【Article/Observer.com, Wang Hui, Liu Qian, Editor/Feng Xue, Guo Guanghao】The impact of the new crown epidemic, the continued conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the weak economic recovery, the urgent energy problem, high inflation, and soaring unemployment... Multiple crises loom over Europe at a time when the far right is rapidly rising.
In Italy's parliamentary elections on September 25, the center-right coalition led by fraternal parties led the way. This follows the right-wing Sweden Democrats who jumped to the second largest party after this month's parliamentary elections.
In addition, far-right parties in France, Germany, Finland, Austria, Portugal, Spain and other countries have shown rapid rise in recent years. Not only in Europe, but also in the United States, far-right forces are making a comeback, moving closer to the mainstream from the edge of the political spectrum.
It can be said that the entire Western world is facing the challenge of "turning to the right", and the traditional left-wing parties and their ideological influence are in decline.
Why did the center-right coalition win the Italian elections? As a founding member of the European Union and the third largest economy in the eurozone, what does Italy's election of the rightmost government since the fall of Mussolini in World War II mean for Europe, and will it lead to the division or even disintegration of the European Union?
Why is there such a far-right wave in Europe, which has always prides itself on a liberal democratic tradition? Is this a temporary phenomenon, or will it last longer? How will this situation affect globalization and the world order?
The Observer Network noted that Méloni from Italy's fraternal party and his right-wing coalition are clearly divided on their attitude toward Russia. After she comes to power, will the ruling coalition's policy toward Russia change? What kind of impact will this have on the Russian-Ukrainian situation and the EU's policy toward Russia?
At the same time, Meloni made many negative remarks on the "Belt and Road" initiative and the Taiwan issue during the campaign. After she came to power, what changes are likely to occur in Italy's China policy and Sino-Italian relations?
In view of the above problems, the Observer Network specially invited Cui Hongjian, director of the European Institute of the China Institute of International Studies, to conduct an in-depth interpretation on the 28th.
Meloni shared a picture of the September 22 rally on his personal Twitter account, attended by Meloni and Berlusconi (second from left).
Observer Network: In the recent Italian parliamentary elections, the center-right coalition of parties won the victory. Italy's fraternal party became the largest party in parliament, and its leader Meloni would become Italy's prime minister. Why did the center-right coalition win the election?
Cui Hongjian: I think there are many reasons.
First of all, this is the result of the political climate change in Europe in recent years, and it is a manifestation of the overall conservative and accelerated rightward shift of European politics. In recent years, far-right political parties in Europe have developed rapidly, and some have not only entered the parliament, but also come to power, which has gradually become a common phenomenon.
For Italy, this is not the first time a far-right party has entered the government, after the far-right coalition party (formerly the Northern League) and the anti-establishment party "Five Star Movement" have coalition. Only this time, the shock effect of the victory of the center-right party coalition is greater, because if a coalition government is formed led by a fraternal party, as the Western media said, Italy will usher in a "farth-right government" since the end of World War II.
Second, the election result is a backlash after Italy's technocratic government has reached its limits.
Since the 2009 eurozone debt crisis, Italy, as one of the major affected countries, has been experiencing political instability. To this end, Italy has found a solution to the problem through technocratic government. This is mainly because in recent years, Italy's political party structure has accelerated fragmentation, traditional political parties are declining, do not have the conditions for a small number of parties to govern jointly, and multi-party alliances are relatively fragile, it is difficult to form a cabinet and a consensus on governance. Therefore, the method of technocracy in charge of the government can alleviate to a certain extent the political crisis caused by the serious differentiation of political parties and the fierce struggle.
But Draghi's government, which came to power in 2021, has taken this model to the extreme. Draghi's own reputation as a technocratic is arguably unrivaled in Italy, and he is backed by a multi-party and cross-party coalition. But in the end, the fall of Draghi's government meant that Italy's path to using technocratic governments to cope with political change since the European debt crisis had reached a dead end.
Technocratic government is not elected but through some of the power exercises of the Italian president, including brokering deals between parties, so its legitimacy is limited and fragile. For Meloni, her right-wing coalition government is elected and has more legitimacy than technocratic government.
In addition, the split and decline of the left has also given the right more opportunities. From this election in Italy, we can see that the three main parties on the right quickly reached a consensus, formed a coalition and gained more initiative in the election.
