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<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="5" >1, the focus of the United States' adjustment of its Korean War policy - the MacArthur hearing</h1>
On the question of what kind of policy the United States should pursue in Korea, on April 11, 1951, Truman gave a radio speech when he dismissed MacArthur. In this speech, for the first time, it was clearly stated that the United States should "fight a limited war" in Korea. With the dismissal of MacArthur, there was a fierce debate and quarrel within the US ruling clique, and the contradictions reached white-hot and public. This fierce quarrel was concentrated in the so-called "MacArthur hearings".
The hearing, jointly chaired by the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations Committee, began on May 3, 1951, and ended on June 25, 1951, and lasted for more than 50 days, including MacArthur, Secretary of Defense George Marshall, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Omar Bradley, Army Chief of Staff Lawdon Collins, Air Force Chief of Staff Hoyt Van Den Po, Chief of Naval Operations Forrest Sherman, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, former U.S. Military Commander-in-Chief Weidmeier, Former Defense Secretary Louis Johnson and 13 other U.S. military dignitaries were investigated for testifying.
MacArthur was the first subject of investigation to testify. He believed that these actions should not be taken without fear of causing the Soviet Union to enter the war. Only by taking these actions would be the best way to put a speedy end to the Korean War, and he even advocated that the United States act alone if the rest of the United Nations was unwilling to assist.
Acheson, Marshall, Bradley, the chief of staff of the three services, and former secretary of defense Johnson, all testified in support of MacArthur's dismissal, believing that MacArthur's claims were both difficult to achieve their goals and took great risks, and opposed the expansion of the war to China. Instead, they all advocated a limited war in North Korea.
Acheson later placed all the blame on MacArthur for the "United Nations Army" to cross the 38th Parallel and move north. In his memoirs, he said:
The distinction between the war aims of the United Nations Command and the long-term political aims of the United Nations would have been clear. "But between October 1950 and April 1951, there was confusion about the eloquence of General MacArthur, who repeatedly spoke and acted in defiance of President Truman's orders."
In fact, as early as late January 1951, when the "United Nations Army" launched a full-line counterattack and pushed hard from near the 37th Line to the 38th Line, the US authorities had already seen that it was impossible for the Uncom Army to advance to the Yalu River, and that Britain and France were no longer enthusiastic about the Korean War and advocated the realization of the Korean Armistice. In mid-March, the United States authorities considered issuing a statement on behalf of the President aimed at negotiating an end to the Korean War and drafted a draft statement seeking the views of the envoys of the countries concerned participating in the "Unprovoked" operation.
On March 20, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the statement to MacArthur for comment. However, MacArthur's march 24 statement, which was very different from the intent of the drafted presidential statement, put the United States authorities' consideration toes toes. In this regard, Britain, France and other countries have expressed strong protests.
After MacArthur's dismissal, with the beginning of the "MacArthur Hearing" of the U.S. Senate on The Korean War policy issue, the U.S. National Security Council also met from May 2 to 16, 1951, to systematically review the U.S. Korean War policy, arguing that the United States could not win a decisive victory in Korea and that it was impossible to solve the Korean problem by military means alone.
On May 16, the U.S. National Security Council adopted a policy memorandum on North Korea, U.S. National Security Council Document No. 48/5. The memorandum drew a clear distinction between the ultimate and current objectives of the United States in Korea, and determined that the current goal of the United States in Korea was to establish a favorable defensive line in the area of the 38th Parallel and to seek to conclude an armistice agreement and end the Korean War.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="80" >2</h1>
On May 17, President Truman approved the document. This was the first time since the successful U.S. landing at Inchon in September 1950 that the U.S. authorities ordered MacArthur to cross the 38th Parallel to advance north, adjusting the Korean War policy and clarifying the operations of the "United Nations Army" and no longer achieving the goal of military occupation of all of Korea. This was the result of the victorious battle of the Chinese Volunteers on the battlefield and, in fact, a manifestation of the Acceptance by the United States authorities of the defeat in the Korean War.
Then, on May 31, 1951, George Kennan, who worked at the Institute of Princeton University and had worked at the U.S. Embassy in the Soviet Union, was commissioned by U.S. Secretary of State Acheson to meet in his personal capacity with Yagb Malik, Permanent Representative of the Soviet Union to the United Nations. Kennan expressed in a vague manner the intention of the US authorities to achieve an armistice in Korea along the 38th Parallel through negotiations. The United States has also made this representation through other channels.
