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After entering the DPRK, Kim Il Sung asked for the command of 260,000 volunteers, Peng Dehuai: Your army command is too naïve

author:Western-Western History

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  In June 1950, at the instigation of the United States, South Korea's Syngman Rhee clique commanded the army to launch an attack on Korea, and the Korean Civil War was on the verge of breaking out.

  But soon the South Korean army took its own humiliation and was beaten in the battle with North Korea, and even the capital Seoul was occupied. And the United States, as the mastermind behind the scenes, naturally will not give up, so after the defeat of Syngman Rhee's group, the United States decided to personally end the battle.

After entering the DPRK, Kim Il Sung asked for the command of 260,000 volunteers, Peng Dehuai: Your army command is too naïve

Syngman Rhee

  On July 10, 1950, U.S. Army Five-Star General MacArthur was appointed commander-in-chief of the "United Nations Forces" and immediately led troops to invade Korea. In the battle against the "United Nations Army" dominated by US troops, the Korean People's Army was defeated and soon returned to the north of the "38th parallel."

  At the same time, the United States also sent the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait, seriously infringing on the mainland's national sovereignty; therefore, under the call of "resisting US aggression and aiding Korea and defending the country," the mainland immediately formed hundreds of thousands of volunteers and marched to Korea to fight against the US military.

  However, not long after entering the DPRK, Kim Il-sung, the leader of the Korean People's Army, made a demand: hand over the command of 260,000 volunteers!

  For such an unreasonable request, Commander-in-Chief Peng Dehuai immediately refused: "Your army command is too naïve! The army cannot be under your command! ”

After entering the DPRK, Kim Il Sung asked for the command of 260,000 volunteers, Peng Dehuai: Your army command is too naïve

Peng Dehuai

  Why, then, did Commander-in-Chief Peng refuse to hand over the command of the volunteers? What is the meaning behind the naïve rhetoric of commanding?

Special assistance

  After the end of World War II, ancient Korea was bounded by the "38th parallel" and divided into two countries, South Korea and North Korea.

  North Korea was supported by the Soviet Union to establish a socialist country, and South Korea was supported by the United States to establish a capitalist country, but South Korea said that it was a state, but in fact it was just a "puppet regime" without national sovereignty.

  In 1950, against the background of the "Cold War", although the world situation maintained a superficial peace, there was a dark tide under the surface of "peace", and the different political camps represented by the two superpowers of the United States and the Soviet Union often broke out in conflicts and frictions between each other.

After entering the DPRK, Kim Il Sung asked for the command of 260,000 volunteers, Peng Dehuai: Your army command is too naïve

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  As the friction escalated, local wars between the "two poles" began to break out, and the Korean Civil War was one of the "local wars" that broke out during this period.

  At that time, the United Nations was controlled by the United States, and through the manipulation of the United Nations Security Council, on July 7, 1950, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution on the formation of a "United Nations army" to "maintain regional peace".

  On the 10th, MacArthur was appointed commander-in-chief of the "United Nations Army", and successively mobilized the troops of 16 countries and regions such as the United States, Britain, France, and Turkey to participate in the war, but the proportion of its American troops reached more than 90%, and other countries were only wrapped up by the United States with symbolic troops, and even Luxembourg only sent 44 soldiers to participate in the war, which was not enough to form a company.

After entering the DPRK, Kim Il Sung asked for the command of 260,000 volunteers, Peng Dehuai: Your army command is too naïve

MacArthur

  South Korea, which is not a member of the United Nations, bowed to MacArthur four days after the establishment of the "United Nations Force": "It is my greatest honor to inform you that during the current hostilities, you have command of all army, navy, and air forces of the Republic of Korea, and you may delegate authority to other officers." ”

  Therefore, MacArthur said that he was commanding the "United Nations Army", but in fact this force was the aggressive group led by the US military, and later even MacArthur himself admitted: "My connection with the United Nations is almost useless, and all my communication systems lead to the US high command." ”

  At the same time, in order to prevent China from liberating Taiwan and preserving the "unsinkable aircraft carrier" of the United States, the United States also sent the Seventh Fleet of the Navy to invade the Taiwan Strait, interfere in China's internal affairs, and infringe on the sovereignty of mainland countries.

