Francis Bacon (1561–1626) was one of the leading figures in the field of natural philosophy and scientific methodology in the transition from the Renaissance to the early modern period. As a lawyer, member of Parliament, and barrister, Bacon's writings deal with legal, state, and religious, and contemporary political issues; he has also published articles in which he speculates on possible social concepts, and even considers ethical issues (treatises) in his natural philosophical work (The Progress of Learning).
After completing his studies at Trinity College, Cambridge and grey guest houses in London, Bacon did not serve at the university, but instead tried to begin a political career. Although his efforts did not succeed in the Elizabethan era, under The Leadership of James I, he was promoted to the highest political office, the Lord Chancellor. Bacon's international fame and influence spread in his final years, when he was able to concentrate entirely on his philosophical work, even after his death, when British scientists at boyle earrings (the Invisible Academy) came up with his ideas. The cooperative research institutes are in their plans and preparations for the establishment of the Royal Society.
To this day, Bacon is known for his treatises on empirical natural philosophy (Progress of Learning, Novum Organum Scientiarum) and the iconoclastic doctrines he proposed in his earlier writings, as well as the modern institutes he describes in The New Atlantis.
1. Biography
2. Natural philosophy: the struggle against tradition
3. Natural Philosophy: Idol Theory and Scientific System 3.1 Idol 3.2 Scientific System 3.3 Matter Theory and Cosmology
4. The Scientific Method: The Instauratio Magna Project
5. The Scientific Method: Novum Organum and Inductive Theory
6. Philosophy of Science and Society
The Ethical Dimension in Bacon's Thought
Bibliography Bacon's major philosophical works Bacon works select other secondary school literature
Academic tools
Other Internet resources
Related entries
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="15" >1</h1>
Francis Bacon was born on 22 January 1561 as the second child of Sir Nicholas Bacon (SEAL Keeper) and his second wife, Lady Anne Cook Bacon, daughter of Sir Anthony Cook, mentor of Edward VI, and one of the most important humanists. age. Mrs. Anne was erudite: she was fluent not only in Greek and Latin, but also in Italian and French. Francis grew up with his older brother Anthony in an environment dictated by political power, humanistic learning, and Calvinist zeal. In the 1560s, his father built a new house in Goreambury, where Bacon received about seven years of education. Later, he went with Anthony to Trinity College, Cambridge (1573-5), where he sharply criticized the academic approach to academic training. Their mentor was john Whitjift, later Archbishop of Canterbury. Whitgift provided classic texts for the brothers' research: Cicero, Demosthenes, Hermogenes, Livy, Sallust, and Xenophon (Peltonen 2007). Bacon began his studies in 1576 at the Grey Hotel in London. But from 1577 to 1578 he accompanied the British ambassador Sir Amias Paulet on missions in Paris. According to Peltonen (2007):
During his stay in France, perhaps in the autumn of 1577, Bacon visited England as a diplomat, delivering letters to Walsingham, Burleigh, Leicester, and the Queen herself.
After his father's death in 1579, he returned to England. Bacon's small estate plunged him into financial hardship, and as his uncle Lord Burleigh failed to help him secure a lucrative government official position, he began a political career in the House of Commons after resuming his studies at grey hotels. In 1581, he entered the House of Commons as a Councillor of Cornwall and served as a member of Parliament for 37 years. He was admitted to the bar in 1582 and in 1587 was elected as a reader at Gray's Inn. He began his involvement in high-level politics in 1584, when he wrote his first political memorandum, a letter of advice to Queen Elizabeth. Bacon worked as an adult to revise natural philosophy and followed his father's example, also trying to secure high political positions. Very early on he tried to outline a new scientific system, emphasizing empirical methods and laying the foundations for applied science (scientiaoperativa). However, this dual task proved to be too ambitious to be achieved in practice. Bacon's ideas about scientific reform did not receive sympathy from Queen Elizabeth or Lord Burleigh. Small expectations in this regard made him a successful lawyer and mp. From 1584 to 1617 (the year he entered the House of Lords), he was an active member of the House of Commons. Under Walsingham's patronage, Bacon played a role in the investigation of Catholics in England and advocated harsh action against Mary Queen of Scots. He served on a number of committees, one of which was responsible for reviewing rejectors in 1588. Later he was a member of a committee responsible for amending the laws of England. He was involved in the political aspects of religious issues, particularly with regard to the clash between the Anglican church and the non-conformist. In a 1591 essay, he tried to steer the middle course of religious politics; but a year later he was commissioned to write an article opposing the Jesuits Jardine and Stewart (1999, p. 125) who attacked British sovereignty.
From the late 1580s onwards, Bacon regarded the Earl of Essex as his patron. At this stage of his life, he devoted himself particularly to natural philosophy. He made his position clear in a famous letter to his uncle Lord Burleigh in 1592:
I confess that I have broad contemplative goals, just as I have modest civic goals: for I regard all knowledge as my domain; if I can purge two kinds of wanderers, one with rash arguments, rebuttals and lengthies, and the other with blind experimentation and hearsay of tradition and deception, and commit so many booty, I hope I can bring diligent observations, well-founded conclusions, and profitable inventions and discoveries; that the province is in the best possible condition. This, whether it's curiosity, or vanity, or nature, or (if anyone wants to) philanthropy, is so fixed in my mind that it can't be removed. It's easy for me to see that anything that makes sense brings more wisdom than a person; it's something I have a lot of influence on. (Bacon 1857–74, VIII, 109)
In 1593, Bacon fell out of favor for refusing to meet the Queen's request for funds to parliament. Although he did not vote against providing the government with three subsidies, he demanded that they should be paid over six years instead of three years. This led sir Robert Cecil and sir Walter Raleigh to oppose him in parliament. Bacon's patron, the Earl of Essex, had served as a close political adviser and informant for him, but could not quell the Queen's anger over the subsidy. All of Essex's attempts to secure a high position for Bacon (attorney general or attorney general) failed. Nevertheless, the Queen valued Bacon's ability to act as a legal man. He participated in the treason trial of Rodrigo Lopez and later in the proceedings against the Count of Essex. In 1594-5 (a traditional Christmas carnival held at the Grey Inn), Bacon emphasized the need for scientific improvement and progress. Having failed to gain a place for himself in government, he considered the possibility of abandoning politics and focusing on natural philosophy. It is therefore not surprising that Bacon engaged in much academic and literary research in the 1590s. In this regard, reference should be made to his letters of advice to the Counts of Lateran and Essex. The advice given to Essex was particularly important because Bacon advised him to be careful in public and, above all, to avoid ambitions for military command. Bacon also worked on reforming English law at this stage of his career. In 1597, his first book was published, his seminal edition of essays, which contained only ten pieces (Klein 2004b). His finances remained precarious; but his plan to marry the wealthy widow, Lady Hatton, failed because Sir Edward Cork had successfully proposed to her. In 1598 Bacon was unable to sell his restored position as a clerk in the Star Chamber, so he was imprisoned for a short time for debts. His parliamentary activities in 1597-98, which involved mainly committee work, were impressive. But when the Earl of Essex began trying to quell the Irish rebels in 1599, Bacon's hopes were dashed. As Bacon expected, Essex failed to resolve the Irish issue, returned to court and fell out of favor. As a result, he lost a valuable patron and his project spokesperson. Bacon tried to reconcile the queen and Essex; but when the Count rebelled against the crown in 1601, there was nothing he could do to help him. The Queen ordered Bacon to attend the treason trial against Essex. In 1601, Bacon served in Elizabeth's last parliament and played an extremely active role.
Bacon looked forward to the next reign and tried to get in touch with Elizabeth's successor, James VI of Scotland. During James's reign, Bacon came to power. He was knighted in 1603 and appointed a year later as an erudite lawyer. He dealt with the political issues of the Union of England and Scotland and was committed to the concept of religious tolerance, supporting a middle course in dealing with Catholics and the non-conformist. Bacon married Alice Barnhem, the youngest daughter of a wealthy London councillor, in 1606. A year later, he was appointed Deputy Attorney General. He was also dealing with the theory of the state and developed the idea of a politically active and armed citizen based on Machiavelli's views. In 1608 Bacon became a clerk in the Celestial Chamber; at this time, he looked back on his life, recording his achievements and failures. Although he still hasn't gotten rid of the money problem, his career has moved forward step by step. From 1603 to 1613, Bacon was not only busy in English politics. He also laid the foundation for his philosophical work by writing seminal papers for Novum Organum and Instauratio Magna. In 1613 he became Minister of Justice, beginning the pinnacle of his political career: in 1616 he became a member of the Privy Council, the following year he was appointed Guardian of the Seal of the Nation—thus obtaining the same position as his father—and in 1618 he was given the title of Chief Justice, and in 1618 he was appointed Baron of Viruram. However, Bacon was impeached by Parliament in 1621 for corruption after being appointed Viscount of St Albans. He became the victim of a parliamentary conspiracy because he opposed the abuse of monopoly and indirectly attacked his friend, the Duke of Buckingham, who was the king's darling. To protect Buckingham, the king sacrificed Bacon, whose enemies accused him of taking bribes for serving as a judge. Bacon saw no way out of himself and declared himself guilty. His downfall was caused by his opponents in Parliament and court factions, for which he was a scapegoat who not only saved the Duke of Buckingham from public outrage, but also from open aggression (Mathews 1996). He lost all his positions and parliamentary seats, but retained his title and personal property. Bacon devoted the last five years of his life—the famous five years—to his philosophical work. He tried to continue his vast project Bacon devoted the last five years of his life—the famous five years—to his philosophical work. He tried to continue his vast project Bacon devoted the last five years of his life—the famous five years—to his philosophical work. He tried to continue his massive project, instauratio Magna Scientiarum; But the task was too big for him to accomplish in just a few years. Although he was able to complete an important part of the Instauratio, a proverb often quoted in his work was correct for himself: Vita brevis, ars longa. In April 1626, he died of pneumonia after an ice test.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="23" ></h1>
Bacon's struggle to overcome the intellectual blockade and dogmatic slumber of his time and early days had to be fought on many fronts. Very early on he criticized not only Plato, Aristotle and Aristotle, but also humanists and Renaissance scholars such as Paracelsus and Bernardino Telesio.
