"I'd rather go into exile than ask China for help!"
Since stepping down in 2008, former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf has been in exile. Whenever he was urged to seek help from China, he always responded with awe.
During Musharraf's reign, he developed the economy with China on the one hand and cooperated with the United States on the other hand to fight terrorism.
However, the American cauldron and the domestic political party's counterattack eventually achieved its role as a "tragic hero".
So, what is the relationship between Musharraf and China? Why was he forced to stay away from politics?
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First, "tough guy" Musharraf: cooperate with China to boost the economy
In October 1999, General Musharraf succeeded in overthrowing the Sharif government and taking over power in Pakistan without bloodshed.
Pakistan was in turmoil at the time, and the fledgling military junta faced four main challenges:
heavy external and domestic debt; high fiscal deficits and low revenue-generating capacity; Rising poverty and unemployment; Balance of payments imbalances and stagnant exports.
Therefore, Musharraf made "reviving the country's economy" a top priority. He continued to reform the tax system and strengthen economic cooperation with China, and trade between China and Pakistan has increased year after year.
During Musharraf's administration, Pakistan's economic situation improved significantly. In the process of cooperation with China, Pakistan has made great progress in various sectors.
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After 2000, the Pakistani government signed a series of cooperation treaties with China and independently carried out a series of economic reforms with fruitful results:
Pakistan's fiscal and account deficits are declining, and industrial production has recovered significantly;
Inflation was lower than expected, exports and remittances increased, and foreign exchange reserves grew significantly.
By 2003, China took the initiative to provide a large amount of free assistance to Pakistan, and Pakistan's economy gradually entered the track of rapid development. Musharraf also affectionately called China "the closest friend of the Pakistani people."
Under Pervez Mushraf, Pakistan's national economy grew stronger, per capita income continued to rise, and poverty was alleviated. During the five-year period 2002-2007, Pakistan's per capita income grew at an average annual rate of more than 13 per cent.
Before Musharraf came to power, Pakistan's GDP grew at 3.5%, 2.0% and 3.1% in 2000, 2001 and 2002 respectively. It can be seen that Pakistan's economic development at this stage has been somewhat disappointing.
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However, between 2003 and 2008, Pakistan's economic growth grew by leaps and bounds. A study of Pakistan's economic situation by the British Economist Intelligence Institute concluded that in 2003, Pakistan's GDP growth rate was 5.8%, the highest since 1990.
Musharraf said excitedly:
"Bakista's economy finally showed good momentum in 2003, and the macroeconomic performance was better than expected. This is inseparable from the gratuitous assistance of Chinese friends. ”
According to data released by the Government of Pakistan's Economic Survey, Pakistan's GDP growth rate reached 8.6 per cent in 2004-2005.
In 2005-2006, despite the impact of soaring energy prices and the earthquake, Pakistan's economy maintained a rapid growth rate with China's assistance, with a GDP growth rate of 6.6%.
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As a result, during the Musharraf era, Pakistan's real GDP growth was its best in decades, and the economy was markedly stable and resilient. This is inseparable from China's strong help.
But at the same time, Pakistan faces a dire counterterrorism situation, so Musharraf has to cooperate with the United States. But it was precisely the "cooperation" with the United States that led to the eventual ouster of Musharraf.
Second, the delicate relationship between the United States and Pakistan
On the day of the "9/11" incident in the United States, Musharraf issued a timely statement and a television speech at the suggestion of the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, condemning the despicable acts of terrorists and opposing all forms of terrorism.
(9/11)
The participation of the Musharraf government in the US-led anti-terrorism alliance not only has its own interests, but also has strong pressure from the United States.
On September 12, 2001, Powell, then U.S. Secretary of State, told Musharraf bluntly through a diplomatic hotline:
"You either side with us or become our enemy".
Since then, US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage has been more explicit about Pakistan's demands:
"If Pakistan chooses to side with terrorists, then Pakistan is ready to be blown back into the Stone Age."
In response to the strong pressure on the US side, the Musharraf government carefully weighed the pros and cons, and finally "forced" to join the US-led anti-terrorist coalition.
While Pakistan's measures in supporting the war on terror have been recognized by the international community, it must also remain vigilant against domestic and regional opposition.
(Pakistan Counter-Terrorism)
Assassinations, kidnappings, attacks and bombings continue to occur in Pakistan, particularly in December 2003, when Musharraf was attacked twice in a row in 11 days, demonstrating that:
There are many opposition in Pakistan to its government's involvement in the US-led war on terror, which is exacerbated by ethnic conflicts, religious divisions, and inequality in Pakistan.
