Wang Jinbin, Executive Deputy Secretary of the Party Committee of the School of Economics, Chinese Min University, this article is reproduced from the April 2022 issue of Academic Frontier magazine (weChat has abridged).
First, the world has moved from the era of super-globalization to the era of slow globalization
The remarkable feature of the economic globalization process in the 1990s is that the rise of the global industrial chain positioning, production layout and sales network with multinational companies as the carrier has become the core force dominating economic globalization, industrial "outsourcing" has become the key word in the evolution of the industrial chain in developed economies, multinational companies have promoted the change and adjustment of the global industrial division of labor pattern at low cost, and the rapid progress of information technology has enabled product research and development, production, management and risk control to break the constraints of geographical restrictions. The decline in transportation costs has allowed the global low-cost arbitrage strategy of multinational companies to produce products to be conditionally implemented and completed, and the global economy has become a "barge economics" (Palley, 2011). Multinational companies have expanded and promoted the formation of domestic industrial chains and value chains through production and operation methods such as technology spillover and supplier localization. The globalization of the industrial chain has promoted the trade-oriented growth model into a new period of development, and global trade in goods and services has become the engine of world economic growth. Over the past 20 years, per capita GDP has increased by an average of 3.4 per cent for countries that have managed to increase participation in global value chains and the value added within China for exports, while those that have only increased participation in global value chains without upgrading domestic value chains have increased by an average of 2.2 per cent (UNITED Nations Trade and Development Organization, 2013).
According to the International Monetary Fund (WEO), before the 2008 financial crisis, the simple average growth rate of global trade in goods and services from 1990 to 2007 increased by 7.0% year-on-year, which was much higher than the simple average growth rate of the world economy by 3.7%. After the financial crisis, global demand was weak and the growth rate of global trade fell sharply. From 2008 to 2009, the average negative growth rate in the two years was 3.9%, which was lower than the global economic growth rate of 1.1% in the two years. With the introduction of anti-crisis measures in some important economies, the world economy and trade resumed growth, but the simple average growth rate from 2010 to 2018 was only 5.0%, compared with 3.8% global GDP growth in this period. In 2019, global trade in goods and services grew by only 0.91%, while the global economy grew by 2.8%. The global spread of COVID-19 in 2020 has had a severe impact on the world economy. To this day, the epidemic has not completely dissipated. From 2020 to 2021, the average growth rate of global trade in goods and services in two years is only 0.3%, and the global economic growth rate in the same period is about 1.0%. It can be seen that since 2008, the growth rate of world trade has dropped sharply, and the growth of global value chain (GVC) trade based on industrial chains has stagnated or even declined (World Bank, 2020). Especially due to the global trade frictions since 2018 and the impact of the new crown pneumonia epidemic, global trade growth has almost stagnated. According to the WTO's forecast, global trade will grow by 4.7% in 2022, which will once again exceed the global economic forecast growth rate of 4.1%, world trade is struggling to move forward in twists and turns, and globalization has moved from super globalization to slow globalization (slowbalization) era.
From a trade perspective, the GVC participation rate can be measured by the share of indirect trade in total exports (Borin and Mancini, 2019); from a production perspective, the GVC participation rate can be measured as the share of the domestic value added of unfinished exports in total value added (Wang et al., 2017). According to the WTO (2021a) research report, from 1995 to 2008, with the global positioning and layout of the industrial chain of multinational companies, the rapid expansion of the global value chain led to a rapid increase in the participation rate, the participation rate of trade-based global value chains rose from 35.2% to 46.1%, and the participation rate of production-based value chains rose from 9.6% to 14.2%. After the global financial crisis, the return of supply chains led to a brief sharp decline in global value chains, which rebounded in 2010. Since then, it has remained in a roughly stable state. The COVID-19 pandemic has had a negative impact on global value chain participation, but it is largely in line with the weak trend that has prevailed since 2010. By the end of 2020, the participation rate of the global trade value chain was 44.4% and the participation rate of the global production value chain was 12.1%.