According to National Security Council Document No. 48/5 of 1951 approved by Truman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States issued a new directive to Ridgway on June 1, setting out the field course of action of the "United Nations Army".
The content of this directive is:
As Supreme Commander of the United Nations Forces, you must always put the safety of your troops first, force the North Korean and Chinese troops fighting in and around korea to make heavy sacrifices in personnel and materials, and complete at least the following tasks, so as to create favorable conditions for the settlement of the Korean conflict:
(1) Conclude a reasonable armistice agreement and terminate hostilities.
(2) Establish a regime of the Republic of Korea to lead the entire Joseon Dynasty in the area south of the northern boundary line suitable for administrative administration and military defence, which shall not be demarcated south of the 38th Parallel.
3. Prepare for the phased withdrawal of all non-Korean armed forces from the DPRK.
(4) Strengthen the armed forces of South Korea sufficient to prevent or repel a renewed aggression by North Korea.
According to these instructions and guidelines, the ground forces of the "United Nations Army", in addition to continuing to compete with battalion-sized troops for several key points in the so-called "Iron Triangle" areas of Tieyuan, Jinhua, and Pingkang, and the area east of Yangkou, in early June 1951, the entire line was transferred to strategic defense and various military preparations were made.
On the one hand, the "United Nations Army" strengthened its position fortifications to prevent the attack of the Volunteer Army and the People's Army, and by the end of July, it had basically completed the construction of the fortifications of the "Kansas-Wyoming Line". The "Kansas Line", which runs up the south bank of the Linjin River Estuary and goes up the river, passes through Jicheng, Daocheng Da Nang, the south bank of Huachuan Lake, and Yangkou to the madali line north of the east coast pole city, with a total length of about 220 kilometers, and is the main resistance line of the "United Nations Army".
The "Wyoming Line", starting from the north bank of the Linjin River Estuary in the west, extends northeast, through Tieyuan and Jinhua to the south shore of Huachuan Lake and connects with the "Kansas Line", with a total length of about 150 kilometers, which is a screen guard line of the "Kansas Line" in the western region. In July, three South Korean National Guard divisions were specially mobilized to construct positions on the Kansas-Wyoming Line. Solid bunkers were constructed from logs and sandbags, including tanks, artillery, machine guns, rifles and other firearms bunkers, connected by trenches. A large number of mines and barbed wire were set up in front of the positions. Permanent fortifications were also constructed on the Wyoming Line.
On the other hand, in order to cooperate with the armistice negotiations, ready to launch a local offensive against the Volunteer Army and the People's Army, and exert military pressure, 6 divisions of the US Army and 4 divisions of the South Korean Army were withdrawn to the second line for rest, and the US Army, the British Army, and the Turkish Army successively rotated more than 190,000 people, and the two brigades of the British Army, the Canadian Brigade, and the Forces of Commonwealth countries such as Australia and New Zealand were merged into the 1st Division of the British Commonwealth on July 28, and 3 South Korean divisions were expanded. 18 frontier airports were built in Dongdouchuan, Yongping, Linhe and so on. In mid-August, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the deployment of five additional anti-aircraft artillery battalions and four field artillery battalions to the 8th Army. The US 8th Army and the US Far East Air Force Headquarters also began to formulate plans to launch local offensives on the ground and in the air.
In addition, the "United Nations Army" also made some strategic military preparations: 14 additional naval and air force transport and supply bases were opened in Wonju, Jinhae, Gunsan, and Jeju Island; the original airports such as Gimpo, Suwon, and Daegu were expanded and new gunsan airports were built; an oil depot was built at each jet base, and an oil pipeline was laid from Incheon to Gimpo and Suwon; by August, the air force wing commanded by the US 5th Air Force (each wing had 1 combat brigade, 1 support brigade and 1 maintenance and supply brigade) were fixed at various airports in South Korea, and four of the wings were moved from the Japanese base in June and August.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="86" >3, the background of China's adjustment of the policy of the War to Resist US Aggression and Aid Korea</h1>
When the CPC Central Committee decided to form the Chinese Volunteer Army to enter the Korean War, it estimated three possibilities for the changes in the situation in the Korean War situation after the Volunteer Army entered the war.
