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In the 10-11 season, Manchester United, why did the battle come to the end - a brief analysis of sir's art of mobilization

As a traditional coach born and raised in the UK, Ferguson is not a top tactical master, but his strategic ability is particularly outstanding. The distribution of physical strength of the players and the grasp of the focus of the game cannot be surpassed by anyone. Today we will talk about how Ferguson, 10 years ago, led Manchester United to win the league title and the Champions League runner-up in the face of injuries and an aging squad.

In the 10-11 season, Manchester United, why did the battle come to the end - a brief analysis of sir's art of mobilization

That year, it seemed that there were many stars, but sir's suffering was only the most clear to him - except for Inter Milan, which collapsed half of the main squad when Benitez was in power for a short time, manchester United's personnel shortage that season was the first of the major European giants. Only Vidic and Evra have normal attendance in the backline, even Van der Sar has hung up the exemption card many times; in midfield, valencia was lost early, followed by Fletcher, coupled with Park Ji-sung's injury after the Asian Cup, only half of the strength remained for a long time; as for the front, 21 league goals Berbatov and Van Hernandez, who must have brought three points in the away goal, can't hide it, and no one can forget how Rooney, who faced various difficulties in the first half of the season, needed to score goals to regain confidence.

In the 10-11 season, Manchester United, why did the battle come to the end - a brief analysis of sir's art of mobilization

The steady United rode the league and didn't swallow their first defeat until the next spring when they lost to Wolves.

However, compared with the dismal defeat of Ancelotti after losing Lampard in the same period, Ferguson used excellent "macro-control" to minimize the loss of core absences.

In Rooney's absence, he used Beba, who can also organize the attack with the ball, as a "shadow warrior". Although most people in the industry have lost patience with Ferguson's repetition of the annoying "Rooney and Beba are the best partners", it turns out that in the opening stages when points are most needed, the "dashing brother" who only scored 26 goals in 86 games in the previous two seasons is like a divine help: the second Red Devils player to score a hat-trick against Liverpool in 64 years, the second person in the Premier League to score 5 goals in a single game, actually belongs to the Bulgarians who are "lazy, low-prolific and slack". Ferguson, who personally drove Berbatov, who smoked two packs of cigarettes a day to Carrington, finally scored 100 percent in the league that needed to be decided first, although the latter's two-and-a-half-year European goal drought remained unbroken.

In the 10-11 season, Manchester United, why did the battle come to the end - a brief analysis of sir's art of mobilization

The unexpected bravery of "Little Pea" Hernans in his first Premier League season allowed Ferguson, who had seen the change of strength, to send Beba, who was weak against a strong opponent, to the bench and even the stands at the end of the season. During the crucial season sprint, Berbatov became a spectator, daring to abandon the league's top scorer, which is estimated to be something that only Ferguson dared to do. It seems that "there is no difference in appearance", but in fact, it is to make full use of the value of all people, which is precisely where the wisdom and courage of the thrifty housekeeper lie.

Because Ferguson understood earlier than everyone that no matter how many Goals Beba scored, Rooney, who was more adapted to the big scene, was the person Manchester United could really rely on.

Rooney is a beneficiary of Ferguson's wisdom, and Rooney, who once said "Manchester United can't meet my ambitions", seemed to be on the Tevez-esque road of no return at one point. It was Ferguson's appeasement and trust that prevented the building from falling. In the sprint of May, Rooney's performance can be described as perfect, the No. 10 active in all positions in the midfield has become the well-deserved core of the team, the hat-trick of the away reversal of West Ham basically determines the Premier League title, and the only goal away to Chelsea in the Champions League is the killing move to eliminate the opponent. Being a guest at Filtins is a classic pass-and-shoot.

In the 10-11 season, Manchester United, why did the battle come to the end - a brief analysis of sir's art of mobilization

4411: Team suppression

Victorious in the first leg of the Champions League with Schalke 04, sir considers one of the best Champions League experiences of his time in charge. Although cautious, the disciples played a vivid "suppression flow" on the field: the midfield trio of Park Ji-sung, Giggs and Carrick seemed to be loosely arranged, overlapping in characteristics and lacked athletic ability, but the distance between the front, middle and back lines was just as required by a generation of giants Saki, always maintaining around 25 meters, for the Red Devils' aging midfielder, such a space is not unnecessary to consume physical strength, but also can carry out various tactical changes on the spot.