According to the WTO (2021 a) research report, from the perspective of global exports, the average annual growth rate of global exports from 2000 to 2010 was 8.7%, and the average annual growth rate of indirect exports was 9.7%,; while the average annual growth rate of global exports from 2010 to 2019 was 3.7%, and the average annual growth rate of indirect exports was 3.8%. In the era of slow globalization, although the growth rate of indirect trade has dropped sharply, it has remained at a level slightly higher than the growth rate of global exports, which shows that the global industrial division of labor still has the rigidity of comparative advantages. From the perspective of the indirect trade growth rate of the world's top five value chain exporters, the growth rate of indirect export trade of Germany, the United States, China, the Netherlands and France from 2000 to 2010 was 9.8%, 5.2%, 20%, 11.1% and 4.2%, respectively, and from 2010 to 2019, it was 4.5%, 5.9%, 4.6%, 5.7% and 4.0%, respectively, and the growth rate of indirect exports as a whole showed a significant decline. At the same time, we see that developing economies with smaller economies are rapidly integrating into global industrial and value chains. From 2010 to 2019, the average annual growth rate of indirect trade between Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam reached 17.1%, 16.5% and 14.3%. The labor cost of these economies is relatively low, and the cost comparative advantage has caused the migration and redistribution of the global industrial chain, which confirms that the layout logic of the global industrial chain of multinational companies is changing, and more labor-intensive parts are transferred to developing countries. The migration and evolution of the global industrial chain reveals the interdependence of the global economic industrial chain and the dependence of enterprises on the global value chain, while the decline in the growth rate of indirect exports represents the evolution of the industrial chain reflects a more refined professional development direction and the re-segmentation of production regions.
Second, the new trend of the industrial chain in the era of slow globalization
Since the 2008 global financial crisis, global trade has grown slowly, the expansion of global value chains has stalled, the trade-led growth model has been severely challenged, and conflicts between major powers may lead to the reduction or fragmentation of global value chains (World Bank, 2020). According to WTO data, import restrictions have increased since 2009, when the monitoring of accumulated unrestricted restrictions began in 2009, and after the escalation of global trade frictions in 2018, there has been a significant increase. By the end of 2020, about 8.6% of world imports were affected by import restrictions imposed since 2009. As of mid-October 2021, the global effective import restrictions were about $1.5 trillion, accounting for about 8.7% of the world's total imports.
The sharp decline in global trade growth and the correction in the participation rate of global value chains, especially the trade conflict and the impact of the epidemic, have exposed the vulnerability of some global industrial chains and supply chain links. For the sake of security and competition, countries around the world have localized and regionalized the industrial chain to accelerate the globalization of the replacement industrial chain. The migration, adjustment and restructuring of the industrial chain will become a significant feature of globalization in the post-epidemic era. Geopolitical competition among major powers has triggered a new round of technological competition, and mastering core technologies and seizing the commanding heights of technology have become the key to industrial chain security and occupying a favorable position in competition. At the same time, new technological changes have accelerated the emergence of a global industrial chain beyond the traditional production-based industrial chain, and service trade, especially digital trade, has become a new trend in the evolution of the global industrial chain.