First, under the condition that the Soviet Union provided weapons and equipment and dispatched air force support, annihilated and expelled the United States and other invading forces in Korea to fundamentally solve the Korean problem; second, under the condition that the weapons and equipment provided by the Soviet Union could not arrive in time and the air force could not provide support, a stalemate was reached in Korea, or even forced to withdraw, and the United States declared war on China, thus affecting the recovery and construction plan of the entire country; third, the volunteer army commanded flexibly, gave full play to its tactical expertise, and was able to attack areas other than large and medium-sized cities. The United States could be forced to negotiate a settlement, but only if U.S. troops first withdrew south of the 38th Parallel.
Among these three possibilities, the CPC Central Committee believes that the third situation is the most likely, and believes that after Chinese People's Volunteer Army and the Korean People's Army fought side by side, the United States suffered a serious blow and loss in Korea, causing it to break its head and bleed and retreat in spite of difficulties. It is estimated that this "possibility is greater, and this is what we are trying to strive for." Our purpose in resisting US aggression and aiding Korea and defending our homeland is to strive for this possible realization, and we believe that our own strength can strive for this possible realization."
However, the US imperialists also have a crazy faction, and we must also be on guard against its desperate risks.
After the Chinese People's Volunteer Army entered the Korean War, under the circumstance that its weapons and equipment were at a disparity and inferiority, it only carried out five consecutive battles with infantry as the main body and a small amount of artillery support, and fought the "United Nations Army," which was completely modernized and carried out joint army, navy, and air force, and all-round three-dimensional operations from the Yalu River to the 38th Line and the area south of the 38th Line. From a strategic offensive to a strategic defense, the US authorities also had to adjust their Korean War policy.
However, due to the huge disparity in weapons and equipment between the enemy and ourselves, especially the lack of support and cooperation between the air force and the navy of the volunteer army, there are many practical difficulties in combat, and in addition, the special geographical environment of the DPRK has also made the operation of the volunteer army subject to many restrictions.
This is mainly:
First, due to the lack of air force and naval support to cooperate with the operation, especially the lack of air force and the serious lack of anti-aircraft combat weapons, the volunteer army was seriously limited in combat space and combat time. In combat space, the U.S. Air Force controls the entire battlefield and can attack the rear of the Volunteer Army, and its Navy can control the rear coast of the Volunteer Side. The front and rear of the volunteer army, day and night, must be closely organized against air raids, otherwise they will suffer unnecessary losses. The Volunteers were powerless to attack the Rear and Coast of the Americans. In terms of combat time, the US military can fight all day, while the volunteer army has no freedom of movement during the day, and the movement and transportation of troops are mainly carried out at night. The operation of the entire combat machine of the Volunteer Army was severely restricted.
Second, only infantry fighting with a small amount of artillery support, no motorized equipment, no tanks participating in the battle, and a serious lack of anti-tank weapons, so the attack firepower and battlefield mobility are weak. It is possible to defeat the attack of the "United Nations Army", but it is difficult to annihilate the heavy army group of the "United Nations Army", it is difficult to deal with the Tanks of the American Army, and each battle can encircle one division or several divisions, but it is difficult to achieve the task of annihilation for one whole division or a whole regiment (it is easier to annihilate the South Korean Army).
When the "United Nations Army" broke through and fled, the volunteer army pursued on foot, but the "United Nations Army" could not be motorized and mechanized, and it was difficult to achieve the pursuit and expansion of the results. In particular, during the second and fifth battles, the "United Nations Army" retreated about 30 kilometers a day, which happened to be a night trip for the volunteer army to pursue on foot, and after the volunteer army approached, the "United Nations Army" retreated another 30 kilometers.
In the first campaign, the US 10th Army took advantage of the superiority of the navy and air force to retreat from the sea, the volunteer army did not have an air force and navy, and was powerless to withdraw the US troops from the sea, starting from the third campaign, both sides formed a coherent front, although the volunteer army could break through the defense line of the "United Nations Army", but it was more difficult to achieve the encirclement of the campaign after the breakthrough. In defensive operations, relying on general field fortifications, the volunteer army was difficult to resist the fierce fire of the "United Nations Army" with aircraft, tanks and artillery, so it was difficult to organize and defend.
Third, the combat materials needed by the volunteer army are almost all supplied by domestic organizations, and the material consumption is the largest, but the means of transport and means of transport are limited, there is no air and sea transportation, mainly by train and car transportation, the entire transportation capacity is weak, coupled with the lack of air supremacy, under the bombardment blockade of the US Air Force, the roads are often damaged, materials and transport vehicles in the transportation process, due to the US aircraft bombing and strafing losses are serious, material losses of 30% to 40%, transportation is seriously difficult, far from meeting the needs of combat, Ammunition can only ensure the supply of key points, and the food supply can only reach 25% to 30% of the demand in the first three battles, and in the fourth and fifth battles, it can only reach about 50% of the demand.