In the 10-11 season, Manchester United, why did the battle come to the end - a brief analysis of sir's art of mobilization

One of the best changes is to give Carrick full tactical freedom: since the 2009 Champions League battle in The City of Rome was inexplicably "invisible" and then put on the hat of attacking and defending, the heir to Keane's number has been intentionally or unintentionally degraded in the past two years. But Carrick's form improved a lot at the time, especially in the Champions League. With Giggs retreating to the center, coupled with Schalke 04 only a symbolic siege of Raul, Carrick, who was able to play the characteristics of short pass scheduling and large-scale transfer, played a gorgeous command rare in those seasons, 57 passes and 51 times in place, completely revitalizing United's frontcourt.

In the 10-11 season, Manchester United, why did the battle come to the end - a brief analysis of sir's art of mobilization

In the face of Schalke 04's idea of trying to open up space on the wing, Ferguson's policy has always been resolutely suppressed: Park Ji-sung, who took the initiative to move closer to the left wing and protect Evra's attack, and Valencia, who was more and more like a British full-back, grabbed Uchida and Sarpe and could not open the gap, the team was forced to return to the single operation mode of the middle of the road, and because of the uniform position of Manchester United when defending, Giggs and Carrick did not fight separately, but jointly covered the defensive space. Coupled with Schalke's lack of excellent midfield organizers, he could not get off the hook when attacking, and was broken by each side when defending, and the defeat was expected.

In the 10-11 season, Manchester United, why did the battle come to the end - a brief analysis of sir's art of mobilization

Rooney, who still has to mention the excellent form, although the first half of the season was completely covered by the light of Beba, but after the Bulgarian gradually faded out of the starting lineup, the state of the Red Devils No. 10 also seemed to return to the previous season's full firepower: while enjoying the freedom of running position in the front court, Rooney's frequent substitutions took all the Schalke players who were staring at him from their positions, thus leaving enough space for park ji-sung and Giggs's fork and inside. When retreating, Rooney, who was pulling back to protect the midfield, also used the opponent's rat thrower. Rooney, an all-around attacker and defense in sports battles, is not only a great partner for the away can opener Hernandez, but also the eye of Ferguson's 4411 new team.

In the 10-11 season, Manchester United, why did the battle come to the end - a brief analysis of sir's art of mobilization

Against Chelsea, the Red Devils had a 65% pass success rate in the short term after they regained the ball, a full half higher than Chelsea's 43%. Manchester United's mature tactical cooperation has led to the team being able to quickly move the ball out of the competition area through local inversion after obtaining the ball, and finding Rooney and Hernandez at the first time, forming a local breakthrough or even a single knife. Although Ferguson's tactical thinking of organizing the midfield, dividing the ball into the wing and then crossing to find opportunities has not changed for more than 20 years, the increasing number of incisions, counter-attacks and rapid offensive and defensive conversions at that time has supported the Red Devils' new 4411.

In the 10-11 season, Manchester United, why did the battle come to the end - a brief analysis of sir's art of mobilization

As for the loss to Barca in the Champions League final, it can be attributed to "no no, really can't also", which is the best Manchester United can do with existing players. Not to mention Habeb in barcelona, compared to the midfielders of another La Liga giants, Real Madrid (Alonso, 272, Khedira, Kaka, Diarra and even Pepe), the midfield of Park Ji-sung, Giggs and Carrick is also slightly shabby.

If there had been as much money as it is now, and the team had bought a back like De Rossi (just to give an example, not to mention that it was impossible to come), wouldn't it be better for a winger like Bale and an organizer like Sneijder? Now that the money is available, the large-scale investment is endless, but the achievements are a mess, how can people not miss the grandfather who once "turned decay into magic"!

In the 10-11 season, Manchester United, why did the battle come to the end - a brief analysis of sir's art of mobilization

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