In several Middle East wars, the air forces of Arab countries always lost to the Israeli air force by a huge margin in air battles, and the MiG fighters lost face. For this reason, Soviet Air Force pilots always blamed the "undertraining" and "lack of courage" of the Afghan Air Force pilots.
But what happened when "technically excellent" Soviet pilots flew their own MiGs into air battles with Israeli fighter jets? Before the outbreak of the Fourth Middle East War, the Soviets experienced it.
The MiG lost face in the Middle East
After the end of the Third Middle East War (Six-Day War) in 1967, Israeli forces occupied the eastern side of the Suez Canal, forming an informal ceasefire with Egypt. On March 8, 1969, Egyptian President Nasser announced the end of the ceasefire, and the two sides began a "war of attrition" that lasted more than a year. During this period, several air battles broke out between Israel and Egypt, but the air battles were one-sided.
As early as the Six-Day War, the Egyptian Air Force suffered heavy losses, with 336 aircraft of all types (most of which were destroyed on the ground), including 147 fighters, including 90 state-of-the-art MiG-21 fighters. The Egyptian side shot down only 19 Israeli military aircraft, of which only 2 were shot down in the air battle.
If the Six-Day War was a surprise to the Egyptian Air Force, during the ensuing War of Attrition, Egypt's MiG-21 and Su-7 fighters still frequently lost to Israel's Mirage III in air battles. In September 1969, the most advanced U.S. F-4E Phantom fighter jet was delivered to Israel, further inflicting heavy damage on Egyptian MiGs.
In July 1969, the Israeli Air Force violently attacked the northern section of the Suez Canal, shooting down eight MiGs in the air battle, without any losses. In August, the Israeli army violently attacked the Egyptian anti-aircraft missile positions, shooting down 21 MiGs and losing only three of themselves (mainly ground-to-air fire). On 11 September, Egypt sent 16 fighter jets against the Israeli army, eight MiG-17s shot down by the Mirage III and three Su-7s shot down by ground-to-air fire. Throughout the War of Attrition, Israel claimed to have shot down hundreds of MiGs (exaggerated) and lost only four Mirages.
Under this one-sided superiority in air combat, Israeli "Ghost" fighters even penetrated deep into the west bank of the canal, almost completely suppressed the Egyptian air defense system, and began to strike various strategic targets to force Egypt to negotiate peace.
Faced with a dilemma, Egyptian President Nasser flew to Moscow on January 22, 1970, asking the Soviet Union to provide Egypt with a "reliable air defense network", and the Soviet authorities quickly responded.
The Soviets thought that Egyptian pilots were not good
At that time, Egypt's MiG-21 fighters were quite numerous, but in air combat, they could not defeat the Mirage III and the Phantom, which were also second-generation aircraft. Soviet Air Force officials and pilots generally believed that this was due to the poor training and technical level of Egyptian pilots.
But in fact, although many people have 2,000 hours of flight experience than their Israeli counterparts, many Egyptian pilots have 1,000 hours of experience (recalls Shazli, chief of the general staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces), and are not the "rookies" that ordinary people mistakenly think. Despite this, the Soviets were still stubborn that the MiG-21 did not have the problem of "technological backwardness", and the problem was that the Egyptians could not do it.
Beginning in March 1970, the Soviet Union sent a complete 18th Special Air Defense Rocket Division to Egypt, which was equipped with the newly improved SAM-2 and the updated SAM-3 anti-aircraft missiles, in addition to three squadrons of the 135th Fighter Aviation Regiment, all equipped with the newly improved MiG-21MF. Soon, more than 10,000 Soviet advisers began in Egypt to help extend sam missile positions toward the Suez Canal.
The Soviet MiG-21MF was stationed in southern Cairo and did not share an air base with the Egyptians, so there was little interaction between the pilots on both sides. Perhaps out of overconfidence, the Soviets refused to ask their Egyptian counterparts for information on Israeli air combat tactics, and ridiculed the courage of Egyptian pilots and belittled their flying skills.
