"Military Sub-plane" author: Big Ivan
We wrote in the article "Raising huge waves tens of meters high, North Korea successfully tested a heavy nuclear torpedo!" Now it is really a nuclear power", he introduced the situation of North Korea's test launch of the "Arrow-1/2" cruise missile and test of the "Tsunami" heavy nuclear torpedo.
In the second half of the article, Big Ivan made a judgment based on North Korea's existing nuclear weapons development and ballistic missile tests, as well as the disclosure of its nuclear strategy: he believed that North Korea was getting closer and closer to the de facto "nuclear power", and a sixth "nuclear power" in human history was emerging.
Of course, due to the limitation of the length of the article, many things we have not talked about in detail, they are all brushed off. So, what exactly is North Korea's nuclear/ballistic missile capabilities? Does it really meet our "nuclear power" criteria? What are the priorities of North Korea's nuclear weapons in the future equipment and strategic construction? Today, let's start a topic and talk a little deeper.
The criteria of a "nuclear power"
Judging from the reality of the five nuclear powers that have emerged in human history, in order to be called a "nuclear power", at least the following should be achieved in terms of relevant technical and tactical equipment and strategic capacity building:
In the construction of technical and tactical equipment, what we usually call the "three-in-one" strategic nuclear strike capability is not necessary. Of the five existing nuclear powers, except for the United States and Russia, which can achieve a "trinity", all other countries are lacking. For example, Britain and France do not have strategic bombers and land-based ICBMs, France's air-launched nuclear weapons can only be launched by Rafale fighters, and Britain simply does not have air-based nuclear weapons, only sea-based "Avant-garde"-class ballistic missile nuclear submarines and Trident-IID5 missiles. Therefore, to be more precise, the criterion of "nuclear power" should be divided into the following elements:
First, there are nuclear warheads with strategic delivery capabilities and ballistic missiles to match them. The so-called strategic projection capability means, on the one hand, that the destructive capability of a nuclear device is sufficient to destroy the social wealth of the enemy country on a large scale, and on the other hand, it means that the nuclear device is sufficient to be projected to the enemy country through a long-range delivery tool, so as to have strategic significance in strike effectiveness.
Secondly, it is a complete set of mass production, maintenance, support and vitality system for nuclear installations and launchers. The first atomic bomb similar to the "Manhattan" project of the United States is not a sign of a nuclear power, and in order to change from a nuclear country to a nuclear power, it is necessary to open up the system of mass production and practical application of nuclear weapons. That is, from hand-rubbing one or two nuclear weapons under laboratory conditions to a complete nuclear industry, chemical industry, metallurgical materials industry, etc., which can stably produce nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and can have enough military forces to maintain these nuclear devices and ballistic missiles.
Then it's extremely important that your nuclear strike system has sufficient battlefield survivability, such as mobile launches, such as hardened underground launches. Make sure that your nuclear weapons are not destroyed by enemy "preemptive" nuclear assaults, or even through conventional means and special operations attacks.
Finally, there is a complete set of nuclear forces doctrine, command and communication systems. At present, the nuclear powers basically first have nuclear weapons, and then come up with a corresponding nuclear force theory, and while studying the nuclear force theory, they gradually build a command and communication system related to nuclear weapons, which is a key step in becoming a "nuclear power". What is the difference between your nuclear device and a dirty bomb that a few terrorists rubbed out, to a certain extent, it depends on your nuclear strategy to make a public declaration, relying on national strength and national will to declare the reliability and use of nuclear weapons.
In order to ensure the reliability of nuclear weapons and the ability of national forces to master nuclear weapons at all times, in addition to high survivability design, it is also necessary to establish a strategic communication system to match it. Whether it is wired or wireless communication, terrestrial communication or satellite communication, the ability of the country's top leaders to contact nuclear weapons units at all times is a basic requirement for a nuclear power. Only after the above factors are integrated can it be called a "nuclear power".
Several levels of the "nuclear power"
Therefore, with the corresponding technical and tactical equipment, there is a strategic capability on nuclear weapons, and our point of view, after the integration of the above technical and tactical equipment and the corresponding strategic doctrine, the "nuclear power" can be divided into the following levels:
In terms of strategic nuclear force delivery capabilities, the lowest level is limited delivery capabilities; Medium level, which is the ability to deliver with various forms and high intensity; The highest level is to have the legendary "Trinity" or even more projection capabilities.
Russia's "Perimeter/Dead Hand" system: After a nuclear strike on the mainland, it automatically launches a "command missile" to "broadcast" to all branches of the army to launch a nuclear counterattack
In terms of the early warning/command/launch capability of strategic nuclear forces, the lowest level is that they do not have the ability to launch early warning and counterattack in the air, and can only wait for the opponent's nuclear weapons to land and then carry out counterattacks; At the medium level, it has limited early warning launch capability and certain air counterattack capability; At the highest level, it is the first-hand nuclear assault that adheres to the principle of verification warfare, and fully possesses the ability of nuclear weapons to counterattack in the air or even the ascending stage.
In the reliability design of strategic nuclear forces (strategic communication and nuclear device reliability), the lowest level is that there are no multiple strategic communication systems, the use of launchers for launch, and the launch preparation time is long; The medium level is to have certain strategic communication capabilities, use a single mode (flat hole sprint/launch frame/silo) launch, launch preparation time is medium; The highest level is to have multiple complete sets of strategic communication capabilities, design for high survivability in the use of nuclear weapons, and extremely short launch preparation time, which is the latitude and longitude of nuclear force evaluation.
