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"Interview" demographer Li Ting: College students are more willing to marry than expected, but they are moving towards "individual marriage"

author:Interface News

Reporter | Gao Jia

Edit | Zhao Meng

As provinces continue to release 2021 statistics, some new demographic trends have attracted attention.

Up to now, 31 provinces in China have announced the 2021 population big data, of which 11 provinces have experienced natural negative population growth, and 5 provinces have turned negative for the first time. According to data released by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, the number of marriage registrations in China in 2021 was 7.636 million pairs, a record low since 1986.

In 1987, Dutch scholar Dirk van de Kaa proposed the concept of a "second demographic transition" to explain why fertility rates continue to fall below replacement levels, and to predict the direction of the overall demographic structure of society and the changes in individual family behavior after the classical demographic transition was completed. Some scholars have shown that the development of the second demographic transition in China has a different trajectory from that of the West.

Recently, the "Report on the Concept of Marriage and Childbearing among Chinese College Students" (hereinafter referred to as the "Report"), written by Li Ting, professor of the Center for Population and Development of Chinese University and director of the Family and Gender Research Center, and her team, reveals some connections between the trajectory of China's second population transition and the concept of marriage and childbearing among young people.

The report sampled 9775 respondents, their average age is about 20.3 years old, from 30 universities across the country (including 4 double first-class universities, 18 general universities, 8 junior colleges), covering 26 cities in 22 provinces, accounting for 50.95% of the respondents. The survey of respondents included five parts: basic information, marriage intentions and concepts, fertility wishes and concepts, mental outlook and marriage views, and college students' Internet participation.

Li Ting and her team found through research that college students still have expectations for marriage and childbearing, "from the overall data, the mainstream concept still believes that marriage is a very important life stage or life choice of the individual body." "But she stressed that the core finding of this report is that in the eyes of contemporary Chinese college students, the value basis of marriage and childbearing has changed." They no longer believe that marriage and childbearing are for the purpose of obtaining security, but emphasize the meaning and value of marriage and childbearing to the individual. She said.

The study also pointed out that the resistance to marriage and childbearing faced by young people shows gender differences. "Housing and parenting costs have the biggest impact on college students. Male college students are more concerned about the cost of marriage and childbirth, and female college students are more concerned about self-development opportunities. Li Ting explained: "This prompts us to consider public policies that integrate the needs of both sexes. ”

The concept of "universal marriage and universal childbearing" is still there

Interface News: Why are young people's concepts of marriage and love behavior worth paying attention to in the current context?

Li Ting: In recent years, China's fertility rate has been declining. Judging from the seventh census and the 2021 birth data, the natural population growth rate is not so optimistic. At the same time, we also observed that there is a low fertility sentiment on the Internet. If the desire for low fertility will continue, then China's fertility rate may not have bottomed out and will continue to decline. We are concerned about China's fertility level, which will affect china's population development in the future.

In addition to childbearing, in terms of marriage and love, we usually think that China is a country of "universal marriage and universal childbearing" (generally need to get married and have children). Judging from the data of the sixth census and the 2015 population "small census", people who have almost completed the trajectory of marriage and childbearing have indeed shown a trend of universal marriage, and the marriage rate is very high. (Note: Public data show that in 2010, the unmarried rates of the 25-29 age group, the 30-34 age group, and the 35-39 age group were 28.91%, 9.02% and 4.13%, respectively, and the unmarried rate of the comprehensive 30-39 age group was 6.32%; in the 2015 random inspection, the unmarried rate of the 25-29 age group, the 30-34 age group, and the 35-39 age group was 34.88%, 10.69% and 4.40%, respectively. The combined unmarried rate in the 30-39 age group was 7.61%. But we want to know whether today's young people still have the mentality of "universal marriage and universal childbearing" with the change of generations, and whether people's concepts of marriage and childbearing have changed.

In addition, we have noticed that the marriage rate in Japan and South Korea is also decreasing significantly. (Note: According to the Nikkei Chinese Network, the unmarried rate of 30 years old in the Kanto region and the eight prefectures of Yamanashi (Tokyo Circle) exceeds the national average (54.5%) in Japan.) South Korea's JoongAng Ilbo reported that the proportion of unmarried people in South Korea's 30s accounts for 42.5%. "Lifelong non-marriage" is already a clear phenomenon in East Asian societies, in Japan and South Korea. Whether China will follow a similar path as Japan and South Korea is also our concern.

