3月2日，在以色列特拉維夫舉行的國家安全研究所（INSS）第16屆年會期間，INSS研究員、大西洋理事會全球中國中心非常駐研究員陶文亞（Tuvia Gering）邀請參會的中國嘉賓、清華大學戰略與安全研究中心研究員周波，就中國提出的“中東安全新架構”進行對話。
中東局勢的最新進展是，3月6日至10日，沙特阿拉伯和伊朗兩國代表在北京對話，并于10日和中國發表聯合聲明，宣布沙伊将盡快恢複外交關系，開展各領域合作，三方願盡一切努力加強國際地區和平與安全。
INSS授權觀察者網釋出對話中文版。
Tuvia Gering (陶文亞)：歡迎收聽收看以色列國家安全研究所（INSS）的播客系列。我是今天的主持人陶文亞 ，我是Diane and Guilford Glaser以色列-中國政策中心的研究員，也是大西洋理事會全球中國中心的非常駐研究員。
去年9月在北京，有一場相當重要的活動，即第二屆中東安全會議，時任國務委員和外交部長王毅發表了主旨演講，并公布了中國的“中東安全新架構”。會議持續了數日，來自中東的約70名政要出席了會議，他們就中國提出的地區問題解決方案開展了讨論。
去年12月初，中國國家主席習近平通路沙特阿拉伯，參加了三個峰會：第一個與沙特阿拉伯，第二個與海灣合作委員會（GCC），第三個與阿拉伯聯盟的21個成員。這些峰會産生了一系列重要成果，包括價值約500億美元的合作備忘錄，以及許多關于中國與中東開展戰略合作的宏偉聲明。此外，中國和海灣合作委員會還釋出了一份聯合聲明，也提到了中國的“中東安全新架構”。
幾周前，伊朗總統萊西通路北京時，雙方簽署了價值約200億美元的合作備忘錄，複制了習主席通路沙特的模式。雙方在聯合聲明中再度提及“中東安全新架構”，并用“戰略”一詞來描述雙邊關系。
為了幫助我們更好了解中國的“中東安全新架構”，我們請來了周波大校（退役）。周波是清華大學戰略與安全研究中心（CISS）的研究員，曾任國防部國際軍事合作辦公室安全合作中心主任。非常歡迎你的到來，周波。
周波：陶文亞，感謝你的邀請。
陶文亞：在過去一周的以色列國家安全研究所（INSS）國際會議期間，我們着重讨論了安全、中國在中東的作用、烏克蘭戰争等話題。我今天想與你讨論所有這些話題。首先，中國何時對中東産生了興趣，而中東何時對中國産生了興趣？過去雙方來往并不是很密切。
周波：中國在中東的利益肯定在擴大。首先，最顯著的就是中國對能源進口的興趣，大多數人隻關注到這一點。但其實不止于此。當下，中國的影響力是全球性的，中國的經濟活動也是無處不在的。中國在中東的投資非常多元化。我幾年前在阿布紮比參觀了被稱為“龍城”的中國城，遇見了很多中國人，據說（那裡）的中國僑民高達20萬名——
陶文亞：我看到有40萬的說法。
周波：好，我知道了。我當時問一位企業家，基礎設施建設的原材料有多少來自中國？他停頓了一下，告訴我：“百分之百。”這讓我很吃驚，說 100%需要勇氣和實力。中國能在中東市場占據絕對份額，太棒了。中國勞工也參與了以色列的建築等行業，在幾乎所有國家都是如此，包括以色列的對手伊朗。中國國際合作所涵蓋的範圍确實很廣。總的來說，中國與中東有十分密切的往來。當然，這也會帶來經濟以外的問題，比如安全問題，如何保護港口或這裡的中國勞工。
陶文亞：确實如此。習主席最近對中東的通路是他執政10年來第二次對該地區的正式通路，今年也是2013年宣布的“一帶一路”倡議10周年。自2013年以來，雙邊貿易迅速擴大； 2021年，中國和阿拉伯國家之間的貿易額達到了3300億美元，這還不包括伊朗、以色列和土耳其。中國已經參與了200多個重大基礎設施項目：港口、橋梁、公路、鐵軌、發電站，甚至埃及的新行政首都。這真的很壯觀。
中石化承建的中東地區最大煉油廠——科威特阿祖爾煉廠
除了傳統基礎設施，中國還參與建設各種各樣的“絲綢之路”，我稱之為“未來基礎設施”：網絡絲綢之路，例如智能城市和華為的5G和6G通信；綠色絲綢之路，包括可再生能源和核能項目；太空絲綢之路，包括聯合衛星發射和北鬥導航衛星合作；還有健康絲綢之路，特别是在新冠疫情之後，中國已經建立了疫苗的分發和制造中心，這是很了不起的。
退一步看，中國已經真正成為中東地區的一個重要角色。我們無需使用“中心”或 “最重要 ”這樣的字眼， 但對本地區人民來說，沒人會否認中國角色的重要性，甚至認同在某些方面，中國是不可或缺的。但在安全和政治領域，中國并沒有在像我們提到的廣泛領域那樣參與進來。中國似乎在這一領域仍有所顧慮。你同意嗎？
周波：我認為是的。當你們讨論所有這些事情時，我所想的是，世界不僅僅是“西方與非西方”之間的問題。如果你考慮一下全球南方，“非西方”在全球實際上要大得多。中國當然在中東投資很多，但同樣在非洲和大洋洲等地大舉投資。可謂無處不在。
中東的不同之處在于，其内部的混亂以及潛在的沖突。中國希望所有的熱點和沖突都消失，但這當然是一廂情願的想法。這就是為什麼到目前為止，中國非常謹慎，主要關注商貿，而沒有過多地軍事介入中東。
