The Middle East is both a geographical and a political and historical concept. Geographically, it belongs to the fractured zone of geopolitics and is the hub connecting Eurasia. From the perspective of civilization and history, the Middle East region has bred the Two Rivers Civilization, and the unique achievements of civilization have radiated east and west as an axis. The Persian Empire and even the Ottoman Empire, which arose in this land, also became the "other" that Western Christian civilization had to face. In the memoirs of European travelers and merchants, the Middle Eastern world is sometimes closed and barbaric, sometimes rich, diverse, and enlightened beyond the imagination of the Western world. In this way of mixing facts and imagination, the Middle East is both a foreign land with a variety of styles, and a challenger to civilization and order. Even now, it has been difficult to define what the "Middle East" is with a simple and clear concept, just as we have not been able to understand the root causes of the turbulent Middle East politics – the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Iranian nuclear issue, the sectarian conflict – in the pale and dry narrative of today's international news. History and reality are vaguely intertwined in this land, and the historical narrative that we are accustomed to using modernization and the nation-state as the main narrative does not seem to explain this land that gave birth to human civilization in the past.
From Bagh to Istanbul by Zan Tao Version: Xinsi Culture | CITIC Publishing Group May 2022
In Orientalism, Said interprets the arrogant view of Western researchers of the Middle East as a bizarre imagination of the East that originated in classical times, the fear of ottoman invasion in modern times, and the unthinking defense of U.S. power in the Middle East after World War II. Since the end of the Cold War, Fukuyama's proud claim to the end of history and Huntington's fear of indigenization and religious revival have deepened our stereotypes about the Middle East. Political scientists blame the wars and failures of state-building in the Middle East on the compatibility of local traditions and customs with the market economy and the system of limited government, but never reflect on the fact that from Muhammad Ali's reforms in Egypt to the establishment of Mustafa Kemal, the Middle East has been trying to transplant European institutions, but there have been few successful examples. Today, Europe, which is plagued by the secularization of refugee and immigrant communities, is also beginning to let go of its former arrogance as a civilization and liberator and to rethink the Middle East as the other and the limits of secularism. Perhaps, we should return to the position that Said called for at the end of Orientalism: "To gain a true understanding of the world, to distance ourselves from it spiritually and to accept everything with tolerance is a sine qua non." Similarly, a person can only make a reasonable judgment about himself and of a heterogeneous culture if the same equilibrium is achieved between alienation and closeness. ”
In May, Zan Tao, dean and associate professor of history at Peking University, published his new book, From Bagh to Istanbul. Zan Tao has always believed that understanding the Middle East world, whether it is the transformation of Turkey today or the marginalized Palestinian-Israeli issue, should return to the historical context and specific context. In the face of today's era of brewing change, it is even more necessary to have a historical perspective. As with any epoch in history, political change in the Middle East has come not only in itself, but has always been part of world history. And our confusion about the Middle East world today also comes from the loosening and urgent need to reorganize the world order behind it.
Mustafa Kemal's unfinished legacy
Beijing News: There is a trend in the study of world history and political science, that is, to pay special attention to the study of pre-modern political bodies. Ethnic contradictions and ideological antagonisms relative to a single nation-state. The religious and ethnic tolerance of pre-modern states, as well as administratively differentiated management, has led many researchers to re-evaluate their political heritage. As you say in From Bagh to Istanbul, the turmoil in the Middle East today and even in the Balkans since the twentieth century stems in large part from the legacy of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Could you please tell us how we should understand the political legacy of the Pre-20th Century Middle East world?
