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✎ Editor's Note
The commander who has fought a world-class war and led the rise of TSMC, how to review the development process of Taiwan semiconductors? Zhang Zhongmou was interviewed by Caixun for 2 4 hours, talking about the rise and fall of the world's semiconductor manufacturers in his eyes and the key to the rise of Taiwan's semiconductor industry from scratch, as well as some unknown secrets.
"You are the first journalist in all the media to put Taiwan in the context of the development of the global semiconductor industry," Zhang Zhongmou, founder of TSMC, said in an exclusive interview with Caixun at the end of January.
Spreading out the 10 giants of the global semiconductor industry in the past 50 years, Zhang Zhongmou pointed to Sylvania, who ranked fourth in 1955, "This company was my first job, when it was still a transistor." He went on to say, "At that time, even the number one Hughes was so small that it couldn't count."
In 1972, Zhang Zhongmou was just promoted to the general manager of the Texas Instrument Semiconductor Division, that year, Deyi was the world's highest-revenue semiconductor boss, and Zhang Zhongmou was the general manager who led the 40,000 employees of Texas Instrument Semiconductor Group worldwide.
In that year, Intel had just been in its fourth year of existence, but it was already regarded by Zhang Zhongmou as the "strongest opponent", and his competition with Intel was later interrupted due to the fatal strategic misjudgment of the CEO of Deyi, and Intel stood on the peak of global semiconductors.
After leaving Deyi to take over as the president of the Institute of Industry and Research in Taiwan, Zhang Zhongmou gained insight into the advantages and disadvantages of Taiwan's development of semiconductors and established the world's first professional wafer foundry ---- Taiwan Integrated Circuit Manufacturing Company. 30 years later, under his leadership, TSMC has changed from a start-up company to a semiconductor giant with market capitalization and process technology comparable to Intel, and Taiwan has developed a unique and dense foundry supply chain because of this innovative business model, starting from scratch and gradually becoming an important global semiconductor settlement.
Turn back the clock 50 years. The manager who has fought a world-class war and led the rise of TSMC, how to review this journey? At the end of January, Zhang Zhongmou was interviewed by Caixun for two four-hour interviews, talking about the rise and fall of the world's semiconductor manufacturers in his eyes and the key to the rise of Taiwan's semiconductor industry from scratch, as well as some unknown secrets.
"Deyi made a fatal mistake in 1972" reveals the inside story of Intel overtaking 20 years later
Reporter q (hereinafter referred to as Q): We have sorted out the revenue ranking of the world's top 10 semiconductor companies in the past 50 years, and found that the market has changed dramatically.
Zhang Zhongmou answered: I joined the semiconductor industry in 1955, then joined Texas Instrument in 1958, and did not leave until 1983. (Editor's note: From 1965 to 1985, Deyi was one of the top 2 companies in global semiconductor sales).
The development of semiconductors began in 1948 when Shockley, Bardeen( Bardeen, brattain (Bratton) three people invented Transistor (transistor) at AT&T's Bell Laboratories; however, there was no semiconductor industry before 1952, and after the invention of this technology, it was first manufactured by AT&T's manufacturing arm, Western Electric Company , very small in scale.
In 1952, many people already knew that the technology of the transistor must be very important in the future, AND&T was socially responsible for licensing the technology to other companies; many large companies bought this license, and Deyi also bought this technology, but at that time it was still a very small company, RCA, GE, Sylvania and Motorola, all of which were bigger than Deyi.
When Zhang Zhongmou (second from the right) was the general manager of the Germanium transistor department of Deyi, he received an award from a customer. (Photo/Recap from Zhang Zhongmou's autobiography)
In 1964, he went to Deyi to "promote once a year" to take over as general manager
But by 1965, Deyi was already quite energetic, and there should be about 10,000 employees in the semiconductor business. At that time, I had already returned to Deyi from Stanford with a Ph.D., and I was the general manager of the Germanium Transistors unit in 1964, which had the largest revenue when I was general manager, but not the most promising business; in 1965 I took over the general manager of Silicon Transistors and in 1966 I took over the Integrated Circuits. The general manager of making multiple transistors into more complex circuits is really the so-called one-year-up move.
