There is a "French exception" argument in France, but what is unique about the French? France is a vast country with a diverse climate and culture. Brittany is different from Alsace, Picardy is different from Provence, and Paris is very different from all the provinces. In fact, the great historian Fernand Braudel concludes at the end of his recent magnum opus, L'Identité de la France, that France is not only diverse, but that "its diversity is obvious, enduring, and structural." In addition, some early French historians have proposed expressions such as "the soul of France," "eternal France," and "French character," as if there had previously been a typical Frenchness that determined social development, rather than, on the contrary, which shaped Frenchness by social development. These views do not help to encourage an essentialist view of French history. However, if the typical national spirit is manifested in turn by resisting the Romans, the loyalty of St. Louis to the Church, the secret destruction of Christian society by the Enlightenment, and the conquest of Napoleon who tried to forcibly establish a new world, then the national spirit must be somewhat chaotic.
However, there is a great irony about the "French exception": the "French exception" became a frequent topic of discussion after its demise, especially after François Furet declared the end of the "French exception" in la République du centre: la fin de l'exception française (La République du centre: la fin de l'exception française). The book was published in 1988, a year before the fall of the Berlin Wall, just before the first edition of Francis Fukuyama's The End of History was published. The book argues that, after the weakening of the French Communist Party, the acceptance of the republic by the traditionalist right, and France's recent accession to a unified Europe, as the fierce internal political conflict has eased, France can now let go of its "exaggerated" geopolitical postures, no longer see itself as different, and show its proper appearance as a middle-class country.
Admittedly, as with the new model of "cohabitation", this is consistent with attempts to move closer to the centralized politics of Chabon-Delma, Giscar Destein, and others, but it is not intended to please everyone. Almost 20 years later, Chirac reiterated his belief in the French exception in his last presidential speech in 2007. He declared: "France is different from other countries. It has its own special responsibility, a bequest of French history and universal values that France helped forge. He concluded by saluting: "Believe me, such a France will continue to amaze the world." ”
So, has there been a "French exception" before? If so, does it still exist?
France is "exceptional", not just because it has a domestic history of violence – Germany, Russia and Spain are almost immune to political violence. More closely related, France is the only country in the European Union that still retains costly overseas provinces and territories in order to align itself with its self-image as a world power. France's grand policies, in many forms, demonstrated its consistent ambitions since the 17th century , after all , the richest , most populous and most powerful country in Europe. The "French exception" is a paradox, because France itself is not only exceptional, but also exemplary. France's exception is not only reflected in the fact that it is different from other countries in the general sense, but also because france adheres to universal values and has become a model for other countries. At the heart of this concept is an ambition — an ambition that France wants to be one of the noblest forms of civilization , and that ambition is also seen as France's national mission.
In the Great Century, when France began to proclaim itself a modern version of ancient Rome, the template for this exemplary society was established. Louis XIV's declaration that "the state is me" goes both ways, because the divine concept of kingship establishes not only the status of the king, but also the status of the government, and the government is the place where the king must make a covenant with God. Moreover, authoritarian rule implies absolute responsibility, and the central government must take up the burden of controlling and coordinating commerce, culture, architecture, and all aspects of society, up to the language itself. Colbert's controlling economic policies, France's attempts to systematically codify artistic creation, and the French Academy's quest for linguistic precision all implicitly express in different forms France's desire to elevate civilization to an orderly, harmonious and harmonious state. In short, the "French exception" implies universal salvationism practiced by centralized states.
Admittedly, over the next century, the Enlightenment, by covertly destroying religion and weakening the authority of the Church, threw out a universalism that competed with these theories. At the age of the Discoveries, when Europeans began to dismantle other cultures that had fallen across the globe, this universalism transcended the state itself and clearly threatened the Catholic monarchical autocracy that claimed the divine right of kings. In the United States, the Revolutionary War was also inspiring radical political thought, and the encyclopedists were building the theoretical basis for the French Revolution of 1789 and its well-known Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen. The Declaration states that all people everywhere have the right to freedom and equality. Obviously, all of this seems to be the exact opposite of the universalism preached by the monarchy of Louis XIV. Ironically, however, the French Revolution, under pressure from the situation and its own internal dynamics, became an autocracy under Robespierre's leadership. This is the mirror image of the monarchy it was meant to replace. Thus, the fusion of authoritarian states and universalism re-emerged. In this expansionist France, it saw itself as having a mission to spread ideas of freedom, equality, and fraternity throughout Europe and beyond.
Broadly speaking, the history of France over the past 200 years is a history of the conflict between these two universalists. In countries like Britain, which later converted to Protestantism and industrialized earlier, political divisions have always been largely social hierarchies. If the situation in France is confusing, it is because class differences are superimposed on two irreconcilable forces – Catholic conservatives and monarchists on the right, and Republicans and revolutionaries on the left. The violence that erupted between the Revolution of 1848 and the Paris Commune of 1871, like the extraordinary hatred unleashed by the Dreyfus affair or the Popular Front, was a by-product of this conflict of universalism. Extremists on both sides mythologize the conflict when they describe it. A further collateral consequence of the conflict was the existence of part of Bonapartism in French politics. It continued to emerge with the help of authoritarian populism in an attempt to bridge the historical divide of public opinion: Napoleon as Emperor rested on the basic achievements of the French Revolution; Napoleon III, who followed the utopian socialist Saint-Simon, played the game of dictatorship; the traditionalist soldier Charles de Gaulle confronted his former mentor Pétain and restored the Republic. In times of crisis, all of this transcends the "conventional" partisan politics of conservatives, socialist parties, etc.