當然，形勢可能會發生變化。首先，如果中國勞工被劫持了怎麼辦？這種情況經常發生，連巴基斯坦俾路支省都發生了，而巴基斯坦的外交政策一貫重視與中國友好。劫匪本身不一定反感中國人，但為了贖金或出于對巴基斯坦政府的怨恨而綁架中國人。這種情況也可能在以色列發生。随着中國參與的擴大，這類事情發生的機率幾乎肯定會增加，這是自然的。
此外，中國需要避免被吸入一個無底洞。考慮到例如以色列和伊朗的敵對關系，中國要想做出選擇是很困難的。此外，中東還有不少沖突熱點，是以中國必須格外小心。
陶文亞：顯然，中東不太平。 甚至在我們談論西方之前，中東國家本質上就難以和平共處，這顯然不理想。中國的地區利益正在增長，參與程度正在擴大，但不得不和我們一樣，依靠冷戰後美國建構的安全架構。
當時，世界是單極的。雖然這不會太長， 但還是發生在過去30年左右的時間裡，美國的參與把它自己變成了中東不可或缺的大國，這一點不會改變。我不同意美國正在從該地區撤出的觀點，也許有一些表層的變化，但本質上我并沒有看到美國的撤出。這可能會造成複雜的情況。
問題是，中國是否仍能保持這種不過多參與的姿态？随着中國與中東增加接觸，有必須保護的海上交通線，還有中國人被綁架現象；在阿拉伯之春期間，2010-2011年，中國不得不從利比亞撤走35,000名中國公民。在那段時間，中國不得不依仗其他國家，以西方國家為主。
中國在利比亞撤僑（圖檔來源：網絡）
而随着大國競争，以及中國與西方—美國和歐洲—關系的緊張性質，情況已經變了一些。我們在中國的許多同僚，例如前外交官楊成教授，最近分析烏克蘭戰争，以及它将如何影響中國在中東的地位。他認為，現在中國學者之間有一個共識，即中國必須增加在中東安全和政治議題上的參與程度，别無選擇。
不過，也有像中國現代國際關系研究院的牛新春這樣的學者，認為此事仍有待商榷。當然，他們都同意，即使東方在崛起，西方在衰落，仍然隻是相對的。美國不會撤出中東。那你是怎樣看待此種局面的？
周波：這些隻是學術上的争論，但我有很多年的實操經曆。我曾是中國在印度洋亞丁灣反海盜行動的協調人。我認為中美競争主要局限于西太平洋，那是中國的家門口。除了南海，中美在安全問題上也沒有大的競争，因為中國無意成為世界警察。
真正的問題是印度如何看待中國在印度洋的軍事部署，因為印度傳統上認為自己是該地區的 “淨安全提供者”，即唯一的安全提供者。這一點我是不同意的。考慮到印度洋充滿了國際海上戰略通道，而且我們也在那裡活動，印度憑什麼自立為整個印度洋的 “淨安全提供者”？
這種印度教的民族主義，也被稱為 "大一統印度"，認為印度包括不丹、西藏和斯裡蘭卡在内的廣大地區。這幫印度原教旨主義者也認為印度洋是 "印度的洋"。這是不正确的。這是為什麼不時有報道，說中國靠泊在斯裡蘭卡的軍艦是事關印度的問題（如“遠望号”）。即使印度相信這是一艘間諜船，它也是在斯裡蘭卡領海内進行補給，而且這艘所謂的 "間諜船 "其實是為了觀察外太空的活動。這可能與印度有關系，也可能沒有關系。如果中國航空母艦在不久的将來駛入印度洋，印度将如何反應？印度一直在努力在大國之間找到平衡。然而，由于他們的心态，找到平衡點對他們将是個挑戰。
在中東，中國和美國的利益都将繼續保持，後者是以色列的鐵杆盟友。我同意你的觀點，美國的所謂撤離隻是表面現象。他們可能不再需要中東的石油，但他們依然在中東有強大的利益。問題是，中國和美國（在中東）的利益在什麼情況下會發生沖突？我很難想到一個具體場景，尤其當我們已經如此深入地參與當地經濟時。“中美肯定會（在中東）發生利益沖突”的想法不一定對。
我們暫且假設以色列發現自己處于一個兩難境地：以色列一方面是美國的堅定盟友，但另一方面繼續與中國在農業和其他非敏感部門進行合作。這本身應該是可以的，而且以色列也可以直接告訴美國，為什麼中國和以色列不能在這些領域開展合作？
陶文亞：我想進一步探讨一下。你和其他專家，如牛新春，認為中美之間在中東沒有利益沖突。當然，兩國在其他地區和領域有很多沖突點。但在中東，可能像一個小“天國”，我們所有利益都保持一緻，畢竟中美雙方都對地區和平、安全、繁榮有興趣。每個人都能認同這一點，對嗎？
然而，在我們談到的第二屆中東安全會議中，中國或許正開始觸及美國在該地區的安全部署。這不僅僅是在農業、教育等非軍事層面的參與；中國宣布希望參與地區安全，将論壇稱為中東安全會議。王毅公布了“中東安全新架構”。我認為，“新”是這裡的關鍵詞，因為這意味着中東有一個 “舊”的安全架構，而中國認為它可以在此基礎上進行改進。這樣的說法正确嗎？
周波：中國一直在大力參與中東事務，是以它對中東安全的關注是可以了解的。而且，由于該地區的安全形勢如此複雜，中國希望在這方面有所作為。
沙特阿拉伯與伊朗在北京釋出聲明，盡快回複外交關系（圖檔來源：外交部網站）
談論中東安全的原則是沒問題的，這表明中國确實在發揮作用。然而，“中東安全新架構”與中國對烏克蘭提出的和平倡議一樣，還沒有明确的路線圖。中方的建議在性質上更加寬泛，側重于原則。
陶文亞：既然寬泛且并不明确，為什麼要提出（烏克蘭沖突）和平倡議？
周波：讓大家了解中國的立場總是很好的，中國的提議在未來時機成熟時就會演進。例如，雖然北韓半島無核化六方會談（2003年）最終失敗，但大家都認為中國在促成會談方面發揮了積極作用。