In 1966, the IC process was still bipolar (dual carrier), while MOS (metal oxide semiconductor) was only a research project. In 1972, I became the vice president of the company group and the general manager of the semiconductor group, AND MOS (editor's note: MOS is the mainstream process technology in the semiconductor industry) also changed from the original research plan to a career, and all the semiconductors of Deyi were under my control. At this time, I was only in my 30s, and my promotion was almost young, which should be the most memorable period in my life.
Q: When you were in Deyi, the semiconductor revenue scale was the largest in the world, but then Intel caught up, what was the intersection in between?
A: There are two battlefields, the first is memory, which is my biggest challenge; the other battlefield, we have an absolute advantage, that is, the chip of the computer.
But in 1972 Deyi made a fatal mistake. That mistake was that Deyi believed that the semiconductor industry was already quite mature and could not easily grow significantly, and that switching to consumer goods as the main axis of future development had dragged down the entire company, including the semiconductor sector that once dominated the world. This was the key to the 1995 Intel Overtaking Decker.
50 years ago, Intel was the key to dismantling the overtaking instrument of the opponent
Reporter asked: In addition to Deyi's own mistakes, what reasons do you think Intel can catch up later?
Zhang Zhongmou: Intel was founded in 1968, and when I took over the entire semiconductor business of Deyi in 1972, I regarded Intel as the strongest opponent because of its technology, and I was also familiar with their founders Robert Noyce and Gordon Moore.
At the time, Intel had the advantage of startups, and they could offer stock options to attract good talent. At that time, Intel's best-selling product was his memory, and I remember his number 1103, which was very famous for this product, which was popular for several years.
Intel's founders were Noyce and Moore, both of whom were born in Fairchild Semiconductor, and as early as 1965, Express Semiconductor was a strong competitor to deyi.
It all started with Shockley, who left Bell Labs after inventing the transistor and founded a wealthy businessman who admired him, Beckman, and founded the Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory.
Shawkley was a very big man, and when he called Noyce and Moore directly, he asked, "Are you Neuss?" I am Shawkley", he did not introduce himself, of course, these two people knew Shawkley's name, and he found it.
A team of 8 people made an ultimatum with the big boss
But Noyce and Moore only did it for a year at The Shawley Semiconductor Lab. First, they felt that Shawkley was too contemptuous of people to get along with him; second, they felt that Shawkley was going to do PNPN2 polar body (Shaw Knn 2 polar body), not Transistor (transistor), was a Diode (2 pole body), Shaw Klee thought this would be very successful, but the 8-person team led by Noyce and Moore did not agree.
For these two reasons, the 8 men offered an ultimatum to the real big boss Baker: "If it's not Shawkley going, it's us going", which is the story of the Tradingorous Eight (8 rebellion) that has been circulating in Silicon Valley for a long time, and the backstage behind them is Arthur Rock, arguably the earliest venture capitalist in history.
Later, Arthur Locke approached Fairrman Fairchild, the owner of Fairchild Camera and Instrument, and told him that this group of people was very outstanding, and Fairchild also agreed to set up a semiconductor department, Noyce was the head of this department, Moore was responsible for research and development, and founded Fairchild Semiconductor in 1957.
Unexpectedly, in 1968, they repeated the drama at Shaw's lab, but by this time Arthur Locke had enough money to fund an independent company, and Noyce and Moore founded Intel.
Intel's success is mainly due to stock options and technical talent. In addition, it is true that California is also a reason why people like to go to California. Moore was originally a Californian, and although Noyce was from the East Coast, he also liked it when he arrived in California. California is arguably loved by everyone, especially the 1960s and 1970s.
Look at the starting point of Samsung's competition with TSMC" "South Korea has Lee Ken-hee, Taiwan has me"
Reporter asked: Why did Japan enter the top 10 of the world's semiconductors in the 1980s, but then declined?
Zhang Zhongmou answered: Toshiba and NEC were very good in the 1980s. But in fact, Japan has never been stronger on logic chips, they are strong in memory, and even so strong that even Intel surrendered and did not make memories.
The biggest reason for the decline of Japan's semiconductor industry is the so-called Plaza Accord. September 1985 was the next month I came to Taiwan. The main purpose of the United States is to reach an agreement with France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Japan, because the United States has too much input into Japan and Germany, so the United States wants the currency appreciation of Germany and Japan.
Germany I did not pay attention, but the yen, before the Plaza Agreement in September 1985, was a dollar to 240 yen, at the end of 1987, it became 120 yen, the yen has been rising, and later rose to 80 yen. Just from 240 to 120 is twice the cost of Japanese companies.