If the marriage rate continues to decline, superimposed on the low desire to have children, our demographic situation may be more severe than imagined, so from a demographic point of view, we need to pay attention to the marriage behavior and concept of marriage and love of young people.

Moreover, based on a sociological point of view, according to the theory of the "second demographic transition", individualism has risen, people will pursue more self-worth, and marriage will no longer be a necessity. In China, the family has always existed as the basic unit of social operation and social governance. We want to observe whether our belief in the family as the basic unit of society will also change significantly when the concept of young people changes, from valuing family culture to advocating the value and meaning of the individual. From the perspective of population and society, we chose to study the concept of marriage and childbearing among young people.

Interface News: The domestic marriage rate shows a downward trend year by year, and the "Report" finds that the willingness of college students to marry is higher than expected. Does this mean that even if the age of first marriage is postponed, "fear of marriage" and "anti-marriage" are not yet mainstream?

Li Ting: The report found that 61% of college students said they would get married, 30% said they were not sure, and only 7% really made it clear that they would not get married. The subjects of study are the youngest generation, and their ideas are not as radical as we think.

Interpreting this finding, we see not only homogeneity, but also the social stratification behind the data. First, from the perspective of gender stratification, women are more pessimistic about the prospects of marriage, men are more determined about marriage, and about 70% of men think they will get married. We have also found that in places where economic and social development is better, people have lower expectations of marriage.

From the overall data, everyone's expectations for marriage have not been much shaken, that is to say, the mainstream of the current concept of marriage and childbearing is not "anti-marriage", the mainstream concept still believes that marriage is a very important life stage or life choice of the individual.

Interface News: After the second demographic transition, people still have a strong willingness to marry, does this phenomenon have its own peculiarities?

Li Ting: There is also a lot of research in the West discussing this issue, the American sociologist Andrew Cherlin published the article "The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage" in 2004, he predicted that marriage would be "de-institutionalized", marriage as a form of social organization, its own meaning may disappear, people may not end up getting married. Or use cohabitation instead of marriage.

In 2020, he wrote another article reviewing what had happened in the past decade or so, and found that it was not the same as he had originally thought. The institution of marriage in the West has not collapsed. Social differentiation does emerge, but how exactly does differentiation manifest itself? He found that people of high socioeconomic status were more likely to marry, compared with poorer people and ethnic minorities who did not.

From the perspective of individualization process, the concept of marriage should be diluted, but why do people still choose to get married? Cherin explains that marriage was previously considered the "cornerstone", so we say "start a family and then start a business". Now, marriage has become the "top stone", you must have a certain economic foundation, will go to marriage and childbirth. In a sense, marriage has become a symbol of success, a manifestation and symbol of success.

Cherin also believes that the value basis of marriage has changed. Before we talked about marriage, people would feel that marriage is a necessary choice in life, and if you have other ideas, people will ask: "Why don't you get married?" Now, while people still feel that marriage is important, people are starting to ask, "Why should I get married?" ”

Chehring concludes that in the West, there has been no subversive and transformative change in marriage, but there has been a gradual, developmental change in people's perception of marriage.

Characteristics of "individual marriage"

Interface News: Judging from this study, how has the perception of marriage and childbearing changed among young People in China?

Li Ting: Back in the Chinese context, the mainstream of young people's concept of marriage is not "anti-marriage", and on this basis, China's marriage system has not undergone transformational changes, and young people have not abandoned marriage. But our research has found that their attitudes toward marriage do change developmentally, and arguably the basis of value in marriage and procreation.

In the past, we didn't ask why we wanted to get married, and we naturally felt that we had to have a companion, and the inheritance had a guarantee function. But among young people now, such a view has been diluted. They feel that marriage and childbearing are not for the sake of obtaining security, but more emphasis is placed on the meaning and value of marriage and childbirth to the individual.

In our survey, the number one answer to the question "Why should we be in love" was: "Being in love allows us to help and improve each other." "Why get married?" The most common answer is: "There needs to be spiritual sustenance and emotional communication." "Why do you want to have children?" The most chosen option was: "It's important and meaningful to accompany your child as they grow." ”

They put meaning and value first, which is in line with the third stage of the marriage transformation described by Chehring, the individual marriage.

What is solitary marriage? Chehring believes that marriage is not de-institutionalized, and everyone still affirms the meaning of marriage, but everyone seeks different things in marriage. In individual marriage, both marriage and family exist around the needs of the individual. Everyone downplayed the traditional division of family roles, emphasized more on finding a partner who progressed with themselves and was helpful to themselves, and emphasized the value of emotion and spirit.

