Interview with political scientist Zheng Fei: The Rise and Fall of Empires

(Source: IC Photo)

Li Peishan/Wen

"Imperialism" and "empire" have largely withdrawn from the stage of contemporary politics, but the study of empire is not an "outdated" science. Both "Star Wars" and last year's hit "Dune" show the long-term obsession of popular culture with the imperial imagination and imperial symbols. More importantly, dissecting and gaining insight into the history of empires is not just about the past, but the dynamics and logic that drive the rise, adaptation, and decay of empires also exist in today's nation-states. Therefore, an understanding of empire also helps people to better see today's crises and find possible solutions.

The scholar Zheng Fei intends to devote three books to exploring the rise and fall of the political organization "Empire". The first two films in the series, The Art of empire and Failure of empire, have been released. Zheng Fei put forward his own analytical framework on the basis of extensively summarizing the achievements of the academic community, and through the meticulous dismantling of specific cases, questioned some widely circulated habits. In Zheng Fei's view, the end of the empire from the stage of history is not an inevitable consequence of nationalism and the rise of the nation-state. The interactive mechanisms of real history are complex and full of contingencies. Faced with the challenges of modernity and enlightenment, the Empire also struggled to adapt and transform itself, trying to earn the right to survive and the opportunity to prosper in the face of unprecedented upheaval. The successes or failures of these attempts and their legacy continue to shape and influence the world today. No matter how much knowledge and society progress, human beings should have more curiosity and humility about their past.

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The Economic Observer: The Art of Empire and The Failure of Empire are the first two books in your Empire trilogy. Why are you so fascinated by the concept of "empire" and try to elaborate it in a trilogy?

Zheng Fei: The empire thing is already an abandoned thing in reality. Although sometimes we still use so-and-so empire to refer to countries in this world with a large sphere of influence and many allies, we know each other that empire is used here as an adjective to show that a country is powerful and far-reaching. The "empire" as a form of government and a state no longer exists.

Why did empires disappear from this world? There are two traditional sayings here: one holds that "the stronghold of a small country, the capture of a great power" is reversed between empires and modern nation-states. The modern nation-state, because of its internal organization and high sense of civic identity, is much more reliable and powerful than the empires that are generally vast, diverse in identity, and loosely organized. Thus, the replacement of empire by the modern nation-state is an inevitable consequence of the evolution of competition. Another theory is that the empire disintegrated largely because of the emergence of local nationalism in its periphery, and that these local nationalists waged a fruitful "national liberation war"—the nimble david who defeated the bloated Goliath.

What both views have in common is that both views consider empires to be "weak" and pre-modern and outdated. It relies primarily on coercion, deception, and segregation to maintain its rule, and lacks responsiveness. In an era of mass awakening, as ethnic groups gradually coalesce into political entities, empires are challenged by local nationalism on the inside and difficult to compete internationally with integrated nation-states on the outside, which is bound to collapse. In short, this is exactly what Benedict Anderson famously asserted in Imagined Communities: "Empires and nations are inherently incompatible."

Both of these traditional accounts have certain problems. If the first claim is true, in the nineteenth century we should have seen a fierce competition between the two paths of empire and the modern nation-state, and then the empire disintegrated and lost. But that wasn't what actually happened, and all the great powers of that era were proud to be empires. In the late nineteenth century, French Prime Minister Joffrey put it this way: "In the times in which we live, the greatness of a people lies in the path of development it follows... If we only spread culture outward, but do not take action, do not participate in world affairs, always stand in Europe, and regard the expansion of Africa and the Far East as a trap and a dangerous move, if we still try to build a great state, I guarantee that such an attitude will lead to the end of our country very soon. Because we are no longer a first-class power, but will become a third-rate or even a fourth-rate country... France is not just a free country, it must be a great country. ”

In other words, in Joffery's view, the next stage of development of the modern nation-state is the "great state," that is, the empire. Conversely, whether a modern nation can have an empire becomes the touchstone of that nation. At that time, all the great powers competed in the competition of empires —both maritime empires such as Britain and France, as well as traditional continental empires such as austria-Hungary and Russia. An important feature of the nineteenth century was that empire and national construction were in fact one.

As for the second statement, there is a bit of a taste of gold on the face of the posterity. In the past, we often described the cause of the imperial center-periphery tension as the rise of local nationalism. But in many cases, local nationalism is not so much the cause of tension as the result of tension. Frankly speaking, nations are rarely natural and mostly the product of inventions. Political conflicts play a greater role in promoting people's national identity than cultural or blood relations—the periphery is almost always weaker and less organized than in the center of the empire. Unless there is strong support from outside forces, or when empires are greatly weakened and facing collapse, local community elites rarely seek autonomy and independence from the outset, preferring reform, respect, and power-sharing, whether this is due to pros and cons, contrasts between strengths and weaknesses, or traditions and customs. Generally speaking, it is the development of events that gradually radicalizes them, and it is the political conflict itself that gradually draws social boundaries and thus "nationalizes" these local communities. Nationalism is often the result of contradictions within the empire, not the cause of the contradictions of the empire.