Regionalization and localization of the industrial chain
As the only multilateral institution providing a free and non-discriminatory trading system, the WTO is one of the indispensable core international institutions, the WTO's "consensus" decision-making mechanism is struggling in multilateral rule-making and market access negotiations, and the United States is the country that uses the most veto power and emphasizes US interests with unilateralism. In particular, after Trump was elected president of the United States in 2017, he proposed an "America First" foreign policy and frantically "withdrew from the group", causing serious damage to the world multilateralism framework, bringing major uncertainties to the order and predictability of international economic operations, and making globalization encounter adverse currents. After Biden was elected president of the United States in 2021, although he shouted slogans against trade wars and safeguarded multilateral trade agreements, the world economic and trade order did not improve, but further intensified the tension between geopolitics and economic and trade relations. Especially affected by the new crown pneumonia epidemic, global governance lacks consensus and effective institutional coordination, and the new crown pneumonia epidemic has caused a huge impact on the global industrial chain. According to the WTO-IMF COVID-19 Vaccine Trade Tracker, vaccination rates in high-income economies worldwide will be 75.4% by the end of 2021, compared with only 49.5% and 34.5% in low- and middle-income economies. Even on vaccine export-related aspects, export restrictions continue to hamper vaccine production and create uncertainty about supplier delivery times (WTO, 2021b). Differences in vaccinations and epidemic prevention and control strategies and levels have led to partial ruptures in the global industrial chain and bottlenecks in the supply chain, pushing up the global price level and bringing major uncertainties to the sustained recovery of the world economy.
At the same time, since the global trade friction in 2018, some developed economies have ignored the law of global industrial cost division of labor, insisted on strengthening competition, and restricted the export of key technologies and products on a large scale, especially by restricting the export of "card neck" technology for malicious competition, which further caused a negative impact on the security of the global industrial chain. Tariff war has once again become an important means of trade friction, compared with an equivalent trading system without global industrial chain and value chain trade, in a trading system with global industrial chain and value chain trade, the cost of increasing tariffs will be higher, and the industrial chain involved will be longer. Higher tariffs, especially a trade war, could prompt companies to shorten their chains or otherwise reshape their global chains and supply chains. A recent study shows that traders of companies involved in global industrial chains and value chains have increased vulnerability to shocks to their trading partners, but have reduced this vulnerability at home (Espitia, A. et al., 2021).
In this context, the security of the industrial chain has become an important issue for various economies to consider when participating in the global division of labor and trade, the importance of strategic industries involving people's livelihood and the lifeline of the country has been significantly improved, and the localization and regionalization of the industrial chain have become a realistic choice. In the medium and long term, the migration and reconstruction of the industrial chain will accelerate, the layout logic of the global industrial chain has changed, and some industries will consider vertical integration to shorten the supply chain in the future, and the localization of the regionalized industrial chain and supply chain will accelerate the formation. The localization trend of the industrial chain does not mean that the industrial chain is completely localized. The trend of regionalization and localization is required to have security in the key industrial chain, under the condition that the regional division of labor and cooperation can be controlled, through the regionalization of the surrounding to establish a relatively complete industrial chain, in the industrial chain link can still achieve the globalization and diversification of suppliers. The Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which entered into force on December 30, 2018, the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, which entered into force on July 1, 2020, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which entered into force on January 1, 2022, are all important regionalized or cross-regional economic relations agreements that have emerged since the global trade conflict in 2018, and the globalization pattern based on regionalization is accelerating. The regionalization and localization of the industrial chain is becoming a reality.
The key technologies of the industrial chain are autonomous
The key to global competition is technological competition. Today's world is experiencing a new round of major changes and adjustments, the strategic game of major powers is intensifying in an all-round way, the international system and international order are undergoing in-depth adjustment, new challenges facing the development of the world economy are emerging in an endless stream, uncertainties and unstable factors have increased significantly, and the new crown pneumonia epidemic has accelerated the evolution of major changes unprecedented in a century, and how to ensure and enhance the position of the country in the global economy and industrial division of labor has become a new challenge facing all economies.
In 2019, the U.S. Department of Commerce issued policies and regulations to restrict the export of 14 types of manufacturing high-tech products to ensure the competitive advantage of the United States in advanced manufacturing. Research by Lovely and Yang (2018) shows that the 301 tariff clause actually uses 20th century trade barriers to deal with the trade chain embedded in knowledge embodying in the 21st century, which will hit transnational technology supply chains and have a certain impact on the restructuring of global technology chains. At the same time, the United States uses large-scale tax cuts to attract the return of THE US manufacturing industry, which will also have a certain impact on the existing global industrial chain and value chain.
