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The Paper Weekly丨Breaking the cycle of violence in Sudan; How did Erdogan win

author:The Paper

How to break the cycle of violence in Sudan

In the May 1 issue of The Paper, we focused on the origins and prospects of the chaos in Sudan. In the article, Alex De Waal of Tufts University in the United States refers to the Sudanese opposing sides as "kleptocratic cartels", in which the power base of one side is important military and corporate interests, forming a network of crony capitalist companies; The leaders of the other side, led by the Janjaweed, a tribal militia, have used chaos in the capital, Khartoum, to expand their family's business empire. Today, we continue to discuss the role of vested economic interests in the chaos in Sudan.

The Paper Weekly丨Breaking the cycle of violence in Sudan; How did Erdogan win

May 20, 2023, local time, Khartoum, Sudan, violence between two rival generals continues, near the vehicles of the Sudanese army, and the road is blocked by bricks.

On May 16, Omar Shahabudin McDoom, associate professor of comparative politics at the London School of Economics and Political Science, published a signed article titled "Sudan: Ending Thieves to Break the Cycle of Violence" on Al Jazeera. In his view, vested economic interests were fuelling conflict in the Sudan and that peacebuilding efforts could not avoid those issues. The authors argue that stopping the fighting in the short term requires a financial solution between the parties to the conflict, and in the long term, sanctions should be imposed on the kleptocracy in the conflict to make violence unprofitable.

McDum's solution is driven by economic interests and limited to sanctions commonly used by Western countries, and does not explore long-term, fundamental political arrangements, but his analysis of the vested economic interests behind the conflict in Sudan and his operational suggestions for the current situation still have some reference value.

McDum wrote that violence in Sudan is often described as a disagreement between two men with money and guns, which is not the case. Mohammed Hamdan, leader of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Mohamed Hamdan "Hemedti" Dagalo and Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, leader of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), are two of the leading figures in the extensive elite network. Until recently, members of these networks had a common understanding of how to divide Sudan's wealth between themselves and their patrons.

Therefore, in order to stop the fighting in the short term, mediators need not only to facilitate a political agreement between the warring parties, but also to mediate a financial solution between their allies.

In the long run, breaking the cycle of violence requires action that makes seizure of power less attractive to the country's ruling class. That means sanctioning Sudanese individuals and their corporate entities, but also targeting those who help them move and transfer corrupt money abroad: bankers, lawyers and accountants in places like Dubai, London and New York.

If a successful transition to a stable, rules-based Government in the Sudan is to be successful, impunity for kleptocracy must end, but caution must be exercised. Sudan – like Myanmar – should be a cautionary tale for democrats seeking change. In both countries, military regimes have shown that they prefer to give up political power rather than economic interests.

Sudan's long-term political solution under President Omar al-Bashir was dramatically rewritten by a popular revolution that also led to Bashir's ouster in April 2019. Soon after, the transitional government took over power after a power-sharing agreement between civilian forces and the military. But the civilian faction in the government has moved too far to dismantle the lucrative military-controlled business networks built up under Bashir's rule. This led to a military coup d'état by Burhan in October 2021.

The ensuing political settlement appears to be just another military junta, and in fact represents an unstable balance of power between Sudan's main security forces and its network of domestic and international allies.

Khmedi is the head of one of the networks, and his power base is built on the armed group Janjaweed. In 2003, al-Bashir enlisted the Janjaweed to suppress the rebellion in Darfur. A decade later, Khmedi was promoted to head the newly formed Rapid Support Force, which was directly controlled by the president. Eventually, Khmedi took control of the lucrative gold mines in Darfur and used his wealth to massively recruit and augment rapid support forces.

He also lent rapid support forces to fight in Yemen and Libya, expanding his political network to the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar. Its business network is also growing, including not only private military contracts, but also gold trading, mining, construction and high-end real estate.

Burhan is the head of another competing network, commanding the Sudanese Armed Forces, which also has a vast business empire with senior officials controlling companies in industries ranging from construction to meat processing. Burhan also has the support of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who wants to avoid precedent in the region of military power being replaced by a civilian government.

