The theory of "innate ideas," in any form of philosophical significance, claims that all morally correct judgments or all science, or both, are based on or contained in a priori knowledge: (a) universal principles governing reality or (b) objects beyond sensory experience. This universal principle is represented by "Ex nihilo" (nihil fit); "equal to plus equals"; "it is wrong to kill." Examples of transcendent objects are Platonic forms and God. At the same time, the theory attempts to explain the origin and epistemological status of these principles and object concepts. To this end, it introduces the concept of innate thought.
Proponents of the theory of innate ideas (hereinafter referred to as "innateists") generally agree with empiricists that sensory experiences are made up of details. However, they will claim that scientific knowledge is knowledge that applies everywhere and at all times, that this knowledge actually exists, and that the abstraction and compounding of the sensory details in empiricist induction cannot provide us with this knowledge, but at best there are only opinions. In keeping with some empiricists, the primordialists also insist that the abstraction and compounding of the sensory details described by empiricism as the basis of concepts cannot provide us with the universal principles described above or the concept of transcendental objects. At the same time, the primordialists generally disagree with the realists who claim that these concepts and knowledge are acquired through direct perception or intuition of non-sensory reality, or if they do combine the theory of innate ideas with this theory of intuition, as Plato seems to have done, they will think of scientific knowledge, although it may draw conclusions with this intuition, but not from them. (Insisting that scientific knowledge begins with this intuition makes the concept of innate ideas redundant in methodology and epistemology.) The concept of innate ideas, in its philosophical sense, is based on the assumption that practical knowledge is not given directly or, if they do combine the theory of innate ideas with this theory of intuition, as Plato seems to have done, they would argue that scientific knowledge, while it can draw conclusions in this intuition, does not begin with them. (Insisting that scientific knowledge begins with this intuition makes the concept of innate ideas redundant in methodology and epistemology.) The concept of innate ideas, in its philosophical sense, is based on the assumption that practical knowledge is not given directly or, if they do combine the theory of innate ideas with this theory of intuition, as Plato seems to have done, they would argue that scientific knowledge, while it can draw conclusions in this intuition, does not begin with them. (Insisting that scientific knowledge begins with this intuition makes the concept of innate ideas redundant in methodology and epistemology.) The concept of innate ideas, in its philosophical sense, is based on the assumption that knowledge of reality is not given directly—at least, not in its first premise in chronological order—but by representation. Where reality is seen as distinct from sensory details, the innateist is thus a representative realist.
Since proponents of the theory of innate ideas deny that the above-mentioned universal principles or the concept of transcendental objects derive from the intuition of sensory experience or non-sensory reality, they are faced with the problem of explaining its origins. They solve this problem by thinking that these concepts are innate or innate—in short, become innate ideas. But when it comes to innate thought, proponents of the theory seem to imply two things. "Thoughts" sometimes refer to objects of consciousness, such as mental images. When speaking in this way, the innateist must adhere to the universal principle or concept of transcendental objects that exist in the mind from birth or even before birth. Then, the primordialists usually explain why children and savages seem to be unaware of the principles or objects in question, believing that these concepts or representations, though present in the mind, are obscured by the presence of other concepts or ideas—especially sensory thoughts or perceptions—just as the sound of a flute may exist in the air but cannot be heard because of other sounds or noises. Similarly, the "ideas" that the primordialists sometimes refer to are not objects of consciousness, but rather tendencies to form ideas or rationality that define concepts under certain conditions or stimuli. In René Descartes, for example, whenever consciousness occurs, also the idea that something that occurs is conscious - that is, oneself - which is an innate sense of temperament.
Equally important for proponents of the theory of innate ideas is the epistemological status of explanations of innate ideas. Since these concepts are thought to form the basis of all science, and because science is considered to depict reality, the question arises: How do we know that these concepts apply to reality?