In fact, the Second World War largely resolved the conflict between these two extreme views of the state. As one commentator reminded us, France is a country in which since 1789 "every form of political government has ended in a coup, revolution or war." Moreover, France has 15 different constitutions". However, Pétain, in cahoots with Hitler, established a fascist regime similar to franco's Spain, and drove French citizens to their deaths in a foreign land. These practices have discredited the Catholic conservative tradition. Since the liberation of France, france has been widely regarded as a republic, despite the pressures of the Cold War and the doubts that have always existed about the functioning of the Constitution. Moreover, in the eyes of Chirac and de Gaulle, the republic still retained the "Exception of France", its global mission, and its belief in the leadership of great powers.
Things become much clearer when we look at these aspects of French life, which often confuse laymen, in the context of the state's role. Because the "French state" is a concept with its own theoretical logic and internal coherence. As defined in the Preamble to the Constitution of the Fifth Republic, "France is an indivisible, secular, democratic, social republic". The terms in this manifesto and the order in which they are arranged are significant. Because, they define the specific characteristics of modern France. First, the concept of "republic" clearly implies that it does not recognize the endogenous hereditary privileges and class systems of monarchies and aristocratic states. It should be borne in mind that the Declaration of Human Rights is a declaration of "human and civil rights". For example, unlike the British before 1948, the French were not subjects, but citizens. They have equal rights and responsibilities. This meant that, regardless of their social status, they not only had the right to be called "sir" or "lady"—although that was a major step forward at the time—but they were defined as members of a collectivist society.
The first term in the Constitution's preamble immediately reinforces this idea: "indivisible" means a centralized, non-federal state. In this country, individuals are not distinguished by region, nor are they defined by the minority culture or ethnic group they pursue. Individuals are only citizens of the Republic. That is why the government has been reluctant to loosen its grip. Government control is achieved by granting separate local powers to local administrators. It was not until France, in order to make the economy more balanced, that legislation was passed in March 1982, that elected regional councils were established. It was supplemented by legislation of July 2006, giving regional councils financial autonomy.
This clearly leads directly to the second term in the preamble: "secular". This marked an important difference between France and Britain and the United States. In the latter two countries, religion may be in decline, but secularism has never been enshrined as a principle in the Constitution. Apparently, the reason for this "exception" is that there was an unusually long struggle between the two until the government was freed from the Control of the Catholic Church itself in politics and society. But this does not mean that secularism is just a formal concept – on the contrary, it has far-reaching implications.
Although the government recognizes citizens' freedom of religious belief and does not oppose religion, it believes that religion is fundamentally a private matter. The public sphere is seen as a neutral republican space where people interact as equal citizens. Therefore, it is inappropriate to provide religious education or to allow people to display religious symbols that cause division. It is worth noting that the UK has kept some distance from its previous multiculturalist stance. It is therefore no accident that the word "secular" in the preamble precedes "democratic". The deep conviction is that democratic freedom, equality and fraternity can be defended only in the neutral public space provided by the secular republic.
Finally, it is inevitable that a republic designed to integrate freedom, equality, and fraternity will describe itself as "social." This is the last term in the definition in the preamble to the Constitution. There is ample evidence that for early French Republicans who sought a middle ground between german authoritarianism in the 19th century and small-government liberalism in Britain, the concept that played a bridging role here was solidarity. It is in the name of this republican value that France has achieved reconciliation between freedom and justice, and it often assumes more responsibility for the well-being of its citizens than other countries.
Of course, this is just theory. In itself, this theory is admirable. But in a kaleidoscopic world, theories tend to be overtaken by reality. The bloody French retreat from Indochina and Algeria did not in the least confirm the view of the "mission of civilization". And France's conservatism in gender equality, it is hard to imagine that it was not until 1967, when the country wanted to increase its population, that the law prohibiting contraception was abolished, and abortion was not legalized until 1975.
But France has achieved much in terms of the most discussed element of the "French exception", the "social model". The World Health Organization regularly ranks France's healthcare system as the best in the world. France has a 16-week maternity allowance, a 2-week paternity allowance, a public daycare, a family allowance, and a very low rate of teenage pregnancies, which are particularly friendly to women and families. France has a basic national pension and "supplementary pension insurance", on top of the "supplementary pension insurance" can be superimposed on the company or individual pension. In France, the statutory retirement age is 62 years and the legal length of service is 40 years. The French have the best health care and longer retirement, not to mention the 5 weeks of paid leave and the statutory 35-hour work week that has been retained to this day, and the republican and social model established in France has gained unanimous support in all circles of political circles. What is clear, however, is that such a system, while admirable, is also costly.
The "French exception", then, is not an illusion, but it is also not a reality that has been realized. Moreover, in recent years, it has become clear that behind the uneasiness of the French public lies the obvious question of whether the "French exception" can at least be preserved if it is not consolidated. In the new globalized economy, France considers social security a necessity of its civilized republican model, but can its economy be strong enough to support its social security? These are the problems that French leaders will face in the 21st century.
—This article is from Cecil Jenkins, "Rediscovering Europe: How France Became France"