Introduction: The US "Foreign Affairs" magazine recently published an article by international political scientist Daniel Drezner to analyze the impact of subjective factors on the development of the international situation. The author's expression in the text only represents his personal views and does not necessarily correspond to objective facts. Observer Network translates this article for reference only.
[Text/Daniel Drezner Translation/Observer Network by Guan Qun]
There is a deep-seated secret in international relations, and while everyone thinks strength is important, there is disagreement about how to define or measure it. Sometimes, there is no disagreement about the state of power: think of the American hegemony of the previous era. But more often than not, the relative power and influence of the great powers is unclear: consider the international politics of the past decade, where all sorts of "China rises and America declines" arguments are juggling. There are also times when international power is put to the full test: think of large-scale wars, such as those currently underway in Russia and Ukraine.
Power is often seen as the ability of a country to force others to act as it pleases. Experts often measure it by military strength or gross domestic product. But these views are one-sided and even biased at best. They rarely reveal how a country will act or stand still. Experts have overlooked one key element in their thinking about strength: expectations for the future and whether national leaders believe the country's future is optimistic or pessimistic. If leaders see bad prospects, they will take risky actions in the moment to prevent further decline of the country, which can trigger an arms race and implement brinkmanship during a crisis. Instead, optimistic leaders who believe in a brighter future for their countries are more willing to embrace strategic patience, which often leads them to actively participate in global governance.
This article was published in foreign affairs magazine
The United States and its allies and partners had thought that Russia would win the war in Ukraine easily and quickly, but the development of the war gave them a "surprise". Unfortunately, this optimism is likely to be fleeting (needless to say, moscow and Beijing will hardly have it). In fact, it is conceivable that the conflict in Ukraine has made the whole world more pessimistic about the future, which greatly increases the possibility of a major power war in the future.
hanging in the balance
Power is the hard currency in international political circles, but the definition of power in academic and political circles is inconsistent. A simple way to articulate strength is to list all the adjectives that apply to the term, such as "soft," "sharp," "social," and "structural"—modifiers that begin with only the letters. From different issues to different actors, the definition of power that applies to them varies.
One reason these definitions conflict with each other is that diplomatic policymakers make different estimates of the future, which in turn determine which aspects of strength are critical. Some forms of influence are valuable in the here and now, including military power and economic coercion capabilities. While they are crucial in crises, these forms of power often create counterproductive security dilemmas. When a major power increases its military budget, its opponents are forced to react the same way, even if it does so for defensive purposes.
Other forms of influence work more slowly. The world economic system and the security framework were not established overnight. The establishment of a global governance framework such as the Bretton Woods system and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is a daunting task that could take years. Soft power – the ability of a country to persuade others to achieve common goals – can take generations to nurture and practice. But these forms of strength have their advantages. They are self-reinforcing, meaning that once established, it is difficult for adversaries to find a replacement for them. Short-sighted leaders will not care about these means of influence, because bothering with them will not have an immediate effect. In contrast, far-sighted leaders prefer to sacrifice immediate gains for the means of power that have long-term value.
Whether diplomatic policymakers' perceptions of power are short-term or long-term depends on a number of factors. If leaders think that the world they live in is Hobbesian, where people live "poor, dirty, barbaric, and short-lived," then they are not blessed with the luxury of a long-term perspective. An international system rife with disasters, plagues, limited economic growth, and violence has forced a greater focus on short-term gains. In other words, for most of the history of international relations, the short-term perspective is entirely reasonable.
In recent years, however, a better international environment has the potential to give leaders a better future. The end of the Malthusian Trap (population growth limited by agricultural output) and the beginning of a new industrial revolution heralded a new era. In this day and age, there is reason to believe that better days are just around the corner. Average human life expectancy increased from less than 30 years in 1800 to more than 70 years in 2015. Around the same time, child mortality fell tenfold. A healthier and richer world for all heralds a brighter future.