Zan Tao: The great empires of the former modern era often followed the path of indirect rule, mainly because the technical means of the time could not achieve effective direct rule, after all, they were often large in scale, ethnic and cultural diversity, or the geographical landscape of the frontier was complex. In the absence of major geopolitical changes, this kind of rule is still relatively stable and orderly, and it is more cost-effective. Especially for the frontier areas, it is originally a buffer zone, and it is more flexible to defend when it has the ability and give up if it is not able. This is not the same as the era of sovereign nation-states, where pre-modern empires had little concept of having to fight for every inch. The Ottoman Empire was one such empire. It lasted a long time from the 14th century to the beginning of the 20th century, maintaining long-term domination over Asia Minor, the Arab region, and the Eastern European-Balkan region until the 19th century. There have always been two opposing views on Ottoman rule, one of which is that it provided peace under Ottoman rule, brought order to the local area, and even regarded the Ottoman Empire as an empire that promoted tolerant rule; Another view is that the Ottoman Empire brought darkness to the local area of foreign domination. Both views are extreme and need to be viewed historically, that is, they cannot be judged by the standpoint of modern nationalism, nor should they be characterized by the ideas or practices of modern civil society. The legacy of the Ottoman Empire is deep and continuous, whether it is inherited, recognized or denied, erased, it is all there. The turmoil in the modern Middle East and the Balkans is certainly related to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, but this does not mean that the ottoman empire rule is a beautiful ideal society. History is developing, and there is no way back. In most of the places that were once ruled by the Ottoman Empire, the people there are now reluctant to go back to the past.
Mustafa Kemal, the founding father of modern Turkey
Beijing News: Ottoman Turkey at the end of the 19th century faced three options: pan-Islamism, "Osmanlıcılık, Ottomanism), and a secular state. In the end, the victory of the line of establishing a secularized, secularized authoritarian state represented by Mustafa Kemal ended. Why did Mustafa Kemalism stand out from the three choices of the three choices of the time?
Zan Tao: Pan-Islamism is a religious trend and movement that emphasizes the unity of Muslims around the world, with the aim of defending the territory and dignity of Islam, especially the caliphate, and resisting the oppression of imperialism and colonialism. In the case of the still existence of the Caliphate in Istanbul, pan-Islamism also had a side to defend the interests of the Ottoman Empire, and in the Resolution II of the Communist International of 1920 it was stated that "it is necessary to fight pan-Islamism, Greater Asiaticism and other similar movements, for they are trying to combine the liberation struggle against European and American imperialism with the goal of strengthening the power of Turkish imperialism, Japanese imperialism, the nobility, the big landlords and the monks." "The problem with pan-Islamism is that in the era of nationalism and imperialism, it is under pressure both internally and externally, not to mention that the central caliphate is so weak that it cannot defend itself. Ottomanism was the creation of a modern Ottoman sovereign state with Ottoman identity, and its problem was also the decline of the empire, the rise and fall of internal nationalism, and the interference of external imperialist forces. In this case, the Turkish-speaking Muslims in the empire could only find their own way out. This is Turkish nationalism. Turkish nationalism is the result of "putting it to death and coming back to life". The defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I was almost completely dismembered, the Arabs were entrusted by the European imperialist powers, and the Christian peoples of the Balkans became independent. That leaves the Turkish-speaking Muslims. They are certainly not saying that a republic must be established, after all, the Sultan-Caliphate is still there. There is also a certain appeal. But as the situation on the battlefield changed, the Turkish nationalist forces led by Mustafa Kemal won the victory, and in the course of such a history, Turkish nationalism eventually won and moved towards the path of Kemalism. There are, of course, some details worth noting, such as the fact that there are also people in the camp of national revolution who want to establish a government with the caliph as a hypocritical monarch, but these forces have not defeated the Kemal in the political game. After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, this political game continued, and eventually the Mustafa Kemal consolidated power and established authoritarian rule.
Beijing News: Mustafa Kemal once tried to construct a "Turkish nationalism" and a "Turkish view of history" to distinguish them from the ideologies of Ottomanism and pan-Islamism. But in contrast to nationalism that dates back to history and a particular ethnicity, Mustafa Kemal's pursuit of Turkish nationalism is quite dependent on the invention and construction of modern intellectuals. Can you tell us how "Turkish nationalism" came to be and how it differs from the nationalism we are familiar with imported from Europe since the 19th century? In today's Turkey, where secularism is constantly under attack, has this ideology become an abandoned option?