Although Aristotle provided specific axioms for each scientific discipline, Bacon found that what was lacking in the Greek philosopher's writings was a major principle or general theory of science that could be applied to all branches of natural history and philosophy (Klein 2003a). For Bacon, Aristotle's cosmology, as well as his scientific theories, were outdated, and therefore many of the medieval thinkers who followed him were also outdated. He does not completely repudiate Aristotle, but he opposes his humanistic interpretation, which emphasizes syllogism and dialectics (physics operativa as opposed to textual hermeneutics) and the metaphysical treatment of natural philosophy in favor of natural forms (or influences of nature as structured modes of action, rather than artefacts), whose phases correspond to nature itself in the form of a pyramid of knowledge.
If there are any "modern" Aristotles close to Bacon, it is a branch of the Venetians or Paduas, represented by Jacopo Zabarella. Bacon, on the other hand, criticized Teresio, arguing that Teresio was only half successful in overcoming Aristotle's inadequacies. Although we find in his mid-period unpublished text the debate with Telesio (De Principiis atque Originibus, secundum fabulas Cupidinis et Coelum or On Principiis at the Fables of Cupid and Coelum, written in 1612; Bacon V [1889], 461–500), Bacon was early in bacon The struggle against tradition began in 1603. In Valerius Terminus (1603?) He had rejected any mixture of natural philosophy and divinity; he outlined his new approach and determined that the end of knowledge was to "discover all the operations and possibilities of operations from immortality (if possible) to the most despicable mechanical practices" (Bacon III [1887], 222). He objected to Aristotle's "natural expectations", which favored inquiring into causes to satisfy the mind, rather than those that "would guide him and bring him the light of new experiences and inventions" (Bacon III [1887], 232).
When Bacon introduced his new disciplinary system structure in The Progress of Learning (1605), he continued his struggle with tradition, mainly against classical antiquity, rejecting book study by the humanists on the grounds that they "pursued more words than matter" (Bacon III [1887], 283). As a result, he criticized the Cambridge University curriculum for placing too much emphasis on dialectical and sophistry training, demanding that "the mind be empty and material" (Bacon III [1887], 326). He reformulated and functionally changed Aristotle's scientific concept of knowledge of inevitable causes. He objected to Aristotle's logic, which was based on his metaphysical theory, thus allowing false doctrines to be implied through the means of our senses (which relates to our experience showing) to automatically present to our understanding of what things are as they really are. At the same time, Aristotle favored the application of general and abstract conceptual distinctions that do not correspond to the existence of things. However, Bacon introduced his new philosophical concepts to the meta-level of all scientific disciplines.
From 1606 to 1612, Bacon continued his work on natural philosophy with the support of a struggle with tradition. This trend is seen in unpublished pamphlets Temporis partus masculus, 1603/1608 (Bacon III [1887], 521–31), Cogitata et Visa, 1607 (Bacon III, 591–620), Redargutio Philosophiarum (III, 1607 85) and De Principiis atque Originibus..., 1612 (Bacon V [1889], 461-500). Bacon rediscovered for himself the former Socratic philosophers, especially the atomists, of whom Democritus was the main figure. He favored Democritus's natural philosophy over scholasticism—and therefore Aristotle's—concerned with deductive logic and faith in authority. Bacon did not want any traditional-based approach to start with a direct investigation of nature and then rise to experience and general knowledge. This criticism extends to Renaissance alchemy, magic, and astrology (Temporis partus masculus) because the "methods" of these "disciplines" are based on accidental insight rather than commanding strategies to reproduce natural influences in investigation. His critique also touches on contemporary technical literature because it lacks a new perspective on nature and an innovative methodological plan. Bacon carried out tasks for the ancients, scholastic scholars, and modern men. He criticized not only the failures of Plato, Aristotle, and Galen, but also Jean Fenel, Paracelsus, and Telesio, as well as the Greek atomists and Roger Bacon.
Bacon's manuscript already mentions that the doctrine of idolatry is necessary to constitute scientia operativa. In Cogitata et Visa, he likens the deductive logic used by scholastic scholars to spider webs pulled from one's own internal organs and bees introduced as an image of scientia operativa. Like bees, the empiricist collects natural substances or products through his inductive method and then processes them into knowledge to produce honey that is useful for healthy nutrition.
In Bacon's follow-up paper, Redargutio Philosophiarum, he continued his empiricist project by citing the doctrine of double truth, while in De Principiis atque Originibus he rejected the alchemical theory of the transformation of matter in favor of Greek atomism. But in the same article, he sharply criticized his contemporary Telesio for promoting non-experimental halfway dorm empiricism. Although Telesio proved to be a moderate "modern", he still adhered to Aristotle's framework, continuing to believe in the quinta essentia and the doctrine of the two worlds, which presupposed two modes of natural law (one for the underground and the other for the superluminal body).
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="31" >3</h1>
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="32" >3.1 idol</h1>
Bacon's iconoclasm not only represented a phase in the history of false theory (Brandt 1979), but also played an important theoretical role in the rise of modern empiricism. According to Bacon, the human mind is not a blank slate. Due to the implied distortion, it is not the ideal plane for receiving images of the world, but a curved mirror (Bacon IV [1901], 428-34). Instead of sketching out basic epistemology, he emphasizes that the images in our minds from the beginning do not present objective pictures of real objects. Therefore, before we begin any acquisition of knowledge, we must improve our minds, that is, liberate it from idols.
As early as Temporis partus masculus, Bacon warned students of empirical science not to deal with the complexity of his subject matter without clearing their idol ideas:
On wax plates, you can't write anything new unless you erase the old ones. The heart is not like this; there you cannot erase the old ones unless you write the new ones. (Farrington 1964, 72)
In the Redargutio Philosophiarum, Bacon reflects on his approach, but he also criticizes biases and misconceptions, especially the speculative system established by theologians as an obstacle to scientific progress (Farrington 1964, 107), as well as any authoritarian positions on academic issues.
Bacon discusses idols in the second book, The Progress of Learning, where he discusses artistic knowledge (invention, judgment, memory, tradition). In his passages on judgment, he referred to proofs and arguments, especially induction and invention. When he speaks of Aristotle's treatment of syllogism, he reflects on the relationship between sophistry fallacies (Aristotle, De Sophisticis Elenchis) and idols (Bacon III [1887], 392-6). Although induction, invention, and judgment are all premised on "the same mental activity," the proof in syllogism is not. Thus, Bacon preferred his own interpretation of nature, rejecting elenches as a "juggling" model of sophistry in order to persuade others to re-debate ("The use of depravity and corruption ...). as the title and contradiction"). There is no discovery without evidence, and no evidence without discovery. But this is not the case for syllogism, where proof (syllogism: judgment of outcome) and invention ("average" or intermediate term) are different. He also advises caution when dealing with ambiguities in elenches when confronting idols:
There is a more important and profound fallacy in the human mind, which I find not observed or explored at all, and I think it is good to put it here, because in all the other fallacies it is best suited to correct the judgment: its power is such that it does not dazzle or boggle understanding in some details, but more generally and intrinsically infects and destroys its state. For the human mind is far from the essence of transparent and equal glass, the beams of things should be reflected according to their true incidence, no, it is more like a glass of magic, full of superstition and hypocrisy, if not delivered and reduced. To this end, let us consider the illusion imposed on us by the general nature of the mind ... (Bacon III [1887], 394-5)
Bacon still made a similar argument to his readers in 1623, namely in De Augmentis (Book V, Chapter 4; see Bacon IV [1901], 428-34). The judgment of syllogism presupposes—in a way that suits the human mind—mediates proofs that, unlike induction, it does not begin with the meaning of the primary object. To control the workings of the mind, syllogistic judgment refers to a fixed frame of reference or principle of knowledge that serves as the basis for "various arguments" (Bacon IV [1901], 491). Simplifying the proposition to a principle leads to a medium term. Bacon deals here with the art of judgment in order to assign a systematic position to the idol. In this art, he distinguishes between "analytical" and detection fallacies (complex syllogism). The analysis used "the true form of the results in the argument" (Bacon IV [1901], 429), which became erroneous due to variations and deflections.
The fallacy of sophistry,
Explain the fallacies, as well
Masquerade or idol.