These trends are almost universal. But countries have different views on the growth of their future power. In countries with high long-term birth rates and the fewest emigrations, national policymakers may interpret these indicators as a period of upward mobility. The birth rate below replacement levels and the increase in emigration may indicate the opposite trend. Similarly, countries that have experienced rapid economic growth or secular stagnation are likely to think the future in the same way. Overall, it is believed that countries with strong growth and leadership will be optimistic about the future. The implementation of important policies, whether with positive or negative consequences, can affect people's expectations for the future. Countries that win wars may have confidence in their ability to deal with future security threats. Countries that lose wars have no choice but to work hard to build short-term military capabilities for fear of further setbacks on the battlefield.
Objective data can give a glimpse of a country: economic prosperity is often a good sign. But for the most part, the future is uncertain. Even so-called objective data can provide contradictory and confusing signals. For example, the true significance of China's economic growth rate or the importance of the dollar to global trade remains controversial to this day. In other words, objective indicators can only play a limited role in foreshadowing the future.
The foreign policy elite's approach to this uncertainty is to form a coherent narrative of the future that is good or bad for the country. Ideologies such as Marxism and liberal internationalism, for example, have a "vision of progress" as their theoretical basis, and they both claim that certain countries are bound to thrive. The pessimistic narrative is the historical cycle of chaos and rise and fall.
Grand narratives about the future vary, but they tend to take one of two rough forms. Actors with positive expectations believe that the future distribution of power will be more beneficial to their countries than the current distribution. In other words, the future is in its own favor, and the development of the international situation will reward its strategic patience. In contrast, an actor with pessimistic expectations believes that the future distribution of power will be more detrimental to his country than the current distribution. These actors see an ominous future and may feel the need for immediate action to halt the decline of the state.
Think long term
Pessimistic governments cannot focus on the distant future because they firmly believe that action must be taken in the present to avoid a more dangerous future world. In this situation, the so-called adaptability is very important, that is, a governing strategy that can be immediately used to change the current situation. As a result, the leaders of these countries will focus most of their energy on the military and economic resources available and how to increase them. Initiatives by other countries to increase their soft power and develop alternative economic systems or institutions may attract the attention of these leaders, but they will not worry them too much. Leaders focused on the present don't prioritize such long-term threats.
Governments with positive expectations for the future are convinced that the country will continue to rise. This gives policymakers a longer-term perspective and the ability to invest in forms of power that take more time to reap the rewards: global governance, cultural diplomacy, long-term alliances and partnerships, whimsical technological innovation, and so on. These forms of strength require a lot of money and time to develop, but the returns are also enormous. Optimistic expectations also mean that these countries can assess the capacity of other countries with a broad definition of strength. They will note that other powers are developing multifaceted capabilities, rather than just military ones. As sociologist Steven Lux explains, "The broader the definition of strength in a person's conceptual framework, the more forms of power he sees in the world." ”
The degree to which major powers remain optimistic or pessimistic about the future will profoundly influence the strategies they adopt today. A world of optimistic powers will have occasional confrontations but few wars. These confident powers will invest in building means to attract or coerce others, which means that the whole world will be competitive but also relatively peaceful. In a world of pessimistic powers, countries will focus on military strength and always can't help but want to be strong first. In a pessimistic world where the weak prey on the strong, disputes are most likely to be resolved by military means.
Consider the interaction between emerging and established powers. For both, believing that good days are coming will change their perception of threats. For emerging powers, this optimism makes it seemingly unnecessary for them to invest immediately in military capabilities, which could lead to unnecessary conflict. Any act that provokes a pre-emptive reaction from the established powers is not desirable. If it is easier to adopt revisionist measures when the distribution of power is more favorable to their own countries in the future, why should emerging powers risk subverting the tolerable status quo in the present?
Optimism also reduces the likelihood that incumbent powers will use force against revisionist adversaries who challenge the existing security order more like self-harm than a real threat. As a result, optimistic hegemons will take some precautions to ensure that revisionist powers do not threaten their core security interests, but their main means is to induce small states to accept the existing rules of the game. The long-term-looking, established powers are more concerned with the development of non-military power by emerging powers, such as the development of soft power, which is more likely to truly threaten them in the distant future.