2013年，當 “一帶一路 ”倡議被首次提出時，沒有人知道它是什麼，但你剛才已經描述了它的發展過程。是以，随着時間的推移，中國的建議可能會變得更有建設性。這些建議不是靜止的；它們有潛力不斷完善。
陶文亞：作為一個中東人和一個以色列人，我想說，既然舊的沒有失靈，為什麼要去建立一個新的架構？我們地區現在已經有了一個安全架構，它絕不是完美的，我們喜歡美國人，他們不是完美的，我們也不是完美的。但我們有一個美國上司下的安全架構。以色列和海灣國家的繁榮和生存需要這一安全架構。
我們當然可以談論舊的安全架構造成的許多問題。但它對中國也起了積極作用，因為中國大約50%的能源來自中東，通過霍爾木茲海峽；美國的威懾力確定貿易得以穩定繼續，至少以色列是這麼認為的，這就是為什麼我們需要它。當我讀到中國的中東安全新架構時，我就會想，為什麼你們不參與到現有的安全架構中，并從内部改進它？在我們看來，中國提出了個替代品，但我們不想要替代品，我們想要改進現有的架構。這你覺得有道理嗎？
周波：當然，如果有一個能滿足各方需求的建議，你說的也不無道理。例如，亞伯拉罕協定（2020年9月以色列與阿聯酋、巴林、摩洛哥和蘇丹關系正常化的協定）是積極的，因為以色列改善了與鄰國的關系。如果某件事被證明是好事，大家應該接受它。
但中國提出這個建議（新安全架構）也是有充分的理由的。中國和美國能否在區域安全方面真正合作？亞丁灣的反海盜行動是一個典型的例子，證明大國實際上可以為了一個共同的目的形成臨時聯盟。
如果你觀察中國解放軍的海外行動，就會發現所有行動都是在人道主義領域，無論是維和還是救災等。中國并沒有試圖轟炸或殺害任何人。如果美國的實力真的在下降，那麼我們一起努力捍衛這些海上戰略通道如何？
中國海軍正在成長。如果你數數中國南海艦隊（SSF）或東海艦隊（ESF）的軍艦數量，其中任何一個艦隊都比曾經首屈一指的英國皇家海軍水面艦艇全部加一起還大。擁有如此龐大的艦隊，當然是為了保護中國的海外利益，并使中國能夠履行其國際義務。除了在中國家門口的的主權問題，我們與美國在安全上沒有太多分歧。中國的心态是開放的。我們為什麼不放棄冷戰思維，攜手使世界更安全？
陶文亞：作為一個以色列人，這真令人高興，我别無他求。我相信中東地區的大多數人都厭倦我們的小家成為大國競争的擂台。但是，我們并沒有生活在一個理想的世界裡。而且我認為，要創造你提到的這種合作存在重重障礙。
我想邀你回到25年前，你在劍橋讀書時，寫了一篇關于“東盟與集體安全”的碩士論文。我認為這就是中國的 “集體/共享安全”與西方的 “傳統安全”之間的差異所在。也許你可以談談中國看待安全的不同方式，不論是關乎東盟還是中東，以及你認為的美國看待安全的方式。
周波：兩者有一個根本的差別。習近平主席在外交方面提出了“人類命運共同體”的頂層設計。在此下面，有兩個重要的倡議，即全球安全倡議（GSI）和全球發展倡議（GDI）。中國善于先提出一些寬泛的概念，然後将其塑造成為一個個更具體、更實在的想法。全球發展倡議已經有很多“幹貨”了，比如 “一帶一路 ”倡議。這是全世界每個人都能看到的實實在在的事，它是全球發展倡議的一個支柱。
另一個倡議即全球安全倡議正在發展中，但已經有一些具體内容，比如解放軍的海外行動僅限于人道主義領域。這表明中國起碼希望同美國那種血淋淋的做法保持距離。解放軍在海外沒有殺過任何人，甚至沒有殺過海盜。
陶文亞：因為美國的參與，是以不需要你們（殺人）。
周波：無論如何，中國人對動武還是相當謹慎的。例如，在打擊海盜和維和行動中，各國被允許使用武力。聯合國授權維和行動并沒有明說 “你可以殺人”，但确實授權 “使用一切必要手段”。即便如此，中國在維和行動中還是非常謹慎的。在打擊海盜的過程中，我們驅散海盜或逮捕他們，但我們并沒有試圖殺死他們。
陶文亞：回到中東地區。這裡的人們一直在互相殘殺。涉及到具體的安全問題，中國到底能不能與美國合作？
讓我舉一個最明顯的例子—伊朗核協定：就在2月23日，我們得到消息，伊朗的鈾濃度已經達到84%（離核彈所需的90%隻差一點）；這遠高于民用鈾濃度。即使實際上“隻是”60%，即伊朗過去一段時間所維持的濃度，伊朗依然似乎一心想要獲得核彈。
我們都可以認為這不符合中國的利益或官方立場，因為中國是《核不擴散條約》（NPT）的簽署國。中國對于2015年達成伊朗核協定（JCPOA）也起到重要角色。當時，前大使華黎明在促進伊朗和美國談判方面發揮了作用。
但現在的情況非常不同；美國和中國之間的關系幾乎跌入曆史最低點，氣球事件就能證明這一點。而現在我們正在接近一個至關重要的臨界點，要麼伊朗造出核彈，将其裝在飛彈上；要麼以色列、海灣國家和美國發動先發制人的打擊。屆時中國會怎麼辦？中國的安全新架構又會如何實踐？中國将如何參與并幫助？這時候，具體方案和舉動就會變得極其重要。中國會做什麼？
周波：最直接的回答是：作為美國的堅定盟友，你們為什麼沒有告訴他們，不要廢除伊朗核協定？特朗普制造了一場混亂，本來每個人都在為核不擴散努力，而伊朗總體上也遵守了該協定。為什麼要把它扔掉？你們應該告訴美國政府這一點，因為你們是他們的盟友，這本身也符合你們的利益。單是為了對以色列的所謂“毫不動搖的安全承諾”，美國也不應該把伊朗核協定扔掉。