Zan Tao: Most nationalism has similar characteristics. The emergence of "Turkish nationalism" is related to the situation in the late Ottoman Empire. In the Ottoman Empire, the emergence of Turkish nationalism was relatively late, which was probably related to the "cosmopolitanism" of the Ottoman Empire. The ruling class of the Ottoman Empire considered itself Ottoman, which is why Turkish nationalism emerged relatively late. However, when nationalism had already emerged among other peoples in the empire, Turkish-speaking Muslims naturally had to consider their own identity, identity, and destiny. Like many Eastern nationalisms, Turkish nationalism has also been influenced by the West, and this influence, in addition to nationalism as a political trend in general, is also in a special sense, about the history, language and culture of the ancient Turks, which is an imagination, invention and construction of the so-called national history before the conversion to Islam, and the materials used, many of which come from the West, such as the influence of so-called "Turkology". In this way, the history of the different Turkic-speaking tribes in ancient times was gradually established as a whole and orderly history of the "Turkish nation". The difference is that the historical imagination and construction of Turkish nationalism does not coincide with the territory of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey, that is, its earlier history is actually outside this territory, such as in Central Asia and North Asia, that is, the so-called "homeland" is in someone else's home. And they are a little unconfident about the connection between themselves and the land under their feet, because, that is, about 1,000 years of history, from a historical point of view, of course, the longer the better, 1,000 years is not too long, preferably since ancient times.
"Ottoman-Turkish Discovery" by Zan Tao Edition: Peking University Press, June 2022
The "Turkish view of history" has such a use, it transforms the Western Aryan view of history, the ancestors of the Turks are traced earlier, saying that they are the earliest pure white people, who once created a great civilization, and because of climate change, they migrated around thousands of years ago, and influenced several ancient civilizations that people know, so that the ancestors of the Turks came to Asia Minor not 1000 years ago, but thousands of years ago, and the Sumerian and Heti civilizations here were created by the ancestors of the Turks. After World War II, especially under the influence of the United States, turks abandoned the "Turkish view of history" in education because it was racist, although its racism was not aggressive.
In the new conception of Turkish history, the Turks emphasize the inheritance of all the historical and civilized heritage of the land beneath their feet. However, after the "Turkish view of history" faded, the nationalist view of history influenced by the so-called "Turkology" was also more influential. In the past 20 years, the AKP has both taken a conservative position in religion and exalted Turkish nationalism, whether it is on the Domestic Kurdish issue or in the international relationship with the European Union and NATO, manipulating and using nationalist sentiments is a means that the current Turkish ruling group is more and more willing to use.
Beijing News: In today's Turkey, the naming of large-scale public works is also mostly named after monarchs in Ottoman history. This is in stark contrast to the deliberate suppression of historical symbols of the Ottoman era in Mustafa Kemal's time. What role do you see the historical memory and legacy of the Ottoman era play in today's Turkish politics? Why do today's Turks deliberately construct their present selves as part of the Ottoman "great history"?
Zan Tao: To put it simply, it is a great sense of historical glory, which is a common and common phenomenon in human nature, that is, to show or boast of the "broad" past of the ancestors. This can really give people a kind of spiritual inspiration and upliftment. After all, man is an advanced species with a sense of time, and he has a memory, and can imagine, reconstruct or construct memory. This is the historical existence of man. It is not easy for humanity to escape the grip of mythical or deified history. This is also a convenient means that politicians are good at using. That is, this historical narrative becomes part of the political ideology. For contemporary Turkish politicians, ten thousand years ago, a thousand years ago is too long, the Ottoman Empire is the closest to modern times, and the connection with the republic is also the most direct. In the Mediterranean, the Middle East, the Black Sea, this large geographical space, there are memories of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey is the most important inheritor of the Ottoman Empire's heritage, whether in fact, or in the world's cognitive level, it is like this, so it is natural for the Turks to show the glory of the Ottoman Empire, both to make themselves comfortable and to make others uncomfortable. The discomfort of others can be used to make themselves comfortable. In this case, since today's Turks have high-profile propaganda and promised to make Turkey great again, they will naturally deliberately narrate their current self as an organic part of the "great history" since the Ottoman Empire.