What ultimately broke the fragile agreement between these hostile networks was the plan to integrate the rapid support force into the Sudanese Armed Forces. Khmedy wanted to slow down the integration. He is aware that once the rapid support force is no longer under its exclusive command, he will lose his military veto power over actions that threaten his interests.

Violence in the Sudan should therefore be understood as the role of hostile networks and competing material interests, and should be dealt with accordingly. One strategy is to incentivize groups within the network not to engage in combat. The U.S. and Iraqi governments did just that in Iraq in 2007, buying Sunni tribesmen to stop fighting with them and instead fight alongside them.

McDum believes that while mediators reach an economic solution to stop the violence through mediation in the short term, they should extend an olive branch to groups within the rapid support force organization that may change their allegiance. The loyalty of Chadian and other foreign fighters, as well as those recruited from Sudan's Kordofan region, may be more negotiable. The facilitator should also engage with other major Sudanese armed groups that have not yet chosen sides, including Minni Minnawi of the Sudan Liberation Movement, Gibril Ibrahim of the Justice and Equality Movement, and Malik Agar of the Northern Sudan People's Liberation Movement, who could turn the violence into a protracted civil war.

In the long run, a clear signal needs to be sent to the kleptocracy in Sudan that the use of violence to ensure vested interests outweighs the benefits. U.S. President Joe Biden's executive order authorizing sanctions against individuals deemed to "destabilize" Sudan means not only freezing the overseas assets of Sudanese individuals and companies they control, but also criminalizing bankers, lawyers, accountants and other service providers in major financial centers for their overseas transfer, concealment, money laundering and increased assistance for illicitly obtained.

It could also be bolder to get kleptocratic rulers, rather than foreign donors, to pay for the damage caused, which could be achieved by helping Sudan recover stolen assets. Hemedi's wealth is allegedly concentrated in the family-controlled company Al Junaid. Separately, the rapid support force reportedly has an account with First Abu Dhabi Bank. On the Burhan side, the military's business empire was controlled by the umbrella company Defence Industries System. These assets can be confiscated for the reconstruction of the country and compensation for the victims of violence.

McDum concludes by writing that the cost of inaction is well known. There are nearly 47 million people in Sudan and more than 6 million in the capital, Khartoum. If the fighting continues, the humanitarian and refugee crisis will be enormous. The disorderly exodus of civilians could destabilize neighbouring countries and exacerbate an already exhausted international refugee system. It could also reinforce an economy of war in which parties see fighting as more profitable than peace. By then, the effort required to stop the killings will be much more expensive than it is now.

How did Erdogan win

On May 14, Turkey held the first round of voting for the 2023 presidential elections. The next day, the country's Supreme Electoral Council announced that incumbent President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the candidate of the National Alliance of six opposition parties, who had won less than 50 percent of the vote, would advance to the second runoff. According to the official gazette on the 19th, Erdogan received 49.52% of the votes, and Klıchdar Oulu received 44.88% of the votes.

The Paper Weekly丨Breaking the cycle of violence in Sudan; How did Erdogan win

On May 20, 2023, local time, Kahramanmaraş, Turkey, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited the earthquake city and delivered a speech.

On May 18, Daron Acemoglu, a professor of economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, published an article on the World Press Syndicate website commenting on the election results. In his view, despite rampant corruption and economic mismanagement, the possibility that Turkey's current president and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) could remain in power is good news for other right-wing populists but bad news for Turkey's deteriorating economy.

Asimoglu wrote that it is difficult not to disappoint the results of Turkey's first round of presidential and parliamentary elections. In a campaign characterized by the aftermath of the February earthquake, growing economic problems and corruption, hopes are high for ending President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's 20-year rule. Some polls suggest that a six-party opposition party led by Kemal Klıchdar Oulu of the center-left Republican People's Party (CHP) will be able to win a majority, or at least advance to the second round ahead of Erdogan.

Turkey will hold a second round of voting on May 28, with Erdogan leading the way with 49.5% of the vote. Klıchdar Oulu received less than 45 percent of the vote, with the rest going to far-right anti-immigrant candidate Sinan Ogan, who will announce on May 19 which of the two remaining candidates he supports, but a large part of his supporters appear to support Erdogan in the second round.

Acemoglu argues that the cause of the problem is more fundamental than the wrong poll. It is impossible to understand the election results without recognizing the level of nationalism of Turkish voters.