The history of the 1990s is an excellent example. American policymakers at the time embraced the political scientist Francis Fukuyama's "end of history" theory that there would never again be any comprehensive ideological theory challenging liberal-free-market democracy. International relations theorist Joseph Nye believes that the United States has a lot of soft power, which makes the future of the United States brighter. Faith in democratization and the establishment of the so-called "Washington Consensus" on neoliberal economic development have also strengthened American confidence. Out of this optimism, it is not surprising that the United States has chosen to engage with potential adversaries such as China rather than confrontation.
It is not surprising that China welcomes such contacts. By embracing globalization, China sees its economy growing at an alarming rate and has positive expectations for the future. This is reflected in the earnest teachings of The Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping to his country: "Observe calmly, stabilize your position, deal with it calmly, cultivate obscurity, be good at being clumsy, and never take the lead." Because Beijing looks forward to a bright future, China has every reason to keep a low profile in the meantime. It is not in China's interest to directly challenge the liberal international order, as it could mean that China cannot reap other benefits. As a result, both Beijing and Washington have stepped up investment in the long-term goals and soft power of global governance. Neither power has stopped developing its military power, but this is no longer a priority for both powers.
If the world's great powers all have pessimistic expectations of the future, the world will be much more dangerous. In this case, countries will give priority to the development of military power. After all, unlike other forms of strength, military power can come into play quickly during a crisis. If a rising power fears that its period of strength is limited, it may choose to acquire military resources to maximize its temporary advantage and prevent the country from falling behind again. And an established hegemon is also worried that the country will decline in the future, so it is possible to react negatively. Established overlords will think that their power will diminish over time and will hastily resort to military means to resolve diplomatic disputes. For two pessimistic countries, hesitation is more likely to trigger disaster.
A classic example of such a dilemma is the international situation before the First World War. Before the outbreak of the First World War, Britain was the most powerful country in the world. But British policymakers were worried about the rapid rise of the German Empire and, in particular, about the growth of German naval power. In Berlin's view, in the face of Russia, which has developed more rapidly, Germany's prospects are not very good. By 1912, the Prussian General Staff began to fear that within five years Russia would be too powerful to resist. This led German strategists to advocate preemptive war before the window of opportunity for German domination of the Continent closed. In short, Europe is swallowed up by pessimism. All the great powers have adopted a fanatical rearmament strategy, and most have started trade wars. The environment is like an overgrown forest covered with dry firewood on fire. All that was needed was a random spark—the assassination of a grand duke—and the entire forest would immediately burn.
Pessimistic times
For the first 20 years of the 21st century, China remained an optimistic power. China's economy is growing rapidly, the security environment is improving, and citizens are more educated than ever before. (Even today, polls show that Chinese more optimistic about the future and more confident that their country is moving in the right direction than citizens of other major economies.) This self-confidence fosters strategic patience and foresight. China has invested in Confucius Institutes overseas to enhance its image and soft power, and has adopted a long-term diplomatic strategy to reduce international recognition of Taiwan. While it is trying to win the favor of developing countries, it seems to be trying to separate the United States and Europe. China has begun to create global governance structures that could challenge the liberal international order, including the brics Development Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the Belt and Road Initiative.
At the same time, the United States has become pessimistic about its expectations for the future. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, the catastrophic War in Iraq, and the 2008 financial crisis all undermined Americans' confidence in the future. According to data provided by the Gallup poll, the last time most U.S. respondents believed their country was moving in the right direction was in January 2004. Looking back at recent presidential inaugural speeches, this growing pessimism has emerged. In 2009, under the dual pressures of an economic crisis and war, U.S. President Barack Obama stressed the need to "begin to reshape the American work." President Donald Trump's rhetoric in 2017 was even more exaggerated, when he denounced the "American catastrophe" of the past eight years and promised to "protect the continent from the ravages of other nations from manufacturing our products, stealing our companies, and destroying our jobs." In his 2021 inaugural address, President Joe Biden acknowledged, "There are few times in continental history that have been more challenging than the one we are in now." ”
Despite growing pessimism in the United States, China has largely succeeded in avoiding confrontation. By joining the U.S.-led "war on terror," China has been able to rise, while the United States continues to focus on more immediate threats. China has also been patient enough to build global governance structures that few U.S. officials see as an imminent threat. Beijing's future looks bright, so it feels no need to immediately challenge U.S. hegemony. China just has to wait for the right moment.
