In various media reports, the US military has beaten the Taliban to the ground in Afghanistan. This has become a common impression among people, especially Chinese netizens. But in a booklet written to the Marine Corps by the U.S. Naval Analysis Center, the situation was reversed.
That is, the Taliban often chase after the U.S. military.
Ambushing convoys on the main roads of the U.S. supply line was one of the Taliban's main means of attacking U.S. troops.
(Convoy destroyed by the Taliban)
In ambush battles against convoys, the Taliban's common tactic was to trap an entire convoy on a narrow stretch of road by destroying vehicles at the head and tail. This tactic has always been the main tactic for ambush convoys and is particularly effective against heavy armored convoys on narrow roads. For example, in July 2008, a U.S. Marine Convoy was suddenly ambushed by the Taliban while passing through a road with ditches on both sides. The Taliban managed to destroy the head and tail cars, and the Marines' convoy was trapped in the firing zone for nearly 20 minutes. During this time, not a single Marine dared to get out of the car and return fire.
(U.S. military vehicle attacked by the Taliban)
For U.S. convoys that lacked heavy armor protection, the Taliban ambush was even bolder. These Taliban personnel, though lowly educated, are well versed in weapons operations and the performance of U.S. military equipment. The U.S. military found that they had a deep understanding of the weaknesses of armored vehicles. They often fired 3 to 5 RPG rockets at a time at close range, which these Taliban operatives knew would be more likely to penetrate the vehicle's armor. For example, in August 2008, some Taliban personnel fired multiple RPG rockets at the hoods of several relatively poorly protected U.S. Humvees, one of which was completely destroyed. In fact, don't say humvees, in the same place, 1 month ago, I don't know if the same Taliban personnel also carried out ambushes. That time they fired multiple armor-piercing shells at very close range with RPG, directly piercing the armor of a U.S. Marine Corps mine-protected anti-ambush vehicle and a Humvee, and completely blowing both vehicles.
In such ambushes, the Taliban will not fight for more than 20 minutes, so it will not cause heavy losses to the US military.
The other case is different.
(Destroyed U.S. military helicopter)
As mentioned in the previous article, because the US helicopter did not dare to fly directly to the remote location of the incident. The Taliban would then set up successive ambushes on these roads, both to maintain multiple rounds of attacks on U.S. convoys and to delay reinforcements.
This ambush circle can even stretch for several kilometers. In May 2006, for example, near the Kajaki Dam in Helmand Province, "an almost catastrophic ambush stretched 6 miles" (U.S. military language), while the ambush in the Gulistan Valley in Farah Province lasted more than 30 kilometers that same month. In July 2007, an ambush occurred even in northern Kandahar province, where a Taliban armed force ambushed a U.S. convoy along more than 3 kilometers of undulating terrain, encountering a new ambush each time the convoy passed at the top of a hill. (Note: Kandahar is not the traditional sphere of influence of the Taliban, which shows the reduction of the control of the US military and the boldness of the Taliban)
The U.S. military pointed out that because of the weakening of air power support capabilities, in many ambush battles, the Taliban were more bold, changing the practice of attacking and fighting for no more than 20 minutes, and continued to attack the ambushed U.S. convoys, often lasting several hours. In May 2006, for example, the Taliban annihilated an entire convoy near the Kajaki Dam in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Because of the delay in the arrival of support, the Taliban calmly divided and annihilated the convoy. In October 2007, the Taliban used ambushes to encircle a U.S. convoy marching along the Gulistan Valley in Farah Province.
But for the U.S. military, this is not the most terrifying thing. Because U.S. helicopters in turn feared an ambush by the Taliban (see previous article). Many Taliban personnel are getting bolder. They even dared to pursue, pursuing and killing the American troops all the way.
In 2007, for example, in the Gulistan Valley, Farah Province, a combined convoy of soldiers from the United States and Albanian armies was ambushed. After the convoy protruded the ambush circle, the Taliban pursued, and finally the American and Afghan soldiers were surrounded in a culvert, withstanding long Taliban fire, causing heavy casualties. In 2008, the Taliban mentioned ambushing the U.S. Marines and another U.S. Marine Convoy. This time, the U.S. convoy fled, and the Taliban followed it for several kilometres, surrounding the convoy after fleeing to an Afghan police checkpoint and beating it.
And what is even more embarrassing to the U.S. military is that the Taliban have "very few casualties in these attacks."
What does it mean to conduct sustained ambushes on the roads on the U.S. Supply Line? The Taliban effectively gained control of many roads, and their ambushes made many U.S. patrol bases in remote areas completely dependent on air supplies. As a result, there were shortages of supplies and ammunition at many patrol bases, and the cost of maintaining remote patrol bases was increased, and many bases were forced to abandon. In other words, these areas fell into the hands of the Taliban.