#头条创作挑战赛 #
2024 Tactical Observation: A Brief Analysis of Uruguay's Japan-Korea Tour
After the World Cup in Qatar, each national team enters the 2024 continental competition cycle, with European regional teams competing for qualification for the European Championship while other regional teams prepare for continental tournaments on their respective continents. Although there is no major competition to watch, it is precisely the time period for the renewal of various national teams and tactical transformation, but there are many tactical points to observe and discuss.
After the defeat of the World Cup in Qatar, the "core front, give up the ball, stick to the counterattack" system built by Uruguayan football since the 2010 World Cup finally collapsed due to the irreversible aging of core players after repeated repairs. Since it collapsed, it had to be rebuilt, which made the team inevitably undergo a more painful tactical transformation.
In the recent international break, Uruguay, who played in the remnants of the team, won one draw and one win against two Asian teams, Japan and South Korea, and although the quality of the match sample was not ideal (Japan and South Korea, especially Japan, are not the main players), there are still some points to talk about.
Change of formation 4-2-3-1: Liberation of Valverde
In both matches, Uruguay used a 4-2-3-1 formation, with frequent personnel rotation in other positions, and the more solid was the midfield trio: Valverde, Besino and Ugarte. Here we will focus on Federico Valverde.
During the World Cup, whether it was 4-3-3 switching 4-4-2 against South Korea, Ghana or 3-5-2 against Portugal, Federico Valverde's position was No. 8 - central midfielder, in this position Valverde showed excellent running ability, but the problem is also obvious - unclear offensive and defensive positioning, overwork.
In the 4-2-3-1 formation in these two games, interim manager Broly put Federico Valverde in the front of the line, establishing him as the attacking core with Nunez, Bentancur and De Araska Caeta all sidelined due to injury. It is true that Valverde's dribbling and passing in the core area is not fine enough, but the impact of his ball holding can attract defenders, and his shooting ability can also affect the judgment of opponents.
With a full-time defensive No. 6 (Ugarte) behind him, Valverde does not need to settle on the key point of position, and can use the coverage advantage brought by his running ability to sweep around, grab the ball and push on the spot to launch a counterattack.
(Valverde's long-range shot + header against Japan)
There is no doubt that front-loading Valverde is beneficial to improve Uruguay's attacking system. But there are doubters here: he lacks the ability to get rid of the spot and pass in the core area, he is not actually a No. 10 player, and his ability to fight in the front waist position is reduced in the environment of his own possession and dense defense.
But if you put it in the front position of a double central midfielder, whether it is with the dispatching type of Bentancur or the defensive type of Ugart (Torreera), there will be problems: either the central midfield is slightly less capable of playing the ball, or the midfield interception efficiency is insufficient. Perhaps a "pseudo-right-winger" positioning, like at Real Madrid, is the most suitable for it.
Maxi Gomez or Darwin Núñez: Maybe it's a helpless choice
There is no doubt that the starting center forward Maxi Gomez has performed worse in these two games: if his aerial scramble and back-to-back ball played some value against Japan, he was completely drowned out against South Korea. The years in Valencia have already made him a little uneasy.
But for Uruguay, he still has the value of starting line-up: Suarez and Edinson Cavani's physical "diving" has become irreversible, unable to fight hand-to-hand with the opposing central defender, and Darwin Núñez is not suitable for the first line. From the perspective of club games, Núñez's strengths are frontal ball impact and point grabbing, insufficient back ability, and lack of precision in touching the ball under strong opponents, which is why Liverpool chose to buy Gakpo.
Although he can't score, when facing opponents with poor power attributes, Maxi Gomez's back-to-back ball, aerial scramble and attrition are still irreplaceable by Uruguay at this stage, but he really can't play high-end games. Alvaro needs to accelerate his growth.
Defensive hazards in the ribs: how to protect a special central defender
The two goals conceded in the two games against Japan and South Korea have a big commonality: both the area where the full-back and central defender are handed over is broken first, and the special central defender Coates leaves the defensive position and is inserted and harvested by the back row of the little fast players.
As a heavy central defender of great height and weight, Coates has good frontal defensive ability, but his limited movement speed leads to limited coverage, and the defensive efficiency on the move is greatly reduced. At Portuguese sport, two light centre-backs, Ignacio and San Giuste, were able to protect the space on their side, but neither of these games was good enough for Santiago Bueno.
(This is a typical picture, Asano Takuma overtakes directly, and Bueno's defensive movement speed is not even as fast as Coates)
It is true that Jose Jimenez and Ronald Araujo may be Coates' natural partners, but the former's movement speed has also been greatly reduced after multiple injuries, and Araujo has been forced to do it due to the lack of talent at the right back of the Sky Blues. How to set up protection before and after a central defender like Coates will be a topic that needs to be considered.
Switching to three centre-backs with Matías Oliveira and Federico Valverde, who have crosses but not sharp defensive footsteps, may be an option. But the defeat in the face of Portugal would clearly lead Uruguayans to reject this approach.
Summary: The Sky Blue Legion faces a tactical transformation
Among the powers, the Sky Blues' preparation for the 2024 cycle is relatively slow, after all, they have not even determined the head coach. Whether World Cup loser Diego Alonso will remain in office has not yet been determined, and it is difficult for acting coach Broly to do so as a national youth manager. The number of active Uruguayan managers is scarce and the quality is uneven, and the cash-strapped Uruguayan Football Association is difficult to hire foreign managers at a high price.
The quality of the new generation of Uruguayan players is generally good, but the collective fall of the Mesozoic generation, the positioning of young players is not clear enough, plus the two core positions of the center and center defender of the previous era have relatively obvious player relegation, for the new coach's tactical transformation task is still relatively large.