  Under these circumstances, on the one hand, the mainland strongly condemns the US military interference in China's internal affairs, and on the other hand, it is also actively providing suggestions to the Workers' Party of Korea to help it resist US aggression.

After entering the DPRK, Kim Il Sung asked for the command of 260,000 volunteers, Peng Dehuai: Your army command is too naïve

Kim Il Sung (right)

  However, after the landing of American troops at Inchon, the situation of the war took a sharp turn for the worse, and the Korean People's Army was in danger. Therefore, on the day the US military occupied Seoul, Kim Il Sung convened an emergency meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea and decided to immediately request "special assistance" from the Soviet Union and China.

  On September 29, 1950, Kim Il-sung wrote a letter asking for help, asking Stalin for help through Soviet Ambassador Stikov, and two days later, he wrote a letter in his own handwriting, asking the Vice Marshal of the Korean People's Army to personally go to China to hand it over to Chairman Mao.

  In the letter, Kim Il Sung anxiously said that his own forces were empty and weak and could no longer resist the US attack, and asked China for "special assistance" and directly dispatched the People's Liberation Army to fight in Korea.

  For Kim Il Sung's request for help, Stalin was worried that the Soviet army's direct dispatch to engage the US army would cause the war situation to expand, and then trigger World War III, so he only called back to Chairman Mao to suggest that the mainland send troops, and the Soviet army had no intention of sending troops at all.

After entering the DPRK, Kim Il Sung asked for the command of 260,000 volunteers, Peng Dehuai: Your army command is too naïve

Stalin

  Later, with the negotiations of Premier Zhou, Chairman Mao and others, the Soviet Union reluctantly agreed to send an air force to assist China's air defense and provide strategic material support.

  Therefore, after the agreement between China and the Soviet Union, under the slogan of "resisting US aggression and aiding Korea, defending the homeland", the 260,000 volunteers who had been assembled crossed the Yalu River and entered the DPRK to fight.

  However, not long after the volunteers entered the DPRK to fight, some disputes arose between China and North Korea over their command rights.

  Kim Il-sung believed that the centralized command of all the armed forces was more conducive to combat and avoided the problems of combat coordination between the two armies, so after entering Korea, Kim Il-sung asked the Chinese side for military command.

  When Commander-in-Chief Peng Dehuai heard this, he immediately refused: "Our operation in Korea this time adopts the rotation system of military units, and we cannot transfer command. And when holding a meeting with the cadres of the Military Commission in private, he pointed out even more bluntly: "The command of the other side is too naïve!" ”

After entering the DPRK, Kim Il Sung asked for the command of 260,000 volunteers, Peng Dehuai: Your army command is too naïve

Peng Dehuai

  So why did Commander-in-Chief Peng make such an assessment of the Korean People's Army? Is the reason for the refusal to transfer command simply the insufficient command capacity of the other side?

  In fact, there are other reasons for our army's refusal to transfer command in addition to the command ability of the other side.

Command

  In fact, not long after the volunteers entered the Korean War to fight, our army had already held an operational meeting to analyze the Korean battlefield, in which the issue of command had already been discussed.

  At that time, New China had just been founded, all walks of life were in ruins, the economy was poor and white, and another large-scale war was really a huge burden for the newly founded New China. In addition, the nature of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea is different from previous wars, and this is the first modern war in which the PLA participates, so it is a good opportunity for military training.

After entering the DPRK, Kim Il Sung asked for the command of 260,000 volunteers, Peng Dehuai: Your army command is too naïve

Chairman Mao (first from right)

  Out of consideration for the mainland's comprehensive national strength, Chairman Mao put forward a proposal against the United States and aid Korea: "Due to the protracted nature of the war, the troops should be combined with shifts in turn."