In addition to the appreciation of the yen, the most important reason for the decline of Japanese companies is Lee Ken-hee of South Korea's Samsung, who is very powerful.
Lee Kin Hee arranges for Zhang Zhongmou and Shi Zhenrong to "see the factory"
Q: When Japan's memory was so strong, even Intel couldn't beat it, why could Samsung get up from such an environment?
A: In 1989, former chairman of Samsung Lee Kin Hee came to Taiwan and invited me (editor's note: then chairman of the Institute of Industry and Research) to have breakfast with Shi Zhenrong, who knew that Shi Zhenrong wanted to invest in Deqi Company and hoped that Taiwan would not be a memory, so he invited us to visit Samsung's factory. He said, "After you look at our factory, you know how much capital is needed to set up a memory factory?" How much talent is needed? You know, maybe you decided not to invest, just work with us."
I know that Samsung began to do memory in 1983, and I wanted to go to see it, so I flew to Seoul with Shi Chintai and Shi Zhenrong, 3 people to Seoul (editor's note: now Seoul), and all the planes were three-star hospitality, and the hotel was also their hotel.
On the second day, the whole day tour was arranged, and any questions the Samsung reception staff would answer, which was indeed a big scale. I've seen a lot of factories before, and it only takes half an hour to see what their potential is; to be honest, it's been 6 years since I left Deyi at that time, and compared to the best Japanese memory factory in my impression, Samsung definitely doesn't lose.
On the 3rd day, we met with Lee Kin Hee before we returned to Taiwan, and he said, "You have seen it, and now you should know that this is going to cost a lot of capital and need a lot of talent." In fact, I was still a little confused at that time, but Shi Zhenrong did not make a sound, and it was only a few months later that Shi Zhenrong announced that he would establish Deqi.
The rise of South Korea's Samsung, Lee Ken-hee is definitely the key. Because he's the boss. Japan's strong semiconductor companies Toshiba, Hitachi, and NEC are only professional managers, not bosses.
A good boss is hard to find, only one out of a thousand; however, Lee Kin Hee happens to be one of those thousand people. Li Jianxi himself is not a semiconductor expert, but he knows and understands the potential of semiconductors, and also knows the potential of mobile phones, is a key person, he is a hero to create the situation.
The Japanese memory was lost to South Korea, Taiwan did not benefit from it, this drama has nothing to do with Taiwan, and Japan has no logic chip, no wafer foundry. South Korea has Lee Kin Hee, and Taiwan has me. Although I am not the boss, I am the one who dares to do it, and the courage to take risks, and to create new business models.
At the beginning, it was difficult to raise funds, "If I invested in TSMC at the beginning, the remuneration has now been a thousand times"
Reporter asked: Can you review the process of founding TSMC at that time?
Zhang Zhongmou answered: Founding TSMC and starting to raise funds from the outside world was initially Li Guoding's idea, but The Chief Executive Yu Guohua also supported it. In fact, Li Guoding is also to solve another problem, in 1965, the institute of electronics integrated circuit plan everyone is very proud, but, where is the future?
The demonstration factory made by the electronics institute has a good yield, but it is competing with UMC. The electronics institute and UMC are only looking at Taiwan, the market is not so big, UMC will also think that the public organs supported by the government to compete with him, is to compete with the people for profits, at the same time, Guoshan, Mao Silicon, Huazhi, hope that the government supports them to build semiconductor factories; so Li Guoding and then Minister of Economy Li Dahai, for the electronics institute has made a 10-year plan, think that the establishment of another company is the best way.
Then I was asked, "Zhang Zhongmou, you are an expert, what kind of company should you set up?" In fact, what they were thinking was a company similar to UMC, and I felt that I was not interested, and I thought it would not be too successful, so they proposed the idea of professional wafer manufacturing.
In the past, Taiwan has never put its own semiconductor industry in the context of the world semiconductor industry; at that time, UMC had been established, and the Electronics Institute began to do semiconductors in 1975, but what they wanted was to serve Taiwan's electronics industry, but How much of Taiwan's electronics industry accounted for in the global electronics industry? I'm afraid it's not even one percent. I am familiar with the world's semiconductor industry, and I put TSMC in the global semiconductor industry to cooperate with them.
Q: Why did you come up with the "professional wafer manufacturing" business model in the first place?