Interface News: The "Report" found that there is a heterogeneity of the population in the willingness to marry, from the perspective of gender, what is the difference between men and women in the willingness to marry?

Li Ting: The study found that in terms of factors that inhibit the willingness to marry, the cost of marriage and childbearing and the balance of work and family have a prominent impact on college students' willingness to marry, male college students' biggest concern is the cost of marriage, and female college students are more affected by the factors of marriage resistance; in terms of factors that promote marriage willingness, male college students value the life course, and female college students pay more attention to support functions.

I think the difference in the willingness of men and women to marry is mainly due to the difference in their gender role positioning. Male college students still position themselves as the backbone of the family economy, so they are more concerned about the economic cost of marriage and childbirth. The general idea in society is that you can only afford a family if you are successful enough, which is also what men define and demand of themselves.

From a women's point of view, with the great increase in women's educational attainment, women's positioning of themselves has also undergone important changes, they no longer position themselves as family caregivers, or as bearers of family affairs, they are eager and willing to position themselves as readers.

The Concept of "Gender Revolution" was proposed in the West, and since the demand for labor by capital was de-gendered, which directly led to the improvement of women's educational level and the rise of labor participation rate, women were more involved in public sphere work, which was considered to be the first stage of the gender revolution.

The second phase of the gender revolution is the increased entry of men into the private sphere, helping women to share the public-private conflict they have created as a result of their entry into the public sphere. As women work, the time and energy spent on the home care component are diminished, which leads to problems in the balance between work and family. We can see that in the Nordic countries, it is very common for men to take care of children and is also an advocated thing. By completing the full closed loop of the gender revolution and achieving a balance between men and women, public and private, people will not inhibit their willingness to marry and have children.

But in other countries other than Northern Europe, the second phase of the gender revolution has been delayed, and men have not entered the private sphere to help women share caregiving responsibilities, but women have been more discriminated against in the public sphere because they need to take care of their responsibilities. In this case, their choice is not to return to the family, but to abandon the family.

Now some young women are reluctant to marry and have children, not because they don't want a family, but because they face discrimination that extends to the public sphere, and they can only make this choice.

Interface News: How can we integrate the needs of both sexes and increase the willingness of young people to marry and have children?

Li Ting: In China, we are also seeing the stagnation of the gender revolution. But I would like to emphasize that we should not simply see this phenomenon as a "gender antagonism".

Men position themselves as the backbone of the family economy, the main bearers of the cost of marriage and childbearing, not because of their traditions, nor can it be said that this is an idea that hinders progress. The potential cost for men to break traditional gender norms is much higher than for women. If a woman doesn't have a good career but takes good care of her family, people won't feel like she's failing. But if a man is unemployed and only responsible for taking care of the family, society will be more harsh on him. This is also a manifestation of men being imprisoned by gender culture.

The discrimination that women face in the public sphere is often discrimination against the market and capital. Women have to take care of children, the contribution to work will naturally decrease, and the market will discriminate against women, which is the logic of the market.

If we want to improve this problem, we must consider how to ensure that women are not discriminated against in the market. How can men be motivated to enter the family realm? The multifaceted collaboration of markets, institutions, and individuals can improve or solve this problem.

Interface News: From the perspective of demographic and family changes in Western countries, the second demographic transition has brought about the loosening of marriage and reproductive relations and the diversification of family forms. However, the report found that at present, in China, college students are very receptive to non-traditional parenting concepts in terms of acceptance of different marital behaviors. Does this finding suggest that China's second demographic transition will have its own peculiarities?

Li Ting: The main point of the second demographic transition is the process of individualization and the weakening of the marriage system, and one of the important manifestations is the debinding of fertility and marriage, that is, childbirth does not necessarily occur within marriage.

In contrast, our "Report" found that Young Chinese people have a low acceptance of unmarried childbearing, they have not untied marriage and childbirth, and still believe that childbirth should occur within the marriage system. It can be argued that this situation is the biggest difference between China and the West under the theory of "second demographic transition".

But this phenomenon is not unique to China, and the non-marital fertility rate in Japan and South Korea is also very low, and at this level, they are in line with China, and marriage and childbearing are still deeply bound in the views of young people.

Women have more resistance to fertility

Interface News: The Report found that college students have the highest acceptance of premarital cohabitation in the nature of trial marriage. Some scholars concerned with population issues have proposed to guarantee the reproductive rights of single women and start a legislative study of China's Cohabitation Law. How do you see the feasibility of launching the Cohabitation Act?