Of course, some of the problems that Italy is currently facing also provide conditions for these far-right parties to come to power, such as the debt crisis, financial difficulties, and strong public dissatisfaction with energy problems and inflation in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
So Meloni adopted a simple and effective strategy during the election, appealing more to popular sentiment than to policy improvements. She did not talk much about how to specifically solve the main problems facing Italy, especially the economic and people's livelihood problems, but put more emphasis on the issue of confidence. Meloni portrayed her government as one that "serves all Italians" and used some of the more typical populist slogans to attract voters, including "Italy First" and so on.
Appealing to emotions rather than concrete policies is currently the main strategy of the far-right in some countries to develop and come to power. This approach corresponds primarily to the emotional dimension of the people, trying to reinforce popular discontent with mainstream parties and place their hopes on the changes and new choices they may bring.
Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi resigned on July 21, 2022 local time Source: The Paper
Observer Network: Some people have compared Italy's general election with Britain's "Brexit" vote, and believe that both have a huge impact on European integration. What do you think of this contrast? What does the far-right leadership of Italy mean for Europe, and will it lead to the division or even disintegration of the European Union?
Cui Hongjian: This is not the first time in recent years that Italy has challenged European integration, and the former leader of the coalition party, Salvini, and the Five Star Movement have a lot of suspicious and anti-European sentiment. However, Italy and the United Kingdom differ in their relations with the European Union, so it is difficult to compare Italy's Europe-suspicious tendencies with the UK's "Brexit".
The main reason for this fear is that the policy ideas of the fraternal parties and some of Meloni's own policy means have anti-European tendencies, and the current solution of some of Italy's internal problems is closely related to the European Union. For example, Méloni's anti-migration claims directly challenge a comprehensive solution to refugee problems within the framework of the European Union. The EU prefers to centralize power on the settlement of refugee issues rather than leaving it up to member states to decide for themselves.
On the other hand, Meloni's rise to power has indeed exacerbated everyone's worries and doubts about the relationship between Italy and the EU, but I think this degree is far less than that of the United Kingdom's "Brexit". After all, Britain's "Brexit" is an established fact that has already happened, and Italy, despite its suspicion of Europe, has not been translated into a realistic policy since Meloni came to power.
Meloni also knows that Italian public opinion can use the EU as a target for venting dissatisfaction, but once it comes to solving some practical problems in Italy, most public opinion will still think that the EU is still indispensable. Although the contradictions between Italy and the EU are sharp on the issue of immigration and refugees, economically, Italy now has a great dependence on the EU's single market and financial assistance. Italy, for example, has received nearly 200 billion euros in funding from the EU's recovery fund, and now the EU is also more strategic on this issue, warning Italy not to follow the example of some other European countries to challenge the EU's authority, while also taking appeasement measures. On September 27, local time, the European Commission announced that it agreed to release a second batch of 21 billion euros of recovery funds to Italy. This is both a reassurance and a reminder to Italy and Méloni that the EU's help is needed if current financial and economic problems are to be dealt with.
Previously, Méloni's "anti-EU" and "anti-immigration" positions were more extreme, but during the election, she adjusted her policy towards the EU and tried to be as moderate as possible. She did so to attract more voters, because Italy is not now forming an absolute majority that is really opposed or even wants to leave the EU. After Méloni did some moderation on EU policy, as she put it, she advocated the right, not the far right.
Observer Network: On the Russian-Ukrainian issue, Méloni has repeatedly made high-profile solidarity with Ukraine and NATO, but Matteo Salvini, the leader of his right-wing coalition coalition party, and former Prime Minister Berlusconi have all been friendly with Putin and have recently made pro-Russian remarks. Do you think that after Meloni comes to power, will the policy of Italy, the ruling coalition, change its policy toward Russia? What kind of impact will this have on the Russian-Ukrainian situation and the EU's policy toward Russia?
Cui Hongjian: The Russian-Ukrainian conflict and policy toward Russia are becoming new points of disagreement between Italian political parties.
Basic public opinion in Italy shows that the majority support the current policy toward Russia. Judging from Meloni's pre-election statement, she wants to grasp the basic public opinion, so she will not be too maverick on this issue, but to be closer to public opinion.