A: Actually, the term business model only appeared in the 90s, I asked the dean and professor of the MIT business school, they all told me that there is no formal definition of business model, the main focus is to see what customers you have? It is based on what customers you have, not to see what products you have.
Wafer foundry is not a new idea. In 1980, Carver. Carver Mead and Lynn. Lynn Conway co-authored a book on chip design, and the two of them can be said to be the ancestors of chip design. The book mentions that because of the chip design, to have a connection with the wafer process, they found this link, and at that time they predicted that there would be a company that could provide manufacturing services in the future; and Moore looked at this, and took a name called Foundry, and now Foundry's name is Moore.
But Moore didn't expect to build a professional foundry (Dedicated Foundry), which was the idea I came up with and implemented by me.
1998 marks the 50th anniversary of Transistor's invention. There was an investment bank in the United States that held a celebration to invite all those who have contributed to the semiconductor industry for 50 years, and I was also invited to go to Carver. Mead too. That was the first time I saw him. Carver. Mead said to me, "Ah! I really admire your professional wafer manufacturing, I have always thought that wafer foundry can be done, but professional wafer foundry is your idea."
Q: The professional wafer foundry model is a new concept, what difficulties were encountered in the early stages?
A: There were a lot of difficulties, but fortunately I was only in my 50s at the time. The first is the difficulty of raising funds, in fact, if you invested in TSMC, the remuneration has been a thousand times now.
Writing a fundraising letter for TSMC, some companies only replied "We have no interest in investing"
At that time, I came up with the idea of professional wafer fabrication and raised funds in this model. I wrote more than 10 letters, including Intel, Deyi, Motorola, Wang An, etc.; at that time, Sun Yunxuan, the senior minister of Sun Yunxuan, although he had already suffered a stroke, was still very helpful. But the vast majority of companies did not respond, and some companies simply replied: we are not interested in investing.
Yu Guohua hoped to find a multinational company, and it was a semiconductor company with technology, and then we cooperated with Philips, and after TSMC was established, Philips quickly became a considerable customer.
Philips invested in TSMC because it looked at cheap labor
Why would Philips be interested in investing in TSMC? It's a very interesting story. In 1985, Philips Holland's strategy was to use Taiwan as a production base for cheap labor, and the Chinese mainland was just emerging.
To put it simply, first, Philips has its own IDM semiconductor business, and will not compete with TSMC for the second, but Philips wants to establish a good relationship with the Taiwan government, and it is more convenient to invest in Taiwan in the future. In fact, Philips once had about 40,000 employees in Taiwan in the 1990s, but then they all moved to the mainland.
Another difficulty is that your business model is locked, but who is the customer? The customer was actually the semiconductor industry at that time, and the fabless design company that mushroomed later, and TSMC's business model did subvert the semiconductor industry.
Yield is a good card for TSMC to make money, allowing Philips to give up the dominance
The reporter asked: At that time, why did you think that the professional wafer foundry model was done in Taiwan, and what conditions did Taiwan have?
Zhang Zhongmou answered: In 1985, I came to Taiwan to take over as the president of the Institute of Industry and Research, and the ability of the Institute of Electronics of the Institute of Industry and Research to produce processes is to be able to manufacture two microns. At that time, the world's advanced companies, including Intel, Deyi, Motorola and even Philips, they had already manufactured a micron, and the technology gap between Taiwan and advanced companies was probably between 2 and a half generations and 3 generations behind, and at that time we only had one thing to compete with them, that is, the high yield in backward technology.
The quality of Taiwan's manpower determines the yield rate
The yield of the demonstration factory of the Institute of Electronics is very good, compared with Deyi and General Motors, there are significant differences, the key lies in the quality of manpower in Taiwan, including operators, technicians, foremen, engineers. When I was in Deyi, I found that the yield rate of the Japanese factory was much higher than that of the Dezhou factory, and the reason for the analysis was the talent factor.
In Japan, at least after graduating from high school, or even after graduating from college, most of them are women, and the turnover rate is very low, and the Japanese factory director told me that the operator will not quit unless he is married. But the Texas factory could not find employees who graduated from high school, and in 1980, even people who knew English were difficult to find, and the turnover rate was as high as 30% when the economy was good, and the turnover rate was more than 10% when the economy was not good.