On (1) Bacon praised Aristotle for his excellent handling of the matter, but he also honorably mentioned Plato. The explanatory fallacy (2) refers to "contingent conditions or essential appendages", similar to dilemmas, open to physical or logical inquiry. When he associates the detection of interpretive errors with the erroneous use of common and general concepts, he focuses his attention on logical processing, which leads to sophistry. In the last verse (3) Bacon found a place for his idol when he called the detection of illusions
The deepest fallacy in the human mind: for they do not deceive details by vague and snarky judgments as others do; but rather by the corruption and disorder of the mind, which seems to distort and infect all the expectations of the intellect. (IV,431)
Idols are the product of the human imagination (caused by the crooked mirror of the human mind) and are therefore nothing more than "untested generalizations" (Malherbe 1996, 80).
In the preface to his New Organs, Bacon promised to introduce a new method that would restore the senses to their original state (Bacon IV [1901], 17f.), restart the work of the whole mind, and open two sources and two distributions of learning, one to cultivate the scientific method and the other to discover the scientific method. This new beginning presupposes the discovery of natural obstacles to effective scientific analysis, namely seeing through idols, thus bringing into focus the function of the mind as the subject of knowledge acquisition (Brandt 1979, 19).
According to the motto XXIII of the first book, Bacon distinguished between the idol of the human mind and the idea of the divine mind: the former for him was nothing more than "some empty dogma", while the latter showed "the true signature" and the mark on the works of creation found in nature " (Bacon IV [1901], 51).
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="48" > 3.1.1 Tribal idols</h1>
Tribal idols originate from the misconceptions that arise from human nature, because the structure of human cognition is like a curved mirror that leads to distorted reflections (things of the external world).
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="50" >3.1.2 Cave idols</h1>
Cave idols are made up of concepts or doctrines cherished by individuals who cherish them, but there is no evidence of their authenticity. These idols stem from everyone's prerequisites, including education, custom, or occasional or fortuitous experiences.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="52" >3.1.3 Market Idol</h1>
These idols are based on misconceptions that stem from human communication among the public. They creep into our minds through a combination of words and names, so that not only does reason dominate words, words also react to our understanding.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="54" >3.1.4 Theater idol</h1>
According to the insight that the world is a stage, theater icons are biased from accepted or traditional philosophical systems. These systems resemble drama in rendering fictional worlds that have never undergone experimental checks or empirical tests. Thus, theatrical idols originated from dogmatic philosophies or false exemplary laws.
Bacon ends his introduction to idols in Novum Organum, Book I, Aphorisms LXVIII, where he says that one should give up and renounce the qualities of idols, "and understand [must] be completely liberated and purified" (Bacon IV [1901], 69). He discussed idols and the problems of information obtained through the senses, which had to be corrected experimentally (Bacon IV [1901], 27).
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="57" >3.2 scientific system</h1>
In the history of Western philosophy and science, Bacon identified only three periods of revolution or learning: the heyday of the Greeks and the heyday of his own time of the Romans and Western Europe (Bacon IV [1901], 70ff.). This meager result sparked his ambition to build a new scientific system. This tendency can already be seen in his early manuscripts, but it is also evident in his first major book, The Progress of Learning. In this work, Bacon conducts a systematic investigation of the existing field of knowledge, combined with a detailed description of the defects, leading to his new classification of knowledge. In The Advancement (Bacon III [1887], 282f.), a new feature was given to phosophia prima, which he noted in Novum Organum, I, Aphorism LXXIX-LXXX (Bacon IV [1901], 78-9). In both articles, this function is attributed to natural philosophy, which is the basis of his concept of scientific unity as well as the concept of materialism.
Bacon divided the natural sciences into physics and metaphysics. The former studies variable and special causes, while the latter reflects general and constant causes, for which the term form is used. Form is more common than Aristotle's four reasons, which is why Bacon's discussion of the form of matter as the most universal property of matter is the final step in man's study of nature. Metaphysics is different from the original philosophy. The latter marks the position in which the general categories of general scientific theories in the system are seen as (1) a universal category of ideas, and (2) a position related to all disciplines. The ultimate causes are not credible because they cause scientific difficulties and tempt us to combine doctrinal theology and teleological arguments. At the top of Bacon's pyramid of knowledge are the laws of nature (the most universal principles). The basis of the pyramid is to start with observation, then the invariant relationship, and then the more inclusive correlation, until it reaches the formal stage. The process of generalization rises from natural history through physics to metaphysics, while contingent associations and relationships are eliminated by methods of exclusion. It must be emphasized that metaphysical bacon has a special significance. This concept (1) excludes the infinity of personal experience through teleologically focused generalizations, and (2) opens up our minds to more possibilities for the effective application of general laws.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="60" >3.3 Matter theory and cosmology</h1>
According to Bacon, if a human being could fully understand the hidden structure and secret workings of matter, he would be able to explain all the processes in nature (Pérez-Ramos 1988, 101). Bacon's conception of the structure of nature, which operates according to its own working methods, focuses on the question of how the natural order arises, i.e. through the interaction of matter and motion. In De Principiis atque Originibus, his materialist stance on the concept of natural law becomes apparent. The Natural Review method is viralus based on the theory of matter (matter-cum-motion) or power, or
The forces implanted by God in these initial particles form the multiplication of various things and are synthesized. (Bacon V [1889], 463)
Similarly, in De Sapientia Veterum, he attributes this power
The appetite or instinct of primitive matter; or, more colloquially, the natural movement of atoms; this is indeed the primal and unique force that makes up and shapes everything from matter. (Bacon VI [1890], 729)
I just want to say here that Bacon, who did not reject the influence of the mathematical sciences in science, was developed by 16 early mathematical versions of chemistry in the japanese century, and such a term "instinct" must be seen as a key word for his theory of nature. Natural philosophers were urged to inquire
The various influences and changes we see in natural and artistic works are caused by the appetite and tendency of things. (Bacon III [1887], 17-22; V [1889], 422-6 and 510ff.: Descriptio Globi Knowledgeis ; cf. IV [1901], 349)
Bacon's theory of the active force and even the dynamics of life in matter explains what he called Cupid in De Principiis atque Originibus (Bacon V [1889], 463-5). Since his theory of goals in which this is the underlying reality of the interpretation of things has emerged, he has dug deeper than no mechanical physics of 17 centuries (Gaukger, 2001, 132-7). Bacon's idea of the exchange of facts in reality presupposes distinctions
Understand how things are made up, what they are made of,...... And through what forces and in what ways they are combined, and how they are transformed. (Gokrog 2001, 137)
This is evident in his work, in which he attempts to develop a mode of interpretation in which his theory of matter, as well as his atomism, is related to his cosmology, magic, and alchemy.
In De Augmentis, Bacon not only mentions Pan and his nymphs to illustrate the permanent motion of atoms in matter, but also reinvigorates the concept of magic in "glorious sense", such as
Knowledge that things universally agree with... I...... Understand [magic] as applying knowledge in hidden forms to the science that produces wonderful operations; and by combining (as they say) active with passive, to show the wonderful works of nature. (Bacon IV [1901], 366-7: De Augmentis III.5)
Bacon's conception of form was made possible by integrating it into his theory of matter, which (ideally) reduced the apparent world to some of the smallest parts that could be accessed and manipulated by the knower/maker. In contrast to Aristotle, Bacon's definition of the "know why" type points to a valid representation of the "know how" type (Pérez-Ramos 1988, 119). In this sense, the convergence between the scope of definition and the scope of causality occurs according to "constructivist epistemology". Graham Rees's basic research shows that Bacon's particular cosmological model was heavily influenced by magic and the semi-Paracel doctrine. For Bacon, the theory of matter was a fundamental doctrine, not classical mechanics like Galileo. Thus, bacon is interested in chemistry, alchemy,
According to Reese, instauratio Magna consists of two branches: (1) Bacon's famous scientific method, and (2) his semi-Paracelsian world system, "a vast, comprehensive system of speculative physics" (Rees 1986, 418). For (2) Bacon combined his particular version of Paracel cosmology with Islamic astrokinesis (especially in Alpetragius [al-Bitruji]; see Zinner 1988, 71). The Chemical World System was used to support Bacon's interpretation of celestial motion in the face of contemporary astronomical problems (Rees 1975b, 161f.). Thus there are two parts in Bacon's Instauratio, which hint at the pattern of their own interpretation.
Bacon's speculative cosmology and theory of matter have been planned to form Part 5 of instauratio Magna. The proposed theories refer to atomism in an eclectic manner, criticizing Aristotle and Copernicus, but also involving Galileo, Paracelsus, William Gilbert, Tyracio, and Arabic astronomy.
For Bacon, "magic" was classified as applied science, and he usually classified "science" under pure science and technology. It is never equated with black magic because it represents "the ultimate legal power over nature" (Rees 2000, 66). While MAGIA connected to the science of Bacon on the 16th and 17th centuries, it was still the form of knowledge in order to translate them into action. In this case, however, knowledge is no longer based entirely on formal proofs.
Bacon's cosmological system—the result of thought experiments and speculations, but not proved by induction—presupposes a finite universe, a geocentric omnipotent, which means that the earth is passive and made up of tangible matter. The rest of the universe is made up of active or pneumatic things. The Earth's interior and tangible matter are covered by the Earth's crust, separating it from the pneumatic paradise, while the area between the Earth and the "upper layer of air" allows pneumatic and tangible matter to mix, which is the origin of organic matter and non-organic phenomena. Bacon speaks here of the "possessed spirit" (Rees 1986, 418-20), otherwise he assumes four free spirits: air and earth fire, referring to the underground realm; and aether and stellar fire, related to the celestial realm. Ether is interpreted as the medium through which planets move around the center of the Earth. Air and ether, as well as non-combustible objects containing water, belong to the first group of substances of bacon or mercury quaternions.