  Under Chairman Mao's instructions, Su Yu, deputy chief of general staff, quickly came up with three rotation plans. First, the rotation of military units is more suitable for the integration of domestic troops, and the rotation is relatively simple.

  Second, division rotation is a plan in which the command of the troops is transferred to the command of the Korean People's Army, so that the army's entry into Korea will not affect the internal defense or the operation in the Korean battlefield.

  However, although the second plan seems to be the most suitable for China's national conditions at that time, in fact, after the army enters the battlefield, due to the fact that "the soldier does not know the general, he will not know the soldier", and the affiliation relationship is complicated, it will seriously affect the command on the battlefield, which means that a large number of volunteer soldiers may be sacrificed due to command problems.

After entering the DPRK, Kim Il Sung asked for the command of 260,000 volunteers, Peng Dehuai: Your army command is too naïve

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  The last one was to send a large number of reserve troops into the battlefield, but this plan seriously affected domestic defense and reorganization, so it was rejected as soon as it was proposed.

  After comprehensive consideration, our army decided to adopt the first plan, which rotates in units of the army, which gave up the second plan of transferring command, so it is impossible for the PLA to transfer command after entering the DPRK.

  As early as October 1, 1950, before China sent troops to aid Korea, Stalin had already explained in a reply telegram to Chairman Mao: "Chinese divisions can appear as volunteers on the Korean battlefield, of course, these volunteers are commanded by Chinese commanders and fighters." ”

  For these two reasons, therefore, it is impossible for the 260,000 volunteers to transfer command to North Korea.

  So, what is the "naïve" command of the DPRK that Commander-in-Chief Peng said?

After entering the DPRK, Kim Il Sung asked for the command of 260,000 volunteers, Peng Dehuai: Your army command is too naïve

Peng Dehuai

  In fact, Commander-in-Chief Peng's remarks were an evaluation of a series of strategic actions of the Korean People's Army before.

  At the beginning of the Korean Civil War, the Korean People's Army marched south, occupied Seoul, the capital of South Korea, and continued to pursue the remnants of Syngman Rhee until Busan, the southernmost city on the Korean Peninsula.

  However, after the establishment of the "United Nations Army", Chairman Mao, Premier Zhou and other leaders immediately saw the problems in the Korean Civil War: the Korean People's Army devoted most of its troops to the south, and if no external forces intervened, the remnants of Syngman Rhee would be completely wiped out, but once the US troops landed at Inchon, the KPA would immediately fall into crisis!

  Therefore, at this time, the Korean People's Army should immediately deploy its defenses in the central part of the Korean Peninsula, leaving only a small number of troops in the Pusan area to continue to pursue and annihilate the remnants of the enemy.

After entering the DPRK, Kim Il Sung asked for the command of 260,000 volunteers, Peng Dehuai: Your army command is too naïve

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  Although China and North Korea had established diplomatic relations at the time, the two sides did not have ambassadors for each other and could not directly use the radio to inform Kim Il-sung of this proposal. However, Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou immediately met with the Soviet ambassador to China, Roshen, and asked the Soviet Union to convey this proposal.

  But after hearing this, Kim Il Sung thanked China for his suggestion. However, after the "United Nations Army" led by the United States landed on the Korean battlefield, at the operational meeting held by the DPRK, Kim Il Sung still paid all his attention to the remnants of Syngman Rhee, who were still surviving, believing that the US army in Busan was insufficient and should completely annihilate the remnants of the enemy in one go.