From an academic point of view, the contempt for "The Art of Empire" and "The Failure of Empire" is to seek a third explanation of "the disappearance of empire".

The Economic Observer: Do the political ideas and practices of our modern world completely preclude the legitimacy of empire as a form of political organization? If this is a fact, is this a certain necessity of modern historical logic, or is it a mixture of many historical accidents, from your comparative studies?

Zheng Fei: I don't know if the Empire is "completely excluded."

In theory, the modern world does demand a more homogeneous political society and a government accountable to the local population, but does this mean that the state, organized by many different people and localities, is naturally divided? You will find that many scholars and policymakers are not self-consistent enough in their answers to this question. They are usually opposed to empire, believing that empire is the oppression of one nation against another. But if you ask them whether the minorities and remote places in the modern state should be independent of themselves, most of them will also take a negative attitude. Most scholars and policymakers agree that in modern times, the demand for self-determination by an ethnic group should first operate within the framework of existing states. Samuel Huntington, the famous American political scientist, commented very sharply a few years ago: "The prejudice against political divorce (that is, separatism) in the 20th century is as strong as the prejudice against divorce between husband and wife in the 19th century." When ethnic groups with deep hostility "cannot continue to live together," he adds, "they can only continue to live together." They have no choice. ”

Why favour one over the other?

Historically, we can indeed find many examples of empires being challenged by the periphery, but we can also find quite a few examples of opposites that show that the periphery is not anti-imperialist.

Until the Declaration of Independence in 1776, for example, the slogan of the North American Continental Congress was "Restore our freedom as British." There was no sign of "nationalism" in terms of what was said at the time, but on the contrary, many later revolutionaries, such as Francis Hopkins and John Adams, claimed their patriotism and British identity.

For example, in the process of decolonization of the French Empire, there were actually quite a few African colonial leaders who were not willing. Scholars have observed that local nationalism in West Africa existed only weakly before 1950. In fact, what prevailed at that time was "the idea of Great France and the universalist ideal of French republicanism". Senegal's first president, Leopold Senghor, said in 1955: "My concern is that ... We may break away from France. We must remain in France, not only in the Federation of France, but also in the French Republic. The first President of Côte d'Ivoire, Felix Houffe-Boigny, said in 1951: "Let us write a vow on this new page: to make Africa the most beautiful and loyal territory of the Federation of France." "Where are the nationalist sentiments of these African leaders? Shortly after de Gaulle took power in France, de Gaulle asked the French colonies to hold a referendum to decide whether to join the French Community or opt for independence. With the exception of Guinea, all countries have chosen the Community. In this example, we also do not see the races scrambling to break free from the shackles of the Empire.

For example, in the past, the Habsburg Empire was called a "prison for all peoples", but the Czech Paraski wrote to the Federal Frankfurt Parliament in 1848 that "the existence, integrity and consolidation of [the Austrian Empire] are extremely important, not only for my people, but for Europe as a whole, for humanity and civilization as a whole." "If the Austrian state had not existed for so many years, we would have to strive to create it as quickly as possible for the benefit of Europe and even humanity." 20 years later, in another place, he added, "We will not preserve our historical-political entities, our particular peoples and cultures and our economic life any better elsewhere than in Austria... We have no desire or political intention to surpass Austria. By world war I, Paraski's willingness seemed to have remained stubbornly in Czech society. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper observed that "the different 'nations' within austria-Hungary in 1914 did not see the war as an opportunity to divide themselves".

If we do not look at the consequences, but go back to the course of history, in many times and in many places, we will not find any signs of the rebellion of the empire and the collapse of the people.

Why can't empires be sustained like an ordinary multi-ethnic state?

I acknowledge that with the advent of the era of democracy and nationality, the country is under some kind of pressure to "shrink" itself. The Empire, which is the cause of a vast number of people, naturally feels the pressure of this "contraction" even more--if the pluralistic elements that make up the Empire are to continue to coexist, if the Empire wants to manage the various groups of people smoothly, it must establish a certain "social contract" between the upper and lower levels, left and right, and agree on "names". And these "social contracts" are very difficult to achieve. The president of the American occupation of the Philippines was McKinley, who once said something like this— "I walked night after night on the floor of the White House until midnight, gentlemen, and I tell you without shame, I knelt down, and for more than one night I prayed to Almighty God for light and guidance." "It's hard to imagine an ancient emperor suffering like McKinley after acquiring a new territory.