Sultan Selim Bridge
It is also important that, in Turkey and other countries in the Middle East, there are also some people who describe the Ottoman Empire as part of the great history of Sunni Muslims, that is, in this sense a certain orthodox view of religious history, in this sense that the history of the Ottoman Empire is not only part of the great past of the Turkish nation, but also the peak of Islamic history, in this sense, it is not only the Turks who miss the Ottoman Empire.
Beijing News: In the book "Modern State and National Construction", you think that the inevitable reason for the failure of nationalism advocated by Mustafa Kemal is: "Because to achieve the so-called 'progress', it is necessary to accept universalism in the European capitalist world, in this case, it is destined to greatly impact or even subvert the core culture/tradition of the nation." Similarly, at the heart of the Mustafa Kemal model was a westernized elite of upper-class political elites. Does this mean that in the process of modernization of the late-developing countries in the East, the top-down political transformation is bound to be affected by the resurgence of tradition and populism, and will eventually be short-lived?
Zan Tao: I am not saying that eastern nationalism, represented by Mustafa Kemal, is bound to fail, but that it inherently contains an insurmountable dilemma, that is, the sentence you quoted. Secular nationalism in Eastern countries is heavily influenced by the West and is often a top-down form of control and indoctrination. In this process, its biggest opponent is the traditional conservative forces within. They are rivals not only in terms of political interests and power, but also in terms of values and ideologies. Turkey's Westernized elite initially started out as a small group of people, but later, after decades of development, this group was not small. However, tradition is very powerful and will not be erased. The Republic of Turkey did not undergo a thorough cultural revolution, and the secularization of the Mustafa Kemal simply excluded the Islamic faith from the public sphere, but in the private sphere it still has its vitality. Once the conditions are ripe, these things will bounce back. But it may not be a resurgence of tradition, or it may be a political use of traditional religions for political gain. Populism and the resurgence of tradition are not the same thing. Populism should actually be translated as populism, as opposed to elitism. In the case of Turkey alone, the transformation of the country brought about by Kemalism is obviously not a flash in the pan, but has a very tenacious vitality.
Beijing News: 2023 is the centenary of Turkey's founding. You conclude that the AKP's political line in Turkey today is "people-oriented, moderate, conservative Islamism." But after 2011, Turkey sought to gain more say in geopolitics and surrounding Arab issues, and led to a revival of the Islamic faith in the Middle East. Does this mean that Mustafa Kemal's political legacy was quickly abandoned? Is the political line chosen by Turkey today motivated by a sense of traditional piety or more from a realistic consideration of changes in the political environment?
Zan Tao: The AKP's strength and long-term dominance in Turkey does not mean that Mustafa Kemal's political legacy has been quickly abandoned. I have a theory that Mustafa Kemalism was marginalized to some extent. This can be seen in the percentage of votes received by traditional Kemal parties in the AKP era, when they often received only about 20% of the vote. But that's not a small number, either. Because that's not to say that the rest of the vote went to conservative political forces. In Turkey, radical secularism and radical Islamism are similar and now do not receive much support, that is, neither of them is mainstream. Kemalism is not just an ideology, it also establishes a secular state, which is still the basic reality of contemporary Turkey and cannot be said to have been quickly abandoned. The choice of AKis is not necessarily religious, and although they are often labeled Islamist, they themselves do not approve of it, and they position themselves as conservative democrats. They are not religious conservatives in the sense of utopianism, but adhere to conservative values, but at the same time are more pragmatic in practice.
