, the United States failed to lift sanctions on Iran in 2016 due to Republican pressure. Iran's often, but not unjustifiably, complaints that the lifting of sanctions is only on paper, which has become an important reason for Iran's later reduction in its obligations to fulfill the agreement.
The interference of bipartisan politics in the United States is also the main reason why negotiations on the resumption of compliance in 2022 have not finally reached an agreement. In September 2022, negotiations entered a sprint phase, and Iran proposed final amendments to guarantee its benefits, which were endorsed by the European Union, and if the United States signed the agreement, then the negotiations reached an agreement. However, the United States was facing midterm congressional elections at that time, and the Democratic Party was not doing well, and the Biden administration feared that the signing of the agreement would be attacked by the Republicans as a compromise with Iran and cause the Democratic Party to lose key votes, so it interrupted the negotiations at a key link, resulting in the loss of the negotiations.
All in all, it is the change of regime in the United States and bipartisan politics that have led to the forced termination of the implementation of the agreements that have been reached, and it is also the domestic politics of the United States that has led to the fruitless situation in the negotiations on the resumption of compliance with the Iranian nuclear agreement in 2022. In fact, the above-mentioned domestic political constraints in the United States are not only manifested in the Iranian nuclear issue, but also more or less in policies such as climate change. In this sense, U.S. domestic politics has become the biggest obstacle to multilateralism and global governance.
In 2023, the Iranian nuclear issue will face three major obstacles
Although the United States and Iran and relevant parties have not closed the door to resuming negotiations on the implementation of the Iranian nuclear agreement, the negotiations will face many obstacles in 2023, mainly three:
First, the United States has returned to its policy of linking the regime issue with the nuclear issue. There are many reasons why the Iranian nuclear negotiations made progress in 2015 and reached the JCPOA, including the multilateralism policy pursued by the Obama administration, but the more important factor is the Obama administration's policy of separating the regime issue from the nuclear issue. The Obama administration's policy of recognizing the political legitimacy of Iran's Islamic regime not only enabled the then U.S. government to focus on the Iranian nuclear issue, but also enabled the Iranian government to participate in nuclear negotiations with relative confidence.
Although the Biden administration attaches importance to the legacy of the Democratic Party on the Iranian nuclear issue, it has not adopted the same style, not only abandoning multilateralism, but also emphasizing value diplomacy, and reviving the old tune of linking the regime issue with the nuclear issue. In September 2022, there was a political turmoil in Iran caused by the "headscarf" issue, and it has not stopped. The "headscarf" turmoil is essentially Iran's domestic politics, but it has triggered criticism of the Iranian government in the United States, once again stimulated the idea of solving the Iranian nuclear issue once and for all through regime change, and negatively interfered with the United States' resumption of compliance through negotiations.
Second, as the Biden administration enters the middle and late stages, Iran's expectations of the benefits of the agreement have further declined. Objectively speaking, Iran has learned from the past and does not expect to fully benefit from the agreement, but still hopes that the agreement will be partially fulfilled and benefit for a period of time. If there is an agreement with the Biden administration, the Iranian side can expect that Biden will not withdraw from the agreement it reached during his term and will be able to obtain some benefits from the agreement. However, entering 2023, even if the negotiations go smoothly, even if from June 2023, the Biden administration has only 18 months left before the end of its term, and after deducting the time required for the agreement to enter the implementation process, Iran can truly enjoy the benefits of sanctions lifting in only about 6 months. Considering that the next US administration may not immediately interrupt the agreement, plus 6 months, Iran can get a window of about 12 months. This is in no way enough to be an incentive for Iran to negotiate seriously.
Third, Israel's right-wing Netanyahu has once again become Israel's prime minister. Back in 2015, when the international community hailed it as a "historic deal," Netanyahu accused it of being a "historic mistake" and has since gone to great lengths to attack the agreement, which eventually led to the Trump administration's withdrawal. Netanyahu's goal on the Iranian nuclear issue is not to solve the Iranian nuclear issue, but to fool the US government into taking stronger measures to overthrow the Iranian regime in one fell swoop, thereby completely eliminating the threat from Iran. After entering 2023, Netanyahu and his far-right cabinet will make a comeback, and it is bound to continue to undermine the relevant negotiation process through pro-Israel lobbying groups in the United States and hinder the Iranian nuclear negotiations.
The outlook for the Iranian nuclear issue
To sum up, the Iranian nuclear issue is nothing more than three possibilities:
First, negotiations reached an agreement, and the Iranian nuclear crisis once again made a soft landing. In 2023, because the Biden administration has temporarily no election pressure, the interference of bipartisan politics has relatively declined, in this context, the United States and Iran and relevant parties continue to negotiate on the resumption of compliance under the auspices of the European Union, and finally reach an agreement, and the Iranian nuclear crisis has once again achieved a soft landing.
Second, negotiations failed to restart, and Iran's nuclear capacity building made a breakthrough, but it stopped before the nuclear threshold. Former Iranian Foreign Minister Kharrazi has repeatedly stated on many occasions in his special capacity as outgoing foreign minister in 2022 that Iran is already a nuclear threshold country in an attempt to attract the attention of the international community. In fact, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Iran already possesses about 60 kilograms of enriched uranium with a purity of 60%, which is very close to the level of making nuclear weapons. If negotiations do not restart due to the negative factors mentioned above, Iran may continue to accumulate nuclear capabilities and be fully prepared to cross the threshold.
Third, negotiations failed to restart, and Iran crossed the nuclear threshold. Negotiations failed to resume, and Iran, despite warnings from the international community, resolutely conducted a nuclear test, crossed the nuclear threshold, and became a de facto nuclear state.
None of the above three possibilities can be ruled out, but the second one is the largest. The first possibility, as mentioned above, is that although the domestic political pressure in the United States has decreased, it does not have the conditions to seriously participate in the negotiations, let alone implement the agreement. In this regard, the Iranian side is deeply touched, and it is unlikely that the agreement without a future will be signed again. The third possibility is that if Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, it will mean a fundamental change in the nature of the Iranian nuclear issue, the pressure will be extremely great, and the uncertainty will be unpredictable by Iran. Given its strategic risks, it is unlikely that a rational Iran will cross the nuclear threshold.
The chances of maintaining the status quo and stopping before the nuclear threshold are greatest. But even before the nuclear threshold, its nuclear capabilities are sufficient to strategically create a certain deterrent effect. Under the current circumstances, Iran has sufficient conventional means, including missiles, drones, and proxies, to maintain its strategic position in the Middle East without developing nuclear weapons. In the event of a strategic conflict that poses a major risk to its national security, Iran can cross the nuclear threshold within a month and create a nuclear weapon to form a strategic deterrent.
(Jin Liangxiang, Associate Fellow, Shanghai Institute of International Studies)