Some advanced economies, led by the United States, have severely restricted exports of high and new technologies to China. Since the Trump administration, the United States has significantly increased its pressure on China's high-tech industries and enterprises, and the Biden administration has continued the practice of the previous administration, using entity lists, chip bans and other means to continuously impose unilateral sanctions on Chinese companies. On December 16, 2021, the U.S. Treasury Department included eight Chinese companies on the "Chinese Military Enterprises" investment blacklist, and the U.S. Department of Commerce included 25 entities, including the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences and the Academy of Military Medicine, on the list of restricted exports. So far, more than 160 Chinese companies have been added to the entity list by the U.S. government. At the same time, the United States has also restricted the export of high and new technologies to China by "pulling small circles" and suppressed China's high-tech enterprises. On June 9, 2021, the United States passed the "U.S. Innovation and Competition Act of 2021", and on February 4, 2022, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill that will invest hundreds of billions of dollars in scientific research and development, support the development of domestic manufacturing in the United States, bring advanced semiconductor manufacturing back to the United States, and ensure that the United States maintains a leading position in manufacturing and innovation.
In addition, the re-industrialization of other developed economies will have an impact on the global industrial chain and value chain. Developed countries are vigorously promoting "upgraded" manufacturing strategies, such as Germany's "Industry 4.0" and Japan's "Industrial Value Chain" and other strategies, by increasing financial budgets for innovative manufacturing processes, cutting-edge materials and other fields of research and development. Major developed economies have increased their development efforts around the core technology, top talents, standards and norms of the manufacturing industry, etc., trying to grasp the initiative in the new round of global science and technology and industrial games, which has opened up the development trend of high-intensity competition in global technological innovation, and will directly drive far-reaching changes in the division of labor in the global industrial chain.
In the era of super-globalization, the technology transfer brought about by FDI and the spillover of knowledge about production technology in the process of product exchange are the two major channels for participating in global value chains and improving economic growth (WTO, 2008), but with the increasing lack of sale and blockade of technology in developed economies, especially the strict control and division of core technology fields represented by semiconductors. Following the release of the US law to encourage the localization of chips, the EUROPEAN Union also issued a chip bill on February 8 to expand the EU's global chip market share, reaching 20% of the global production capacity by 2030. The pain of "core" has become a problem that must be overcome in the industrial upgrading of some developing economies.
Therefore, the autonomy of key technologies is fundamental to ensure the safety of the industrial chain and promote the continuous upgrading of the industry. In the post-epidemic era, global competition will only become more and more intense, and only by increasing innovation and having key technologies for independent innovation can we ensure the safety of our own industrial chain.
The development of the service industry chain has become a new trend
As global value chains increasingly shift from traditional manufacturing processes to services and other intangible assets, global value chains are also undergoing a fundamental shift. Digitalization is the dominant factor in this shift, and the COVID-19 pandemic is accelerating this shift. The WTO's Global Value Chain Development Report (2021) explores this shift beyond production value chains, showing how the rise of the services value chain can provide a new way for the development of industrial chains. Trade protectionism, geopolitical tensions and the new crown virus have undermined the stability of the global industrial chain and value chain, forcing the industrial chain to reorganize in the global geographical location, while the development of the service industry will occupy an important position in the reconstruction of the global industrial chain, becoming a new trend in the development of the industrial chain beyond the production value chain.
Historically, offshoring has often been associated with manufacturing, which has also driven the globalization of the service sector. Multinationals seek cost-effectiveness through offshoring, where companies outsource their non-core business processes to specialized third-party service providers, who in turn offshorse their labor-intensive operations to developing countries with lower labor costs. Of course, large multinational companies have also directly offshored their labor-intensive service industries, improving their cost advantages by setting up "global internal centers" (UNCTAD, 2014), and a global industrial chain driven by the service industry has emerged. India and the Philippines are prime examples, both of which have invested heavily in export processing zones and IT parks, providing the necessary environment and conditions for the formation of service value chains.