Earth fire is a weak variant of stellar fire; it binds to oily matter and sulfur, for which bacon introduces sulfur quaternion. These quaternions contain opposing properties: air and aether with fire and stellar fire. The struggle between these qualities is determined by the distance of the Earth as the absolute center of the world system. As the fires of The Earth and stars get stronger, the air and ether become weaker and weaker. The theory of quaternions functioned in Bacon's thought as a constructive element constituting his own theory of planetary motion and the theory of general physics. This theory differs from all other contemporary approaches, although Bacon states that "it is possible to assume that many theories about heaven are very consistent with phenomena, but differ from each other" (Bacon IV [1901], 104). The circadian movement of the world system (9th realm) is driven by compassion; it carries the sky around the earth to the west. Stellar fires are powerful, so stars move rapidly (stars complete their orbit in 24 hours). Since the closer the stellar fire is to the Earth, the weaker it burns, so the lower planets move more slowly and unevenly than the higher ones (so that bacon, like Alpeterages, explained the irregular planetary motion without reference to Ptolemy's current theory). He applied his theory of consensual motion universally to physics (e.g., wind and tides) and thus clashed with Gilbert's theory of interstellar vacuum and Galileo's theory of tides (for Bacon, the cycle of tides depended on the diurnal motion of the Earth). Heaven, but for Galileo, is in the motion of the earth).
Through quaternion theory, we see that, in the final analysis, Bacon was not a mechanistic philosopher. His theory of matter underwent an important shift toward "form", which we now classify as biological or life sciences rather than physics. Bacon distinguished between non-psychotropic substances and psychotropic substances. The latter, also known as "subtle matter" or "spirit," is more reminiscent of Leibniz's "monad" than mechanically defined, materially, and spatially determined atoms. The soul is seen as an active promoter of phenomena; they are endowed with "appetite" and "perception" (Bacon I [1889], 320–21: Historia Vitae et Mortis; see also V, 63: Sylva Sylvarum, IX: "It is certain that all bodies, although they have no meaning, have perception: for when one body is applied to another, there is a choice to embrace what is pleasant, and exclude or exclude or expel ungrateful").
These spirits never rest. In The New Organism, Bacon rejected "the existence of eternal and unchanging atoms and the reality of nothingness" (Kargon 1966, 47). Thus, in bacon's semi-Paracel cosmological sense, his new concept of matter is "close to that of a chemist" (Rees 2000, 65-69). The attentive natural philosopher tried to uncover the secrets of nature step by step; thus, he said of his method: "I propose the establishment of a gradual stage of certainty" (Bacon IV [1901], 40: Novum Organum, preface). This points to his inductive procedure and his tabular approach, which is a complex pattern of exclusion induction. This is necessary because nature hides her secrets. In his Maxim XIX in the first volume of his Novum Organum, Bacon writes:
There are only two ways to search for and discover the truth. A man flies from sensations and details to the most general axioms, from which its truth is fixed and unshakable, and then makes judgments and discovers intermediate axioms. This approach is now very popular. The other derives axioms from sensations and details, rising through gradual and uninterrupted ascents, so that it finally reaches the most general axioms. This is the real method, but has not yet been tried. (Bacon IV [1901], 50)
The laws of nature that Bacon intended to discover through his new method were expressed in "form", in which "uninterrupted ascent" reached its peak. Through these forms, natural philosophers understand the general causes of phenomena (Kargon 1966, 48). In order to learn more about the secret workings of nature, Bacon concluded that atomism could not provide an adequate explanation for "really existing particles" (Bacon IV [1901], 126: Novum Organum, II.viii) because he considered the invariance of matter and the void (two necessary assumptions of atomism) to be untenable. His language shifted from the language of Greek physics to the usage of contemporary chemists. This is because his insight needs to be "scrutinized", because our senses are too coarse for the complexity and refinement of nature, so this method must make up for the lack of direct comprehension. Only methods lead to an understanding of nature: in Sylva Sylvarum, Century I.98 Bacon explicitly addresses the asymmetrical relationship between the natural tools of man (i.e., the senses) and the complexity of its structure and functioning.
Bacon distinguishes between "living" or living spirits, which are continuous, consisting of matter similar to fire, cut off from inanimate or inanimate spirits, cut off and similar to air: spirits interact with crude matter through chemical processes (Bacon IV, 195-6 (Novum Organum, II.xl)). These spirits have two different desires: self-proliferation and the attraction of the spirit of the same kind. According to Kargon (1966, 51):
Bacon's later theory of matter was one of the interactions between the visible part of matter and the unconscious material spirit, and the two were physically mixed.
Spirits interact with substances that are the means of medicinal juices, colliquation, and other non-mechanistic processes, making Bacon's scientific paradigm different from Descartes' philosophy of the theory of the mechanics of matter (1644), which presupposes extensive spatial movement. Thus, Bacon's theory of matter is closely related to his speculative philosophy:
The difference between tangible and pneumatic substances is the pivot at which the entire speculative system turns. (Rees 1996, 125; Paracelsus has said that knowledge exists in objects: see Shell 2004, 32)
Bacon's theory of matter is more particle-like than atomism in its final version (Clericuzio 2000, 78). The particles of bacon are semen: they are endowed with power that makes various movements possible and allows the production of all possible forms. These spirits constitute Bacon's theory of matter. As matter, fine matter made up of particles, formed by the combination of air and fire, as we have seen, they can be inanimate or inanimate. Bacon thus hints at the presence of particles and chemical chains:
<col>
Inanimate objects
→
Pioneering spirit
vegetable
Inanimate + living spirit
animal
A vibrant spirit
No wonder Bacon's spirit was essential to his physiological conception:
The Spirit of Life regulates all plant functions of plants and animals. The organs responsible for these functions, such as digestion, assimilation, etc., seem to act through perception, only in response to local stimuli, but these responses are coordinated by the life force. These functions come from the air-flame constitution of the spirit. The spirit has the softness of the air to receive impressions and the vitality of fire to spread its actions. (Reese in OFB VI, 202-3)
This physiological level of Bacon's natural philosophy was influenced by his semi-Paracel cosmology (on Paracelsus, see Müller-Jahncke 1985, 67-88), and Rees and Upton (1984, 20-1) reconstructed the Instauratio Magna from the extant part. Therefore, Bacon's theory of "quaternions" must be considered in detail.
Bacon's speculative system was based on a mixture of different sources that provided him with seminal ideas: for example, atomism, Aristotleism, Arabic astronomy, Copernican theory, Galileo's discoveries, the works of Paracelsus and Gilbert. In his theory, he combined astronomy, referring to Alpetragius (cf. Dijksterhuis 1956, 237-43; Rees and Upton 1984, 26; Gaukroger, 2001, 172-5; See also Grant 1994, 533-66, for a discussion of Cosmology and Chemistry (Rees 1975a, 84-5):
[i]t parts are designed to accommodate kinematic skeletons and to generally explain the irregularities of planetary motion as a result of the chemical makeup of the universe. (Reese 1975b, 94)
Bacon had no explanation for planetary regression and saw the universe as a finite geocentric-centered plenum in which earth consisted of two forms of matter (tangible and pneumatic). Earth has a tangible interior and is in contact with the surrounding universe, but through an intermediate region. This area exists between the crust and the purely pneumatic paradise; it goes into the crust for miles and into the air for miles. In this region, gaseous matter is mixed with tangible matter, resulting in "possessed spirits", which must be distinguished from "free spirits" outside of tangible objects. Bacon's four free spirits are related to his "quaternion theory":
- Air
– Ether
Under the moon
Heavenly
– Earth fire
– Stellar fire
Planets orbit the Earth in the aether (a thin air), which belongs to the "mercury quaternion": it includes bodies of water and mercury. Earth fire is a weakened form of stellar fire. It is associated with oily substances and sulfur, constituting a "sulfur tetranym". Two quaternions are opposed to each other: air/ether and fire/stellar fire. As the flames of the Earth and stars become more vigorous, the air and the ether lose their power—the sulfur and mercury of bacon are not principles in the paracelsus sense, but just natural matter. Bacon excludes the Paracelsian principle of salt, and this substance, which works only in the underground realm, is for him a natural compound of sulfur and mercury (Rees and Upton, 1984, 25).
Bacon applied his quaternion theory to his cosmology, which is very different from other contemporary systems (Rees 2000, 68):
Day and night movements turn the sky around the Earth to the west;
Under the powerful stellar fire (i.e., the principle of celestial motion), motion is rapid: the orbit of the star occurs within twenty-four hours;
Under the fire of weaker stars—closer to Earth—the planets move more slowly and more erratically.
Bacon tried to conceive of a unified physics, and he rejected the different modes of motion of the super-moon and sub-moon worlds (Bacon I [1889], 329). He did not believe in the existence of (crystallized) spheres, nor did he believe in the analogy between macroscopic and microscopic. He radically revised Paracels's thinking. He refused to establish his theoretical foundations in the Bible and paid no attention to the tendencies of mysticism and Hermeticism (Reese 1975b, 90-1). But he extended the explanatory power of quaternions to Earth phenomena such as wind and tides.
The two systems of Bacon are closely linked:
System 1: (two quaternions) explains and encompasses the cosmological aspects of his natural philosophy. System 2: (Theory of Matter) explains Earth's nature, that is, it "deals with the multifaceted changes in the animal, plant, and mineral kingdoms of celestial bodies and the earth's inner boundary" (Rees 1996, 130; these two tables are taken from Rees).