The ability to follow up and supply in combat is weaker, basically only relying on the troops themselves to carry, with a few days to fight for a few days, generally can only maintain 7 to 10 days. The U.S. military called the Volunteers a "worship offensive." This situation of transport and replenishment seriously affected the implementation of the operation, limited the determination of the campaign, the scale of the campaign and the duration of the continuous operation, and also caused the volunteers to be chased away from many favorable fighters.
Fourth, the Korean Peninsula is small in size, surrounded by the sea on three sides, and narrow and long in the north and south. This geographical characteristic limits the exertion of the superiority of the volunteer army's strength, and the large number of troops cannot be opened, and the lack of troops is not enough to achieve the combat task. In particular, it is not possible to carry out large-scale and extensive mobile operations as on the domestic battlefield, nor can it open up multiple battlefields. This geographical characteristic is conducive to the "United Nations Army" giving full play to its naval and air superiority and carrying out landing offensives. The farther the Volunteers advanced south, the more exposed the east and west coasts behind the flanks became, the heavier the task of coastal defense, and at the same time, as the transport lines were extended, the greater the burden on transport.
In addition, fighting in Korea, unlike at home, lacks the cooperation of guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines. The "Un Army" has no worries and can concentrate more than 90% of its troops on frontal combat. This increased the pressure on the Volunteers to fight head-on.
<h1 class="pgc-h-arrow-right" data-track="87" >4, the introduction of the CPC Central Committee's "talk while fighting" policy</h1>
Due to the huge disparity in economic strength and weapons and equipment between the enemy and us, the operations of the Chinese Volunteer Army in Korea are bound to be arduous and difficult. Therefore, when the CPC Central Committee decided to form the Chinese Volunteer Army to fight in Korea, it was very cautious about the combat guidance of the volunteer army, and decided that after the volunteer army entered the DPRK, it would first organize a defensive battle for a certain period of positions, wait for the arrival of weapons and equipment ordered from the Soviet Union, and complete the equipment and training, and then talk about the counteroffensive after 6 months.
When the volunteer army entered the DPRK, the situation on the battlefield changed, making it impossible for the volunteer army to organize a defensive battle in the position according to the original plan, and Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai, in light of the situation in which the "United Nations Army" was divided into troops and ventured forward on the battlefield, they judged the hour and sized up the situation, changed the policy of annihilating the enemy in the movement, and began a strategic counteroffensive. Although the first and second battles were fought relatively smoothly, Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai held that the war was still quite protracted and arduous, and it was necessary to make long-term and arduous preparations.
After the second campaign, there was a mentality of quick victory among the volunteer army and within the democratic camp, believing that the Korean War could end quickly. The Soviet ambassador to Korea also put pressure on Peng Dehuai to deploy the campaign according to the principle of quick victory. After the third campaign repelled the US-led "United Nations Army" near the 37th Line, the mood of quick victory was even more serious, believing that as long as it pursued, the US military would withdraw from Korea. Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai believed that the volunteer army must rest and recuperate, and only by making full preparations can it be possible to fundamentally solve the Korean problem.
After the start of the fourth campaign, the CPC Central Committee and the Headquarters of the Volunteer Army held that the United States would not automatically withdraw from Korea without the fierce contest of several battles and the annihilation of most of the South Korean army and hundreds of thousands of US troops, and the war would still be protracted and arduous.
In early February 1951, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai decided to "adopt the policy of taking turns in Korea" in order to keep the volunteers engaged in protracted combat. Zhou Enlai also presided over the Central Military Commission in formulating a specific plan for taking turns to fight. After the end of the first phase of the Fourth Campaign, Peng Dehuai returned to Beijing from Korea in late February and analyzed the war situation together with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, who clearly still adhered to the principle of "preparing for war for a long time and striving for a short term as much as possible."
Zhou Enlai presided over the collation of the opinions jointly studied with Peng Dehuai, and on March 1, in the name of Mao Zedong, he sent a telegram to Stalin, in which he further pointed out: "From the recent battles currently being waged on the Korean battlefield, it can be seen that the enemy will not withdraw from Korea without being destroyed by a large part, but it will take time for the majority to eliminate these enemies, so the Korean War has the possibility of protracted, and I should prepare for at least two years." "Our army must be prepared for a long-term battle, and in a few years, it will consume hundreds of thousands of American personnel and make it retreat in spite of difficulties in order to solve the Korean problem."