The service industry plays many important roles in the global industrial and value chains. The service industry is not only an intermediate input, but also has penetrated into the activities of industrial value creation and integrated into the specific production process of products. Intangible assets such as software, branding, design, operating processes and other intellectual property rights that multinational companies invest in their global subsidiaries are sources of product value creation, especially as productive services accelerate their development, which plays an important role in better participating in global trade and better positioning in global industrial chains and value chains.
In addition to playing an important role in trade value-added, the service sector has also increased the productivity of downstream manufacturing firms. Improvements in financial, communication and transport services resulting from cross-border service transactions have contributed to the development of global value chains, increased productivity of downstream manufacturing firms, and shifted the comparative advantage model to the intensive sectors of these services (Heuser, C. and Mattoo, A., 2017). Innovations in the digital and information technology service industries have effectively reduced the impact of covid-19 on production and operation. Digital information technology has hedged against the negative trade effects of covid-19, and although the industries affected by COVID-19 are very broad, there has been less contraction in sectors that are more suitable for remote work throughout the pandemic (Espitia, A. et al., 2021).
The digital economy has become an important engine for a new round of global growth. According to data provided by the WTO (2022) Digital Governance and Global Trade Forum, in the more than a decade since the 2008 global financial crisis, more than 100 countries around the world have formulated plans such as "New Industrial Policy", "Industry 4.0" and "Digital Transformation". The core theme of these plans is to encourage technological upgrading, digital production and digital innovation, and countries at all stages of development have policies to support innovation and digital transformation.
Third, China's development under the new situation of the global industrial chain
Since China joined the WTO in 2001, its division of labor in the global industrial chain has become increasingly important. China has used its advantages to establish a whole industrial chain system, which has become a key link in the global supply chain, and the impact of the new crown pneumonia epidemic has highlighted the resilience and strength of China's industrial chain. At present, the global political and economic pattern is facing great challenges at a time when the old order has been impacted and the new order has not yet been established, the changes in the political and economic relations between China and the United States and the impact of the new crown pneumonia epidemic, and globalization is facing great challenges. China has entered a new stage of development and put forward new requirements for high-quality economic development. The interweaving of internal and external factors highlights the urgency and importance of China's implementation of the new development concept and the acceleration of the formation of a new development pattern with the domestic cycle as the main body and the domestic and international dual cycles promoting each other.
We must fully realize that the formation of the global industrial chain and value chain in the past few decades is determined by market forces, and the structure of the global industrial chain is the result of the joint participation of global enterprises. Trade frictions will reduce the volume of global trade, reduce aggregate demand, and may have an impact on global production patterns, but the misalignment of production caused by trade frictions will lead to additional efficiencies, job losses, and we have good reason to believe that global companies may not respond in the way that countries that initiate trade frictions hope or expect. Therefore, in the long run, trade frictions will impact the existing global industrial chain and value chain system to a certain extent, but the changes in the industrial chain and value chain will ultimately depend on the global competition of economic technology and cost, and on market forces. Empirical evidence using a 30-year panel dataset covering more than 100 countries shows that factor endowments, geography, political stability, free trade policies, FDI inflows, and domestic industrial capacity are important in determining participation in global industrial chains and value chains. These factors have a greater impact on global industrial chain and value chain participation than traditional exports (Fernandes, A. et al., 2020). An ECB study also shows that technological advances, reductions in transport and communication costs, and the removal of political and economic barriers are important factors in driving the formation of global industrial and value chains (Amador and Cabral, 2014). The metabolism and fierce competition brought about by the new round of scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation are unprecedented, especially the impact of the new crown pneumonia epidemic on some links of the global industrial chain and supply chain, which prompts us to examine China's participation in the restructuring of the global industrial chain from more dimensions under the new development pattern of double circulation.