Again, two answers have traditionally been given to this question. An answer that originated in Plato holds that innate thoughts are actually memories. These memories are direct intuitional representations of the reality experienced before birth. Innate ideas express knowledge in the form of memory. The second answer, taking Descartes as an example, argues that the veracity of innate thoughts can be verified internally. Thus, in Descartes, we find through reflection that two innate ideas, the idea of the self and the idea of nothingness, have a special character—they not only involve the direct consent of reason (their denial is some kind of contradiction), but they cannot be doubted, because any possible argument for skepticism, for example, the appeal to evil demons as the source of these ideas, must implicitly affirm the ideas under discussion. Therefore, in arguing that a demon who may be evil is deceiving me, I simultaneously affirm that I am and adopt the principle of making something out of nothing. Descartes stood on these two innate ideas and then claimed to prove the existence of God and the goodness of God; by doing so he believed that clarity and clarity were established as necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of an idea, thus validating all other innate ideas.
In sum, the theory of innate concepts states that certain concepts of universal principles and non-sensory objects are innate, i.e., either images that appear in the mind at or before birth, or in some cases the innate tendency of the mind to form concepts. Since these concepts, whether as images or tendencies, exist chronologically before sensory experiences, they are a priori in the literal and temporal sense of the term. Since they are not constituted or testable by sensory experience, but because they provide the basis for all scientific knowledge, they are also a priori in a logical and epistemological sense.
The concept of innate concepts clearly applies to theological speculation and metaphysical systems that place reality in a realm beyond sensory experience. Plato used this concept as a bridge to the formal sphere, and in the works of Neoplatonists (e.g. Plotino) and later belonging to platonic and Neoplatonic traditions, including Saint Augustine and Marcio Ficcino in the early Christian period during the Italian Renaissance. Outside the strict line of Plato and Neoplato, as mentioned earlier, Descartes adopted this doctrine in his proof of the existence of God, and it was used in similar ways by the ancient Stoics, Chebury's Herbert, and many other philosophers.
The doctrine of innate concepts is also closely related to the philosophy of science. Historically, this relationship has been miniaturized by the fact that the philosophical debate on this doctrine is greatest when philosophers are most concerned with establishing foundations and methods for science. Thus, the existence of the innate concept was particularly debated by the philosophers of the Academy and Lyceum in the 4th century BC and by continental rationalists and English empiricists in the 17th century.
The existence of innate ideas is not without consequences in the establishment of science. The doctrine of innate ideas favors certain scientific processes and opposes others. In particular, it favors meditation rather than laboratory experiments and mathematical methods rather than inductive methods. However, philosophical theories about the origin and basis of scientific knowledge may seem to have no practical effect on the establishment of science, and therefore on the establishment of science, just as in the view of many philosophers, philosophical theories on ethics may have had neither had a real effect on the moral behavior of men, past and present. But this view ignores the failures of science in the 17th and 18th centuries: on the one hand, jonathan Swift, for example, in part of the comic strip of Gulliver's Travels. The fact seems to be that it is not that the doctrine of innate ideas has no real influence on the development of science, but that science would not have been established if it had been strictly and universally adhered to in the 17th century and beyond; But, then, the general adherence to stricter forms of empiricism would also be a futile reason, and therefore, would also seem to be an atmosphere of thought in which philosophical empiricism or philosophical rationalism played no role in people's minds.
The classic attack on the doctrine of innate conception was proposed by John Locke in the first book on human understanding. Locke argues that if the doctrine of innate ideas is correct, one would expect to find certain ideas, such as the idea of God, or the idea that everyone possesses and consciously applies to all reasoning. However, this is not the case. Little children and savages do not have these ideas, and people do not consciously use them in all their reasoning.
Commentators on the theory of innate ideas sometimes complain that Locke's critique of the theory establishes a straw man for which no responsible primordialists are willing to defend. In particular, it has been claimed that responsible primordialists do not, nor pretend to believe, that universal recognition and acceptance are the inevitable result of the existence of innate ideas. But this complaint has nothing to do with Locke's views. Obviously, for example, if children everywhere, when they begin to talk to others, explicitly appeal to whatever it is, what it is, or the idea of God, there will be a good empirical basis for assuming that innate ideas exist. Because these are at least some of the key empirical results that people want to derive from theory.
