In the early hours of September 1, 1983, a Korean Airlines Boeing 747 passenger jet KAL007 was hit by a missile and crashed in the Sea of Okhotsk, leaving none of the 249 passengers and 29 crew members alive. At the time of the crash, there were no witnesses at the scene, only a few Japanese fishermen on board who heard Boeing's explosion in the distance. In the last 12 minutes of the plane's attack, the captain barely reported anything to the ground via the radio on the plane.
To this day, apart from the fact that the plane was hit by a missile and crashed, why was the plane hit? Which country was hit? It remains a mystery to this day. None of the many conjectures, many hypotheses, and many speculations concerned with this have been fully substantiated, and no one can explain them clearly except the parties concerned.
After the South Korean airliner took off from Anchorage Airport in Alaska, the United States, it was supposed to fly directly to Seoul along the international route, via Japan. But KAL007 departed from the normal course when it arrived in Alaska shortly after takeoff. At first it was only a few degrees, but then the plane rushed into the diagonal thorn, 500 kilometers away from the international route, into the Territory of the Soviet Union, first flying over the Kamchatka Peninsula and then through Sakhalin Island in the Sea of Okhotsk.
The Sea of Okhotsk is not a vast ocean that is not noticed by the world, but this area is home to 1/3 of the ships of the Soviet Navy. It was also the largest Soviet naval base in the western Pacific, equipped with intercontinental ballistic missiles. Soviet submarines, which were enough to destroy any city on the American mainland, also rested here at the interval between the two voyages to sea. If KAL007 continues, it will fly over Vladivostok, the largest Soviet naval base in the Far East.
Why did KAL007 not fly on international routes, but fly over military restricted areas that even Soviet citizens could not set foot on?
At the time, Korean Airlines, the U.S. government, and ICAO thought it might be a driving error. However, the Boeing 747 is not a dilapidated aircraft, and the crew such as captain Jeong Byung-yin have rich piloting experience, and Jung Byung-yin is considered the best pilot in South Korea's civil aviation, and former President Kim Doo-hwan's visit to the United States in 1980 and Southeast Asia in 1981 was piloted by Jeong Byung-yin. Moreover, in order to ensure that the course is correct, the aircraft is equipped with three sets of control systems that work independently, and the three sets of systems cannot fail at the same time. According to people close to the French intelligence agency, in general, the Boeing 747 deviated by 500 kilometers from the course, and the ground command station can certainly detect and immediately correct it, not to mention that this occurred in a very sensitive area.
In addition, before the plane took off from Ancolech, the captain resolutely refused to load the excess baggage that passengers had already paid for, allowing the airport to add 5,000 liters of jet fuel to the plane than the constant. Is this just out of caution? It is entirely conceivable that this was a backup fuel for later avoidance of Soviet fighter pursuits, sudden changes in course, acceleration and altitude adjustment.
It is also puzzling that after the aircraft is attacked by a missile, according to international practice, the pilot must repeat "MAYDAY" three times before reporting the specific situation. However, in addition to the simple report of "rapid pressurization and 10,000 feet down" made by the South Korean pilot 45 seconds after the plane was hit, in the next 10 minutes or so, neither called for help nor contacted the ground station, and the radio on the plane was obviously good. Why don't drivers shout out to the world that flight opportunities are difficult? These unanswered questions are a source of doubt.
Hersh, an American journalist who endorsed the crash because of a misguided flight, wrote a book on it that cited information provided by the NSA and other senior figures. According to the authors, the aircraft error was caused by an unfortunate combination of factors. Kal007, there were several influential Americans, including a deputy government minister and the leader of a far-right group. The captain was busy socializing with these people, and it was very late that he found out that he was flying in the wrong direction, and later in order to save fuel, he did not immediately turn. In addition, the crew did not notice that it was being followed by a Soviet fighter, and the pilot did not see the warning tracer shells fired by the MiG-23 and The Soviet-15, because the aircraft was climbing high.
Moscow certainly did not believe this. The Soviets said the rookie's bottom compartment was filled with electronic reconnaissance equipment, saying it flew into soviet territory and "ended" its flight because the plane was engaged in espionage.