Firmly grasp the "bull nose" of innovation and grasp the initiative of innovation. The core of the double cycle is innovation-driven, and it is necessary to lead the re-layout of the industrial chain with technological innovation. According to WIPO's World Intellectual Property Report 2017: Intangible Capital in Global Value Chains, nearly one-third of the value of manufactured goods sold worldwide derives from intangible capital such as brands, designs and technologies. Although China ranks first in the number of patent applications in the world, there are fewer patents for key technologies and core technologies, and Chinese enterprises have to pay a large number of intellectual property licensing fees every year. For a long time, China has mainly embedded in the global industrial chain and supply chain through contract manufacturing, outsourced OEM, assembly, OEM production, etc., and integrated into the global production, trade and circulation network. In the future, when China launches the national strategy of intellectual property rights, it should make greater efforts to enter the core technology patents, lay out the innovation chain in the world, and promote and enhance China's position in the global industrial chain.
After a long period of arduous and unremitting efforts, China has gained more and more global recognition for scientific and technological innovation. According to the Global Innovation Index Report 2021 released by the World Intellectual Property Organization, China's scientific and technological innovation capabilities rose to 12th in the ranking of 132 economies, making it the highest-ranking middle-income economy and one of the fastest-improving countries in the world. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, China's total social research and experimental development (R&D) investment in 2021 was 2,786.4 billion yuan, accounting for 2.44% of GDP, which is close to the pre-epidemic average of 2.47% in OECD countries. China is making efforts in both the core technology value chain and the green technology value chain, and China's economy is accelerating the formation of an innovation-driven growth model, which is a fundamental measure for China to reconstruct the industrial chain and promote high-quality development.
Support the multilateral trading system and actively develop regional and cross-regional trade cooperation. Adhering to the principles of openness and inclusiveness, strict rule of law, consultation and cooperation, China advocates the construction of a new type of international relations featuring mutual respect, fairness and justice, and win-win cooperation. The course of reform and opening up over the past four decades has shown that China is a practitioner, defender and builder of the world economic and trade order, and china's economic growth has made significant contributions to the world economy. Since 2002, China's average contribution to world economic growth has been close to 30%, becoming the driving force and stabilizer of world economic growth. In 2021, China's imports and exports exceeded $6 trillion for the first time, reaching $6.05 trillion, a record high. According to data from the Ministry of Commerce, in the 20 years since China's "accession to the WTO", it has provided tariff-free treatment to 97% of the tax lines of 42 least developed countries, becoming the largest export market for least developed countries, and the Chinese market has absorbed 25% of the exports of least developed countries. In July 2021, the Ministry of Commerce announced that it would take the lead in cultivating and building an international consumption center city in five major cities, including Shanghai and Beijing, so that the Chinese market will become the world's market and a shared market.
China's development has also benefited from the world. As a test field for the mainland's reform and opening up, the number of construction pilot zones has reached 21, forming a pilot pattern covering the east, west, south, and north. According to data from the Ministry of Commerce, in 2013, the FTZ launched the first negative list of foreign investment access, which has been revised many times, of which special management measures have been reduced from 190 in 2013 to 27 in 2021. In 1988, China's use of foreign capital exceeded 10 billion US dollars for the first time, and in 2010, it exceeded 100 billion US dollars for the first time, becoming an important place for attracting foreign investment in the world. From 1983 to 2021, China attracted a total of $2.33 trillion in FDI. Foreign investment has become an important force in China's economic growth and exports, and since 1997, foreign imports and exports have accounted for about half of China's total economic imports and exports. At the same time, in the competition, foreign capital has actively promoted and improved the technological progress of Chinese enterprises. On November 24, 2021, Vice Premier Liu He wrote an article in the People's Daily entitled "High-quality Development Must Be Achieved", emphasizing that foreign-funded enterprises are very important to achieve high-quality development, and it is necessary to encourage the introduction of more competitive products, technologies and services, create value in higher level competition, and achieve mutual benefit and win-win results. A World Bank study also shows that multinationals have driven a significant rise in global value chains over the past 30 years because they break down production processes and spread their networks globally, and domestic firms have benefited greatly from participation in global value chains by learning from multinationals through investment, cooperation, or trade (Qiang, et al., 2021).