There is opposition to the theory of innate ideas, i.e., any transcendental principles or concepts that the theory claims to explain can be more reasonably explained by assuming that they are constructed from empirical givens or obtained through transcendental intuition. However, this argument is not very convincing. For example, it is impossible to imagine how the concept of infinity can be constructed from the given of experience or acquired through contemplation of some transcendent physical realm. But it is not clear how to explain the possession of concepts through the theory of innate ideas.
Plato linked the theory of innate concepts to the memories and reincarnation doctrines of Meno and Fidel. (See Diarogues, b. Jowett, eds., vol. 2, 4th edition, Oxford, 1953). He supports this with the case of slave boys, and he makes geometric demonstrations in a way that suggests memories.
Chebury Herbert based his doctrine of natural religion on the theory of innate ideas. In his Virtue of Truth, translated as MH Caré on Truth (Bristol, England, 1937), universal recognition and acceptance would be seen as distinguishing the conception of gifts from other ideas by standards. Pragmatism is introduced: the concepts we share or are also those that help us to preserve, and vice versa.
Descartes, in his description of wax pieces and our judgments of other ideas in the "Second Meditation" and his triple division of thought in the "Third Meditation", laid the foundation for most later discussions of the theory of the idea of innate concepts. 2 volumes. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1911, 1931; New York, 1955).
Locke's classic attack on the theory of innate ideas is given in The Treatise on Human Understanding, Volume I (edited by JW Yolton, vol. 2, London, 1961). Locke believed that the theory that all knowledge was derived from experience could be confirmed empirically; the doctrine of innate ideas was confirmed by experience.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's New Essays on Human Understanding provides a detailed examination and critique of Locke's attack on the theory of innate ideas. See "Sample of Ideas for the First Book on the Paper on Human Understanding, 1698", preface and "First Book" in the new paper, translated by AG Langley. Version 3. ( La Salle , IL, 1949)。 In contrast to Locke, Leibniz argued that there was unconscious perception, so Locke's argument that children and barbarians did not know the concept of God or such principles did not refute the theory of the innate conception. Contains Leibniz's own version of the theory of innate ideas.
David Hume, in his investigation of human understanding, has a very brief but in-depth and informative discussion of the theory of innate ideas and their relationship to his principles, namely that every simple idea is a copy of a simple impression of precedent. See seconds. 2, Footnote 1, in Inquiry (New York, 1955), edited by CW Hendel.
NO Losskii links the historical emergence of the doctrine of innate conception in the 17th century with the failure of the empiricists of that era to explain transcendental knowledge, necessary truths, and knowledge of the outside world. See chapter. His 2 in The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge, translated by NA Duddington (London: Macmillan, 1919), where he argues that while the former Kant rationalists seemed able to solve problems through the doctrine of innate ideas, the price of doing so was that resolution was prohibitive. They "have to assume that the whole knowledge is innate."
RI Aaron discusses the innate ideas associated with his intuitionist theory of knowledge in The Nature of Knowledge (London: Williams and Nogate, 1930). Although he insisted that all discursive knowledge was based on a priori knowledge of unquestionable or self-evident principles, he denied that the latter was an innate idea.
HH prices are maintained in perception (London: Mayhuin, 1932), with a priori notion of genius, but "we can only end up with such a clear sense of consciousness ... When we have applied them many times. ”
Lewis E. Hahn's A Contextualistic Theory of Perception (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1942) discusses in detail the interrelationship between rigorous sensory data perception theory, practical theory of perception, and innate conceptual theory. Hahn argues that strict perceptual data theory forces people to accept the doctrine of innate concepts to explain one's knowledge and conception of material things, while pragmatic perceptual theories do not. He argues that this result supports a practical theory of perception and opposes the theory of sensory data.
John Wilder, in his Introduction to the Philosophy of Reality (New York: Harper, 1948), insists that the evidence we have strongly suggests that rational knowledge does not depend on innate ideas, but on acquired knowledge. The evidence for this is that "first of all we don't know. Then we know".