Another direction of modernization
Beijing News: Compared with the Mustafa Kemal model pursued by Westernization, in the context of anti-colonialism after World War II, there were also Arab nationalist movements that imitated the Soviet Union's industrialization model + nationalism. This movement has also made European and American countries and Israel tremble with fear. But with the defeat of the 1967 war and Nasser's death, this attempt to modernize quickly came to an end. What do you think of this "illiberal" modernization attempt in the Arab world? Why is Arab nationalism rapidly disappearing from the stage of history compared to Turkey's attempts at secularization?
Zan Tao: There are many reasons for the failure of Arab nationalism. One is that during the Ottoman Empire, the Arab region did not form a unified state, but was divided into pieces, such as the Crescent, the Peninsula, Egypt, the Maghreb, and so on. After World War I, the European imperialist forces divided their spheres of influence in the Arab region, leaving the Arab world in a state of fragmentation for a long time. Naturally, this gave rise to the respective interests of different Arab forces, and this local interest hindered the development of Arab nationalism in pursuit of unity. Not to mention the long-standing tribalism and sectarian contradictions in the Arab region, which are also the cause of the division of the Arab world. These are important prerequisites and constraints for the development of Arab nationalism after World War II. After World War II, the Arabs were able to unite in the face of the newly established Israel, but the defeat in the war eventually frustrated Arab nationalism. Immature Arab nationalism, even if it pursues unity in a pan-Arab sense, is often manifested in the pursuit of some Arab powers for their hegemonic interests in the Arab world, rather than on the alliance of sovereign nation-states. Coupled with the division between the West and Israel, the defeat of Arab nationalism can be imagined.
Egyptian army in the Second Middle East War
Non-liberal modernization is not a phenomenon unique to the Arab region, but a common feature of catch-up modernization in backward countries. This is closely related to the "founding moment" of these countries, that is, whether it is established through turkey's revolutionary war or other countries in the context of the ebb and flow of colonialism, most of them do not have the internal and external conditions for liberal reforms. Catch-up modernization requires the state to concentrate its efforts on "doing big things." Mr. Luo Rongqu believes that the role of the state in the modernization process of third world countries has its rationality, and the "market is underdeveloped and the capitalist economic factors are weak" in underdeveloped countries and regions, making the state a concentrated and powerful force that "organizes economic life and controls society". Mr. Luo believes that in the early stage of national reconstruction, authoritarian-leaning third world countries have played an important role in maintaining high political stability by using their strong national capabilities, and have achieved remarkable results in overcoming and mitigating social disorder and developmental crises caused by the process of rapid change, enhancing social cohesion and strengthening macroeconomic regulation and control of the economy.
Even if we compare it with the history of Europe, we should not be surprised by this. As early as the 1970s, Western scholars such as Charles Tilly said, "In Europe, authoritarian mechanisms were established just before economic growth and universal popular participation." Moreover, the introduction of special skills and talents by European countries has not been hindered by citizenship and nationalist sensitivities. Even more shocking and disturbing is the fact that these Western scholars have found that "war and the threat of war play such a crucial role in the building of a strong European state." ”
Beijing News: After the Third Middle East War and the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty, revivalist Islam quickly returned. After the end of the Cold War, Islamist revivalism developed in a more radical way. At present, Middle Eastern society is being influenced by Islamism to varying degrees. Can you please talk about why this trend of "retro" has emerged in Middle Eastern countries, and what does this have to do with the attempts to modernize and secularize Middle Eastern countries in the twentieth century?