However, this optimism seems to be starting to wane. For 30 years, China's birth rate has been below replacement levels. Chinese has just recorded its slowest annual growth rate in decades, with the number of migrant workers falling in 2020 for the first time since data collection. Compared with the United States, China faces a serious demographic contraction. The country may grow old before it gets rich.
Source:Xinhua News Agency
China's economic momentum has also slowed in recent years. Although China's economy grew extraordinaryly between 2000 and 2010, it has experienced the same slowdown over the past decade. China's GDP growth rate fell from a peak of 14 percent in 2007 to nearly 2 percent in 2020. China's overall productivity growth has fallen by half since the 2008 financial crisis, leading political scientist Danny Roy to call China a "low-productivity superpower." Moreover, China's debt-to-GDP ratio is almost three times that of the United States.
These trends are worrying. International relations are most unstable when all the major powers have pessimistic expectations — a situation that threatens to shape the political landscape of the great powers of the next decade. If both China and the United States become negative, there is reason to fear that the outlook will deteriorate further. Both countries are getting older. Immigration is the traditional way to enrich the U.S. population, but according to the U.S. Census Bureau, the number of immigrants in the United States has bottomed out. It is estimated that if the pre-2020 migration trend continues, the number of working-age immigrants in the United States should now be 1.8 million more than the actual number of immigrants today. Even more troubling is the continued systemic shock – covid-19 in 2019, financial turmoil, global supply chain bottlenecks, political polarization – that only fuels a crisis mentality of quenching thirst.
See light at the end of the tunnel
Pessimism was also a major factor in triggering the war in Ukraine. Although Russian President Vladimir Putin has been talking about reshaping Russia's glory, his worldview is pessimistic, which explains why he went to war. Russia's intervention in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014 was counterproductive. Ukraine has not returned to Russia's embrace, but has responded to this situation by strengthening its military capabilities and moving closer to NATO and the European Union. As Ukraine's westernization accelerates, Putin believes he must act quickly and militarily before Kiev is completely out of Russian control. As an anonymous Western intelligence official explained to the BBC, Putin "feels his window of opportunity is closing." ”
Ukrainian buildings destroyed by blow-ups
The unexpected course of the war could further fuel Putin's pessimism, but it will also fuel beijing's pessimism, and months of war between Russia and Ukraine have made other Asian countries more vigilant. In addition, in order to aid Ukraine, the United States and its allies have adopted a series of economic, military, and intelligence measures that have severely constrained Russia's capabilities. When Chinese officials think about Taiwan, it is impossible not to consider the dilemma that Russia faced in the War in Ukraine.
The key question now is whether the conflict in Ukraine will give the United States more positive expectations for its future. Over the past two decades, terrorist attacks, financial crises, and political polarization have destroyed American optimism. Rising inflation and commodity shortages are likely to further exacerbate pessimism in the United States. If policymakers fear that their own power and influence are declining, the likelihood of a major-power war will increase dramatically.
However, U.S. successful support for Ukraine could be a game-changer. For the first time in years, the United States has demonstrated its ability to implement policies in a global crisis. Ukraine's stubborn resistance and its identification with Europe and the United States remind everyone, including Americans, that America's soft power and structural power still exist. After decades of American decline and democratic decline, U.S. policymakers can now speak of restoring the alliance system and a determination to strengthen the liberal international order. Perceptions of U.S. hegemony may begin to shift in a more favorable direction for the United States.
If U.S. officials believe the future will be more favorable to the United States than it is now, then perhaps they can focus their attention on strengthening the liberal international order that has been advancing American interests for decades. With less concern for immediate threats, Washington may be able to re-emphasize its long-term goals, such as reversing the decline in democracy and establishing a set of resilient rules for the 21st-century global economic system. A strong United States, confident in its own future and international role, can regain its place in the international system. An optimistic United States will consolidate the international system and facilitate developing countries, including China, that aspire to enter the international order responsibly. However, if the great powers succumb to pessimism, then all hope will be lost and the entire world will usher in a dangerous decade.
(The Observer Network is translated by Guan Qun from the US "Foreign Affairs" magazine)
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