System 2 relies on System 1 because the interpretation of Earth's things is subordinated to the interpretation of the cosmological level. The table for System 2 shows Bacon's theory of matter. His theory of quaternions is related to system 1. System 2 is explained by "intermediates", which combine the properties of an item in one quaternion with the properties of an item in another quaternion.
Bacon's system is constructed in a clear symmetrical way: each quaternion has four segments, for a total of eight, and there are four types of intermediates. Therefore, the system distinguishes a total of twelve segments. He wanted to explain all natural phenomena through this instrument:
<col style="width: 88px;">
Two quaternions
Quaternion of sulfur
Tetratons of mercury
Tangible matter (with spirit attached)
Sulfur (underground)
Mercury (underground)
Oils and oily flammable substances (land)
Water and "crude" non-flammable substances (land)
Pneumatic substances
Ground Fire (Underground)
Air (secondary lungs)
Stellar Fire (Planet)
Ether (medium of the planets)
Theory of matter
Intermediates
Salt (underground and organic)
Flora and fauna sap
Attached living and inanimate souls (in the visible body)
A paradise of stars
Ether (medium of planets)
There are two main intermediates:
Fire gas intermediates
↓
"Attached" to the living spirit
Inanimate souls
Only in the living
In all tangible objects, including living bodies
Bacon's theory of binary quaternions necessarily involves the world under the moon and the world on the moon. Despite Thema Coeli (1612; see Bacon V [1889], 547–59) first mentions quaternion theory, but he provides a summary in his Novum Organum (Bacon II [1887], 50):
Chemists have not mistakenly observed sulfur and mercury throughout the universe in their three basic principles... Of the two, one of the most pervasive consents in nature seems to be observable. Because there is consistency between sulfur, oil and greasy exhalations, flames, and perhaps stars. The same is true between mercury, water and water vapor, air, and perhaps pure inner ethers. However, these two great tribes of quaternions or things (each within its own range) vary greatly in number and density of matter, but dovetail very well in configuration. (Bacon IV [1901], 242-3; see also V [1889], 205-6; for tables of two quaternions and Bacon's theory of matter, see Rees 1996, 126, 137;) Rees 2000, 68-9）
Bacon saw his cosmological worldview as an anticipatory system that could be revised in the light of further scientific findings based on inductive methods (Rees 1975b, 171). It is primarily a qualitative system that has nothing to do with mathematical astronomers and Paracel chemists. Thus, it emphasizes that in his general system of science, physics takes precedence over mathematics.
Bacon's two quaternions and his theory of matter provided a speculative framework for his thought, which was open to the future acquisition of knowledge and its application of technology. His Neo-Atlantis can be understood as a text somewhere between his inductive theory and his speculative philosophy (Klein 2003c; Price 2002).
It is important to remember that Bacon's speculative system was his way out of the predicament, which made it impossible for him to complete his Instauratio Magna. His turn to speculation can only be explained as an intellectual anticipation in the intermediate stages of the history of science, when there was still a great deal of research to be done, so that the empirical theory could neither be established nor fully guaranteed. Thus, speculation in the bacon sense can be seen as a preliminary means of explaining the secrets of nature before methodical research catches up with our speculations. For "scientific people", speculative positions are still a relative intermediate process.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="172" >4</h1>
Bacon's major work, The Great Revival, was published in 1620 under the title Franciscus de Verulamio Summi Angliae Cancellaris Instauratio magna. This great work is still a fragment, as Bacon can only complete part of the plan outline. The volume is composed of a general speech introduced by Prooemium, which is given for the purpose, followed by a dedication to the King (James I) and a preface, which is all "a summary of the directions, patterns, and meaning of his life, work" (Sessions 1996, 71). After that, Bacon printed Outauratio's plan and then turned to the strategy of his research plan, namely Novum Organum Scientiarum. A total of 1620 books constitute the second part of the second part of the second part of instauratio, of which the first part is represented by the first book of De Augmentis and the progress of learning. When Bacon organized his Instauratio, he divided it into six parts, which reminds contemporary readers of God's six-day work, like Guillaume Du Bartas (La Sepmaine, ou Création du Monde, 1579, transl. 1605) and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (Heptaplus, 1489).
Bacon saw nature as a labyrinth whose operation could not be explained entirely by "wit" and "repetition of accidental experiments":
Our steps must be guided by clues and look at what must be done from the way we first perceive a definitive plan. (Bacon IV [1901], 18)
Bacon's work plan is as follows (Bacon IV [1901], 22):
Science department.
New Olgañon; or instructions on the interpretation of nature.
Cosmic phenomena; or the natural and experimental history that underpins philosophy.
The ladder of intelligence.
Forerunner; or the anticipation of a new philosophy.
New philosophy; or active science.
Part 1 contains a general description of the sciences, including their divisions in the Bacon era. Here he aims to distinguish between what has been invented and what is known, in contrast to "what should exist is omitted" (Bacon IV [1901], 23). This section can be taken from The Advancement of Learning (1605) and a revised and enlarged version of De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum (1623).
Part 2 developed Bacon's new method of scientific investigation, Novum Organum, which transcended intelligence over ancient art, and thus made a radical revision of the method of knowledge; but it also introduced a new epistemology and a new ontology. Bacon called his new art "interpreting nature," a logic of study that transcends ordinary logic, as his science aimed at three inventions: art (not argumentation), principle (not something based on principle), and names and descriptions of works (not very likely causes). The effect Bacon sought was to direct nature in action, not to defeat opponents in arguments. The new tool is only partially instauratio Magna which is close to completion.
Part 3 will contain a record of natural and experimental history or cosmic phenomena. According to De Augmentis Scientarum (Bacon IV [1901], 275), natural history is divided into narrative and inductive, the latter of which is considered "to serve and exist for the sake of establishing philosophy". These functional histories support human memory and provide research with materials, or factual knowledge of nature, that must be certain and reliable. Naturalism takes and emphasizes the subtleties of nature or the complexity of its structure, rather than the complexity of philosophical systems, as they arise from human thought. Bacon saw this part of Instauratio Magna as the basis for reconstructing science to produce physical and metaphysical knowledge. In this context, nature is studied under experimental conditions, not only in the sense of the history of the body, but also as the history of virtue or primitive passion, referring to material desires (Rees 1975a). Bacon considered this knowledge to be in preparation for Part 6, second philosophy or active science, for which he gave only one example, Historia Ventorum (1622); but—writing six typical natural histories according to his plan—he also wrote Historia vitae et mortis (1623) and Historia densi, which remained in the manuscript. The text that develops the ideas of Part 3 is called Parasceve ad Historiam Naturalem et Experimentalem.
Part 4, which Bacon called the Ladder of Intelligence or Scala Intellectus, was intended to serve as a link between the natural history approach and the second philosophical/active scientific approach. It contains not only fragments of Filum labyrinthi (Bacon III [1887], 493–504), but also Abecedarium nouum naturae (OFB XIII, xxi), which is planned as Section 4, "[To] Show the Whole Thought Process" (OFB XIII, xxii). Filum labyrinthi is similar but not identical to Cogitata et Visa. Bacon talks about himself in the tone of an author, reflecting on the current state of science and drawing from the gaps and inadequacies within the disciplinary system the construction of his research plan: future science should be examined, and sciences that go further should be discovered. The focus must be on new issues (not on arguments). Superstition, fanatical religion and false authority must be rejected. Just as the Fall was not caused by natural knowledge, but by the moral knowledge of good and evil, the knowledge of natural philosophy was a contribution to Bacon's contribution to the magnification of God's glory, and in this way it became apparent to pray for scientific knowledge for his growth.
Part 5 deals with the precursors or expectations of a new philosophy, with Bacon emphasizing that Instauratio Magna's "big machine" takes a lot of time to complete. It is expected to be a method of scientific reasoning without resorting to the methods proposed in Novum Organum. At the same time, he studied his speculative system, thus processing and completing parts of his second philosophy: De Fluxu et Refluxu Maris and Thema Coeli. For this part of the Great Revival, the text of the plan draws philosophical conclusions from a collection of facts that are not yet sufficient to use or apply Bacon's method of induction.