Before the election, Meloni clearly expressed his support for NATO and Ukraine on the Russian-Ukrainian issue. This is at odds with her two governing partners, Salvini and Berlusconi: Mr. Berlusconi has previously been close to Putin in words and deeds, and Salvini is believed to have had a Russian portion of his political funds, in other words, he may have taken Russian money.
These differences do exist, but whether the policy toward Russia will become a major point of disagreement within the new government, and even lead to the inability of the unity of political parties to continue, I think it depends mainly on the following two points:
First, how Meloni balances his statement with the ambiguity of the other two parties toward Russia.
Second, it depends on the division of power within the new government. If important members of Berlusconi's or Salvini's party hold positions involving diplomacy, security, defense, etc., the contradiction may be more prominent. Because then Meloni must always control the expression of opinions in these important departments, otherwise the Italian government may have a confused policy signal in terms of policy toward Russia.
On September 26, 2022 local time, Italian Brotherhood Party leader Méloni participated in the election night event at the headquarters and delivered a speech Source: The Paper
Observer Network: Italy was the first major country in Europe to welcome and embrace China's Belt and Road Initiative, but Meloni made many negative remarks about the Belt and Road Initiative and the Taiwan issue during the campaign. After she came to power, what changes are likely to occur in Italy's China policy and Sino-Italian relations?
Cui Hongjian: Before being elected, Meloni did make incorrect and unfriendly remarks on China-related issues. At that time, as a leader of the marginal opposition party, her motivation was more to broaden her eyeballs and improve visibility. Challenging China's interests and making irresponsible remarks on some China-related issues seems to have become a common tactic and trick used by some European politicians in recent years.
But for Meloni after winning the race, she must clarify the difference between her role as a party leader and as a government leader: as a party leader, her statement is more representative of personal or party interests, while as a government leader, her words and deeds represent policy and Italy's national interests. Without such a clear sense of responsibility, she could make mistakes not only in her China policy, but also in other areas.
In addition, I think that although Méloni has a biased understanding of the relationship with China, or has some incorrect views, whether this can become a policy depends on how she has balanced the different concerns and interests within the government and all sectors of Italian society since she took office.
For a long time, Sino-Italian relations have had a very good foundation, and in addition to economic and trade relations, political and cultural exchanges have also been relatively close. Now China and Italy not only have the "Belt and Road" cooperation framework, but also many other cooperation channels and projects. There is a saying that "when the family knows the chai rice is expensive", after Meloni became the home of Italy, after she really understood the whole picture of Sino-Italian relations, under the various interests of appeal, I think Meloni's position on China will undergo a beneficial change. From her previous remarks to future policies, in fact, Meloni has the opportunity and space to achieve better transformation and adaptation.
Observer.com: Before the Italian election, Sweden's right-wing camp also received a majority of votes in the general election. In addition, far-right parties in France, Germany, Finland, Austria, Portugal, Spain and other countries have shown rapid upward momentum. Why is there such a far-right wave in Europe, which has always prides itself on a liberal democratic tradition?
Cui Hongjian: First of all, there is a political tradition in Europe to seek some more right-wing, more conservative political solutions when the crisis inside and outside the country is more serious and difficult. In the past, on the eve of World War I and World War II, a similar situation occurred, and the worst result was the rise of fascism and Nazis. A similar situation now emerges in Europe, which to some extent shows that Europe is not separated from its own political logic and inertia.
The political views of these far-right parties and leaders in Europe that we have seen recently point to varying degrees in the same direction: the search for so-called "traditional values." For example, this time Meloni proposed to use traditional values to cope with the changes and challenges in front of us. I think an important reason for the rapid rise of the far right is that they all try to present themselves as representatives of traditional conservative values that can serve as a spiritual comfort to people dissatisfied with the status quo.
The current Italian and European people are dissatisfied with the status quo and are increasingly confused and even afraid of the future. Mainstream parties cannot come up with decent solutions to this and have fewer and fewer chances of succeeding on real policies. At this time, the far-right parties have prescribed a prescription, which is to return to tradition. Ideologically, conceptually, and emotionally, far-right forces have largely filled a gap left by mainstream parties.