  To this end, he issued an order to the whole army: "The All Korean People's Army and Navy must finally sweep away the troops of the American interventionists and the remnants of Syngman Rhee's puppet army, and make August the month of complete liberation of Korea!" ”

After entering the DPRK, Kim Il Sung asked for the command of 260,000 volunteers, Peng Dehuai: Your army command is too naïve

Kim Il Sung (center)

  As Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou expected, on September 15, 1950, the US troops landed at Inchon in the middle of the peninsula, and the landing force had an integrated division, while the troops responsible for the defense of Incheon were only two new regiments, and had no combat experience at all.

  And such a war example happened just a century ago in China. In the third year of Xianfeng, in 1853, the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom gathered 20,000 elite soldiers and marched to the Northern Expedition. The righteous division set out from Yangzhou, through Huizhou and Henan to Gyeonggi, and fought as far as Tianjin Wei, but in the end, the whole army was destroyed because of the lone army.

  Chairman Mao was well acquainted with Chinese history, especially the peasant movements in various Koreas, so he pointed out the key when he looked at the situation of the Korean Civil War.

After entering the DPRK, Kim Il Sung asked for the command of 260,000 volunteers, Peng Dehuai: Your army command is too naïve

Chairman Mao

  However, Kim Il Sung's authorities were obsessed and missed the opportunity to deploy defense at Incheon, but instead went deep alone and Syngman Rhee's troops reached a stalemate in Pusan, which eventually led to a subsequent defeat, which is enough to show the "naivety" of Kim Il Sung's command ability.

Lure the enemy deeper

  Considering the previous strategic mistakes of the Korean People's Army, Peng Dehuai naturally would not let many volunteer soldiers lose their lives in vain due to command problems, so he flatly rejected the DPRK.

  After that, Peng Dehuai's command on the Korean battlefield also proved the correctness of the decision made at that time.

  After the "United Nations Army" entered the Korean battlefield, there was a cry of "victory" in the United States, and at the beginning of the war, they seemed to have seen the day of victory, so they bloomed a "victory" smile on their faces in advance.

After entering the DPRK, Kim Il Sung asked for the command of 260,000 volunteers, Peng Dehuai: Your army command is too naïve

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  They believe that the "United Nations Army," which possesses all kinds of modern heavy weapons and joint operations by land, water and air, must be overwhelming in Korea. However, soon the smiles on their faces disappeared.

  Soon after the volunteers entered the DPRK, they encountered the "United Nations Army", and the first battle broke out between the two sides, and the "United Nations Army", which possessed various modern weapons, did not see the expected victory, but lost a large number of troops.

  In early November 1950, the United States confirmed that there were formed People's Volunteers participating in the Korean battlefield, which was tantamount to a disguised admission of its own defeat in the first war with the volunteers. After that, in order to save face, MacArthur prepared to launch a "general offensive", planning to deal with the Korean People's Army and the People's Volunteers within 10 days.

After entering the DPRK, Kim Il Sung asked for the command of 260,000 volunteers, Peng Dehuai: Your army command is too naïve

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  MacArthur's idea was anticipated by Commander-in-Chief Peng Dehuai just after the first campaign. On November 4, 1950, Commander-in-Chief Peng wrote in a telegram to Chairman Mao: "Since there are not many enemies to be destroyed, the strength of our army has not yet been fully exposed, and the US puppet army may also organize a counteroffensive and plan to let it go deep and then annihilate." ”

  After Chairman Mao received the telegram, he immediately called back: "Draw the attention of all units of our army and annihilate them in their counteroffensive!" And this tactical policy of "luring the enemy deep and breaking each one" was exactly what the Red Army used to use when "counter-encircling and suppressing" in those years, and it was most suitable to use this strategy when dealing with enemies whose strength exceeded their own.

  After discussing with Hong Xuezhi, Han Xianchu and other volunteer cadres, as well as Park Il-woo, deputy commander of the Korean People's Army, Peng Dehuai immediately deployed a plan for fighting on the eastern and western fronts, and both fronts adopted the tactic of luring the enemy deep into the front, first annihilating one road, and then violently expanding the results of the battle, concentrating troops to annihilate the second route.