The war on terror and internal security is therefore a long-term and difficult task for the Musharraf government.
In order to maintain political stability at home, Musharraf's government has had to adopt policies that the United States sees as inconsistent with its counterterrorism goals.
Because of this, during the Musharraf administration, the two sides were at loggerheads over counterterrorism cooperation. In fact, the differences between the United States and the Musharraf administration on counterterrorism have become increasingly evident as the war on terror deepens.
(Pakistan's counter-terrorism has initially been fruitful)
In the early days of the war on terror, U.S.-Pakistan cooperation was good because there were fewer conflicting interests and goals on both sides:
The United States supports Pakistan's restoration of foreign relations and the country's economy, which in turn supports the overthrow of the Taliban regime by the United States. As the counter-terrorism front shifted to Pakistan's western border to search for the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, the anti-American tendencies of the Pakistani people became stronger, and the activities of extremist forces became more frequent.
The United States calls on Pakistan to actively cooperate with its war on terror in Afghanistan while resolutely cracking down on the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaida and religious extremists in the tribal areas of Pakistan.
(Pakistani soldier)
The Pakistani government believes that it should "fight mainly and combine fighting", and can adopt a policy of resolute crackdown on the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, but for religious extremist forces in tribal areas, as long as they do not support the Taliban and al-Qaida and do not confront the Pakistani central government, they can adopt the method of negotiation; Negotiations with extremist forces are intolerable to the United States.
Under the covert manipulation of the United States, Pakistan's attitude towards Musharraf is gradually declining, and the situation is precarious; At the same time, Pakistan's counter-terrorism measures have been questioned and domestic accusations have continued.
Third, there are constant constraints and frequent downfalls
In fact, one of the most fundamental internal factors why Musharraf has not been able to successfully solve the problem of terrorism and control the situation is that he came to power in October 1999 through a bloodless military coup and was sworn in as President of Pakistan in June 2001, and the result of the 2004 referendum made Musharraf a dual president and army chief of staff until November 2007.
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He wore many hats when he came to power in a coup, and although the military regime reserved loose room for the parties, its legitimacy has been questioned by political forces of all parties and Western countries such as the United States, which have never given up their attempts to oust Musharraf.
Musharraf's regime is a typical "presidential military regime", and the support of pro-presidential parties and military groups are two indispensable pillars.
On the military side, one of the most far-reaching effects of Musharraf's resignation on 24 November 2007 was undoubtedly the distance between him and the military.
Musharraf's move from direct leadership of Pakistan in the past to remote command through General Kiyani, who succeeded Musharraf as Pakistan's army chief of staff, advocated that "the army does not engage in political power struggles" – adding uncertainty to Musharraf's relationship with the military that would not have existed in the past.
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In addition, some lower-ranking Pakistani officers and soldiers are dissatisfied with Musharraf's counter-terrorism policies, such as the interrogation of 50 suspected military officers by Pakistani security services on 16 November 2006, although they refused to say whether the assassination of the President was linked to Al-Qaida and the Taliban, which were widely believed to be behind the case.
The United States has always been a supporter of the Musharraf administration's fight against terrorism, which is a common interest pursued by both sides. However, there are differences in perception between the two sides in their counter-terrorism approach and treatment of terrorists.
For example, in the second half of 2006, the Pakistani military began to change its previous policy of focusing on military strikes and turn to negotiations with tribal armed forces, making the United States and NATO allies extremely dissatisfied with the Pakistani government.
In early September 2006, the Government of Pakistan announced the signing of a peace agreement with pro-Taliban militants in the North Waziristan Tribal Special Zone, agreeing to withdraw tens of thousands of troops stationed in the region in exchange for the disarmament of local militias.
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Musharraf's government insists that keeping tribal people away from armed groups requires an end to violence and the development of the local economy, so the only way to sign a peace agreement is the only way.
However, the "National Intelligence Assessment" issued by the United States intelligence agency on July 17, 2006, pointed to Pakistan's move as a "tiger breeding" to allow al-Qaida and Taliban elements to find refuge in the region and restart the stove, which was considered a compromise between the Pakistani government and the Taliban.
For the United States, al-Qaida and the Taliban are targets to be eradicated, but the Pakistani government is in a position to identify with its own ethnicity and religion and the Taliban.
Pakistan needs financial assistance from the United States, not only for the sake of countering terrorism, but also from the United States to address domestic economic hardship and poverty.