你可以想象在核問題上達成協定是多麼困難。六方會談沒有成功，但這邊的情況不同，伊朗核協定幾乎達成。中國參與其中，但由于以色列的一些人，主要是由于特朗普，他們廢止了這份協定。結果，我們現在處于一個更危險的境地。
伊朗總統在新聞釋出會上表示，伊核談判達成協定需要解決核保障問題（圖檔來源：ICphoto)
陶文亞：對于特朗普的做法，我同意你的評價。順便說一句，是以色列遊說美國廢除該協定，因為以色列當時的決策者認為該協定很糟糕。即使在其生效階段（從2015年到2018年），伊朗也在繼續擴大其影響力，扶植本地區的多個代理人，特别是在以色列周圍。
而如果我們考慮中國對烏克蘭戰争的官方立場，例如，是北約東擴引發了這場戰争。盡管俄羅斯發起了攻擊并侵犯了人權。中國表示，戰争的根本原因是美國和北約在過去20年的擴張，以及沒有聽取俄羅斯的意見和考慮其勢力範圍。
那麼，把中國的這一邏輯應用到中東，在過去的不是二十年而是四十年間，伊朗這個自封的“革命政權”，一直在中東傳播極端主義，扶植代理人，進而創造它自己的“專屬安全區域”。那麼，以色列和海灣地區的“合理安全利益”呢？在伊朗核協定的執行階段，我們并沒有享受到安全，現在也沒有。中國在這方面的立場是什麼？
周波：那我先問你一個簡單的問題。我首先必須說，就對伊朗的看法而言，幾乎每個以色列人都持有與你同樣的立場，這是完全可以了解的。但是，我問你，與伊朗核協定被廢止之前的情況相比，現在的情況是否更加危險？
陶文亞：對中國來說，是的；但對我們來說，不是。我認為，這就是這一情況中的道德風險。一些猶太人或阿拉伯人被伊朗恐怖主義殺害，并不會危害到中國的利益。如果伊朗獲得了核武器，沙特将立即效仿，然後是阿聯酋和埃及，甚至可能發生戰争，危及中國在該地區的所有利益。這就是我們的安全與中國的安全之間的差別。
周波：你自己已經回答了這個問題。如果你認為現在的局勢比伊朗核協定廢止之前更危險，那就意味着以色列做出了錯誤的決定。顯然，局勢變得更加危險了。是以，以色列實際上已經招緻了這種危險。
陶文亞：如果大機率中東出現攤牌，我們應該怎麼辦？中國會怎麼做？中國是否能夠與美國合作，或至少不幹涉美國的行動？也許，中國甚至可以支援以色列和海灣國家保護自己的安全，而不是伊朗的專屬安全及其代理人？或者，因為現在的大國競争非常激烈，伊朗與中國更親近，兩者都反對美國，中國會不會隻是袖手旁觀？
周波：我不認為中國會袖手旁觀。在防止核擴散問題上，中國和其他國家一樣，堅定認為伊朗不應發展核武器。這一立場是堅決的，基于我們幾十年來一以貫之的政策。多年來，中國改變了許多國防政策，但在不對無核國家或地區使用核武器這個問題上沒有改變。中國承諾永遠不會首先使用核武器，這一承諾重如泰山，唯一的問題是我們如何實作無核化這個目标。
根據我同一些人的談話，我相信伊朗人并沒有那麼執着于發展核武器，因為他們知道後果。他們很難預測以色列是否真會先發制人發動打擊，因為你們一直刻意保持這個選項的模糊性，稱“不排除任何可能性”。
然而，打擊伊朗并不能解決問題，甚至可能引發更多問題，因為伊朗在軍事上不是一個弱國。沒有人希望這種情況發生。但我相信，伊朗這種不确定的态度，對所有人來說都是一個機會；我們必須把握機會，避免最壞的可能性。現在還有時間。
陶文亞：我也希望如此。最後，我想問問你的個人意見，不是中國的官方立場。通過在以色列的一周時間裡，你的想法有沒有什麼變化？你從這次通路中有什麼重大收獲？
周波：不，我沒有改變自己的想法，但我更了解以色列人的看法。我想到的一件事是，中美競争可能會加劇，而這可能會使作為美國堅定盟友的以色列處于更不利的地位。這對你們來說将是非常困難的。這就是為什麼昨天會議結束時，我說：“衆所周知，猶太人是世界上最聰明的人——
陶文亞：我不是那麼确定……
周波：有人這麼說。但你們也是美國的堅定盟友——
陶文亞：這個的确是。
周波：這兩點放在一起，意味着以色列不應該盲目地遵循其他人的訓示。你們應該根據你們自己的國家利益做出決定。我們知道你們無論如何都不會站在中國這一邊，那會使你們處于非常困難的境地。但我們還是不希望你們選邊站隊。
陶文亞：我們絕不想要什麼“邊”， 那是冷戰思維。
周波：是的，但遇到這種情況時，你們首先應該考慮自己的國家利益，應該不偏不倚地判斷事情本身的是非曲直，并做出自己的正确決定。
陶文亞：我完全同意。非常感謝你，周波。
周波：謝謝你。
（翻譯：李澤西 核譯：韓桦）
訪談英文原文：
The following conversation took place on March 2nd, 2023 at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) after the INSS 16th annual conference in Tel Aviv, Israel. It is shared with Guancha with the INSS's permission. The English transcript has been lightly edited for clarity.