Zan Tao: First of all, this cannot be said to be a "retro" trend. In the Third Middle East War of 1967, the Arab countries again failed. This is, of course, a very important stimulus, and the Arabs will of course reflect on their own problems. One such reflection is the view that the secularist model of development, whether capitalist or socialist, is seen as devoid of the success and dignity that Arabs aspire to. In addition, the Arabs saw the victorious Jews, who not only did not lose their faith, but also seemed to consolidate their faith. All these circumstances have contributed to the development of Islamism. Secularism sees Islam as a problem, and Islamism sees religion as a method and a means. In addition to the above-mentioned big politics, within their respective societies, secularization and modernization have also brought many problems, the traditional social ties of warm pulse have gradually been broken, and the new order has not been established, let alone the widening inequality, which provides the suitable soil for the revival of religion.
Beijing News: Since the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916, European and American countries have been deeply involved in the politics of Middle Eastern countries. Turkey, Iran, and Iraq during the Cold War also became the front line of the U.S.-Soviet struggle for hegemony. The attitude of the United States on the Iranian nuclear issue and the middle East peace and equality issue is also constantly changing with the domestic political environment. Some people believe that the old imperialist countries in Europe and the United States are responsible for the turmoil in the Middle East today, while others believe that the United States is trying to transplant the Western political system to the Middle East with a passion for the fundamentalism of the democratic system. What do you think of the role that European and American countries have played in the Middle East since the twentieth century?
Zan Tao: If we broaden our historical horizons, we can say that the different forces of Christianity in Europe have been involved in the political, economic, cultural and religious development of the Middle East for more than a thousand years. The difference is that before modern times, Islamic societies in the Middle East have long been in a dominant position. For example, the Ottoman Empire was also a european nightmare for a long time. However, as history entered the modern era, the original backward and weak Europe showed a revival and rise, and gradually entered the stage of the coexistence of great powers. Relatively speaking, non-Western regions, including the Middle East, have lagged behind, and a large number of regions have become Western colonies and semi-colonies. If there is no value judgment, then the intervention and influence of Europe and the United States on the Middle East is the manifestation of this historical process of changing times and strong and weak.
As the military, political and cultural imperialist forces that once dominated the world, Europe and the United States are of course responsible for the upheavals in many parts of the world. The United States intervenes in the Middle East both for its own benefit and the arrogance and naivety of enforcing its own version of the modernization and development model. But the United States has the advantage over most countries, and it thinks it can transform others. However, from the actual situation, the United States has brought more problems than it has solved.
Due to the abundance of energy needed by industrial societies in the Middle East and its extremely important and sensitive geographical location, external powers want to establish their own influence when conditions permit.
The struggle between civilization and secularization
Beijing News: In today's world politics, European populists such as Orbán and Le Pen are trying to criticize the identity and identity rift brought about by globalization, and try to mobilize those voters who have been "forgotten" in the process of globalization with traditional national identities and beliefs. If in this context of opposition to globalization and neoliberalism, can we conclude that the context of Islamic revivalism actually has the same background as the revival of right-wing populism in the European and American worlds, and that they are both a response to globalization and the end of history?
Zan Tao: The context of the development of Islamism is much more complex than the populism of Europe today. As I said earlier, the Third Middle East War in 1967 was an important backdrop, which is very different. From the perspective of the Arab Spring, there was a situation in which Islamist political forces came to power, but there were also reversals, for example, in Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood experienced a fate from rising to falling into a trough. The social problems brought about by neoliberalism are indeed an important background to the Arab Spring, and in this context, many countries in the Middle East have been turbulent, giving Islamism the historical conditions to enter the political arena. But Islamist forces have existed before this, and they are not weak, but they have been suppressed for a long time. Islamist or conservative Middle Eastern political forces are not necessarily opposed to neoliberalism, such as Turkey's Justice and Development Party, which is largely on the neoliberal development route economically.
Marie Le Pen, leader of France's right-wing National Front, argues with an immigrant. Le Pen is known for his tough immigration control policies.
Islamism has been an option for the Middle East's modernization path in modern history, but in the era of authoritarianism, secularism has prevailed. Therefore, it does not necessarily have a causal relationship with anti-globalization and the like.