Part 6 of the plan contains Bacon's description of the new philosophy as the last part of his great revival; but this plan yields no results, so that this part of the project has no existing text at all.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="189" >5</h1>
Bacon had already discussed his scientific method in his early book Cogitata et Visa (1607), which was famous for inductive methods. He rejected the syllogism approach and defined his alternative program as "collecting information from things and bringing it into understanding through slow and faithful toil" (Farrington 1964, 89). Later, when he developed his method in detail, i.e. in his Novum Organum (1620), he still noticed it
[of] Inductive logicians seem to have given little serious consideration, but they ignored it with a slight attention and quickly moved into the formula of debate. On the contrary, I reject the proof of syllogism... (Bacon IV [1901], 24)
Bacon's method appears as his conceptual plot,
Applies to all stages of knowledge, and the whole process must be kept in mind at each stage. (Malkheb 1996, 76)
Induction means rising to the axioms, as well as descending to work, and therefore getting new details out of the axioms, and getting out of these new axioms. Induction begins with perceptual experience and moves through natural history (providing sensory data as a guarantee) to lower axioms or propositions derived from apparent appearances or conceptual abstractions. Bacon does not equate experience with everyday experience, but assumes that the method corrects the sensory material and expands it into facts that he establishes (tables of presence and absence and tables of comparison or degrees, i.e. absent or present). "Bacon's antipathy to simple enumerations as a universal method of science stemmed first and foremost from his preference for theories dealing with internal physical causes, which could not be observed immediately" (Urbach 1987, 30; cf. § 2). The last type can be supplemented by an inverse instance table, which may indicate an experiment:
The transition from sensibility to reality requires the revision of the senses, the tables of natural history, the abstraction of propositions, and the induction of concepts. In other words, induction needs to be fully implemented. (Malkheb 1996, 85)
However, a series of methodical steps did not end there, as Bacon hypothesized that more general axioms could be deduced from lower axioms (through induction). The whole process must be understood as a chain of connecting parts into a system. From more general axioms, Bacon sought to attain more fundamental laws of nature (formal knowledge) that led to actual deductions as new experiments or works (IV, 24-5). The decisive instrument in this process is the intermediate or "living axiom", which acts as an intermediary between the special and general axioms. For Bacon, induction was only valid if it was excluded by exclusion, which was beyond the scope of simple enumeration induction. Induction helps the human mind find a way to determine true knowledge.
Novum Organum, I, Aphorism CXV (Bacon IV [1901], 103) ends the "pull-down" of "signs and causes of error" in science, which is achieved through three rebuttals that constitute an introduction to the conditional approach of reason: a rebuttal to the "rationality of natural man" (idol); a rebuttal of "argument" (syllogism) and a rebuttal of "theory" (traditional philosophical system).
The second part of Novum Organum deals with Bacon's interpretation of the rules of nature, even though he does not provide a complete or universal theory. He did so by introducing his discovery sheet (Inst. Magna, IV), showing an example of a detail ( Inst. Magna , II) and Observations on History ( Inst. Magna, III) contributed to the new philosophy. It was well known that he had worked hard in the last five years of his life to make progress in his natural history, and he knew that he could not always meet the standards of legitimate interpretation.
Bacon's method presupposes a dual starting point: experience and reason. If we want to advance from lower certainty to higher freedom, and from lower freedom to higher certainty, we gain true knowledge. Bacon's rules of certainty and freedom are consistent with his negation of Aristotle's old logic, which determines true propositions through criteria of generality, essence, and universality. Bacon rejected anticiptatio naturae ("expectation of nature") in favor of interpreting nature ("interpretation of nature"), starting with the collection of facts and their methodical (inductive) investigations, avoiding entanglement in pure taxonomy (as in Latinism), which established the order of things (Urbach 1987, 26; see also Foucault 1966 [1970]) but did not produce knowledge. For Bacon, to make is to know, to know is to make (Bacon IV [1901], 109-10). According to the "Command Nature ... By obeying her" (Sessions 1996, 136; Gaukroger 2001, 139ff.) maxim, which must exclude superstition, deception, error and confusion. Bacon introduced variation in the "intellectual tradition of the maker", as the discovery of a given natural form led him to develop methods of acquiring factual and verified knowledge.
Bacon objected to the "expectation of nature," which he saw as a conservative approach that led to theory restating the data without producing new data that favored the growth of knowledge. In addition, these theories are considered final and therefore will never be replaced.
"Expectation of nature" is similar to "traditionalism" (Urbach 1987, 30-41), according to which theory refers to unobservable entities (e.g., atoms, this round). These theories are "computational rules" or "inference licenses" within this given framework, which interpret and predict specific types of observable events. The conventional acceptance of predicting future events is inseparable from the question of probability. Bacon's process of acquiring knowledge runs counter to "conventionalism" because "anticipation of nature" does not reject authority and ultimate speculation about "unobservable", and because it allows for "temporary adjustment". But now,
Philosophers will not accept the idea that just because we cannot directly observe something... So there is no such thing. （Huggett 2010, 82。 See also Von Weizsäcker and Juilfs 1958, pp. 67-70; Rae 1986 [2000], 1-27 and passim
The traditional deep theory of the world is chosen from alternative methods of observing phenomena. Although theories that reveal the structure of the world cannot be directly proved or refuted by observation or experiment, the conventionists may insist on the theory of their choice even in the face of disproof. Thus, they avoided a change in theory. Any move to a new theory is not based on new evidence, but on the fact that the new theory seems simpler, more applicable, or more beautiful. The laws of nature are generally considered unmodified (O'Hear 1995, 165). The famous debates about paradigm and non-paradigm science and theory sparked by Thomas Kuhn are related to this. Bacon's position—open to scientific progress—was closer to Kuhn than to Duhen or Poincaré. For Bacon, the "expectation of nature" (as a model of "traditionalism") created an obstacle to the progress of knowledge. Traditional methods avoid speculating about things that are not immediately visible; however, Bacon's speculation is an element of "explaining nature." He presupposes hypothetical theories, but these theories do not go beyond the data collected. His acceptance of assumptions is related to his refusal to accept assumptions about "expectations of nature." Thus, the hypothesis relates to the axiom of "interpreting nature" beyond the original data. The number of established facts differs from the number of possible data (Gillies 1998, 307). Expectations are rejected only if it "flies from sensation and detail to the most general axioms" (OFB XI, xxv). Because of the danger of premature generalization, Bacon was cautious about speculation and firmly rejected any dogmatic defense of speculation and a tendency to claim that speculation was correct.
...... The philosophies we now possess cling to certain creeds (if we study them carefully) and they fully hope that people will think that there is nothing difficult, that there is nothing really powerful and influential on nature, that should be expected from art or human endeavor; [...] These things, if we examine them carefully, are entirely inclined to the evil limits of human power and a deliberate, unnatural despair, which not only obfuscates the omens of hope, but also destroys every nerve and stimulus of industry, and abandons the opportunities offered by experience itself—though they care only with the fact that their art is considered perfect, they have expended their efforts to obtain the most foolish and bankrupt glory, Because it believes that nothing that has not been discovered or understood so far cannot be discovered or understood in the future. (OFB XI, 141)
Bacon saw nature as an extremely subtle complexity that provided the full energy of a natural philosopher to reveal her secrets.
For him, the new axioms must be larger and broader than the material from which they come. At the same time, "explaining nature" cannot jump to distant axioms. In his approach, he rejects the idea of generality as a simple abstraction of very few sensory perceptions. This abstract word can serve as a convention for organizing "new observations," but only as a means of classifying order. This meaningless procedure has nothing to do with "natural interpretation", which is not final or infallible, and is based on the insight that confirmation assumptions do not provide rigorous evidence. Bacon's method therefore has the characteristics of openness:
Nevertheless, I am not sure that nothing can be added to the prescriptions I prescribe; on the contrary, as a man who observes not only the inner faculties of the mind but also its grasp of things, I firmly believe that the art of discovery grows with the number of things discovered. (OFB, XI, 197)
Peter Urbach's comments underscore Bacon's openness:
He believes that theory should be advanced to explain any data available in a particular field. These theories are best focused on potential physical, causal mechanisms, and should go beyond the data that produced them anyway. They are then tested by coming up with new predictions that, if verified empirically, may confirm the theory and may eventually make it certain, at least in a sense that is difficult to deny. (Urbach 1987, 49)
Bacon was not a 17th-century Popper. Instead, due to his inductive theory, he is:
The first great experimentalist theorist" ": "The function of experimentation is to test theories and establish facts" (Reese, in OFB XI, xli).
Encyclopedic repetition with Aristotle tendencies is being replaced by primitive compilations, in which respect for authority was irrelevant. Individual knowledge is being replaced by collective research. The protection of traditional knowledge is a new, discarded function of the realization of natural history, which requires Tunguska-things to be read and can be replaced by the basic materials that will form a radical attempt to improve the material conditions of mankind. (Rees, at OFB XI, xlii)
For Bacon, form was a structural component of a natural entity, or a key to its truth and operation, and therefore it approached the laws of nature and could not be reduced to causation. This is all the more important because Bacon, who seeks only the necessary and sufficient causes for his results, rejects Aristotle's four reasons (four explanations for his complete understanding of a phenomenon) on the grounds that the distribution, form, efficiency, and purposeful causes of matter do not function well, and that they fail to advance science (especially ultimate, efficient, and material causes). Consider again the paragraph quoted in Section 3.3:
There are only two ways to search for and discover the truth. A person flies from sensation and detail to the most general axioms, and from these principles it considers to be fixed and unshakable truths, continues to judge and discover intermediate axioms. This approach is now very popular. The other derives axioms from sensations and details, and through gradual, uninterrupted ascension, eventually reaches the most general axioms. This is the real method, but has not yet been tried. (Bacon IV [1901], 50: Novum Organum, I, Maxim XIX).
Because for Bacon, the formal necessity of syllogism was not sufficient to establish the first principle, his approach consisted of two basic tasks: (1) the discovery of forms, and (2) the transformation of concrete objects. From every case of occurrence and motion, it is found that it refers to an underlying process, according to which the efficient material cause leads to the form; but also the latent structure of stationary and non-moving objects (Bacon IV [1901], 119-20).