Tuvia Gering (陶文亞): Welcome to the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) podcast series in Tel Aviv. I'm your host for today, Tuvia Gering , I'm a researcher with the Diane and Guilford Glaser Israel-China Policy Center, and a non resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council global China Hub.
In September we had a pretty major event in Beijing, the Second Middle East Security Conference, headed by then Foreign Minister and State Councilor Wang Yi, who gave the keynote speech. That is when he unveiled what he called China's New Security Architecture for the Middle East. The forum lasted a few days and was attended by about 70 dignitaries from all over the region, who discussed China's solutions to the problems that plague the Middle East.
A few months later, in early December, Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Saudi Arabia for three summits. The first one was hosted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; the second with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the third with with 21 members of the Arab League. They made some significant announcements, including $50 billion in MoUs and numerous grand statements about the strategic nature of cooperation between China and the region. In addition, China and the Gulf have released a joint statement, and there, too, they mentioned China’s New Security Architecture for the Middle East.
This framework was repeated a third time just recently, a few weeks ago, when Iran's President Ebrahim Raisi, visited Beijing. His visit mirrored Xi Jinping's visit to Saudi Arabia in that both sides issued a joint statement and signed MOU worth approximately $20 billion. They, too, used the word “strategic” to describe the nature of the relationship.
To help us understand what China's New Security Architecture for the Middle East means, I'm very happy to welcome today, senior Colonel (retired) Zhou Bo. Zhou is a senior fellow with the Center for International Security and strategy (CISS) at Tsinghua University, and a China Forum expert. In his military capacity, Professor Zhou was director of the Center for Security Cooperation of the Office for International Military Cooperation of the PLA. A very warm welcome to you, Zhou Bo, thank you for joining us today.
Zhou Bo (周波): Thank you for having me, Tuvia.
Tuvia: Over the last week, during the INSS International Conference we got to talk a lot about security, China’s role in the region, and the war in Ukraine. I would love to touch on all these topics today, but just to kick us off, when did China become interested in the Middle East, and when did the Middle East become interested in China? This wasn’t always the case.
Zhou: Well, I think China's interests the Middle East are certainly growing. The most obvious point is that China is interested in energy input, and most people are focused solely on that. But there is more than that; nowadays, China's influence is global, so China's economic activities are also ubiquitous.
So with that, and nowadays, we couldn't see, you know, a very much diversified investment in the Middle East. I was in Abu Dhabi a few years ago, where I visited the so-called Dragon City and discovered a large number of Chinese nationals. People are talking about 200,000 Chinese expats –
Tuvia: I saw 400,000 last time.
Zhou: Oh, I see. Yeah. I asked one entrepreneur how much of the materials for infrastructure construction come from China. And he paused for a moment and said, “100 percent.” That really surprised me. It takes some guts to say "100%," don't you think? It is outstanding how China has actually occupied lion share in the in the Middle East market. Chinese workers are also employed in construction and other industries in Israel. This must be true for almost all countries, including your rival, if not enemy, Iran. China’s coverage of cooperation is truly intensive. Putting all this together, China is deeply, deeply engaged in the Middle East. And, of course, this would raise issues other than economic ones, right? Then there's the issue of security, such as protecting harbors or the Chinese workers here.
Tuvia: Yeah, for sure. And when Xi Jinping visited the region just recently, that was his second in his official capacity after 10 years in power, and this is also the 10th year anniversary of the Belt and Road Initiative 一帶一路, which he unveiled back in 2013. And since that time, some of the numbers that we're talking about just to give the viewer some idea, in 2021, the trade was to the tune of $330 billion between China and just the Arab states, excluding Iran, Israel and Turkey. China's has been involved in over 200, major infrastructure projects - and I'm talking about ports and bridges, roads, rail tracks, power stations, and even entire cities, when it comes to Egypt's New Administrative Capital. It really is spectacular.
It's not just physical infrastructure either. You can see it in other sectors, in the infrastructure of the future, as I call it, in all these different types of Silk Roads: a big web of the Digital Silk Road, e.g., smart cities and 5G and 6G communications by Huawei; the Green Silk road, with renewable energy, nuclear energy; a space Silk Road, with joint satellite launches, and BeiDou navigation satellite cooperation; there is also a Health Silk Road, especially after COVID. China has established redistribution and manufacturing centers for vaccines, which is pretty amazing.
When you take a step back, you see that China has really become an important player. We don't need to use the word “central” or “the most important,” but certainly, no one will object that it's important. It is very important to local people, perhaps indispensable in some ways. However, there is one area where it has not been as involved in the wide range of fields we mentioned: security and politics - it appears that China is still a little hesitant on these topics, do you agree?