After entering the DPRK, Kim Il Sung asked for the command of 260,000 volunteers, Peng Dehuai: Your army command is too naïve

Hong Xuezhi

  On November 6, 1950, the tactical policy of "luring the enemy deep and destroying each one" was officially implemented. In order to "lure the enemy," two divisions of the 42nd Army on the Eastern Front of our volunteers pretended to be invincible and retreated after a bloody battle with the "United Nations Army," leaving "broken rear troops" on the way to the "retreat" to gradually lure the enemy army deeper.

  The "United Nations Army" led by the US army slowly began to flutter in the "overwhelming" attack, and did not notice that the main force of the 9th Corps of the Chinese Volunteers had moved from the Ji'an and Jiangjie fronts to the Changjin Lake area.

  And a division of the 38th Army of the Chinese Volunteers, which was responsible for the lure task on the Western Front, also withdrew its position after the battle for Flying Tiger Mountain. In addition to the 38th Army, the 40th Army and the 39th Army each arranged a division of troops to introduce the enemy step by step towards the established ambush site.

After entering the DPRK, Kim Il Sung asked for the command of 260,000 volunteers, Peng Dehuai: Your army command is too naïve

Images from the web

  But MacArthur, commander-in-chief of the "United Nations Forces", is not a nameless person, and under the PLA's strategy of "luring the enemy deep", the US military advanced very smoothly, so smooth that he had some doubts. Therefore, before the elite troops of the US 9th Army reached the front line, MacArthur only adopted the method of probing the attack and did not dare to rush forward.

  In order to dispel MacArthur's misgivings and "satisfy" his desire to "solve the problem of the volunteers and the Korean People's Army in 10 days," Peng Dehuai ordered on November 16 that the troops on the eastern and western fronts should be completely withdrawn, preferably "holding their heads" and allowing MacArthur to advance boldly.

  On November 17, the volunteers on both the eastern and western fronts disengaged from the "United Nations Army," and in the eyes of the US military, the volunteers at this time were "abandoning their armor and fleeing in embarrassment," which was a good opportunity to take advantage of the situation to pursue.

  The "victory" of the "10-day settlement of the volunteers and the Korean People's Army" was at hand, and MacArthur had no more worries and immediately ordered a pursuit. On November 18, the U.S. 8th Army and 10th Army on the eastern and western fronts advanced in full swing north, reaching the town of Hyesan on the Sino-Korean border on November 21, and their officers also took photos of the Chinese territory opposite the town to commemorate the "victory."

After entering the DPRK, Kim Il Sung asked for the command of 260,000 volunteers, Peng Dehuai: Your army command is too naïve

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  However, just as the "United Nations Army" and MacArthur were celebrating this "victory," the 380,000-strong army of volunteers suddenly launched a "counterattack" and launched attacks in the Changjin Lake area on the east road and the mouth of the Houchang River in the west.

  On 26 November, the 250,000-strong troops of the "United Nations Army" had completely fallen into the siege, and under the fierce attack of the volunteer soldiers, the "United Nations Army" suffered casualties one after another, and the officers of all units had no idea what was happening, and they were in chaos everywhere.

  MacArthur came to his senses, but it was too late, and in the end, the volunteers won a complete victory in the second battle. In this battle, more than 36,000 enemies were annihilated, inflicting heavy losses on the US army, and fundamentally turning the tide of the Korean War, and Peng Dehuai's command contributed a lot to such a victory.

After entering the DPRK, Kim Il Sung asked for the command of 260,000 volunteers, Peng Dehuai: Your army command is too naïve

Images from the web

  Nowadays, the "War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea" has been long gone, but the "War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea" has become the memory of the mainland generation, and these memories carry the patriotic spirit of defending the country and the fighting spirit of the Chinese nation in self-improvement and heroic resistance to aggression.

  Therefore, for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, we should continue to carry forward the spirit of "resisting US aggression and aiding Korea" and continue to strive for the rise of China!