The process has improved, the equipment model must also improve, and the maintenance technicians must also enter the process. But in Texas, it is found that all the people who repair locomotives and cars, and there are no maintenance personnel who repair fine equipment, resulting in new machines on the production line, the time to operate smoothly is only 60% to 75%, but in Japan can do 90%, which is a big difference. Because semiconductor process equipment is very expensive, there is only one production line, and if the smooth operation time is reduced, all the products in process are piled up in front, and it is difficult for you to improve the yield.
Japanese process engineers are quite good, in contrast, at that time the United States has begun to give up manufacturing; more than 30 years later, now the United States wants to turn back the clock to resume manufacturing, I think this is also one of the problems.
The reason why Philips gave up a majority stake in TSMC was exposed
Q: Later, why was Philips willing to give up the right to obtain 51% of TSMC and let TSMC go public smoothly?
A: Our cooperation process with Philips is actually quite a long time. Later, after the establishment of TSMC, Philips quickly became a considerable customer.
Philips found that although we are relatively backward technologies, the price he has to pay us for those backward technologies is even lower than his own cost; the fact that our prices are lower than the cost of vertically integrated manufacturing is an important finding. Of course, our price competitiveness of TSMC also comes from good yield.
So why is Philips willing to give up 51% of its stake? At the beginning of the fundraising, Philips's equity was about 28%, but the option could be increased to 51%; originally he also wanted to control the company, but later the head office found that we would operate better than they did, at that time, Philips' semiconductor department was doing a very hard job, and even the general manager was removed.
Therefore, Philips adjusted its strategy to pure investment, and whether pure investment can be recovered depends on whether the company can be listed. I told Philips at the time that one of the conditions for the company to list in Taiwan was that no shareholder could hold more than 50% of the shares, and then TSMC could be listed.
Most of the IC design talents are in UMC, and the chances of success of Taiwan DRAM are actually very small
Reporter asked: How do you view the development of Taiwan's IC design industry?
Zhang Zhongmou answered: Most of the IC design talents in Taiwan are in UMC, in the late 80s and early 90s, I think most of them were in UMC, and the Institute of Electronics did not have many design talents. In about 95 and 96 years, UMC spun mediatek, Lianyang, Lianyong (spin-off), basically, he derived the design talents to MediaTek, Lianyang, Lianyong, almost 10 years later than the institute of electronics derived from TSMC of the Institute of Industry and Research.
Q: How do you view Taiwan's development in memory, and will there still be opportunities in the future?
A: In the past in Taiwan, in terms of memory, I feel very sorry, don't forget, Deyi is a big factory that does memory, I have the most experience, originally the world's advanced is to prepare to do DRAM (dynamic random access memory).
In short, Taiwan has small successes in memory, such as Wanghong doing ROM (only reading memory), they are mainly NOR (non-volatile flash memory), I see that they are now also doing NAND (storage flash memory), but the vast majority of memory is DRAM. DRAM I have made quite a lot of attempts, are lost a lot of money, do not do, so Taiwan in the memory should be said to be not very successful, but only in a relatively small field of success.
In fact, in DRAM, Taiwan has invested not much at all, and I believe in the Experience curve, so the chances of success are actually very small.
TSMC has a high market value, and I see it rather lightly
Q: The gap between the market capitalization of TSMC and Intel is getting wider and wider, what do you think about this?
A: Regarding this market value, I have always taken it very lightly, and I have seen so many companies with large market capitalizations that were considered to be the top at the time, and then they have faded.
Do you know how much IBM is worth now? It used to be God! Now the market value is more than 100 billion US dollars, and Intel has more than 200 billion US dollars. In the 2nd millennium, I went to the CEO of Cisco, John Chambers, which at that time had a market value of about $500 to 600 billion, ranking first in the world. I said, "John, don't you worry, aren't you afraid?" He replied, "I think I will definitely look higher in the future." Now, Cisco's market capitalization is more than two hundred billion DOLLARs, about 50 to a hundred.
Therefore, not only you, many people feel that TSMC's high market value is very remarkable, I see or don't think like this, I look very light.
HPC capabilities unleash companies such as AMD
Q: When TSMC releases its ability to make CPUs, what kind of changes will occur in the market?
A: This is quite a meaningful question, we have released the capabilities of advanced processes in high-performance computing (HPC) to many companies, including AMD, Intel, NVIDIA, Apple, as well as MediaTek, Qualcomm (Qualcomm), Broadcom (Broadcom), etc., of course, they need to have the ability to cooperate.