Did this difficulty completely prevent the Empire from existing as an effective way of ruling? Not necessarily. Because of the disappearance of the empire, historically, it is not mainly because the empire has been seriously challenged internally, but because the war between the empires has disintegrated them - the First World War was a war in which the empires destroyed each other, and the main ideologies of the post-war world were Leninism and Wilsonism, both of which were quite critical of empire and imperialism, and the superpower of the Two Great Powers of the Soviet Union and the United States made the twentieth century a great ebb and flow of the empire.

In other words, the collapse of modern empires has historically been imposed primarily from the outside, not by the inability to govern themselves.

My final answer to your question is probably: No, I don't know if the demise of empires was accidental or inevitable. There is no alignment between theory and historical practice, and I cannot answer.

The Economic Observer: Both the traditional territorial empire and the colonial empire in the 19th century faced the problem of transformation in the 20th century. As a result, the colonial powers that embraced "liberal imperialism" were ultimately unable to bear the tension within the empire and eventually disintegrated. Like the Anglo-Indian Empire described in the recently published book The Tears of the Princes, do you think that "liberal imperialism" inevitably degenerates into hypocrisy and self-contradiction? And have traditional empires, which have clearly rejected liberal imperialist solutions, also shown unexpected resilience?

Zheng Fei: According to my understanding, the so-called "liberalimperialism" mainly refers to a political trend of thought in the middle and late nineteenth century, when some people believed that the rule of the empire was beneficial to indigenous societies, so it was the mission and responsibility of civilized countries in Europe. They believed that the more advanced European civilizations should import their political, social, and cultural models into the more backward world, so that empires would benefit each other. Both John Mill and Tocqueville were believers and advocates of liberal imperialism.

Liberal imperialism has something to say. For example, although Marx denounced the evils and barbarism of colonialism, he also believed that Britain's conquest in India had a positive side in his article "The Future Outcomes of British Rule in India". Engels also pointed out that "the conquest of Algeria [by France] was meaningful to the progress of civilization ... Modern bourgeoisie, who possesses civilization, industry, order, and at least is relatively enlightened, is slightly superior to the feudal lords or to the captive robbers who are still in a state of barbarism." As ideological opponents, they don't always deliberately say nice things.

The problem is that liberal imperialism, as you say, is ultimately free from hypocrisy and self-contradiction (though not necessarily at first).

Let's take the Examples of The United Kingdom and France.

Let's start with British rule in India. Metcalfe has an observation in the book The New Cambridge History of India: "There is a constant tension between the two ideas of similarity and difference in the India that the British consider... The British view of India never appeared as a single and coherent line of thought. Sometimes, the British see Indians as people like themselves... Other times, they emphasize the enduring nature of what they believe to be India's differences. Sometimes, even, they let two views coexist in their thinking at the same time. ”

This entanglement is not unexplained. In simple terms, the perception of the extent to which indians are similar/different from the British actually concerns what India's future holds within the empire. If the two are considered similar, then Britain is responsible for civilizing, and India will expect to gradually achieve social progress, implement the same legal and political system as Britain, and acquire "Britishness". If we think that there is an essential difference between the two, then we can only "rule the Han dynasty and rule the law", and India is just a foreign land.

Metcalfe concluded that throughout the period of British unification, the most powerful influence on British perception of India was still the idea of difference. In the early days of the conquest, the British administration emphasized respect and tolerance for traditional Indian customs, laws, and religions, as well as working with traditional social elites to govern using established political structures. This is both a respect for political and social realities and a recognition that "India is only worthy of authoritarian rule." By the 1820s and 1830s, as liberal ideas had gained the upper hand in Britain, a group of liberal intellectuals and politicians had decided to implement reforms in India and began to turn Indians into British. For example, the Whig historian and statesman McCollett called in 1835 for a radical transformation of Indian culture and society to produce "British people in taste, perception, morality, and thought." This is the language of liberal imperialism. But the Great Indian Uprising of 1857 swept away this idea, and a British official in India, recalling the causes of the uprising, wrote: "This fatal mistake of intending to impose European policy on the people of Asia ... It will have to be corrected in the future. Another British official, who was in charge of the Ministry of Indian Affairs in 1859, also said: "Inspired by the most charitable emotions, and in our conception of justice and justice, we have fallen into the misconception that a system has been introduced that is completely alien to the customs and aspirations of the people." He concluded: "We should try to adopt and improve as much as possible what is available in the existing institutional system of the country and that is beneficial to us." In other words, the British felt that the radical reforms had triggered the rebellion, and they were full of "dog bites Lu Dongbin" grievances, and they decided to restore everything.

So the liberal imperialism of the British is not immune to hypocrisy.