After five consecutive battles of repeated contests, especially the fifth campaign, the CPC Central Committee and the Headquarters of the Volunteer Army have more fully seen that relying on the existing equipment and conditions of the Volunteer Army, it is impossible to quickly annihilate the enemy's effective forces in a short period of time and fundamentally solve the Korean problem.
The core problem of the volunteer army's combat difficulties is backward weapons and equipment. At that time, China's industrial base was backward, and there was no decent military industry. Although there are some arsenals, they can only make some simple infantry weapons and ammunition, can not make cannons, can not make cars, and can not make aircraft and tanks. In fact, the improvement and strengthening of the weapons and equipment of the Volunteer Army was mainly based on the purchase of weapons from the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was in a period of recovery after World War I, and it was difficult to quickly provide the weapons and equipment needed for volunteer combat. China's purchase of equipment from the Soviet Union was limited by funds, and even if it did, it would take some time to train to master the performance of the equipment, operational technology and the new tactics that followed, especially the training of the air force and navy. Therefore, it is impossible for the weapons and equipment of the volunteer army to be fundamentally improved in a short period of time, so the protracted nature of the war is more fully revealed.
At the same time, China's economic strength is weak, and its financial and material resources to support the war are limited. Originally, after the basic liberation of Chinese mainland, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, chaired by Mao Zedong, and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, which had just been established for less than a year, planned to restore the national economy in about three years, but as soon as the deployment began in June 1950, the US authorities imposed this war on the Chinese people, and the Chinese people had to meet the challenge of the US war.
In 1950, China's total industrial and agricultural output value was 57.4 billion yuan (New currency value), and if calculated with the US dollar in a 2:1 ratio, it was only equivalent to about 1/2 of the us military budget appropriation of more than 48 billion US dollars for the fiscal year from July 1, 1950 to June 30, 1951, and even less could it be compared with the GROSS national product of the United States. In 1950, China's fiscal revenue was 6.52 billion yuan, which was only about 1/4 of the direct war cost of the United States in the first year of the Korean War.
Because of the support for the war, China's military expenditure in 1950 accounted for 41.1% of the financial final account, and the expenditure on the recovery of the national economy accounted for only 25.5% of the financial final account, while the military expenditure allocated in the 1951 financial budget increased in quantity and proportion compared with 1950. In this way, if the war continues to be fought for a long time, the recovery of the national economy and the long-term construction of the country will be affected. The Korean people have been fighting for a year, and the financial, material and human difficulties in supporting a protracted war are even greater.
Of course, the CPC Central Committee and the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China, chaired by Mao Zedong, have extremely high prestige, have strong appealing and organizational power, and the people of the whole country are united as one, share the same hatred and hatred, give full support to the war, and have the support of the Korean Government and the Korean people every day, and the Korean People's Army and the Volunteer Army fighting side by side.
Pending the fifth battle, the United States authorities insisted on continuing to expand aggression, making a peaceful settlement of the Korean issue impossible. After the fifth campaign, the front line had stabilized in the north and south of the 38th Parallel, and the US authorities were forced to adjust their Korean War policy due to the defeat of the "United Nations Army" on the battlefield, abandoning the goal of military occupation of all of Korea, and making an offer to negotiate a Korean armistice along the 38th Parallel. This shows that at this time, the basis and possibility of resolving the DPRK issue through negotiations already exist.
On June 3, kim Il Sung also came to Beijing to jointly analyze the war situation and discuss the war policy with Mao Zedong after the U.S. authorities expressed their willingness to negotiate an armistice in Korea along the 38th Parallel. Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung studied and decided to implement the principle of fighting while talking, and to carry out both political and military struggles:
On the one hand, we are ready to hold negotiations with the United States side in order to achieve an armistice and withdrawal of troops on the 38th Parallel; on the other hand, we have no illusions about the success of the negotiations, and we must make long-term and lasting plans militarily, and smash any offensive of the "United Nations Army" with resolute military strikes to coincide with the smooth progress of the armistice negotiations.
Based on this, the CPC Central Committee has set the guiding principle of "fully preparing for protracted operations and striving for peace talks to bring an end to the war."
(End of text)
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