Biden's statement of "defending Taiwan by means of armed intervention" has made all parties suspicious. Based on the overall U.S. China policy and the scope of its capabilities in the Taiwan Strait region, this is not so much a "tactical clarity" as it is just a move of cognitive warfare. As far as the so-called "Commitment to Taiwan" is concerned, the White House's supplementary notes and Blinken's speech at George Washington University are more informative and clearer.
The United States lacks an international legal basis and moral support for its intervention in the Taiwan issue. Although he has repeatedly violated his political commitments to the Chinese side by saying one thing and doing one thing after another, in fact his ability to intervene in the Taiwan Strait is relatively low, especially in military intervention. For some time now, I have used military means to counter the collusion and provocations between the United States and Taiwan, which has made the US side deeply feel its will and ability to safeguard national sovereignty and security and promote reunification. Senior U.S. officials have repeatedly stressed that they will not seek conflict with China and demanded that "Taiwan learn lessons to improve its self-defense capabilities," reflecting the idea that the United States is not willing to "go down" itself.
In his speech, Blinken also acknowledged the limited ability of the United States to change China's behavior, announcing that it would shift its focus to "shaping the strategic environment around Beijing." Under the overall framework of the United States' determination to carry out competition with China through "systemic pressure," the so-called "defense assistance against Taiwan" by the United States will not exceed the military means of providing "Taiwan self-defense." In other words, the priority option for the United States to intervene in the Taiwan issue is to assist Taiwan in "self-defense."
"New York Times" analyzed on the 24th that the Biden administration on the one hand actively strengthened the posture of the US military in the Indo-Pacific region, on the other hand, it is accelerating the transformation of Taiwan's defense system, hoping to deter Chinese mainland from taking military action against Taiwan. Ukraine has become the "most important example" of the US and Taiwan authorities, that is, Taiwan can also "defeat the strong with the weak."
Comprehensive observation, at present, the IDEA of the US side to "assist in the defense of Taiwan" is: On the periphery, it will carry out deterrence against China with "tactical clarity" in policy and "dynamic deployment" in military terms; on the inside line, with arms sales to Taiwan and "training" with Taiwan as the focus, Taiwan will be armed as much as possible into a "porcupine island" or a "defendable island." In the event of war, it may refer to the "Ukrainian experience" to provide intelligence, early warning and offshore command for the Taiwan military to improve the lethality of its weapons system; at the same time, on the basis of weaving the Asia-Pacific alliance system and the global alliance system, it is necessary to gather and coerce allies and partners to participate in "condemnation" of China, sanctions and military assistance to varying degrees.
It is precisely because of this consideration that the "one-China" policy of the United States has been retreating and is committed to framing the narrative of "aggression in the Taiwan Strait."Biden spoke up and the White House clarified that "the policy remains unchanged", which has also become a new routine for implementing "tactical clarity" toward Taiwan. The US State Department has openly pointed out that "the United States does not agree with China's 'one-China principle,'" and even included the "six guarantees" promised to Taiwan privately as the guidance of the US version of the "one-China policy." Once the US side judges enough conditions, it is not excluded that they will also include "using military assistance to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait" in the content of the Taiwan Strait policy. White House national security adviser Sullivan said, "Use all tools to ensure that military action against Taiwan or unilateral changes to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait will not happen." This is the real Taiwan Strait policy of the United States.
With regard to arms sales to Taiwan, the United States is adjusting and delaying some of its arms sales to Taiwan in accordance with the need to "assist in the defense of Taiwan" and grab commercial benefits.
In a may 10 testimony in Congress, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Haynes declared that Taiwan is in a critical period between now and 2030, and that Chinese mainland is working to strengthen its military to withstand U.S. intervention in "taking over Taiwan." Therefore, the US side suggested that in the case of the Taiwan authorities' limited defense budget and the temporary inability to increase, they should not first buy large-scale heavy equipment, but should step up the procurement and deployment of "Asymmetric warfare" weapons. This is also an important reason why the US State Department called for the suspension of the M109A6 self-propelled gun case some time ago, refused to sell the MH-60R anti-submarine helicopter, and proposed an alternative to the M142 Haimas multiple rocket system. In addition, the United States has also encouraged Taiwan to purchase additional mobile weapons such as Harpoon anti-ship missiles, bayonet anti-aircraft missiles, and javelin anti-tank missiles.
In terms of "co-training" with Taiwan, the US military's special operations forces have gone to the island to "assist in training" the Taiwan military, which has become an important part of US-Taiwan military exchanges.
According to Taiwan media reports, the "co-training" of the US military entering the island is carried out at least 1-2 times a year, and the practice is carried out by the U.S. Army's First Special Operations Corps stationed in Okinawa and dispatching the ODA special operations detachment under its jurisdiction. In addition, the US Army Security Cooperation Brigade's guidance on the joint service battalion of the Taiwan Army also surfaced last year. This year, the United States and Taiwan will also launch the "non-commissioned officer exchange plan", the future of the US military "training" the scale of the Taiwan military is expected to expand significantly, from the experience of the US military to assist in the training of the Ukrainian army, the interoperability of asymmetric weapons such as US-made man-portable missile launchers, unmanned aerial vehicles, network electronic equipment will be the focus. Davidson, commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, has said that 2027 may be a turning point in the Taiwan Strait, the Ukrainian army has trained for 8 years to have today's combat strength, and Taiwan's "time is very tight."
According to the US vision, the premise of "assisting in the defense of Taiwan" is that Taiwan has the ability to "defend itself," and in the words of Mark Milley, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Taiwan's best defense is done by the Taiwanese." Obviously, the DPP authorities will not and do not dare to defy this US design.
In a recent interview with the US National Public Radio, Wu Chao-sup said that Taiwan's "government" will learn "Ukrainian techniques" to defend against a more powerful enemy, "defending Taiwan is our own responsibility," but Taiwan also needs "international support" to provide Taiwan with "necessary means." This is simply a seamless coupling with the US side's statement.
Lai Yizhong, a think tank of the Tsai Ing-wen administration, even proposed that Taiwan is becoming a confrontation point in the Indo-Pacific strategy of "China-Russia vs. the United States, Japan and Australia", and what Taiwan must learn from Ukraine's experience is not only how to "not lose", but how to "win", so as to ensure that it is in a favorable position in the negotiations.
Taiwan's military is also absorbing the "Ukrainian experience" to evaluate and verify the "Porcupine Island" defense operation. During the wargame deduction phase of the "Han Guang No. 38" exercise in mid-May, the Taiwan military switched to the method of deduction on the map. Taiwan's defense department declared that the main purpose is to learn from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and review the "solid security plan" for defending Taiwan, including asymmetric operations, field air defense, and cognitive operations. It is worth noting that one of the changes in the exercise was to change the previous concept of "annihilating the enemy on the beach shore" to "annihilating the enemy in the position", that is, to simulate the town warfare and mountain warfare in which short troops meet each other.
In other words, the DPP authorities are committed to arming themselves as a "porcupine" to form a heavy defense system. However, the pig thorn is not a steel plate, under the heavy blow of absolute superiority, its resistance to pressure and countermeasures is limited, and the porcupine itself will suffer more damage. More importantly, once drastic measures need to be taken, the PLA is fighting a target war, and there is no need to pull out the thorns one by one.
What needs to be noted is that when designing the "porcupine" strategy, the US military and its experts have taken into account the consequences of causing major "collateral damage" (including the destruction of Taiwan), which is actually to fulfill the "proxy" role of the Taiwan authorities at the expense of the lives of Taiwan's military and civilians.