On the other hand, since few Soviets spoke Arabic, they brought their own radar stations and communicated with MiGs in the air in Russian. This is very serious, because Israel has a large number of immigrants from the Soviet Union, and it is easy for the intelligence services to eavesdrop on the Soviet radio content.
Objectively speaking, Soviet technical assistance was effective, and despite repeated israeli attacks, the Soviet military succeeded in slowly advancing sam's positions near the canal.
On June 27 of the same year, Egypt, supported by Soviet radar and SAM missiles, dispatched eight warplanes to attack targets on the east bank of the canal. During the air battle, two Egyptian MiGs were shot down, but one Mirage III was also successfully shot down. On June 30, Soviet-operated SAM missiles successfully shot down two Israeli F-4 Phantoms. In July, the forward Sam position shot down two more F-4s, killing Shmuelkhtz, one of the Israeli Air Force's most prominent squadron commanders.
Faced with new threats, the Israeli Air Force began to brew new plans.
Israel's "Decoy Program"
In June 1970, Israel's radio intelligence services spotted Soviet pilots starting combat patrols over the Suez Canal. But to avoid conflict with the Soviet Union, Israeli top brass briefly forbade pilots from engaging Soviet fighter jets.
But as sam positions continued to push toward the Suez Canal, the Israelis could not sit still. IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Sham Barlev and Air Force Commander Morty Hodder strongly advocated letting the Soviets "taste the pain." On July 25 of the same year, a MiG-21 piloted by Soviet pilots shot down an Israeli A-4 Aquila attack aircraft in the Sinai Peninsula. Taking this opportunity, the Israeli military leadership finally forced Prime Minister Mrs. Meir to change course and decide to confront the Soviet army.
The Israeli Air Force developed an action plan called the Rimon 20, sending seemingly vulnerable fighter jets to Egyptian airspace to lure Soviet fighter jets into attack. The first part of the Rimon 20 was planned to simulate the high-altitude flight of two Mirage III reconnaissance aircraft, but the "Two Reconnaissance Mirage III" consisted of four heavily armed Mirage III in dense formations, allowing Soviet radar to make a misjudgment.
The second part of the operation was carried out by four F-4E "Ghosts" posing as A-4 "Skyhawks" along the canal. Meanwhile, four other Mirage III flew low to the south, dodging Soviet radar as ambushes. Four other Mirage III aircraft were deployed at Refidium Air Base in the central Sinai Peninsula as a reserve for rapid response.
The Israeli pilots involved in the decoy operation were elite pilots carefully selected from each squadron, and there was even a fierce internal selection within each squadron. Almost all of the pilots involved in the war had actual combat experience in "shooting down a MiG".
The "decoys" of the simulated reconnaissance aircraft consisted of four Phantom III of the 119th Squadron, the captain of the long aircraft, Lieutenant Colonel Amos Amir, the second aircraft, the Asher Sneil, the third aircraft Avram Salmon, and the fourth aircraft Avi Girard. It is worth mentioning that the cumulative number of MiGs shot down by these four pilots reached 7.
The four F-4Es disguised as the A-4 were from the 69th Squadron. The new F-4E has a new long-range airborne radar capable of firing Sparrow missiles beyond the line of sight. The captains were Squadron Leader Avihu Bennon, Aircraft Ii Avim Serra, Aircraft Iii Ehud Hankin, And Fourth Uri Gill. Since Israel's F-4E was mainly used for ground attacks, the pilots involved in the war had a less historical record than the decoy force Phantom pilots.
The four Phantom III, which served as ambushers, came from the 117th Squadron, with captain Uri Iannier, aircraft Ii Itama Neuena, aircraft Yehuda Coren in aircraft iii, and Kirby Richter in aircraft iv.
The four Phantom III, who served as reserves, came from The 101st Squadron and were led by Squadron Leader Iftah Spector.
Judging from the layout of the fighters, the main force of the Air War of the Israeli Army at that time was still dominated by the "Phantom III", and there was only one team of "ghosts" in the combat troops. In fact, during the Yom Kippur War of 1973, most of the results of the air combat also came from the Mirage III, not the F-4E "Ghost" touted by Western history books.
