Mr. Zhang Hao, a renowned historian and professor emeritus of the Faculty of Humanities at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, passed away in California, USA on April 20, local time. Born in 1937, Zhang Hao graduated from the Department of History of National Taiwan University and went to the United States to study in the United States and received his master's and doctoral degrees from Harvard University. While studying at Harvard University, he studied under the master of sinology, Yang Liansheng, and the giant historian of comparative thought, Shi Huaci. Before retiring in 2014, Zhang hao served as a faculty member in the Humanities Department of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology and taught at The Ohio State University in the Department of History for 30 years. After retiring, he also served as a communications researcher at the Institute of History and Linguistics of the Academia Sinica, and moved to the San Francisco Bay Area in 2019.
Zhang Hao became famous for his research on the history of modern Chinese thought in the late Qing Dynasty and early Ming Dynasty, and his representative works include "Dark Consciousness and Democratic Tradition", "Martyr Spirit and Critical Consciousness: An Analysis of Tan Sitong's Thought", "Liang Qichao's Transition with Chinese Thought (1890-1907)", and "Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis: Seeking Order and Meaning (1890-1911)". He was also a contributor to the late Qing dynasty section of the Cambridge History of China. The discourses he has put forward in his academic career, including the Axial Age in the world's humanistic tradition, the dark consciousness in Western liberal thought, and the era of transformation in the history of modern Chinese thought, have been deeply influential in academic circles.
This article was originally published in the History of Political Thought, No. 3, 2013, translated by Su Penghui, who was a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science, School of Social Sciences, Tsinghua University, proofreader Ren Feng, and a professor at the School of International Relations, Chinese Min University.
If we study the traditions of Confucian socio-political thought, it is advisable to start with the concept of the classics. The worldly, "the world of economy" also. It is the idea of scripture that distinguishes Confucianism from the other major competing tendencies of thought in the Chinese tradition. More importantly, the sutra is at the same time a very complex and ambiguous concept, and its multi-layered meanings permeate almost all the key dimensions of Confucian social and political thought.
This article will explore the three main implications of the concept of the classics in the historical context of the Confucian tradition of the Song and Ming Dynasties, in order to illuminate some of the characteristics of this intellectual tradition for the modern world.
I. The Sutra as the Ideal of Confucian Vocation
At the most fundamental level, the sutra implies the Confucian ideal of vocation for the social moral elite, the so-called group of gentlemen. Behind this vocational ideal is a moral idealism that gives People and Society a Confucian character. Nevertheless, while Confucianism assumes that everyone has an intrinsic moral potential for self-realization, this optimistic belief is subject to a realistic realization that not everyone can undergo the arduous process of self-transformation necessary for self-moral realization.
On the assumption that only a few people with superior moral character can rule, these gentlemen set an example and performed their ministry, thus nurturing the vocational ideal that it was the special responsibility of the group of gentlemen to govern the world. In the traditional Chinese institutional environment, this ideal of vocational duty, which is oriented toward social action, is often transformed into the concept of becoming an official or leading the local society. In this way, the moral idealism and social activism implicit in the Confucian concept of the classics have a special political color.
Of course, the fundamental present orientation in Confucianism has always been at the root of the concept of the world. For centuries, Confucian scholars viewed this orientation of "joining the WTO" as the key to distinguishing Confucianism from competing traditions of thought such as Shi and Lao Zhuang. They are dissatisfied with the excessive attachment of the Buddha and the Tao to the "birth" or "other shore", regard it as harmful and irresponsible, and contrary to the concept of life of human morality.
Indeed, the idea of realizing the potential of humanity in this lifetime is at the heart of Confucian self-understanding. But Confucianism is not just a secular humanist tradition, as some modern scholars have assumed, because its secular orientation is rooted in transcendent beliefs centered on heaven or the Heavenly Dao. The primary concern of Confucianism may be how to practice and present righteousness in this life, but this concern has a strong transcendent spiritual dynamic. What cannot be ignored from this is that the transcendental character of the concept of scripture often leads to a certain religious tension between Confucian socio-political thought and the reality of the specific socio-political order.
