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今天小編為大家帶來的是最新錢報（七十一），
具體為文獻推文（期刊論文）的精讀
《Consumer Rebates from E-Commerce Platforms and Multi-Channel Management of Third-Party Sellers》
歡迎您的用心通路！
本期推文閱讀時長大約6分鐘，請您耐心閱讀。
Share interest, spread happiness, increase knowledge, leave beautiful.
Dear you,
This is LearingYard Academy!
Today Xiaobian brings you the latest money report (71),
Specifically for the intensive reading of literature tweets (journal papers)
A dual supply chain revenue sharing contract considering online reviews and Rebates
Welcome your heart visit!
This tweet will take about 6minutes to read, please be patient.
今天小編分享一篇期刊論文《Consumer Rebates from E-Commerce Platforms and Multi-Channel Management of Third-Party Sellers》的模型描述部分，小編将從思維導圖、精讀内容、知識補充三個闆塊來介紹這一部分内容，請讀者跟小編一起學習一下吧！
Today Xiaobao shares the model description of a journal paper "Consumer Rebates from E-Commerce Platforms and Multi-Channel Management of Third-Party Sellers". Xiaobian will introduce this part of the content from the mind map, intensive reading content, knowledge supplement three sections, please learn with Xiaobian!
1.思維導圖
該篇文獻的模型建構部分的思維導圖部分如下圖所示：
The mind map of the model building part of this paper is shown in the figure below:
2.精讀内容
根據學者模型描述部分了解到，學者研究的是由一個制造商，一個傳統零售商和一個電子商務平台組成的供應鍊模型。制造商一方面批發産品給傳統零售商以及在第三方平台上進行銷售。一方面，制造商以傳統方式通過線下零售商分銷其産品，制造商設定批發價格。另一方面，制造商同時也通過平台銷售産品，制造商可以直接制定零售價格，而銷售收入則根據平台初步确定的傭金率與平台分享。
According to the description of the scholar model, the scholar studies a supply chain model composed of a manufacturer, a traditional retailer and an e-commerce platform. Manufacturers sell their products wholesale to traditional retailers and on third-party platforms. On the one hand, manufacturers distribute their products in the traditional way through offline retailers, and manufacturers set wholesale prices. On the other hand, manufacturers also sell products through the platform. The manufacturer can directly set the retail price, and the sales revenue is shared with the platform according to the commission rate preliminarily determined by the platform.
本文的主要目的是探讨消費者返利如何影響線上和離線管道的定價決策。我們使用s來表示平台給消費者的返利。假設所有的返利都由消費者完全兌現，并參考學者(Arya和Mittendorf、Caliskan-Demirag、Yang和Dong、張等的文獻)。設定如果線上零售價格設定為p，消費者從線上購買的每件商品的現金支付價格為(1-s)p。關于誰消費者返利的成本，我們考察了兩種不同的情況:(一)成本由平台承擔，(二)成本由供應商承擔。學者還假設線上線下銷售的産品具有同質性，但消費者存在消費者偏好，有的消費者更喜歡線下管道，因為它可以立即獲得，但有的換線上管道。學者參考供應商多管道管理的研究(，Abhishek、陸、沈)，根據效用函數設定需求函數。學者将模型中的參數描述進行了參數，然後對所有返利由平台承擔，還有所有返利由制造商承擔情況下的利潤函數進行表述，學者将社會福利定義為所有廠商的消費者剩餘和利潤之和。
The main objective of this paper is to explore how consumer rebates affect pricing decisions in both online and offline channels. We use s to represent the platform rebates to consumers. Assume that all rebates are fully cashing by consumers, and refer to the literature of scholars (Arya and Mittendorf, Caliskan-Demirag, Yang and Dong, Zhang, et al.). Suppose that if the online retail price is set to p, the cash price paid by the consumer for each item purchased online is (1-s)p. As for the cost of rebates for consumers, we examined two different scenarios :(1) the cost is borne by the platform, and (2) the cost is borne by the supplier. Scholars also assume that products sold online and offline are homogeneous, but consumers have consumer preferences. Some consumers prefer offline channels because they can be obtained immediately, while others switch to online channels. Scholars refer to the research on supplier multi-channel management (Abhishek, Lu, Shen) and set the demand function according to the utility function. The scholar parameterized the parameter description in the model, and then expressed the profit function under the condition that all rebates are borne by the platform and all rebates are borne by the manufacturer. The scholar defined social welfare as the sum of the consumer surplus and profits of all manufacturers.
博弈的第一階段，制造商向傳統零售商收取批發價價格。在第二階段，零售商設定線下零售價格，而制造商設定線上零售價格。學者先将返利設為外生參數，以探究返利的變化如何影響線上和離線管道的定價決策。
In the first stage of the game, manufacturers charge wholesale prices to traditional retailers. In the second stage, retailers set offline retail prices, while manufacturers set online retail prices. Scholars first set rebates as exogenous parameters to explore how changes in rebates affect pricing decisions of online and offline channels.
3.知識補充
1.模型描述寫作注意事項
1.Notes for writing model description
博弈論（Game Theory ）(亦稱對策論或賽局理論，是研究理性決策者之間戰略互動的數學模型。
Game Theory (also known as game theory or Game Theory) is a mathematical model of strategic interactions between rational decision makers.
2.什麼是子博奕完美均衡
2. What is perfect equilibrium of sub-game
定義:展開型博弈的一個政策組合稱為子博弈完美均衡，如果對于該展開型博弈的每一個子博弈，該政策組合都是Nash均衡。
Definition: A strategy combination of an expansion game is called a subgame perfect equilibrium, if for every subgame of the expansion game, the strategy combination is a Nash equilibrium.
3.論文模型建構注意事項
3. Notes for paper model construction
（1）資訊結構判斷，經濟行為主體之間各自掌握的資訊是對稱還是非對稱的。
(1) Judging the information structure, whether the information held by the subjects of economic behavior is symmetric or asymmetric.
（2）博弈關系，在不同主體之間的博弈結構以及各自政策集合需要描述清楚。
(2) Game relations: the game structure between different players and their respective strategy sets need to be described clearly.
（3）模型建構需要有依據，一方面是需要有現實依據，另一方面是需要有經典文獻支撐，是以模型建構需要有邏輯性。
(3) Model construction needs to be based on reality on the one hand, and classical literature on the other hand, so model construction needs to be logical.
（4）模型建構需要清晰簡潔，需要用最精煉的語言把模型要輸呈現出來，以便于審稿人或者同領域的學者能夠一眼看到論文就知道你在分析什麼問題。
(4) Model construction needs to be clear and concise, and the model needs to be presented in the most concise language, so that reviewers or scholars in the same field can know what problem you are analyzing at a glance.
今天的分享就到這裡了。
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讓我們相約明天，
祝您今天過得開心快樂！
That's it for today's sharing.
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Welcome to leave us a message,
Let us meet tomorrow,
I wish you a happy day today!
參考資料：有道翻譯
參考文獻：[1] Monden A, Zennyo Y. Consumer Rebates from E-Commerce Platforms and Multi-Channel Management of Third-Party Sellers [J]. Available at SSRN 3639717, 2021， 1(1): 1-14.
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