Zhou: I think so. Well, when you're talking about all these things, what I'm thinking is that the world is not only about the “West versus the rest.” The rest is actually much bigger, if you consider the Global South. Just in this region, China is certainly investing a lot in the Middle East, but equally in Africa and Oceania. Everywhere.
So what makes the Middle East different is its internal chaos, the underlining potential for conflict. China would wish for all the hotspots and conflicts to disappear, but this is, of course, wishful thinking. That is why, so far, China has been very cautious, walking on a tightrope and focusing primarily on business without getting too involved militarily in the Middle East.
But things could change. First of all, what if Chinese workers are hijacked? It happens all the time, even in Baluchistan, Pakistan, whose foreign policy is friendly with China. They don't necessarily despise Chinese people, but they kidnap them for ransom or out of resentment toward the Pakistani government. This could happen here as well. This type of thing will almost certainly increase as Chinese involvement grows. This is only natural.
The other thing is how could China avoid being sucked into this black hole. Even you don't like each other, as in the case of Israel and Iran, so for us, this is difficult to for us to make a choice. Furthermore, there are many subregional hotspots, so China has to be very careful.
Tuvia: Of course, our situation in our neighborhood is not very quiet. And even before we talk about the West, it's just intrinsically, here, in our neighborhood, we don't get along, as you said; this is not an ideal world. Facing these facts, that China's interests are increasing, its engagement is growing, until now, we had this arrangement where China had to rely, like all of us, on the American security architecture after the Cold War, where it'd become a unipolar moment. Sure, it's been only for a short while, but still, in the last 30 years or so. US involvement turned it into the indispensable power, and this is something that is not going away. I of disagree with the idea that the US is withdrawing from the region. I don't see it, maybe just superficially. But the US is still here to stay. That's how they say it. That's the way we see it. And now this may create complications. And the question is, will China be able to still maintain this balance - or this more aloof position - because we have growing engagement, we have sea lines of communications that you have to protect, you talk about hijacking, and it was just over 10 years ago, during the Arab Spring, in 2010-2011, when China had to evacuate 35,000 Chinese nationals just from Libya. During that time, China had to rely on the benevolence of other actors, namely Western.
And now with a great power competition and the fraught nature of the relationship between China in the West - the US and Europe - the situation has changed a bit. And this led leads many of our colleagues in China, for example, Professor Yang Cheng , a former diplomat. He was talking recently about the war in Ukraine, and how it will affect the China's posture in the Middle East. He thinks that there's now a consensus among Chinese scholars that China has to increase its security and political involvement in the Middle East; there's just no way around it.
On the other hand, you have people like Niu Xinchu from CICIR. And he thinks that it's still up for debate. And of course, all of them agree, even when they say the East is rising, the West is declining. It's still just relative. America is here to stay. So how do you reconcile with this situation?
Zhou: Those are just academic debates. But I used to be a practitioner for many, many years. And I myself have been China's coordinator for counterpiracy operation in the Gulf of Aden in the Indian Ocean. When we talk about the China-US rivalry, I believe it is primarily limited to the Western Pacific, which is on China's doorstep, and aside from the South China Sea, we don't have any significant rivalry on security issues, because China has no intention of becoming the world's police.
The real question is how India views China's military presence in the Indian Ocean, because India has traditionally regarded itself as the region's "net security provider," that is, its sole security provider. This is something I disagree with. How do you establish yourself as a "net security provider" for the entire Indian Ocean, considering the fact that it is full of strategic international sea lanes and that we operate there as well.
This is based on Hindu nationalism, also known as "Akhand Bharat" which believes that India possesses a vast region that includes Bhutan, Tibet, and Sri Lanka. They consider the Indian Ocean to be "India's Ocean," which is not true. That is why, from time to time, we hear about Chinese military vessels berthed in Sri Lanka reported as a problem for India (such as the case of the “Yuan Wang”). Even if you believe it's a spy ship, it was restocking in Sri Lankan territorial waters, and this “spy ship” was in fact for observing activities in outer space, which may or may not have anything to do with India. How will India react if Chinese aircraft carriers sail into the Indian Ocean one day, which I don't think is far away? And India has been working hard to strike a balance between the major powers. However, because of their mindset, this presents a challenge to them.
In the Middle East, China's interest will remain, as will the Americans, your ironclad allies. I agree with you that American withdrawal is only superficial. They may no longer require Middle Eastern oil, but they continue to have a strong interest in the region. The question is, under what conditions would Chinese and American interests collide? I can hardly think of a tangible scenario, when we are so deeply involved in economic activities. The idea that we will undoubtedly have a clash of interests does not appear to be correct.
For example, in a hypothetical situation, Israel may find itself in a difficult situation because, on the one hand, it is a staunch ally of the United States, but on the other hand, it continues to do business with China in agricultural and other non-sensitive sectors. This should be fine, right? And Israel can speak directly to America about this. Why can't we collaborate in these areas?
Tuvia: I would love to explore this a bit more. So from what you're saying - and other experts like Niu Xinchun said so as well - there's no conflict of interest between China and the US. In other areas, of course, there's a lot of conflict. But here in the Middle East, this can be like our small Kingdom of Heaven, where all of our interests are aligned, because after all, both sides, China in the US, are interested in regional peace， security, prosperity - everyone can agree on that, right?
However, in the security second security forum that we talked about, in the beginning, in September, China is beginning to perhaps step on the toes of the US security posture in the region. Then, it's not just in agriculture, and education, and all these various civilian non military aspects; China is, by definition, declaring that it wishes to become involved in security. They called it the Middle East Security Forum. Then, a senior Chinese diplomat, Wang Yi, unveiled this New Security Architecture for the Middle East. And the word “new,” I think, is the key word here. Because this implies there's an “old” security architecture for the Middle East, that China thinks it can improve upon. Is that a correct way to put it?