Li Ting: Cherin believes that an important manifestation of the non-institutionalization of marriage is that cohabitation will replace marriage, and a large number of births occur in cohabiting partners. This phenomenon is currently common in Europe and the United States, especially in Northern Europe and Western Europe. Returning to the Chinese context, not only through our survey, but also from other studies, we can also see that the proportion of cohabitants is rising, and college students are more receptive to cohabitation and premarital sex.

However, the emergence of cohabitation does not mean that the meaning of cohabitation is similar. In China, cohabitation is more of a prelude to marriage. Love enters a better stage, the purpose of cohabitation is to see whether marriage is appropriate, and this behavior can also reduce the cost of living. This is also where China's second demographic shift is different from the West, where the nature of cohabitation and marriageability is greater than that of marriage substitution in China.

The law represents the will of the state, and its value orientation determines the relationship between cohabitation and family marriage. If we recognize cohabitation as an alternative to marriage at the national level, believing that the development trend of marriage is gradually weakening, and more and more people will only live together and not marry, then the introduction of the Cohabitation Law is necessary, which can protect the economic and physical rights and interests of both men and women.

However, if society generally believes that cohabitation is only a transitional stage and an informal trial marriage, under this orientation, the significance of the Cohabitation Law may be discounted to some extent. So I think the legislative viability of the Cohabitation Act depends on the value orientation behind it and the perception of this phenomenon in society.

Interface News: The report mentioned that the average ideal number of children of college students is 1.85, and the average number of willing children has dropped to 1.36. How is this data understood?

Li Ting: We set the indicator of the ideal number of children in the study to show a change in the concept of fertility. If the ideal number of children of college students is more than two, it can be said that the concept of fertility is still relatively traditional, and there has been no major change. If the ideal number of children is less than two, it means that their concept has tended to have fewer children, and their recognition of the value of fertility has changed.

When the two indicators of ideal children and willing children are put together, we see the difference between the two, and the difference between the two indicators represents the perception of college students' fertility obstacles. For example, in his ideal, having two children is the best situation, but in reality, he only wants to have one. Why has the ideal fertility not been achieved? Because in reality there are some factors that prevent a person from reaching his willingness to have children. From a policy point of view, the gap between the number of ideal children and the number of willing children is where the policy can exert its strength.

Through research, we see that women feel more resistance to fertility, and women are clearly exposed to conflicts between personal development and family fertility, compared to men who feel less conflict in this regard.

We also see that in a risk society, people's perception of risk is hierarchically differentiated. The study found that people with urban hukou, double-first-class colleges and universities, eastern regions, and parents with higher levels of education have higher expectations for their future development, and can feel greater pressure of social competition, but also feel greater resistance to fertility.

Interface News: You measure the degree of Internet participation of college students by three dimensions, intensity (the length of time college students spend on the Internet at leisure), circle culture (participation in subcultural circles, the applicable type of APP), and information exposure (exposure to the influence of different types of information), and study their connection with college students' views on marriage and childbearing, and the conclusions drawn are very interesting. Do you think this part of the findings will inspire us to understand, and even improve, the current less desirable rate of marriage and childbearing?

Li Ting: Many people say that the study found that people who are used to using an APP generally have low fertility intentions, so does the state have to shut down this APP? We are not studying this topic as a means of governance. The question we want to explore is how changes in communication technology affect people's views on marriage and childbearing, and what impact they actually have on people's views on marriage and childbearing.

The reason why we should pay attention to the Internet participation of college students is because the objects of our research are "Generation Z youth" and "post-95s", they are "natives of the Internet", and unlike the post-70s and post-80s, they are more likely to form a circled culture. This stratification is reflected in their many subcultural hobbies, and in the fact that because of the decentralized information distribution mechanism, people with different preferences have become accustomed to using different apps. There are more and more such aggregations, and the differentiation of values between different apps is becoming more and more obvious.

Our research found that the use of Weibo was negatively correlated with college students' willingness to marry and have children, the use of Tiger Flutter was positively correlated with college students' willingness to have children, the use of Douban was negatively correlated with women's willingness to have children, and the use of Xiaohongshu was positively correlated with women's willingness to marry and have children. But I have repeatedly stressed that we have not made strict causal inferences, and the research has not yet strictly proved that the use habits of college students' apps affect their views on marriage and childbearing.

What this part of the study wants to show is that without discussing cause and effect, young people's concept of marriage and childbearing has indeed appeared significantly differentiated on the Internet. At present, our research only presents this phenomenon.

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