Now, there are Amazon, Meta, Google, etc., these companies are the future Apple, through TSMC to release advanced process technology, the market will not let like Intel, just by a company dominated.
Q: There are still several large IDM companies in Europe, will they exist after the rise of new demand for electric vehicles?
A: First of all, I don't agree that there are several large IDM companies in Europe, and I don't quite agree with the word large, there is no real IDM in the world now, and IDM has become FAB Lite (light fab).
Europe is interested in Facing Semiconductors (STM), Infinion, NXP can also be said to be an IDM, because he has an old FAB, but not very big.
Q: Intel isn't really an IDM either?
A: No, Intel is a big customer of TSMC.
TSMC's two strategic values determine the company's future
Reporter asked: Geopolitics has driven the global wave of semiconductor investment, can Europe, the United States and Japan once again have a revival of semiconductor manufacturing?
Zhang Zhongmou answered: It depends on how Taiwan, South Korea, and Chinese mainland, and if they fall, they will also be revived.
Last year I gave a talk on the theme of "Cherishing the Advantages of Semiconductor Wafer Manufacturing in Taiwan". Of course, Taiwan lacks everything, but I think that for these negatives, there should be determination to solve them; my speech is not only an appeal to the Taiwan government, but also to the society and TSMC, and I hope that everyone will cherish it. The advantages of our Semiconductor wafer manufacturing in Taiwan are not easy to come by, and if we do not cherish them, it is easy to lose.
To answer your question, if South Korea and Taiwan are fighting for gas, Chinese mainland can continue to enter the river on their own, and the revival of semiconductor manufacturing in Europe, the United States and Japan should be said to be in 20 years, which is unlikely.
Taiwan Semiconductor from scratch
Q: In the face of this history of Taiwan's semiconductors, it is gradually turning from weak to strong, how will you comment?
A: Taiwan is from scratch! Speaking of turning from weak to strong, I think it is not accurate enough to describe this process, it should be from scratch, and a little bit to strong.
This period of time is indeed the golden age of Taiwan semiconductors, seeing Taiwan's advantages in wafer manufacturing, generating a new business model, and implementing many strategies to achieve this advantage. For example, a good brand for the development of Taiwan semiconductors is a good yield, which has always been the case, but no one noticed it at the beginning.
Q: How do you make TSMC grow from scratch and from strong to strong?
A: TSMC's innovative business model also needs a good strategy to achieve, the only time I wrote down TSMC's strategy was on September 7, 1998, when it was written in English, there was no need to translate into Chinese at that time, anyway, only for more than 10 core members to see, basically, is how we use high yield to make money, the most important strategies include the following two:
The first strategy is to meet customer needs. I listed 11 values that customers need, such as providing technologies that can help customers compete, low prices, short time from finalization to mass production, protecting customers' intellectual and financial rights, and providing design services that help customers compete.
TSMC's strategy is to significantly outperform its competitors in addition to the low price. Our pricing strategy is to earn Premium without losing customers, and to successfully achieve this strategy, we need to have excellent customer relationships, and the benchmark for measuring this relationship is whether the customer sees us as "first and last look".
Another strategy is to make TSMC a market- and service-oriented enterprise. In TSMC's organizational culture, every employee should be the company's business personnel, to serve customers as an opportunity, and TSMC must establish a world-class marketing planning department, which not only has the ability to determine the technical blueprint with the R & D organization, but also has the ability to develop new customers, recommend new services that can be listed, and formulate different marketing strategies for different application products, fields and regions, and customers.
As for what metrics to measure the success of the strategy? Compared to the three ideal quantitative results I proposed in 1998, the first is to maintain a return on shareholders' equity of more than 20%; second, to become the world's largest integrated circuit manufacturing company, with revenue at least double that of the second largest competitor; and third, before 2010, the revenue reached 10 billion US dollars, and it turned out that our strategy was very successful and exceeded expectations.
Q: Because of good strategies and good leaders, can we have today's success? Different companies, also developing in Taiwan, are very different?
A: Yes, there is another one is values, I think for a company, values, vision, and strategy are 3 elements, values are very important. If you want to rank first, values are number one, which will determine the future of a company.
*Disclaimer: This article is original by the author. The content of the article is the author's personal opinion, semiconductor industry observation reprint is only to convey a different point of view, does not mean that semiconductor industry observation endorses or supports the view, if there is any objection, welcome to contact semiconductor industry observation.
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