Zhou: China has been heavily involved in the Middle East, so it is understandably concerned about security. And, because the security situation in the region is so complicated, China wishes to do something about it.
Talking about it in principle is fine, and it shows that China does play a role. However, this is similar to its peace proposal for Ukraine, which lacks a tangible roadmap. China's proposal is more general in nature, focusing on principles.
Tuvia: So, why offer a peace plan at all, if it is general and not tangiable?
Zhou: It is good for people to know China's attitude, and China proposal might evolve in the future, when time is right. For example, consider China's role in the Six-Party Talks on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (in 2003), which ultimately failed, but everyone agrees that China played a positive role in bringing the talks together.
When the Belt and Road Initiative was put forward 10 years ago in 2013, nobody knew what it was. But you have now described how it has evolved. So, as time passes, China may become more constructive in its proposals. These proposals are not static; they have the potential to thrive.
Tuvia: But still, for me, as a Middle Easterner and an Israeli, I say that if it isn't broken, why fix it? We already have us an existing security architecture. It's by no means perfect. I mean, we like the Americans, but they're also not perfect, we're not perfect. But we have a security architecture led by America. Israel wants it and the Gulf countries need it for their own prosperity and survival.
And it works. I mean, of course, we can talk about the many problems that it has caused. But it has also worked for China, because China gets approximately 50 percent of its energy from the Middle East, it passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and it is US deterrence that keeps the whole thing from falling apart, at least the way we see it here in the Middle East. That's why we need it. When I read about China’s New Security Architecture for the Middle East, I ask myself, why don't you just become involved in what exists and improve it from the inside? Or, in other words, integrate instead of interfere? Because in my mind, it looks like something that is alternative. We don't want an alternative. We want better, but not an alternative. Does that make sense?
Zhou Bo: Of course, there is some truth to what you said if there is a proposal that meets the needs of all parties. For example, the Abraham Accords (the normalization of relations between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan in September 2020) are positive because you improved your relationship with your neighbors. If something is proven to be good, people should accept it.
But China's attitude, if China puts forward this proposal, I believe it is for good reasons. And, as a result, you may wonder whether China and the US can actually cooperate in terms of regional security. Counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden is a typical example of how major powers can actually become a coalition for a common purpose.
If you look at the PLA's overseas operations, you will notice that they are all in humanitarian areas, whether it is peacekeeping or disaster relief. China is not trying to bomb or kill anyone. If America's strength is truly declining, how about we work together to safeguard these strategic sea lanes?
The Chinese navy is growing. If you count the ships of China's South Sea Fleet (SSF) or East Sea Fleet (ESF), each of them is larger than the surface ships combined of the whole British Royal Navy, which was once second to none. What's the use of having such a large [fleet]? Of course, it is to protect China's interests overseas and to enable the Chinese people to [fulfill] their international obligations. Apart from issues of sovereignty closer to home for China, we do not have many disagreements with the US in terms of security. China is open minded. Why don't we just abandon the Cold War mentality and join hands to make the world safer?
Tuvia: For me, as an Israeli, this is music to my ears. I would love nothing more. And I'm sure most people in the Middle East are tired of having our little region become an arena for great power competition. But again, we're don’t live in an ideal world. And I think there are some barriers to create this sort of cooperation that you mentioned.
I want to take you back 25 years to your time in Cambridge. You wrote a master’s thesis about ASEAN and collective security. And I think this is where the difference lies between China's “collective/shared security”. And then you have the Western “traditional security.” And maybe if you can talk about the different ways in which China views security, it could be for ASEAN and for the Middle East, and the way the US views security.
Zhou: There is a fundamental difference, because if you look at Xi Jinping Thought, in terms of foreign policy, I consider his ideas about a Community of Shared Destiny for Mankind is a top hat. Underneath it, there are two important initiatives, the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Development Initiative (GDI). China is good at developing some general ideas and then make them become a more tangible and concrete. On the GDI, I would say that we already have a lot of things in it, such as the Belt and Road Initiative. It is something that everyone can see and grasp around the world, and it serves as a pillar for the Global Development Initiative
The other pillar of security is currently being developed, but there is already something in it, such as PLA operations overseas that are only limited to humanitarian areas. This reveals a great deal. That indicates that China wishes to distance itself from America's practice, which has proven to be more bloody, to say the least. The PLA have not killed anybody overseas, not even pirates.
Tuvia: You didn’t have to because the US was involved.
Zhou: But Chinese are still more cautious about using force. For example, in counter piracyand peacekeeping you are allowed to use force. The UN mandates for peacekeeping operations do not say “you can kill,” but they do authorize you to "use all necessary means." Even so, China has been extremely cautious in its peacekeeping efforts. In counter piracy we scattered the pirates or apprehended them but we didn't try to kill them.
Tuvia: Back to our region here in the Middle East. Of course, people here kill each other all the time. And when it comes to the tangible, concrete areas of security, will China be able to cooperate with the US or not? Because if China does not offer anything tangible, and let's take the most glaring example, the Iran nuclear deal - just a week, week and a half ago, we got the news that Iran has reached 84% of uranium enrichment (just short of the 90% required for the bomb). That is way above civilian use, and even if we say it's “only” 60%, something they've been doing for a long while now. Iran appears to be hell-bent on obtaining the bomb, and we can all agree that this is not in China's interest or declared position, as China is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). China also important in reaching the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA) in 2015. At the time, former ambassador Hua Liming (華黎明) was instrumental in facilitating the relationship between Iran and the United States.