Bacon's use of a new model of human understanding meant working to achieve a parallel relationship between human power and the construction of human knowledge. Technical know-how leads to successful operations, which are combined with the discovery of forms (Pérez-Ramos 1988, 108; Bacon IV [1901], 121）。 Understanding the workings of nature is premised on a series of facts, which makes it possible to investigate and analyze causality, especially through new experiments. At this point the idea of scientia operativa reappears, because the direction of the truly perfect rules of operation is parallel to the discovery of the true form. Bacon-specific non-Aristotle's Aristotleism (Pérez-Ramos 1988, 113, 115) is one of the main features of his theory. In addition to Aristotle's revised version, Bacon's other indispensable influences were the rigorously evaluated Hermeticism, Rhetoric (Vickers), and Alchemy (Reese).
The two axioms correspond to the following divisions of philosophy and science: the study of form or metaphysics; and the study of effective causes and matter, which lead to potential processes and configurations in physics. Bacon divided physics itself into mechanics (i.e., practice) and magic (i.e., metaphysics).
Today, Bacon's view that "he had little first-hand contribution to science" (Hesse 1964, 152) no longer has to assume that the "status of assumptions and mathematics" in his work is undervalued (Urban 1987; 1999, 139; Rees 1986). But in the past few doubted bacon that he "encouraged detailed and methodical experimentation" (Hesse 1964, 152); he did so because of his new inductive approach, which meant the need to negate examples and refute experiments. Bacon argues that confirming examples is not sufficient to analyze the structure of the laws of science, because the task presupposes a hypothetical deductive system that, according to Lisa Jardine, is related to "the logical and linguistic context on which Bacon's new logic is based... ” (Sessions 1999, 140;
Bacon's interpretation of nature uses "table of examples and arrangements of examples" about the natural phenomena studied, which is necessary to crack a valid causal code. His instances of privilege are not simply taken from natural examples or phenomena, but rather imply information with inductive potential that, when inserted into tables, shows precedence in favor of knowledge or methodological relevance. Examples do not represent the order of sensible things, but the order in which they express nature (properties). These qualities provide the basis for work on an order of an abstract nature. Bacon's tables have a dual function: they are important to natural history, collecting data on bodies and virtues in nature; they are also indispensable for the generalization of these data.
In Temporis Partus Masculus (1603), Bacon had already demonstrated the "shrewd observational power" of his inductive thought (Sessions 1999, 60). In his Novum Organum, he argues that the essence of all human science and knowledge is to proceed most safely through denial and exclusion, rather than affirmation and inclusion. Even in his early pamphlets, Bacon was well aware that he had to seek a way to discover the right form, the most famous of which was heat (Novum Organum II, Aph. Thompson). XI-XII) or "famous forms of heat" (Rees 2000, 66; see Bacon IV [1901], 154-5).
In his "Methods of Exclusion Analysis" (Sessions 1999, 141), negation proved to be "one of Bacon's most powerful contributions to the modern scientific method" (Wright 1951, 152). The most important is his degree table and exclusion table. They are needed to discover the cause, especially for the supreme cause known as the form. Induction is carried out in two stages:
Learning experiences from known to unknown must be gained, and tables (presence, alibi, degrees) must be established before they can be interpreted according to the exclusion principle. After judging and analyzing the three tables first shown, Bacon announced that the first vintage or the first version of the interpretation of nature was coming to an end.
The second phase of the method focuses on the exclusion process. The aim of this program is to reduce the empirical characteristics of experience in order to analyze convergence with the anatomy of things. The presence and absence tables are also set here. Appropriate research work involves looking for a relationship between the two properties. Here, exclusion plays a role in determining the process. Bacon's method proceeds from material decisions, in the form of establishing a real cause, but does not stop there, since it aims to gradually generalize the cause. Here, the core element of induction is the exclusion procedure.
The form, as the end result of an orderly procedure, is:
They are nothing more than the laws and regulations that govern and constitute any simple and absolute reality of nature, such as heat, light, and weight, in all kinds of matter and the subjects affected by them (Bacon IV [1901], 145-6);
They are different from the laws of nature, but are identical to the simple properties (elements) or definitions of the final components of the things that make up the basic material structure (Gaukroger 2001, 140). Form is a structure made up of elements in nature (microphysics). This evokes cross-references to Bacon's atomism, which has been called the "constructivist component" of his system (Pérez-Ramos 1988, 116), including an alchemical theory of fundamental material species. His goal is to "understand the basic structure of things ... As a means of transforming nature for human ends" (Gaukroger 2001, 140; Clericuzio 2000, 78ff.); thus he "ended" the unfinished Novelu Organum listing what still needs to be done, or the phenomena that are important and indispensable to future natural history.
Historians of science who favor mathematical physics have criticized Bacon's approach, pointing out that "Bacon's concept of science, as inductive science, has nothing to do with, and even contradicts, today's form of science" (Malherbe 1996, 75). In reaching this conclusion, however, they overlook the fact that natural philosophy based on the theory of matter cannot be evaluated on the basis of natural philosophy or science based on mechanics-based disciplines. One can interpret this long-standing pattern of misunderstanding as a sample of the paradigm fallacy (Gaukroger 2001, 134ff.; see Rees 1986）。
Bacon's basic insight was that facts could not be collected from nature, but must be composed of methodical procedures that scientists must put into practice to determine the empirical basis for inductive generalizations. His induction, based on the collection, comparison and exclusion of the factual nature of things and their internal structures, proved to be a revolutionary achievement in natural philosophy that did not exist in classical antiquity. His scala intellectus has two opposite movements "up and down: from axioms to experimentation and opera and back again" (Pérez-Ramos 1988, 236). Bacon's inductive method is interpreted and conceived as a tool or method of discovery. Above all, his emphasis on negative examples of inductive procedures themselves is of high importance in terms of knowledge acquisition and is hailed as innovative by scholars of our time. Some found in Bacon Carl Popper's pioneering approach to counterfeiting. Finally, it is undeniable that Bacon's inductive procedure consisted of deductive and abstract aspects based on negation and exclusion. Contemporary scholars praise him for pioneering inductive theory. Since the 1970s, this theory has been more respected than it has been for a long time before (see Rees, Gaukroger, and Pérez-Ramos, 1988, 201-85). Nevertheless, Bacon's critics were associated with the tradition of positivism and analytic philosophy, and it is doubtful that they acquired enough knowledge of his writings to provide a solid basis for their criticisms (Cohen 1970, 124–34; Cohen 1985, 58ff.; For general questions on the induction, see, e.g., Hempel 1966; Swinburne (ed.) 1974; Lambert and Brittan 1979 [1987]). A more recent and in-depth assessment of his work than the neglect of Bacon in the 20th century is related to the Oxford Francis Bacon project, which was initiated by Graham Rees in the late 1990s and which he directed until his death in 2009; it is now edited by Brian Vickers. Sufficient knowledge was acquired to provide a solid basis for their criticism (Cohen 1970, 124–34; Cohen 1985, 58ff.; for general questions of induction, see Hempel 1966; Swinburne (ed.) 1974; Lambert and Brittan 1979 [1987]）。 A more recent and in-depth assessment of his work than the neglect of Bacon in the 20th century is related to the Oxford Francis Bacon project, which was initiated by Graham Rees in the late 1990s and which he directed until his death in 2009; it is now edited by Brian Vickers. Acquired sufficient knowledge of his writings to provide a reliable basis for their criticism (Cohen 1970, 124–34; Cohen 1985, 58ff.; for general questions of induction, see Hempel 1966; Swinburne (ed.) 1974; Lambert and Brittan 1979 [1987]）。 A more recent and in-depth assessment of his work than the neglect of Bacon in the 20th century is related to the Oxford Francis Bacon project, which was initiated by Graham Rees in the late 1990s and directed the project until his death in 2009; it is now edited by Brian Vickers. A more recent and in-depth assessment of his work than the neglect of Bacon in the 20th century is related to the Oxford Francis Bacon project, which was initiated by Graham Rees in the late 1990s and which he directed until his death in 2009; it is now edited by Brian Vickers. A more recent and in-depth assessment of his work than the neglect of Bacon in the 20th century is related to the Oxford Francis Bacon project, which was initiated by Graham Rees in the late 1990s and which he directed until his death in 2009; it is now edited by Brian Vickers.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="229" >6</h1>
In Bacon's thought, we encounter the relationship between science and social philosophy, as his ideas about social utopian transformation presuppose the integration of his social framework for the two forms of natural philosophy and technology as forms of knowledge for the maker. From his point of view, influenced by Puritan ideas, early modern societies must ensure that the losses caused by the Fall are compensated, mainly through the expansion of human knowledge, providing preconditions for new social forms combined with new sciences. and the Millennium, according to the prophecy of Daniel 12:4 (Hill 1971, 85-130). Science as a social endeavor is seen as a collective project to improve the social fabric. On the other hand, a strong collective spirit in society may be a sine qua non. Reform of natural philosophy. Bacon's famous argument that it is wise not to confuse the Book of Nature with the Book of God, since the latter involves God's will (which is inconceivable to man), while the former deals with God's work, and its scientific interpretation or appreciation is a form of Christian worship. The successful functioning of natural philosophy and technology has helped to improve the fate of mankind and make life hard and obsolete after the Fall. It is important to note that Bacon's conception of Christian society—in a way—is by no means the Christian pessimism of the godfather thinkers, but rather a distinct optimism as a result of compounding the question of truth with the scope of humanity. Freedom and sovereignty (Brandt 1979, 21).
