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今天小編為您帶來博士論文《考慮公平關切的雙管道供應鍊系統營運政策研究》6.1 引言。
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Today, the editor brings the " Introduction of the doctoral dissertation 《Consider the research of the operational strategy of fair and concerned dual-channel supply chain system》”.
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内容摘要：Abstract
本期推文将從思維導圖、精讀内容、知識補充三個方面介紹博士論文《考慮公平關切的雙管道供應鍊系統營運政策研究》6.1 引言。
This issue's tweet will introduce the doctoral dissertation 《Research on Operational Strategies of Dual-channel Supply Chain Systems Considering Fairness Concerns》 from three perspectives: mind mapping, detailed content analysis, and supplementary knowledge, focusing on introduction.
思維導圖：Mind mapping
精讀内容：Intensive reading content
在引言部分，作者首先介紹了本章的研究背景，介紹了一些因公平利益配置設定導緻問題的現實案例。
In the introduction section, the author first introduces the research background of this chapter, and presents some real-life examples where problems arise due to the equitable distribution of interests.
其次介紹了現有的研究表明決策者具有公平關切行為特性并對決策結果有着重要的影響。決策者在交易過程中不僅追求自身物質利益的最大化，還對比參與同一經濟活動的其他主體的物質收益，追求互惠公平的心理偏好。還介紹了一些學者對于公平關切的研究，許多學者将公平關切引入到傳統供應鍊成員完全理性的模型中，以期得到更加貼近實踐的理論結果。
Next, it introduces existing research indicating that decision-makers exhibit characteristics of fairness concern, which significantly influence decision outcomes. Decision-makers, during transactions, not only seek to maximize their own material interests but also compare their material gains with those of other parties involved in the same economic activity, pursuing preferences for reciprocal fairness. Additionally, it presents some scholars' research on fairness concern. Many scholars have introduced fairness concern into models of traditional supply chain members, who are assumed to be completely rational, in hopes of obtaining theoretical results that are more practical.
最後作者介紹了本章的研究創新點，在現有研究中，鮮少見在資訊不對稱下分析縱向關切與供應鍊均衡結果之間的關系。本章在退化的單管道環境下初步探讨需求資訊不對稱時公平關切對供應鍊成員決策産生的影響。還介紹了本章的研究内容，針對需求資訊不對稱的情況，基于采用批發價合同的單層二級供應鍊，其中制造商具有先行優勢，零售商具有資訊優勢，在供應鍊成員公平中性、僅有零售商公平關切、僅有制造商公平關切、零售商和制造商均有公平關切４種情形下，分别建立考慮行為偏好的價格決策博弈模型，分析不同供應鍊成員縱向關切對供應鍊均衡結果的作用，以及需求資訊不對稱在供應鍊成員縱向關切時，對供應鍊系統的均衡結果是否會産生不同的影響。
Finally, the author introduces the research innovation of this chapter. In existing studies, there are few analyses on the relationship between longitudinal concern and supply chain equilibrium outcomes under asymmetric information. This chapter preliminarily explores the impact of fairness concern on supply chain member decisions in a degraded single-channel environment with demand information asymmetry. It also outlines the research content of this chapter. Specifically, considering demand information asymmetry, based on a single-layer two-tier supply chain using wholesale price contracts, where the manufacturer has an upstream advantage and the retailer has an information advantage, four scenarios are considered: supply chain member fairness neutrality, retailer fairness concern only, manufacturer fairness concern only, and both retailer and manufacturer fairness concern. For each scenario, a price decision game model considering behavioral preferences is established to analyze the impact of different supply chain members' longitudinal concern on supply chain equilibrium outcomes. Additionally, it examines whether demand information asymmetry would have different effects on supply chain equilibrium outcomes when longitudinal concern among supply chain members is considered.
知識補充：Knowledge supplement
1.批發價格契約 Wholesale-Price contract
批發價格契約的條款規定，零售商需要在銷售期開始之前，根據市場需求和供應商的批發價格制定自身的訂購量決策，零售商承擔市場的全部風險。供應商在整個交易過程中的機關收益固定，總收益與訂貨量成正比，且不承擔任何風險。但是，批發價格契約會導緻雙重邊際化效應，零售商的訂購量将低于集中決策下的最優訂購量。是以，批發價格契約并不是供應鍊整體協調契約，但作為最基本的供應鍊契約，批發價格契約目前已得到廣泛的研究。
The terms of the wholesale price contract stipulate that the retailer needs to make its own order quantity decision based on market demand and the supplier's wholesale price before the start of the selling period, with the retailer bearing all the risks of the market. The supplier's unit profit remains fixed throughout the transaction process, with total revenue proportional to the order quantity, and bears no risk. However, the wholesale price contract can lead to double marginalization effects, resulting in the retailer's order quantity being lower than the optimal order quantity under centralized decision-making. Therefore, the wholesale price contract is not a contract for overall coordination of the supply chain. However, as the most basic supply chain contract, the wholesale price contract has been widely studied.
Bresnahan 和 Reiss(1985)最先研究了批發價格契約。在批發價格契約下Lariviere 和 Porteus(2001)證明單純的批發價格契約是無法協調供應鍊的因為隻有當批發價等于産品的生産成本時，這種契約才能協調供應鍊，此時供應商的期望利潤等于零，顯然供應商不願意。是以，單純的批發價格契約是無法實作供應鍊整體期望利潤最優的。目前絕大多數文獻都把批發價格契約融入其他參數契約中，作為其他契約形式的補充。
Bresnahan and Reiss (1985) were the first to study wholesale price contracts. Under the wholesale price contract, Lariviere and Porteus (2001) proved that a simple wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the supply chain because only when the wholesale price equals the product's production cost can this contract coordinate the supply chain. At this point, the supplier's expected profit is zero, which the supplier is clearly unwilling to accept. Therefore, a simple wholesale price contract cannot achieve the optimal expected profit for the supply chain as a whole. Currently, the majority of literature incorporates wholesale price contracts into other contractual parameters as supplements to other forms of contracts.
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參考文獻：[1] 趙燕飛. 考慮公平關切的雙管道供應鍊系統營運政策研究 [D]. 重慶: 重慶大學,2022.
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