But now we're in a very different situation, where the relationship between the US and China has almost never been lower. Just look at the balloon incident. And now we're are reaching closer to a point that is very possible, where either Iran is going to reach a bomb and mount it on a missile or you're going to have a preemptive attack by Israel, the Gulf countries and the US. What will China do then, and what will become of China’s security architecture? How will it help? This is where the tangible aspect becomes extremely important. What will China do?
Zhou: My direct answer is, why hadn’t you, as America’s staunch allies, told them not to scrap the JCPOA? Donald Trump made a mess; everybody was working towards non-proliferation, and to a great extent the Iranians have abided by the deal. Why would you just throw it away? You should have told the American government, because you're your allies and it served your best interest. Even for the sake of your so-called ironclad commitment to Israel, they shouldn’t have thrown it away.
You can imagine how difficult it is to reach an agreement on nuclear issues. Whereas the Six-Party Talks simply failed, the situation was different here, and an agreement was almost reached. Despite the fact that China was involved, they scrapped it due to some people in Israel, but primarily due to Donald Trump. As a result, we are now in a more dangerous situation.
Tuvia: I can’t disagree on what Trump did. And by the way, it was Israel that lobbied the US to scrap the deal because Israeli policymakers thought at the time that the deal was terrible. Even during the implementation phase (from 2015 to 2018), Iran continued to expand and strengthen its proxy powers throughout the region, particularly around Israel.
And if we consider China's official position on the Ukrainian war, for example, that NATO's expansionism started the war, even though Russia is carrying out the attack and violating human rights. China claims that the root cause is the United States and NATO's expansion over the last 20 years, as well as a failure to listen to Russia and consider its spheres of influence.
If we apply this logic of China here in the Middle East, we have not twenty years, but forty years, the Iranian regime, a self-described “revolutionary” regime, has been spreading its extremism and expanding its proxies throughout the region, thereby creating its own ‘exclusive security.’ What about Israel’s and the Gulf’s ‘legitimate security interests’? We didn’t enjoy security during the implementation phase of the JCPOA, and we don’t have it now. Where does China stand on that?
Zhou: But first, let me ask you a simple question. Before I go any further, I must state that what you said in regards to Iran is something that almost every Israeli would say in a tone that is completely understood. But let me ask you one very simple question: comparing the situation now and the time before the JCPOA had been scrapped, is the situation now more dangerous or not?
Tuvia: For us no, for China yes. This, I believe, is the story's moral hazard. Because the deaths of some Jews or Arabs killed by Iranian terrorism do not jeopardize China's interests. If Iran obtains a nuclear weapon, Saudi Arabia will immediately follow suit, followed by the UAE and Egypt. We might even have a war, putting all of China's interests in the region at risk - this is our security versus China’s security.
Zhou: You have already answered this question. If you believe the situation right now is more dangerous than before the JCPOA had been scrapped, that means you made the wrong decision. This clearly made the situation more dangerous. Therefore, you actually have invited this kind of danger.
Tuvia: But what do we do now in case that this not so speculative scenario where we might have a showdown in the Middle East, what will China do? Will China be able to cooperate with the US, or, at least, not interfere; perhaps, it could even support Israel and the Gulf countries in protecting their own security over Iran’s exclusive security and its proxies - or is the great power competition so [fierce] right now, and because Iran is leaning closer to China today, and both are against the US, will China just stand with folded arms in the sidelines?
Zhou: I don't think so. On the issue of non-proliferation, China is as decisive as anyone else in the belief that Iran should not develop nuclear weapons. This position is absolute, because it is based on a decades-old policy. China has changed many of its defense policies over the years, but not on this issue on the use of nuclear weapons against countries without nuclear weapons or regions, and China is committed to never be the first to use a nuclear weapon. China's commitment is ironclad. Therefore, I do not believe that there is a difference, even with the major power rivalry. The only question is how can we achieve denuclearisation.
Through my conversations with people, I believe that the Iranians are not as adamant about developing a nuclear weapon because they understand the consequences. It's difficult to predict whether you'll launch a preemptive strike or not because you've kept this option deliberately ambiguous. You said that “all the options are on the table.”
However, striking Iran will not solve the problem. It may even cause more problems, because Iran is not a weak country militarily. So, nobody wants this to happen. But I believe that this kind of attitude, this Iranian uncertainty, is an opportunity for all of us; we must consider this opportunity so that the scenario does not become reality, making the situation even more dangerous. There is still time.
Tuvia: I hope so too. To wrap up, I'd like to ask your personal opinion rather than China's official position. Has anything changed your mind during your week in Israel, or do you have a major takeaway from this trip?
Zhou: No, I haven't changed my mind, but I am more aware of how Israelis perceive the situation here. One of the things that comes to mind is how the China-US competition might intensify, and how that might put you, as a staunch US ally, in a worse position. That would be extremely difficult for you. That is why, at the end of yesterday's conference, I stated, "We know that the Jewish people are the most clever people in the world" -
Tuvia: - I don’t know about that…
Zhou: Some people say it, but we also know that you are staunch allies of the United States
Tuvia: That’s true.
Zhou: So, putting all this together, that means you should not blindly follow other people's instructions. You should make the decisions on things the concern your national interest. We know you won't take China’s side, even in the most extreme scenario - that would put you in a very difficult situation. But we do not want you to pick sides -
Tuvia: We don’t want “sides” at all; that is Cold War mentality.
Zhou: Yes, but when such a situation arises, you should first consider your national interests. Be impartial in determining who is right and who is wrong, and make your own correct decision.
Tuvia: On that, I absolutely agree. Thank you very much, Zhou Bo.
Zhou: Thank you.
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