Both the American and Western media have indirectly supported this claim of the Soviets, saying that when KAL007 flew into Soviet airspace, the Soviet Union was preparing to test a secret weapon, the 88-X-25 or PL-5, which was an anti-missile missile with the Us MX missile as a hypothetical target. During the scheduled time for the test, the NSA took up positions in the Sakhalin Island area. The destroyer Badger cruised off the sea of Okhotsk, with RC-135 AWACS hovering in the air and a U.S. military satellite ferret Ferret D higher in the atmosphere. The Americans may also have dropped an 8T8-8 space shuttle in the operation, and when kal007 deviated from the course, the STS-8 was fixed over the Pacific Ocean. At the same time, the Space Shuttle Challenger took off for the first time, taking off during the day and returning to land at night, with two U.S. Navy pilots in its cabin.
On September 20, 1983, Pravda published a lengthy article detailing how KAL007 was involved in espionage. Kal007 was deliberately delayed by 40 minutes during takeoff from Anchorage in order to meet eight U.S. spy satellites flying over the area while flying through the Sea of Okhotsk. According to the analysis of British experts, there is a lot of technical data listed in the Pravda article, and it is difficult to say that it is pure propaganda.
In October 1983, some U.S. intelligence experts gave up support for the Reagan administration. They re-analyzed the public or secret material they had, saying that the Soviets had made a mistake and might have treated the South Korean airliner as an RC-1 35 AWACS aircraft. This misunderstanding is entirely possible. Because on the radar monitor screen, the display image of the RC-135 and The Boeing 747 is similar. The Soviet army newspaper Red Star revealed that at least seven RC-135s flew through the area the day before the crash. The Americans themselves admitted that there was an RC-1 35 and KAL007 that crossed each other, and for several minutes the two planes even went hand in hand, and they were now on the Soviet radar screen as one, showing the display of an aircraft. The Americans said the RC-135 returned to base because the Soviets did not conduct secret weapons tests.
The Soviet pilots claimed that the KAL007 used the same method used to get rid of the tracking, which was exactly the same as the method used by the RC-135, which flew over the Sea of Okhotsk to get rid of the Soviet pursuit, that is, when it was tracked, it unfolded all the slowed-down wings of the aircraft, braked urgently, and let the Soviet fighters rush to the front. Records of the air crash provided by the Japanese confirm that KAL007 did.
Moreover, the cunning of Korean pilots is not limited to this. While he reported to the Ground Command Station in Tokyo that he was asking to climb high, he descended steeply in an attempt to fool the Soviet fighters. One American pilot believed that the KAL007 was able to complete this maneuver at nearly the speed of sound. Insiders know that civil flights can never cross the threshold of sonic speed. Otherwise, the consequences are unimaginable. In May 1985, a batch of information released by the Japanese government also confirmed the above behavior of KAL007 pilots. Japanese government information also proves that KAL007 was not in a natural driving state at that time, but was operated by the hands of captain Zheng Bingyin.
The incident provided an opportunity for the Soviet propaganda machine to make a big fuss. The Soviets said South Korean Airlines pilots were trained by the CIA, saying the CIA funded South Korean Airlines and regularly used the company's planes for espionage for nearly 10 years. Although the Soviets could not come up with any real evidence to confirm their claims, it was not all nonsense. According to the US "Defense Science" magazine, KAL007 captain Zheng Bingyin often boasted about how he was appointed by the airline to engage in anti-Soviet espionage activities and repeatedly accomplished miracles. After the crash, the families of the deceased sued the airline in court. Zheng Bingyin's widow said in court that her husband was very afraid to fly KAL007 and said that if the pilot flew the large circle route, that is, flew close to the Soviet coastline, he would get a bonus.
The use of civil aviation for espionage is not uncommon in major countries around the world.
The KAL007 crash led to a series of disclosures. It is often the allies who want to distance themselves from the United States, such as Japan, France and Germany, and the United Kingdom, the most loyal partner of the United States, is even more unusual, giving the United States a good look.
The United Kingdom has a pair of monthly magazines called "Defense Information", and the subscribers are carefully screened by the British Ministry of Defence, which is full of seriousness. The magazine published a lengthy article in its June 1984 issue stating that KAL007 was involved in espionage activities, coordinated by the Ferret D satellite, the RC-135 early warning aircraft, and the STS-8 space shuttle that entered orbit 36 t hours before the accident. The space shuttle is stranded at a suitable distance and can play a command, control and liaison role in the coordinated operation of sea, land, air and space at several levels. The author of the article reminds everyone that so far, the public has not seen the list of all passengers of KAL007, is there anyone in it who can't see the light of day? According to the author's analysis, KAL007's espionage operation was decided by William Clarke, director of the NATIONAL Security Council.