The Rule of the French Empire was, on the face of it, more "liberal imperialism" than that of the British. For example, on May 5, 1881, the famous French republican politician Gambida gave a speech at a banquet commemorating the abolition of slavery (1794), proposing to toast "France Abroad" and saying: "The Declaration of the Rights of Man does not distinguish people according to skin color or rank ... It is this that gives it solemnity and authority... It does not say 'the rights of the French and the citizens', but 'the rights of the people and the citizens'. Stephen Roberts, a researcher in French colonial history, commented that "freedom, equality, and fraternity pervade the air, all based on the Napoleonic Code and the orthodoxy of eighteenth-century rationalism." France saw only Pabite, Dakar and Insula as suburbs of Paris. ”

The Australian historian Robert Aldridge also pointed out: "The concept of French colonial policy throughout the late nineteenth century was 'assimilation'... The purpose of this policy is to ,...... When the time comes, turn Africans, Asians and islanders into French men and women of different skin colors. ”

The French not only thought so, but they did part of it. But in the end, the French could not actually accept the consequences of the policy of assimilation. By the 1950s, a growing number of French people felt that empire was a liability rather than an asset, sucking up large sums of aid from the mainland each year without reciprocating, allowing outsiders to become French citizens to undermine the stability of French society, and the conflict between the kind of federalism that French African leaders wanted for that was both individual equality and multiculturalism was increasingly in conflict with France's existing political practices. In discussing this history, Friedrich Cooper concluded that "the French and Africans were repeatedly caught between the politics they wanted and the politics they could get." This incongruity can be said to be the main reason for the bankruptcy of the French Empire. We may say that the French were less hypocritical, but "self-contradiction" was the inevitable result of their imperial policy.

Wouldn't a traditional empire without liberal imperialism be more resilient? Historically, certainly not. Let's say the Russian Empire. It is difficult to say what liberal agenda the Russian Empire is pursuing. At the end of the empire, for example, it tightened its grip in Finland to a considerable extent, undermining its original constitution and autonomy.

The Finns were originally very fond of and centripetal towards the Russian Empire, because when the Russians annexed Finland, they gave the Finns considerable autonomy. But as the Russian Empire suppressed, more and more unrest followed, first and foremost in the fact that more and more Finns emigrated to other countries. This is then reflected in acts of terrorism. For example, on June 9, 1904, a young government employee, Eugene Shoman (whose father was a former general in the Russian army and a senator), after assassinating the Tsar's Finnish governor Bobrikov in the Senator Building, raised a gun and left a suicide note to the Tsar, saying that "this method is violent, but it is the only way." I know that His Majesty has good intentions and noble intentions, so I implore His Majesty to know the truth of the Empire. ”

In April 1912, a Finnish aristocrat expressed in a letter a mentality that his countrymen generally held: "Nothing can save us except major European or world events that change all current power relations." This sentence actually means that as soon as something happens, then the Finns will act. Leonard Rending, an expert on Finnish history, laments: "No matter how plausible some of the reasons for Russification may seem at first, developments in Finland have proved that this calculation is fundamentally wrong." A people loyal to the vast majority of the people was alienated, the Finnish national consciousness was strengthened, and an enemy was created unnecessarily. ”

In fact, not only Finland, but the Russian Empire created countless "unnecessary enemies" at the end of its empire. To be honest, I don't see any resilience in such an empire.

The Economic Observer: Formal empires may have entered the historical context, but the logic and dynamics of empires may still exist informally in today's political evolution. Can you provide some insight into the study of empires to clarify and understand contemporary politics?

Zheng Fei: The role of empire in politics is two-sided, on the one hand, the existence of some empires has indeed curbed geopolitical and ethnic conflicts in some regions, but on the other hand, the criticism of empire after World War I is also justified - empire is a division of the world, it undermines the free flow of the world economy, and competition between them brings great risk of war. But if we revert our gaze from the realm of international relations to the internal means of domination of the Empire, then the Empire can still teach us something.

There is one thing in the historical experience of the empire, which I think is particularly noteworthy and learned, that is, all the universal empires can generally accept the ambiguity and uncertainty of sovereignty, and they usually do not force "imperial counties" and uniform administration of their territories composed of multi-ethnic dependents. In many cases, the imperial rule method is to pay attention to the four words of "rare confusion". Edmund Burke, summing up the lessons of British Empire rule, said that although a country's sovereignty over its territory must be unlimited in theory, in fact, it has a boundary of rights according to the differences in local environment and history, and the politician needs to exercise self-restraint and respect this naturally formed boundary.

In the historical experience of empires, I think the second item worthy of attention is that successful empires are usually able to realize the existence of the center-periphery division, not to take the unity of the country for granted, to realize that the center-periphery should be a kind of cooperative relationship, to realize that the periphery may need more special protection psychologically and politically, which means that the political and social elites in the core and periphery areas should establish some kind of normal communication channels outside the political hierarchy, conduct political consultations and interpersonal exchanges, and absorb personnel.

From these two experiences, I think that in the heterogeneous and large modern nation-states, political elites should perhaps look more at the history of empires in order to learn from successful empires in these ways.