The change reflects Turkey's long-running conflict with Kurdish separatists in the southeast, a massive influx of refugees from the Middle East and decades of propaganda by major media outlets and Erdogan's Justice and Development Party. In the parliamentary elections, the AKP, its coalition partners the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the Good Party (the second largest party in the opposition coalition) and at least three other parties campaigned on nationalist agendas. Among them, the Nationalist Movement Party, despite being led by a weak, disconnected leader and poorly organized election campaign, won more than 10% of the vote.

As a result, Erdogan's aggressive nationalism resonates more with voters than Klechdar Oulu's moderate posturing and anti-corruption campaign, especially given that Klechdar Oulu comes from the Alvi minority (a Shiite branch in a country with a majority of Sunnis) and is implicitly supported by Kurdish parties and voters.

However, two flippant interpretations of the election results should be resisted: the first is that the results reflect the democratic will of the Turkish public, whether educated city dwellers like it or not. The second view is the opposite of the first - this is a fake election orchestrated by a dictator.

The truth is that many Turkish voters support Erdogan despite realizing that Erdogan's party is corrupt to astronomical levels, that economic mismanagement has led to triple-digit inflation and severe difficulties. They supported him even in the areas most severely affected by the earthquake, where AKP's corruption was a major factor in the staggering destruction and casualties.

On the other hand, elections cannot be described as free and fair. Television and print media are almost entirely under the control of Erdogan and his allies. The leaders of Kurdish minority parties have been in prison for years, and the judiciary and much of the bureaucracy are no longer independent, but have been under Erdogan's orders.

Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party also use state resources to maintain the strong funding network they have created and cater to key constituencies. Raising the minimum wage, raising wages for government employees, providing cheap credit to conglomerates by state-owned banks, and pressure to maintain employment even in difficult times have cemented voter loyalty. Part of the reason Erdogan has received so much support in the earthquake-stricken areas is that he personally distributed cash, expanded government employment and promised new homes for victims.

While Erdogan's opponents have once again underestimated his skillful use of the AKP's local organizing and funding network, as well as his ability to capture the emotions of many voters, the election results are bad news for the future of the Turkish system. Erdogan's control over the media, the judiciary and the bureaucracy, including the central bank, will only grow. Policies to curb corruption or improve economic mismanagement seem unlikely.

Optimists may point out that the AKP's leading position in parliament has declined. However, after the second round of elections, Erdogan may be more likely to control parliament than he did before. The imperial presidential system he introduced weakened the role of parliament, and the opposition in parliament would be more divided. The CHP has fewer seats as the opposition further splits and its leader, Klıchdar Oulu, has ceded some of the BJP's safe seats to smaller partner parties to unite the opposition coalition and unite its presidential candidates.

In addition, the Turkish economy is in dire straits. Aggregate productivity has stagnated for more than 15 years, and the general deterioration of the economic system means that inflation is barely under control. Both non-financial companies and banks have poor balance sheets, heralding a deeper collapse in the near future. After depleting its foreign exchange reserves in 2021, Turkey's central bank began to rely on the support of friendly countries, and at a time when the government needed significant financing to rebuild the earthquake-stricken areas, AKP's election-related public spending depleted financial resources.

It is difficult to see how the economy can normalize without a large inflow of resources. Without strong signals that the government will adopt more traditional policies, these reforms are unlikely to materialize.

But the AKP and its allies in the bureaucracy do not have the expertise to steer the economy through these difficult times. Some economists and bureaucrats had sympathized with the party's conservatism and were willing to work with it, but they have been expelled from Erdogan's circle and replaced by those who promise.

Acemoglu concludes the article by writing that Turkey's elections offer broader lessons. First, Erdogan's success is good news for other right-wing populists and strongmen, such as Narendra Modi in India and Donald Trump in the United States, who are likely to continue to use similar tactics and radical nationalist rhetoric to mobilize their voter base and deepen polarization.

Second, Turkey's experience in the coming months will reveal the economic consequences of this politics, who will pay for it, and how domestic and foreign capital will respond. Since authoritarianism is often associated with economic mismanagement, what happens in Turkey will not happen only in Turkey.

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