Six weeks after the crash, Clark was fired and the U.S. military, which funded the development of the space shuttle, began to withdraw, all of which are intriguing episodes.
After the article was published, Korean Airlines went against the grain and filed charges against Defense Data, and the two sides were private on the condition that the magazine publicly stated that KAL007 was not engaged in espionage. Defense Data has limited financial resources and cannot afford to spend huge sums of money and Fight a protracted war in court with South Korean civil aviation. However, here the "Defense Data" bowed its head and compromised, and the Manchester "Guardian" and Thames TV over there were in high spirits, taking up the "Defense Data" statement, and even not afraid to fight against the Koreans in the British court.
Walkman, editor of "National Defense Science and Technology", believes that after KAL007 entered the airspace of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union used all electronic equipment, which means that the US intelligence agencies have achieved a great harvest. General Gabuyer of the United States Air Force held the same view, believing that the understanding of the Soviet communication system obtained using KAL007 was of great significance and inestimable value.
Why should Americans take such a big risk?
The answer is extremely simple and frightening. In the event of a nuclear war, how to break through the enemy's electronic defense system or make it ineffective will determine the outcome of the war. In the eyes of military personnel, it is of great significance to seize the initiative. It is also assumed that five weeks before the crash, U.S. intelligence agencies learned that the Soviet Union had set up a new radar in Krasnoyarsk, Siberia. How well does this anti-missile equipment perform? Is it a violation of the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty? For strategic reasons, Americans must learn more.
In addition, given the domestic political situation in the United States, if it is proved that the Soviets are militarily unblinking and manipulative, the Reagan administration can obtain congressional support and significantly increase the military budget. If this hypothesis holds, the whole point of the operation is to use a civilian aircraft as a decoy and get the Soviets to use their new radar. Who has the guts to fight a civil aviation airliner with more than 200 passengers?
This plan can be regarded as both very bold and very risky. The Soviets could have thought of the Boeing 747 as an RC-135, and they could do it after warning. After 5 hours of circling with the Soviet aircraft, he understood that as long as he insisted for another ten minutes, he could leave the Soviet airspace, and he firmly believed that the Soviets saw that this was a Boeing 747 civil aviation aircraft and would never dare to act rashly.
So, did the South Korean airliner fly by mistake into Soviet airspace? Or did they deliberately enter Soviet airspace for espionage? At present, there is no conclusion, only some speculation, some hypothesis.
Since KAL007 was destroyed in Soviet airspace, the South Korean airliner was destined to be attacked by the Soviets. There seems to be no doubt about this. But there are also those who doubt this for good reason, arguing that the South Korean airliner was shot down by the United States.
Because the tragedy occurred in the most heavily monitored areas of the world, the air crashes at that time are well documented.
American surveillance stations on the southern Alaska and northern Japan lines recorded the entire incident from beginning to end, without missing a minute. In some of the monitoring stations, a small number of officers even listened to live broadcasts.
The first to detect anomalies in the Soviet Union was the NSA's surveillance station in Elmondov near Ankorec. Monitoring station technicians found at the time that after "an aircraft of unknown nationality invaded," Soviet troops in the area were on emergency alert. When the Soviets were chosen, they found KAL007 leaving the intended route and rushing into the military restricted area. The area was home to many Soviet military bases, and all aerial maps indicated that aircraft entering the area were at risk of being attacked at any time.
Shortly thereafter, the NSA monitoring station in Ermundorf learned that four Soviet fighter jets had taken off. A few hundred kilometers away, an officer at an American monitoring station in northern Japan overheard not only conversations between Soviet pilots, but also intercepted calls between the Soviet Air Defense Command and the Moscow Ministry of Defense. The supreme commander of Burleigh was clearly reluctant to bear the responsibility of destroying the aircraft alone.
On the morning of September 1, 1983, a U.S. National Security Agency technician based in Yane, Japan, overheard and recorded a conversation with a Soviet pilot tracking a South Korean airliner. He didn't really care at first. After hearing the roar of "give", he was shocked. Because he knew that Soviet pilots only shouted like this when firing missile elbows. He continued to listen to the conversation, and then rewind the tape, that is, it was nearly an hour before he understood what was going on at the beginning and who the missile "gave" to.