Two books about Bacon—the Book of God and the Book of Nature—one must bear in mind that when one is free to read the Book of Nature, one should not be content to simply read it. He also had to find out the name of the thing. If man does this, not only will he be restored to the position of a noble and powerful being, but the Book of God will also lose its importance from a traditional point of view compared to the Book of Nature. This is what Blumenberg calls "the asymmetry of readability" (Blumenberg 1981, 86-107). But the process of reading is an open activity in which the expansion of new systems of knowledge and disciplines is no longer limited by concepts such as the integrity and permanence of knowledge (Klein 2004a, 73).
According to Bacon, the Book of God refers to His will and the Book of Nature refers to His works. He never implies in his work that he withheld any message of unbelief from his seasoned readers. But he stressed: (1) religion and science should be separated, and (2) they are still complementary. For Bacon, theologians' attacks on human curiosity cannot be based on reason. His statement that "all knowledge shall be subject to religious limitations and be called use and action" (Bacon III [1887], 218) does not express a general judgment of theoretical curiosity, but rather provides a normative framework for the task of science in the general sense. Already in his dedication to James I's Progress in Learning, Bacon attacked "the enthusiasm and jealousy of theologians" (Bacon III, 264), and in his 1607 manuscript Labyrinth labyrinth, he "thought ... How great is the opposition and prejudice of superstition to natural philosophy, the blind fanaticism of religion" (Bacon VI [1863], 421). As Calvin did long before he instituted, Bacon said that since God created the physical world, it is the legitimate object of human knowledge, which is his famous example with King Solomon illustrating a belief in academic progress (Zagorin 1999, 49-50; see also Kocher 1953, 27-8). Bacon praised Solomon's wisdom, which seemed more like a game than a human thirst for knowledge:
The glory of God is to conceal one thing, and the glory of the king is to ascertain; as if by the innocent jokes of the children, His Majesty heaven is happy to hide his works and eventually be discovered; and given the great commandments of wisdom and means, there is nothing to hide from them, as if the king had no more honor in this game than to be a playmate of God. (Bacon III [1887], 299; Blumenberg, 1973, 196–200)
From this perspective, the punishment that humanity received as a result of Adam and Eve's first disobedience can be seen from a different perspective than the theological interpretation. In Bacon's view, this disobedience and its consequences can be remedied in two ways: (1) through religious and moral demands, and (2) through the advancement of art and science: "The purpose of advancing art and science is for the glory of God and the relief of man's property" (Wormald 1993, 82).
These two therapies are interrelated with the moral dimension and refer to the progress of learning and religion. These three (learning, religious, and moral advances) are combined in a mutually reinforcing way; thus, in these three areas the limited perspective of dealing with life and knowledge is completely excluded.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="236" >7. Ethical dimensions in Bacon's thought</h1>
The ethical dimension of Bacon's thought has been underestimated by generations of scholars. Time and time again, rough utilitarianism comes from the first book, Aphorism 1 Novum Organum; However, this does not stand up to a more careful analysis of his thoughts. As Bacon's philosophy of science sought to answer the question of how humanity overcomes the defects of earthly life caused by the Fall, he entered the realm of ethical reflection. The use of philosophy and science to improve the destiny of mankind, not from a narrow utilitarianism, purely for the benefit and support of the power or influence of certain people, but with an emphasis on building a better world for humanity, which may exist by determining the truth about the workings of nature (Bacon III [1887], 242). Thus, the prevailing view of Bacon's ethical thought predominates. In its ethical sense, the scope of science and technology extends beyond the field of application of tools and/or instruments, in terms of its goal of transforming the entire system. Since causality and finality can interact on the basis of human will and knowledge, multiple worlds become feasible (Bacon V [1889], 506-7). Moral philosophy and the nature of virtue (habitual or innate?) and the ethical reflection of its relationship between private and collective use in life is closely related. The application of any principle of virtue presupposes Bacon's ideological education so that we understand what is good and what should be achieved (Gaukroger 2006, 204-5 and passim): since causality and finality can interact on the basis of human will and knowledge, multiple worlds become feasible (Bacon V [1889], 506-7). Moral philosophy and the nature of virtue (habitual or innate?) and the ethical reflection of its relationship between private and collective use in life is closely related. The application of any principle of virtue presupposes Bacon's ideological education so that we understand what is good and what should be achieved (Gaukroger 2006, 204-5 and passim): since causality and finality can interact on the basis of human will and knowledge, multiple worlds become feasible (Bacon V [1889], 506-7). Moral philosophy and the nature of virtue (habitual or innate?) and the ethical reflection of its relationship between private and collective use in life is closely related. Any application of the principle of virtue presupposes Bacon's ideological education so that we understand what is good and what should be attained (Gaukroger 2006, 204-5 and passim):
The primary and original divisions of moral knowledge seem to be divided into models or platforms of the good, as well as cultural systems of the mind; one describes the nature of the good, and the other prescribes how to conquer, apply, and adapt the will of man (Bacon III [1887], 419).
Thus, Bacon had already studied the nature of the good and distinguished between the various good in his study progress. He insisted on personal responsibility to the public. Private moral self-control and the obligations that come with it are related to behavior and action in society. A person's moral personality is linked to morality by reference to acceptable behavior. While there may be a limit to what we can do, we must mobilize our mental strength and control our passions when dealing with ourselves and others. We need to apply self-discipline and rational evaluation, while suppressing our passions, in order to live a positive moral life in society.
Thus, for Bacon, the acquisition of knowledge did not simply coincide with the possibility of exercising power. Scientific knowledge is the condition for the expansion and development of civilization. Therefore, knowledge and charity cannot be separated:
I pray humbly... Now that the knowledge in the venom infused by the serpent is being released and the mind is inflated, we may not be wise and sober, but cultivate truth in charity... Finally, I would like to issue a general exhortation to all; they consider what the true purpose of knowledge is, and the purpose of their search for knowledge is not for the pleasure of the heart, not for quarrels, not for superiority over others, not for profit, not for fame, not for power, or anything inferior to them; It is for the good and use of life; and they perfect and manage it in charity. For angels fall from the lust for power, man falls from the desire for knowledge; but benevolence cannot be excessive, and neither angels nor men are in danger (Bacon IV [1901], 20f.: Instauratio Magna, preface).
Finally, Bacon's view of The New Atlantis ,"concerned with a utopian society carefully organized for scientific research and a life of virtue" (Urbach 1988, 10) applies to his life's work. In New Atlantis, social, political, and academic life is organized according to efficiency guidelines; but Solomon House is an independent and highly respected research institution, but it is closely related to the entire system of Ben Salem. In his utopian state, Bacon presented a radical collective life in society and science, both based on the religion of revelation. Religion— essentially Christianity — is not dogmatic, but it instills in the bensalem people reverence for the exemplary members of society and— most importantly— the strictest sense of discipline (Gaukroger 2001, 128–30). Discipline is essential for both those involved in religious life and for researchers, since both must be carried out in an orderly manner. On the one hand, the isomorphic structures of nature and science, society and religion prescribe patterns of political processes, social processes and religious attitudes that overcome any desire for individuality. If both religion and scientific research prove to be true in Bensalem, then, according to Bacon, imagination can serve as a means of illustrating scientific revelation: "Bacon's purpose is ... indicates that scientific research is properly conducted with religious etiquette and social stability..." (Bierman 1963, 497). Bensalem's scientists are sacred explorers of truth: ethics, religion, and science come together. Bacon's parabolic strategy, which we should not separate from the power of idols, allowed him to exploit his tricks of introducing new ideas like a smuggler: his colored goods were smuggled into the minds of his readers by being visualized in sacred and highly symbolic rituals (Peltonen 1996, 175). Science and religion are separate in New Atlantis, but they are also interconnected through the offices of the Ben Salem Society. What Bacon clearly wanted to illustrate to his readers was that Ben Salem's example should free them from the fear that scientific progress would lead to chaos and upheaval. This key point was made by Jürgen Mittelstrass, who understood bacon's colorful goods being figuratively smuggled into the minds of his readers through sacred and highly symbolic rituals (Peltonen 1996, 175). Science and religion are separate in New Atlantis, but they are also interconnected through the offices of the Ben Salem Society. What Bacon clearly wanted to illustrate to his readers was that Ben Salem's example should free them from the fear that scientific progress would lead to chaos and upheaval. This key point was made by Jürgen Mittelstrass, who understood bacon's colorful goods being figuratively smuggled into the minds of his readers through sacred and highly symbolic rituals (Peltonen 1996, 175). Science and religion are separate in New Atlantis, but they are also interconnected through the offices of the Ben Salem Society. What Bacon clearly wanted to illustrate to his readers was that Ben Salem's example should free them from the fear that scientific progress would lead to chaos and upheaval. This key point was made by Jürgen Mittelstrass, who understood Bacon's Bacon and apparently wanted to explain to his readers that Bensalam's example should free them from the fear that scientific progress would lead to chaos and upheaval. This key point was made by Jürgen Mittelstrass, who understood Bacon's Bacon and apparently wanted to explain to his readers that Bensalam's example should free them from the fear that scientific progress would lead to chaos and upheaval. This key point was made by Jürgen Mittelstrass, who understood Bacon's New Atlantis as a utopia and regarded utopia as it
The blueprints of practical reason, not the blueprints of theories, that is to say: they are there, and the progressive ideas of the early modern era appear insignificant in terms of content: within ethical and political theory. (Mittel Strath 1960, 369)
![Looking at "The Dream of the Covered Bridge", I discovered the truth of Francesca's derailment[fig]]()