Their number doesn't matter, ours must be zero!
On July 27, Israeli commanders scheduled to enter the war flew to Tel Aviv for a comprehensive mission briefing. At the briefing, Israeli Commander-in-Chief Dayan asked the pilots to "shoot down as many MiGs as possible," while Air Force Commander Hodd further emphasized that the key to the mission was that israeli fighter jets could not lose anything: "It doesn't matter how many of them are numbered, we have to be zero!" ”
Avihu Bennon, the captain of the 69th Squadron piloting the Phantom, later recalled that he was excited but knew nothing about the technical level of the Soviet pilots, and even speculated that the MiG-21MF, which the Soviets used themselves, had "some kind of new type of weapon or equipment."
The bait operation was originally scheduled for July 29, but was postponed by one day for some reason. At 2 p.m. on July 30, four Phantom III of the Israeli 119th Squadron took off from the airfield. The decoy squad first flew low to the south shore of the Gulf of Suez, then climbed north to more than 10,000 meters and began to form a dense formation in pairs, looking like "two reconnaissance aircraft" on radar. The decoy formation then continued to use standard reconnaissance radio calls and flew along the normal reconnaissance route to Suez City.
Sure enough, the Soviet pilots were hooked! After receiving the notice of the radar station, 12 MiG-21MF urgently took off from two airfields to intercept the so-called "two Israeli reconnaissance aircraft."
At the same time, four "ghosts" posing as A-4 attack aircraft attacked a Radar Station of the Egyptian Army. The Soviets then flew another 8 MiG-21MF to intercept the so-called A-4 attack aircraft.
With its long-range radar detection capability, the "Ghost" first spotted the incoming MiG and quickly greeted it. However, the "Phantom III" that cooperated with the "Ghost" crew dropped the chain, and the 117th Squadron Leader and the Second Squadron, which served as the ambusher, both had engine failures and were forced to return, and the Third and Fourth were also late.
In the end, Israel had 14 fighters (10 Mirages, 4 Ghosts) in the war, while the Soviets had 16 MiG-21MF on the battlefield.
The Soviet MiGs collapsed
The four Phantom III, who served as bait, were the first to go into battle. The Soviets' initial input of 8 MiGs (4 unengaged) approached the decoy squad from the west. Lieutenant Colonel Amos Amir, the captain of the Israeli 119th Squadron, led the team to continue luring the MiGs eastward, bringing them closer to the Red Sea. Immediately, Lieutenant Colonel Amir ordered the auxiliary fuel tank to be thrown away and turn around to fight with the MiG!
At this time, four Phantom fighters also approached the battlefield, but due to the difficulty of radar recognition, they were forced to abandon the use of AIM-7 "Sparrow" medium-range missiles and also engaged in close-range air combat.
Israel was calculating, while the Soviets were paralyzed, and the Israeli military electronically interfered with the radio frequencies of the Soviet army's ground command system, which caught the Soviet fighters, who were accustomed to relying on ground command, by surprise and quickly became confused.
Salmon, the third aircraft of the decoy squad, spotted two MiG-21s slightly above 11 o'clock and chased the two F-4s. He seized the opportunity to bite one of them and fired the AIM-9D Sidewinder. He watched in amazement as the Soviet pilots catapulted out, the parachute immediately opened, and Salmon became the first record player of the day.
At this time, the long and second planes of the decoy squad also chased after a team of MiGs. At this moment, the second machine, Sneil, saw two other MiG-21s flying overhead, and he couldn't help but turn sharply to the left and chase them. Amir was temporarily blinded by the sun and lost sight of Sneil. Amir heard Sneil shouting "Albel II hit!" But then came the news that "Alber II was injured and was returning, and the aircraft was under control". The reckless Sneil managed to shoot down a MiG-21, but was also injured by another MiG with an "atoll", but was lucky enough to return to the airport.