Eight hours after KAL007 disappeared, the NSA sorted out all the information on the crash and alerted its security system.
The news of the air disaster had spread in the Soviet and American decision-making organs, and the outside world did not know about it more than twenty hours later. On the American side, there was a commotion. Six F15 and one AWACS aircraft arrived in Sanhun and were ordered to patrol the front line on Sakhalin Island. Their task was to get as close as possible to the Soviet border line and induce miG-23s and Soviet-15s to react. Before the outside world knew the news, the Reagan administration held a secret conference call to develop countermeasures to prepare to make the most of the incident.
The United States Senate's subsequent publication of The State of America (September 22, 1983) has a chronological record of the matter. The secret conference call was held on the advice of William Casey, director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, and William Clark, director of the National Security Council. The meeting determined that the Soviet Union was responsible for the destruction of the aircraft and the tragedy of the air crash, and decided to immediately set off a large-scale press campaign.
On September 1, Wick, director of the U.S. Information Service, organized a team with a special mission, including the director of Voice of America, to "strengthen coverage of the current world public opinion's response to Soviet atrocities." In order to carry out the specific task of "breaking through soviet radio interference and expanding propaganda to the Soviet Union", VOA invested twice as many transmitters as usual and increased the number of broadcasts by 90 hours a day. On September 21, President Reagan delivered a speech strongly condemning the Soviet Union. At the same time, the "Voice of America" broadcast to the Soviet Union reached its peak. At this point, people around the world have been convinced that the Soviet army shot down the South Korean airliner.
But seven years later, in 1990, there was a new narrative on the matter. Michelle Burren, a former U.S. Navy officer and pilot, has revealed some of the lesser-known results of his seven-year investigation into the matter with the U.S. Foundation for Constitutional Government and U.S. diplomat John Keppel.
Bren Keppel and others went to the site of the accident several times to investigate and carefully study the newly released relevant materials, compared the flight plan, flight dial and flight speed of the passenger plane, collected witness testimony, analyzed the wreckage of the plane, and concluded that the South Korean Boeing 747 was not shot down by the Soviet Union, but shot down by the United States. The Soviets did shoot down an aircraft at this time, but not the KAL007, but an American reconnaissance aircraft.
Buren revealed that the wreckage of the aircraft found near Sakhalin Island was marked with English letters and the characteristics of the American aircraft, not at all the wreckage of the South Korean Boeing 747 passenger aircraft, but the wreckage of the US military aircraft, and the wreckage of the real Boeing 747 passenger plane was found along Hokkaido and the northern part of Honshu Island.
Buren also believes that the South Korean passenger plane is not as the United States and South Korea said, after taking off from Anchorage in Alaska, the United States, and mistakenly entered the Soviet Union's Sakhalin Island, because under normal circumstances, the passenger plane should fly at sea, and the crew is easy to find on sakhalin Island. In fact, before the South Korean airliner was shot down, it flew south of the Tsugaru Strait for about 45 minutes. Buren also said that there were two U.S. warships cruising near Vladivostok at the time, and that U.S. RC-135, SR-71, and EF-111A reconnaissance aircraft were also active in this lead aircraft. Buren therefore deduced that the South Korean airliner was likely to be followed by an American reconnaissance plane.
So how did the South Korean airliner get shot down by the United States?
Buren Keppel and others analyzed that at that time, the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were very tense, the situation over Sakhalin Island was complicated, and the radar of the US Air Force found a South Korean airliner that deviated from the course and entered the airspace of the Soviet Union, and mistakenly thought that it was a Soviet aircraft that launched an attack, so it first took an offensive action and shot down the South Korean airliner.
This inference is somewhat flawed, somewhat absurd, and almost fanciful, but the evidence they have cannot but be believed. But whether the findings and inferences of Buren et al. are 100 percent correct remain a mystery.
On November 19, 1992, when Yeltsin visited South Korea, he personally returned the "black box" to the then president of South Korea, Roh Tae-woo.
But to this day these two questions are a mystery! A few years ago, a Russian media outlet revealed that the plane was equipped with American spy equipment. But after a long time, there are not many people who care now, and maybe this mystery will still exist for a certain time.