Marina Le Pen, leader of the far-right French far-right National League Image source: The Paper
Second, far-right parties have taken advantage of popular discontent with mainstream politics. One of the reasons Méloni was able to win this time was that her party did not participate in Draghi's multiparty coalition government, but instead posed to "transform the system outside the system." This gesture of not "compliciting" with mainstream politics has won her the support of the people who are disappointed with mainstream politics. In other words, how disappointed the Italian people are with mainstream politics, how much support is for Meloni, whose fraternal party is seen as the opposite of mainstream politics. In this way, far-right parties offer people a "whole new alternative" at least on the practical level of psychological needs. This is the more common popular psychology of the rise of far-right parties in Europe.
Third, far-right parties are more resilient to the current political environment and changes in political instruments in Europe. Far-right parties and their leaders often offer simple, straightforward slogan propaganda to attract popular support. They know that most people do not have the relevant expertise, and the people's demands are relatively simple, so they also give simple and direct responses, so that they can mobilize the support of the people in a short period of time.
In contrast, mainstream political parties are subject to their own traditional inertia and tend to be slower to react in this regard. And over the years, mainstream parties have become less and less grounded in regaining popular trust.
In addition, there are some technical or strategic factors. Far-right parties and their leaders are often very adept at using platforms such as emerging social media to criticize governments and make political claims, with a more direct and rapid impact on voters. Traditional political parties, on the other hand, show a lot of discomfort in this regard.
Observer.com: Is this far-right wave in Europe a temporary phenomenon, or will it last longer?
Cui Hongjian: Whether this phenomenon is short-term or long-term depends on whether the political soil in which far-right forces emerge and arise – such as the country's internal and external difficulties, people's insecurity, and opposition to mainstream political parties – will change further.
Specifically, it depends on the following three factors:
First, it depends on how mainstream parties respond to the rise of far-right forces.
When Germany's far-right Alternative Party (AfD) first emerged a few years ago, it developed rapidly and had a great impact on German politics. But Germany's mainstream political parties have since taken some countermeasures and achieved some results. For example, mainstream parties first form a consensus internally and resolutely refuse to ally with far-right parties, so that far-right parties lose the space to grow within the system.
Second, even after the AfD entered the parliament, the mainstream parties adopted some kind of segregation measures, so that their influence in the parliament was always limited, and it could not be extended to other aspects through the platform of the parliament. This makes it almost impossible for the AfD to become the dominant ruling party in the short term like Italy's fraternal party.
In addition, Germany has a successful experience in tackling far-right challenges, namely that mainstream parties transcend left-right differences to achieve stable cross-party cooperation. For example, in the Merkel era, the grand coalition of the two major political parties on the left and the right, this willingness to cooperate played an important role in curbing the rise of far-right parties.
Italy lacks this kind of grand coalition now, and the demarcation between the left and right parties in Italy is very obvious. This raises the question that when the far right grows, if there is no consensus between the left and the right to deal with it together, then the far right will erode into the right to varying degrees. For example, this time Meloni's far-right party became the largest party in parliament, while former Prime Minister Berlusconi's more authentic traditional right-wing party became a little brother of the far right.
Jimmy Oaksson, leader of the far-right Sweden Democratic Party, Source: IC photo
Second, it depends on the extent to which the existing political systems in these countries are counterproductive to far-right political forces.
The process of Meloni's election this time is also a process of mutual adaptation between her and the existing political system. We have seen her constantly adjust some of her previous policies and ideas during the election process, softening or moderating them. She knew that this was the only way to win the election with a greater advantage. This process can also be understood as the transformation of Italy's existing electoral system into her and her party.
Of course, there are still concerns about the Meloni government: whether she will return to the previous policy ideas after she takes office, and whether there will be a far-right government in Italy. To avoid this, the Italian parliament must play its due role in creating an effective check on the government's policy preferences, and if this is not done, then it can be said that the design and practice of the political system on which Italy relied after the war was a failure. This is a complex relationship between the far-right forces and the existing political system of mutual play, adaptation and transformation.
Third, in the final analysis, it depends on the extent to which the common problems facing European countries can be alleviated and whether effective solutions can be truly found. If the internal and external contradictions of European countries cannot be well resolved in the short term, then some European countries will still seek solutions in the form of far-right politics, and this far-right wave will continue for some time.
