#头条创作挑战赛 #
In the history of Europe, we will find an interesting phenomenon, that is, the existence of commercial city-states. This is commonplace in Europe, but rarely in Asia. In the history of our China, there seems to be no place for commercial city-states. The reality in Chinese history is that there were merchants and merchants, but there were no commercial city-states, let alone dominions belonging to merchants. Why does China, which is good at accepting foreign cultures, have no place for commercial city-states?
The commercial city-state is the product of a weak central
The history of Europeans began with the collapse of the Roman Empire, and became fragmented. Although the Eastern Roman Empire inherited the cultural genes of the Roman Empire, the dominance of the Roman Empire no longer exists. In the homeland of the Western Roman Empire, various forces constantly invaded, and the culture there was intricate. The Franks, Germans, and Saxons continued to grow, resulting in the absence of a unified and stable political entity in Western Europe. Although there was a brief unification, this unification was more of a union between families, and there was no real cultural unity.
In the process of continuous cultural fragmentation, the unified Greco-Roman culture was gradually replaced by the own culture of each region, thus laying the hidden danger of lasting division. It can be said that since the fall of the Western Roman Empire, Western Europe has not had emperors in the substantive sense, but only kings. The king's power was extremely limited relative to that of the emperor, and the king had no control over his subordinates. The king can command the duke, but for the counts below the duke, the king often has no way to take them. This is related to the feudal system in Europe, they have a clear relationship of rights and obligations, and everyone has their own boundaries of rights.
Such a limited relationship of rights and obligations has led to a weakening of centralization within the Western European kingdoms. This phenomenon of weak central and strong local areas gave space for the development of commercial city-states. Looking at the commercial city-states of Europe, we can see that commercial cities such as Venice, Geno, and Pisa survived precisely in the absence of strong centralized governments in the surrounding areas. Because commercial city-states are not bound by the central government, they can rely on their own advantages to develop a type of city that meets their own conditions. Although the autonomy of the city was in the hands of a small number of commercial oligarchs, its rights were severely restricted, thus providing liberal conditions for the development of commerce.
A subsistence agrarian economy became a barrier to business
As early as the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods in China, the commercial atmosphere was already quite strong. What is strange here is that China's business development has not been revolutionized for so long. Commerce a thousand years ago and commerce a thousand years later, except for changes in the form of commercial transactions, there has been no change in the organization of business, and the status of merchants has not been improved. From the perspective of development, this is not in line with the law of development.
From the perspective of ancient Chinese economy, it seems that there is a glimpse of it. The agrarian economy is closely linked to the development of Chinese society. In ancient times, the ruler of a dynasty, in the early days of its founding, first considered a smooth transition of power. A necessary condition for a smooth transition of power is to solve the food problem of the large ruling population in the country. The stability of the Chinese dynasty is highly bound to the food issue, and food stability means the stability of the regime.
A large population is China's advantage and China's disadvantage. It is unrealistic to rely on commercial trade to solve so much food demand, and can only be solved by the farmers themselves. In order to increase farmers' enthusiasm for cultivating land, the central government often grants farmers land without compensation and reduces farmers' taxes, so as to solve the food problem as quickly as possible. This mode of production requires farmers to be bound to the land, and reducing the mobility of farmers is an inevitable choice for the dynastic government. The development of business will also be slowed by the weakening of liquidity, and in extreme cases may stagnate. Sometimes, in order to encourage production, the government often takes over all industries except agriculture and develops other industries through official means, which gives a fatal blow to business development.
The development of the commercial economy was not conducive to the rule of the dynasty
The attitude of the Chinese dynasty rulers towards business was often unsupportive. In the eyes of these rulers, the unearned gains of merchants would shake the peasants' desire to actively cultivate. The business philosophy of businessmen selling high and buying low is detrimental to social stability because it has no production value. Farmers will be dissatisfied with this business model of merchants, who believe that they are taking advantage of themselves. This dissatisfaction will shake the ruler's foundation. In ancient dynasties, where the agrarian economy was the main pillar, rulers would inevitably suppress the development of merchants out of the need to rule.
For the sake of social stability, the rulers of ancient dynasties were government-run for specific commodities. For example, salt, iron and other related industries, you can always find the shadow of the government. These monopolistic industries could really generate huge profits in ancient times. Businessmen, of course, can participate in these industries, but the costs are enormous, and the profits are often exploited by the government. Businessmen are in a difficult situation, not only to blame for high prices, but also to bear policy risks from the government, in which personnel changes in local officials sometimes destroy their life savings.
Businessmen who survive in the cracks cannot become stronger while becoming bigger. Because the basis of strength is the union of each other, and the Chinese businessmen cannot unite. There is an opinion that this has to do with Chinese's solitary personality. But I think the bigger reason is pressure from the government level. Dynastic governments could allow commerce, but not commercial associations. Such a broad and federated industry organization is detrimental to the central government, which needs a high degree of centralization, to assert its power. In ancient times, when productivity was low, the dynastic government was not able to mobilize and could not instill decrees in every corner of society. And because of its mobility, the transmission of information is extremely fast. This keen control of information is the weakness of the dynastic government, and naturally cannot allow the union of merchants.
Individual traders cannot resist government pressure
In the eyes of dynastic rulers, a single merchant was incapable of threatening rule. In ancient times, the power of the individual was powerless in a strong centralized government. The central government can keep business development at a manageable level by controlling mobility. Once the scale of commerce is controlled, it will naturally not be able to form a strong synergy, and it will lose its power to oppose the central government.
Businessmen can enter into limited cooperation with local governments, and this cooperation is aimed at repression. As the main force of commerce, merchants have always been in this state of suppression, and they have lost their due vitality. Without dynamic commerce, it loses the impetus to generate commercial associations, let alone commercial city-states that are more friendly to the development of commerce.