Beijing News: In "From Bagh to Istanbul", you also mentioned the conflict between the Islamic faith and pluralistic politics in the European and American worlds. In the same way, we can see that the traditional interpretation of the conflict between sharia and multiculturalism in European society by social and economic factors has gradually become less explanatory. Also, as mentioned earlier, the resurgence of right-wing conservatism in Europe can amplify the incongruity between heterogeneous civilizations. Do you think this "clash of civilizations" means that the EU's proud path of pluralism and secularization has failed?
Zan Tao: We know that France has a strong tradition of anti-clericalism, and its secularism is revolutionary. So it's not very surprising that France has this reaction. After all, we also often see in the news the radical side of France's secularist stance. But I think we still have to look at this problem in multiple dimensions. For example, how many of the immigrants into Europe are there so-called "radicals"? Did they become "radicals" before they went to Europe, or did they become "radicals" after they arrived in Europe? Are there more or fewer "radicals" with Muslim backgrounds than the radical forces in Europe? Are there any similarities between them? These need to be studied and analyzed. At present, I do not have more detailed data. If a liberal stance is upheld, there should be no some sort of racist or sectarian bias against immigrants. Does the resurgence of right-wing conservatism in Europe mean that European pluralism has failed? Judging from the election situation, it should not be said that it has failed. Of course, it is also true that right-wing conservativeism in Europe is growing. But how much is the connection between immigrants from the Middle East and right-wing politics in Europe? That is, can Middle Eastern migration be seen as the immediate and most important reason for the rise of the Right in Europe? Are there bigger political-economic reasons? For example, the issue of globalization you mentioned earlier may be a good analytical perspective.
Europe needs migration to fill the population and labour gap on the one hand, and culturally excludes immigrants on the other. There doesn't seem to be a good solution to this problem in the short term. But it would be unfair to say that immigration brings problems without opportunities.
According to common sense, immigrants came to Europe with their own last resort, mainly to find more opportunities for development and a better life, rather than to expand their own culture or mission. It seems to me that the question of the integration of immigrants into local society, historically, and in many other places, has been characterized by some universal character, which is not a question of radicalism and liberalism, but above all a fundamental socio-economic problem. Ignoring this can be very misleading.
Beijing News: European countries and intellectuals have repeatedly advocated European values and dialogue on immigration. Middle Eastern immigrant communities in Europe also have a long-standing debate with European governments over turbans and mosques. Do you think European values can reach a "consensus politics" of the social problems that have arisen in recent years, and find another common value context for secularized policies?
Zan Tao: The road will not be very smooth, because it is difficult to have an organization that truly represents the entire immigrant community, even if it is only the immigrant group of a certain country. That said, there will always be a lot of people who will be outside the frame. In any case, the participation of one or more organizations in the political process on behalf of the majority is something to be affirmed and encouraged, since it is much more convenient and hassle-free than dealing with atomized individuals.
The values of the republic are based on the rationalist assumption of equal citizenship, and consensus requires recognition of this premise. For most immigrants, this should be their goal, not an obstacle. But from another point of view, equal citizenship is to withdraw from the sub-identity of citizens, and in real society and daily life, individuals cannot exist only as a rational person, and various sub-identities are also very important, and even can be said to be more real, devout religious beliefs, which are a kind of sub-identity. Therefore, under this "consensus politics", how to deal with heterogeneous beliefs is also the other side of the problem. This is a fresh problem for Europe, and there is no good historical experience to learn from. Because many of the Enlightenment values arose historically, and in that context, there was no problem of Middle Eastern immigration, that is, there was no problem of completely heterogeneous cultures coexisting with them. And the so-called cultural pluralism developed in Europe is not to deal with a heterogeneous culture such as Islamic civilization. From such a historical perspective, Europe needs to constantly explore and "create". History is not over.
Written by Yuan Chunxi
Editor/Zhu Tianyuan
Proofreading/Lin Zhao