The "Ghost" squad's long-time machine Bennon and the second aircraft, Serra, are constantly looking for targets in the air. At an altitude of 4500 meters, Serra spotted a MiG-21 biting him, but he easily forced the MiG to overtake him with a high G-barrel movement and bite the other side. Serra later recalled: "The Russians made every mistake in the textbooks. After the MiG was bitten, it began to spiral down in an attempt to get rid of Serra's attack.
After two or three turns, Sierra finally met the firing requirements at an altitude of 600 meters, firing an AIM-9D Sidewinder. The missile hit the MiG-21, but after the smoke cleared, Soviet fighters continued to fly. Serra quickly fired a sidewinder, but before the missile hit, the MiG disintegrated on its own, and the Soviet pilots successfully parachuted.
The only two remaining Phantom III of the ambush squad arrived belatedly, and Crane III and Richter, Aircraft IV, set off from low altitude, threw away the auxiliary fuel tank and quickly climbed up. When they arrived at the battlefield, they found the sky full of maneuvering phantoms, ghosts and miGs, as well as crisscrossing missile trajectories. The two Mirage III saw four MiG-21s below and swooped down, forcing each other to scatter. The two men each picked a single MiG, while the Soviet pilots dive and frantically maneuvered a stunt maneuver.
Coren and Richter fired domestic "Dragonfly" missiles, but neither achieved infrared tracking guidance, and the two immediately launched a cannon attack.
At this time, the "Ghost" squad leader Bennon also found the MiG machine that was being chased by the ambush squad. The Ghost's rear-seat radar crew locked on to one of the MiG-21s, while Bennon fired a Sparrow, which flew past Coron's Mirage III, destroying the MiGs in front.
Finally, Salmon, who was the first to open the record, caught up with another MiG, firing a Sidewinder, and the missile exploded near the MiG without shooting down the other side. Subsequently, Specket, the captain of the 101st Squadron who was in reserve, arrived and fired two AIM-9Ds, which flew over Salmon's cockpit and exploded in the tail of the MiG.
The MiG-21 was very tenacious in life, still accelerating its escape, Salmon chased after it, but it did not shoot down the other side after the shells, so it had to give up the pursuit. However, the tenacious MiG-21 eventually crashed during a forced landing at the airport, and Salmon and Spector shared the results afterwards.
Soviet pilots ridiculed as "flying aerobatics"
The entire battle lasted only four minutes, with the Israelis shooting down four MiG-21Fs and one crashing on the way back, including two For the Phantoms and three for the Mirage III. Only one Phantom III was injured.
When the Israeli fighters returned to the airport, they were wildly celebrated by the ground personnel and sprinkled with champagne. However, after landing, The Third Aircraft of the Ambush Squad, Coren, found that his Mirage III had knocked off the pylon of the Dragonfly missile when it threw away the auxiliary fuel tank before the air battle, which led to the failure of the launch.
After the battle, an Israeli pilot commented: "The Russian pilots are terrible, although at first we were a little uneasy ... Russian pilots were highly skilled in flying, but they seemed to be doing only stunts, not air combat at all. ”
For years, the air battle that preceded the Fourth Middle East War was kept secret by both sides. However, soviet pilots personally piloted the MiG-21, still suffered a fiasco, and the impact on the Egyptians was great. Shazli, then chief of the general staff of the Egyptian Armed Forces, later recalled that the Soviets refused to admit that their fighters were bad, but devalued the skills and courage of the Egyptian pilots, and the battle punched the Soviets in the face.
On the other hand, Egyptian confidence in Soviet fighter jets was also affected. During the Fourth Middle East War in 1973, the MiG-21 of the Egyptian Air Force passively avoided the battle, except for the first day of the war, which was more active, and has been hiding in the fire circle of sam missiles ever since.
The day after the end of the air battle, the commander of the Soviet Air Force arrived in Egypt for a "vacation in Luxor." It was later learned that when the Soviet air commander landed, he issued very clear instructions to the Soviet task force: "Whoever talks about this battle with friends or family members of the (fighter) squadron will leave Egypt and the plane will fly directly to Siberia." ”
Israeli pilots, on the other hand, were also barred from discussing engagement and could not mark down Soviet aircraft on fighter jets. (Author: Tao Mujian)