The deteriorating security situation in Pakistan has raised doubts about the Musharraf government's counterterrorism capabilities and threatened to reduce economic assistance.
Under the impact of a series of events, the situation in Musharraf is worrying.
Fourth, in times of crisis, China is not involved
In 2006, the return of religious power in Pakistan was rapid, and the coalition of religious parties began to break with the government. The main reason is that the coalition of religious parties has gained certain seats in parliament and is in power in Pakistan's two most conservative provinces, the Northwest Frontier Province and Balochistan.
In addition, Pakistan's "grassroots" forces are gradually posing one of the serious threats to Pakistan's social stability. This grassroots force includes mosques controlled by conservative religious leaders and their affiliated religious schools.
In fact, in the early years of Musharraf's rule, he had a good relationship with religious forces, and in the first national and provincial council elections in 2003, religious parties rose rapidly and gave Musharraf strong support in exchange for religious forces in the northwest frontier region.
(U.S. Counterterrorism)
However, three years later, religious parties openly broke with the government in July 2006 as the junta's "ally in the opposition" and formed an anti-Musharraf alliance with former Prime Minister Muslim League Nawaz Sharif's Shepai Muslim League and Benazir Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party.
In 2007, from religious parties to "grassroots" religious forces, from grassroots parties to the Supreme Court, Pakistan's various anti-military regime forces either formed alliances or acted alone to launch wave after wave of offensives against Musharraf, who encountered the most serious challenge in his eight years in power, and this political storm began in March 2008 in a direct struggle between Musharraf's executive power and the judicial power of Supreme Court Chief Justice Joe She, the essence of which was. The continuation of a half-century power struggle between Pakistan's military clique and bureaucratic party elite.
(U.S. Counterterrorism)
Although the military regime has reserved room for other parties to operate, their legitimacy has been strongly questioned by the latter, and the parties have never given up their attempts to oust Musharraf from power.
In March 2007, Musharraf announced the dismissal of Chief Justice Qiao Sheli on charges of abuse of power, the release of terrorists detained by the military intelligence services, and interference in the work of the executive and legislative branches by a small number of judges.
After Qiao Sheli's suspension, Pakistani legal professionals and religious forces mobilized supporters to march in the streets, causing Pakistan's worst political crisis in recent years.
In July of the same year, the Pakistani Court of Appeal finally ruled that Qiao Sheli was reinstated, and the military group failed to defeat the judicial department's attempt to block Musharraf's re-election in the first round, laying the groundwork for the subsequent outbreak of Pakistan's political crisis.
The "Supreme Court crisis" has not yet ended, and there has been another incident of religious extremists abducting foreign citizens and attacking police officers in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, that is, the "Red Mosque Incident".
These clashes have further disadvantaged the Musharraf regime, which has completely alienated Musharraf from his country's powerful religious forces, worsened the security situation in remote areas with strong religious ties, and destroyed the peace in the tribal areas that the Palestinian government has painstakingly maintained.
After two rounds of contests over the Supreme Court crisis and the Red Mosque incident, Musharraf's isolation became even more pronounced.
In the end, Pakistan's political landscape was reshuffled, and on the party side, the parliamentary election results produced a regime unfavorable to Musharraf's regime.
On the afternoon of 18 August 2008, Musharraf delivered a televised address in which he expressed his willingness to resign from the presidency in the interests of the country and the nation.
After stepping down, Musharraf began a career on the run.
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Over the years, he traveled to more than a dozen countries, hiding both from the opposition in Pakistan and from the Americans.
During his flight, Musharraf was asked questions:
"During your reign, the relationship between Pakistan and China was so good, don't you want to take refuge in China?"
Whenever he hears such a question, Musharraf always responds with awe: even if he is in exile in a foreign country, he will never go to China for help.
This is not because Musharraf has a bad heart for China, but because he knows in his heart that China will never interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. Rashly asking China for help will only drag China down.
Such a great righteousness, everyone who heard it was moved to tears.
Epilogue:
Although Musharraf's rise to power is controversial, during his reign, the economic cooperation between China and Pakistan has deepened, and Pakistan's economic level has made a new leap - he contributed to the casting of the "Pakistan Railway";
At the same time, Musharraf also actively wanted to make a difference in "counter-terrorism", but the domestic public did not fully approve of his policy, and the United States, which held him to the top, ended up drawing salaries from the bottom.
As everyone said, Musharraf was a "tragic hero."
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