Taiwan's defense department restarted its "missile positions" only to "stick to" northern Taiwan

The Taiwan Regional Defense Department recently announced that in order to deploy new ammunition species around Taipei and the "Fraternity Special Zone" and at the same time strengthen the air defense combat capability of western Taiwan facing the Taiwan Strait, it will use six anti-aircraft missile positions that were used during the past US military stationing in Taiwan, and deploy Tianbow III air defense missiles in these six positions to cope with the possible future "air-sea overall war" and "anti-access/ area rejection" around the Taiwan Strait "and other military operations.

This move shows that under the sino-US geostrategic competition structure and the ideological thinking of Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP authorities to "unite the United States to resist China", the military strategic design of the Taiwan region is deeply affected by Sino-US strategic competition; In order to cope with the impact of China's rise and the modernization of the People's Liberation Army on the national interests and geostrategy of the United States, and in order to cooperate with the Indo-Pacific strategy of the United States to encircle and Chinese mainland "go out," the focus of Taiwan's overall defense strategy of "heavy deterrence and defense stubbornness" has been mainly based on the northern part of Taiwan's main island.

Restart the strategic deployment of US air defense positions

At present, the Taiwan regional defense department's air defense deployment in Taipei is currently made by Patriot II and III missiles as the main air defense force, but these missile positions, in addition to the "Nangang Company" and the "Xindian Company" are "anti-missile" tasks, the Patriot Missile Company deployed in Wanli in New Taipei City is actually mainly to carry out the "anti-aircraft" task in the airspace in the northeast corner of Taiwan's main island, and is combined with the Tiangong II air defense missiles in Sanzhi in New Taipei City to take turns to prepare for combat.

Judging from the map, the airspace facing the Taiwan Strait in the northwest of the main island of Taiwan is not tight enough, and the air defense south of Sanzhi in New Taipei City is not tight enough, and it is not until the Dadu Mountain Area in Taichung that there is a Tiangong II missile position deployed. Therefore, the "Air Defense and Missile Command" announcement of the Taiwan Regional Defense Department will conduct an explanatory meeting to reorganize and rebuild the six anti-aircraft missile positions that have been used by the US military in the past, including at Miaoli West Lake, Taoyuan Guishan, Taoyuan Mountain, Taoyuan Mountain, Yilan Suao Fortress Mountain, Hualien Meilun Mountain, and Taitung Zhiben.

Among them, the Miaoli West Lake and Taoyuan Guishan Bases deployed the Goddess of Victory missiles in the early years of the US military stationed in Taiwan, and the camps and ammunition depots are currently listed as "flat seal war starters," that is, "closed in peacetime and activated in wartime." In the future, new firing control areas suitable for Tianbow III missiles and new positions for ammunition storage will be built. Taiwan's defense department last year allocated 74.8 billion yuan to purchase 12 sets of Tiangong III missiles, which is only about one-third of the price of patriot missiles.

The Tiangong III missile has a combat range of 200 kilometers, an altitude of 45 kilometers, and a speed of Mach 7; in the future, after the Tiangong III missiles are stationed at these two bases, they will fill the air defense gap in the northwest of Taiwan's main island. The remaining four missile positions, such as the foot of Taoyuan Mountain, Yilan Su'ao Fortress Mountain, Hualien Meilun Mountain and Taitung Zhiben, have also been deployed in the past.

The center of gravity of "heavy deterrence and defensive entrenchment" has shifted to northern Taiwan

This shows that Taiwan's overall defense strategy design of "heavy deterrence and defensive entrenchment" has changed qualitatively, and the focus of the "stubborn defense" has shifted to northern Taiwan, echoing the news that the taiwan regional defense department seems to be interested in moving all the "sea dragon frog soldiers" stationed on the outer outlying islands to the banks of the Tamsui River and keelung rivers to hold Taipei and guard against the PLA's "landing" and "beheading" operations. Ko Wen-che, chairman of the People's Party and mayor of Taipei, also said that if Chinese mainland wants to use force against Taiwan, it must adopt the tactic of "beheading" by directly attacking The main island of Taiwan.

Indeed, under the guidance of the PLA's military preparations for "active defense" and "winning informationized local wars," the PLA has continued to increase the development of military strength in the navy, air force, and rocket force, and has actively refined its troop organization and tactical tactics to enhance its joint combat capability. At the same time, since the offensive operation has always been one of the main combat preparation targets of the PLA, various exercises have also been institutionalized and normalized in recent years.

Today, the People's Liberation Army has the ability to blockade Taiwan, carry out diversified operations, and advance into the outlying islands outside the Taiwan region, and its overall combat strength development has broken through the blockade and encirclement of the United States in the first island chain, and developed long-range force projection capabilities to the western Pacific region; Taiwan, on the other hand, due to its own defense planning and limited resources, cannot compare with Chinese mainland in terms of defense budget, military development, and military strength growth, which naturally puts great pressure on Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP authorities, who have always advocated "resisting China and defending Taiwan/independence."

As for the United States, although based on the need to safeguard its Indo-Pacific interests and respond quickly to regional emergencies, in addition to maintaining the forward deployment of troops in the Asia-Pacific region, it also holds regular joint military exercises with allies to enhance joint operational capabilities in order to maintain its strategic advantage in the Asia-Pacific region; However, it is still manipulating the security issue in the Taiwan Strait in a two-sided way of "strategic ambiguity," and only willing to sell arms to Taiwan, and even lending money to Taiwan to buy US arms sales to implement the "guarantee" of Taiwan's "assistance in enhancing its self-defense capability" and avoid stepping on the bottom line and red line of the Chinese mainland for "core interests."

In this way, the "promise" of the United States to be "solid" is like a "floating cloud" and has become the most untrustworthy "ally" between Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP authorities. Under the circumstance that it is necessary to cooperate with the strategic deployment of the United States and take into account Taiwan's own defense planning and limited resources, it seems that the Ukrainian side can only take the Ukrainian side's stubbornness in Kiev during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and avoid Zelenskiy's "beheading" as a mirror, and shift the center of gravity of "heavy deterrence and defense stubbornness" to northern Taiwan, with "sticking" to northern Taiwan, or more precisely, "sticking to" Taipei and the "Fraternity Special Zone" as the mainstay.

Scholars from the Taiwan Regional Defense Department, who said that they had been exaggerated and misinterpreted by the media as "attacking the Three Gorges Dam with two missiles," said that the air defense range of the Tiangong III missile could be extended from Sanzhi in New Taipei City to the Matsu Islands, so if a position was added to Guishan in Taoyuan, it would help to form an overlapping air defense network between Taipei and the air defense circle of the "Fraternity Special Zone," and form a better combination of combat strength with the Patriot missiles, and use the "quantity" of the Tiangong III missiles to offset the threat of PLA fighters to northern Taiwan.

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Author Xiao Hengzhong, Research Fellow, Center for Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao and East Asia Studies, Central China Normal University

Editor-in-Charge: Huang Yang