Observer Network: Not only in Europe, but also in the United States, far-right forces are making a comeback, moving closer to the mainstream from the edge of the political spectrum. It can be said that the entire Western world is facing the challenge of "turning to the right", and the traditional left-wing parties and their ideological influence are in decline. What do you think of this phenomenon?
Cui Hongjian: Collective "turning to the right" is a political phenomenon shared by Europe and the United States. In recent years, the European far-right and the anti-establishment in the United States have influenced and even promoted each other, which was most fully demonstrated during the Trump era.
On the one hand, Trump's rise to power has given great hope to Europe's far-right parties, who believe that the United States as a "beacon" of Western ideology has yet undergone such a change, which justifies the ultra-right movement in Europe. After Trump's election that year, France's Le Pen once said that "today's America is tomorrow's France." In other words, she believes that if Trump can govern in the United States, it indicates that she can also govern in France in the future.
On the other hand, during Trump's administration, he particularly favored some far-right leaders in Europe in terms of political stance and policy. Trump has maintained very close personal contacts with them, which in turn has inspired these far-right political forces in Europe.
Because of the similarities in political systems, cultures, and ideas between Europe and the United States, a phenomenon of co-frequency resonance has formed on the issue of the extreme right. However, the two take different forms, with the far-right appearing as an anti-establishment movement within the republican or Democratic Party in the United States and as a traditional or emerging fringe far-right party gradually moving to the center of the political arena in Europe.
Therefore, despite the different forms of expression, European and American politics are more inclined to seek right-leaning, conservative solutions when responding to crises. As long as the immediate internal and external crises in the West cannot be effectively alleviated, the conservative political tendencies in Europe and the United States will continue.
On August 2, 2022 local time, former US President Trump met with Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán Image source: surging images
Observer Network: How will this situation affect globalization and the world order?
Cui Hongjian: In the early process of globalization, Europe and the United States played the role of the main promoters, promoting the expansion of capital and markets with liberal overtones. However, when globalization develops to a certain stage and some problems arise, the anti-globalization trend will be reflected in the political level of Europe and the United States through the form of right-leaning conservatism.
It can be seen that whether it is Trump in the United States, Le Pen in Europe or Mélony, one of their main policy tendencies is relatively consistent, emphasizing the supremacy of self-interest in order to form a new identity and political identity. If this awareness is further developed and embodied in economic, trade and foreign policy, it will have a contributing effect to anti-globalization.
The main consensus of all countries in the rapid development stage of globalization is "win-win cooperation", and common development can only be achieved through cooperation, but now the political ideology represented by the extreme right is actually to redefine the boundaries and scope of interests between different groups, ethnic groups and countries.
Whether it is the return and re-industrialization of manufacturing during the Trump era, or the investment review mechanism and other economic and trade restrictions introduced by the European Union, it is a manifestation of this political stance. These measures and the policy directions they represent are undoubtedly contrary to previous globalization.
Therefore, after more and more far-right political forces rise and even come to power, if they turn their political ideas into policies, they will fundamentally affect the ideological concepts and economic basis of globalization, and may even have a fundamental reversal of globalization in some countries. If all countries emphasize the priority of their own interests, it will have a great impact on the existing pattern of international relations based on globalization.
Previously, international relations were based on economic and trade cooperation, common markets, investment, and people-to-people exchanges. The political conservative tendency, represented by the extreme right, emphasizes that the boundaries should be clear, not only geographical boundaries, but also interest boundaries, and only calculate the accounts of their own interests rather than the accounts of common development.
This will encourage the forces in international relations to play a zero-sum game. If the principle of win-win cooperation is abandoned and the zero-sum game thinking is allowed to be allowed to be, it will have a great impact on the current international relations, and it will exacerbate the fragmentation of international relations that has been caused by geopolitical conflicts.
Moreover, under this so-called principle of prioritizing national interests, it is possible that the cooperative relationship between countries may quickly transform into a competitive or even confrontational relationship. If left unchecked, this trend will also spread rapidly from the economic sphere to the security and military spheres, so that the situation in Europe on the eve of World War I or World War II may be repeated, that is, the competition of power among countries has entered a disorderly state, and contradictions, competitions and conflicts are difficult to control. This is obviously not the direction that changes in the international pattern should take.
(Fang Yiyi also contributed to this article)