According to the information on the website of the Ministry of Commerce, in terms of cross-border or cross-regional cooperation, China has signed 21 free trade zone agreements, 10 free trade zones under negotiation, and 8 free trade zones under study. On January 1, 2022, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) came into force, and on September 16, 2021, China formally applied to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Under the multilateral framework, China is integrating into regional and cross-regional industrial chains at an increasingly rapid pace. China's firm policy expectations of openness and stability ensure the stability of investment and trade patterns, which is conducive to improving the stability and security of the industrial chain.
Further consolidate and improve the existing advantages of China's industrial chain. Since the outbreak of the new crown pneumonia epidemic, the high growth rate of China's manufacturing exports has further polished the world business card of China's manufacturing. From the perspective of manufacturing output value, China has become the world's largest manufacturing country in 2010. At present, the added value of China's manufacturing industry accounts for about 30% of the added value of global manufacturing, and the global supply chain is increasingly dependent on China's industrial chain.
The huge domestic market and the rapid improvement of the business environment have improved the mutual promotion of domestic and foreign industrial chains. The impact of market size on GVV participation is largely moderated through linkages with domestic industries, and larger markets in the manufacturing sector are characterized by greater GVV participation, highlighting the importance of domestic supplier participation in GVCs (World Bank, 2020). China's manufacturing industry has the strong support of the domestic market, and the domestic market is more smooth, which is conducive to promoting the formation of a global industrial chain in the manufacturing industry.
The quality of China's labor force education varies greatly, which is the basic support for China to form a whole industrial chain from low-end technology to high-end technology. Since the outbreak of the new crown pneumonia epidemic in 2020, Made in China has demonstrated to the world the integrity and resilience of China's industrial chain, which can provide the world with products of the whole technology chain, which is the existing advantage of China's manufacturing industry, and it is necessary to firmly grasp the innovation and development of the manufacturing industry is the basic force to promote the high-quality growth of China's economy, and the policy should vigorously support the development of the manufacturing industry. At the same time, increasing support for small and medium-sized enterprises and ensuring the main body of the market is to ensure employment and the industrial chain, which is also an important basis for the domestic large cycle as the main body.
Continue to promote the high-quality development of the "Belt and Road". The 14th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China and the Outline of Long-term Goals for 2035 clearly point out that "promoting the high-quality development of the Belt and Road Initiative" is "promoted". According to data from the Ministry of Commerce, from 2013 to 2020, the total trade in goods between China and countries along the "Belt and Road" has accumulated more than 9 trillion US dollars, the cumulative direct investment volume is about 140 billion US dollars, the cumulative turnover of contracted projects is 640 billion US dollars, and the cumulative investment of countries along the "Belt and Road" in China is about 60 billion US dollars. The "Belt and Road" initiative has won the respect of the world and actively expanded the global industrial chain. Global value chains should be more inclusive, and there was a need to overcome the constraints on the participation of SMEs and facilitate low-income developing countries by establishing a multi-year plan to expand and upgrade the necessary infrastructure to enhance the capacity of all countries to contribute to more inclusive and sustainable growth and development on a global scale. A world bank study shows that China's "Belt and Road" initiative, through the establishment and improvement of the "Belt and Road" financial cooperation network, promote the interconnection of financial infrastructure, support multilateral and national financial institutions to participate in investment and financing, the regional scope of the industrial chain has developed from a country or region to a global scope, forming a global industrial chain (Cusolito, et al., 2016). The OECD and the World Bank Group submitted an Inclusive Global Value Chain Report to G20 Trade Ministers in October 2015 to promote the formation of more inclusive global value chains. The high-quality joint construction of the "Belt and Road" conforms to the strong desire of the people of all countries to share development opportunities and create a better life, continuously enriches the connotation of the community of human destiny, and increasingly becomes a new platform for improving global governance, and has also become a model for the sustained and stable development of the global industrial chain.