With the latitude and longitude of the evaluation, we can evaluate North Korea's nuclear forces.
The real situation of North Korea's nuclear forces
First of all, in terms of technical equipment construction, North Korea's nuclear weapons already have the characteristics of "two series, land and sea, and diverse models":
In the type of rocket engine used, two large series of liquid and solid shells have been formed; On the launch vehicles used, a variety of launch platforms such as land-based ballistic missile launchers, sea-based ballistic missile submarines, and underwater nuclear torpedoes have been formed; In terms of type, North Korea's ballistic missiles with nuclear weapons carrying capabilities include Hwasong-12/15/17, new solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles, and submarine-launched Polaris-3/4 missiles, not including the Arrow-1/2 cruise missiles that can carry tactical nuclear weapons.
In the manufacture, maintenance, and vitality of nuclear devices/ballistic missiles: It is an unquestionable reality that North Korea's ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons have already been mass-produced. From the beginning of this year, when the People's Army Strategic Army publicly released a large number of Hwasong-12 ballistic missiles, to the launch of Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missiles under the guidance of the First Launch Company of the Strategic Army, all of them have proved that the DPRK's ballistic missile nuclear weapons are not too difficult to manufacture and use.
However, in terms of vitality design, there is currently insufficient information to prove what kind of high survivability design is used in North Korea's ICBM/nuclear devices. The Hwasong-15/17 was launched using a motorized launch vehicle, but the 11-axis heavy launcher was built on North Korea's domestic roads and seemed to lack sufficient space for maneuver. Therefore, North Korea's nuclear weapons survivability construction may be to dig a flat hole, a launch vehicle to be concealed and standby, and after receiving the order, sprint to the field to launch.
There is also no evidence that North Korea has any early warning system for nuclear forces. A complete set of space-based/land-based/sea-based early warning radars such as those built at sky-high prices such as those built by the United States and Russia certainly does not exist for North Korea. In fact, with the air defense of the Korean People's Army, especially the ability to grasp the air situation, it is difficult to say whether the DPRK can fully grasp the air situation in the atmosphere in wartime. Moreover, North Korea's own narrow territorial depth also puts North Korea's nuclear weapons at a certain disadvantage in terms of survivability. This constitutes a very large constraint on the vitality of North Korea's nuclear weapons system.
On the doctrine of nuclear forces and the construction of the command system: North Korea made its nuclear strategy doctrine public at the end of last year, although we wrote last year in the article "Gasp for air!" The DPRK promulgated the "Nuclear Forces Policy Decree" to become the 8th nuclear power, burying two huge hidden dangers for the world! It has been pointed out that North Korea's nuclear strategic doctrine has some characteristics of unclear expression, extremely low nuclear threshold, and serious preemptive strike. But in any case, a nuclear strategic doctrine is better than none.
But in the command and communications system of its nuclear forces, it is difficult to say how far North Korea has come. North Korea does not have communication satellites, and it is impossible for other countries to lease communication satellite channels to build a strategic communications network for North Korea's nuclear weapons forces (and North Korea will not do so); In the wired communication system, North Korea certainly exists, but it is not clear how reliable it is, as for the wireless communication network, with North Korea's technical capabilities, it is a big problem to avoid interference and monitoring by the United States and South Korea in wartime.
So far, several of North Korea's intercontinental ballistic missile launches have been conducted at Sunan International Airport in northern Pyongyang. This is not necessarily a coincidence, nor is it necessarily close to the missile assembly plant, and it cannot be ruled out that there is a close proximity to the supreme leader that is convenient for receiving direct orders from the Central Committee of the Workers' Party. The advantages of better road conditions around Pyongyang and ease of maneuvering and sprint launches will to some extent become a disadvantage for North Korea's nuclear forces.
How to view North Korea's nuclear forces
Therefore, according to several major evaluation data of North Korea's nuclear forces, North Korea's current nuclear forces, we can make the following definitions:
In terms of the projection capability of strategic nuclear forces, North Korea has a variety of forms and high intensity projection capabilities. Although the nuclear yield delivery of its "main imaginary enemy" does not meet the so-called "McNamara standard", it is enough to become a fairly powerful strategic weight;
In terms of the early warning command and launch capability of strategic nuclear forces, the DPRK has a very poor early warning capability and poor early warning launch capability, and can only adopt the launch strategy of landing nuclear counterattack. This could be a factor in North Korea's aggressive nuclear strategic doctrine with its emphasis on preemptive nuclear strikes, or it could lead North Korea to direct its nuclear forces toward high-survivability designs (such as using robust silos);
In terms of the reliability design of strategic nuclear forces, North Korea may have certain strategic communication capabilities, but it has congenital defects in radio communications and satellite communications. This would also lead North Korea's strategic nuclear weapons to a high-survivability design, that is, the digging of silos as we mentioned earlier, or the enhancement of flat-hole excavation, sprint launch capabilities, etc.
In short, in terms of North Korea's strategic nuclear force system, North Korea's strategic nuclear forces have now reached a "medium" level. Although it is not as good as the "upper three permanent members", compared with Britain and France, it is already in a "not weak" situation in several evaluation criteria, and has thrown off several de facto nuclear countries such as India, Pakistan and Israel.
What North Korea needs to do next is to further improve the survivability of its nuclear weapons, improve its strategic early warning capabilities and strategic communication capabilities, and at the same time, relevant capabilities also need to be announced to the outside world through certain forms. But in any case, from our point of view, North Korea's nuclear forces as a whole have reached the standard of a "nuclear power".