As a Confucian ideal of vocation, the sutras are especially based on the concept of self-cultivation. In short, Confucian self-cultivation is a process of self-moral transformation, which consists of three parts: the original human nature, the perfect human nature, and the path from the former to the latter. The most central part of this connection is the concept of the Tao, which has become a consensus among the different branches of Song Ming Confucianism.
If we focus on its mainstream, we can distinguish between the right:ethics of virtue, intellectualism, ritualism, meditative practices, and asceticism. Whatever the relative position of the other components in Song Ming's Confucian conception of the Tao, there is no doubt that the ascetic spirit is in the most important position among them.
This ascetic spirit is clearly reflected in the aphorisms about character tempering. Such aphorisms are abundant in the Confucian classics, especially in the four books that are the core of the Confucian classics of the Song and Ming dynasties. Over the centuries of history, these maxims have been refined and systematically incorporated into various self-cultivation theories of work.
These theories vary in detail, but are generally composed of three intrinsically related elements: first, introspection, which is to initiate and maintain the confucian goal of becoming a gentleman, which is to concentrate and unswervingly aspire to become a gentleman; second, the practice of sincerity and hardship; and finally, the cultivation of temperance of desires and emotions. In many moral work theories, the last element is often prominent and receives special attention.
It is certain that temperance of lust has always been one of the main concerns of Confucianism. But Song Ming Confucianism reinforced this concern, which led to the emergence of a Manichaean self-image. The ego is seen as a battlefield in the endless life-and-death struggle between the opposing forces of reason and desire. It is on this basis that Zeng Guofan believes that the effort to domesticate desires and emotions is a difficult struggle like "descending the dragon and the tiger". [1]
As we all know, as a traditional Confucian scholar in the 19th century, Zeng Guofan's theory of Kung Fu had a wide influence on intellectuals and political leaders of various lineages in modern and modern China. The existence of a Manichaean self-image in the Confucian moral texts of the Song Ming Dynasty also implies that Confucian social action symbolized by the idea of scripture has a strong ascetic character. In the process of reading the Song Ming Confucian classics from this perspective, people are often shocked by the spiritual dynamics presented in them that try to fully control the inner world of the self.
Of course, this does not necessarily mean that there is a corresponding incentive to try to control the same external nature and society. But on the other hand, we must be wary of Weberian generalizations, namely, the flippant view of the Confucian worldview as an adaptation to the present world.
The presentation of the threefold scheme of self-moral transformation also indicates another characteristic of the "sutra" as the Confucian ideal of vocation. In this ideal, responsibility to society is balanced by a self-responsibility for pursuing the moral realization of the individual. The latter is often seen as a means to achieve the former.
But in the Confucian vision, the moral perfection of the self is also seen as a goal of self-sufficiency. The more orthodox commentaries of the four books of Song Ming Confucianism, such as Zhu Zi's commentaries, clearly demonstrate the twin goals of Confucian thought: Mingde and Xinmin. The two are interdependent and not any one-way derivation. [2]
At the same time, the Confucian concept of self has a transcendent foundation. Human nature, in the Confucian view, is by no means a biological setting. It contains moral and spiritual elements that can only be fully depicted by the sacred beyond. It is precisely because of this transcendent foundation that the individual self cannot be implemented merely in concrete social relations, however important such social relations may be for the nurturing and realization of the self.
Because Confucianism establishes a connection between the transcendent self and a socially-based sense of responsibility, the ideal of vocation transcends the individualist/collectivist dichotomy. In this respect, it can be compared to Christian individualism, as Theodore de Bary and Yu Yingshi tried. [3] In looking at this characteristic of the sutra concept, we should not only focus on the relationship between Confucian symbolic resources and modernization; at the same time, we should also explore whether this concept has the ideological resources for dialogue with the present on the theme of the relationship between the individual and society in the postmodern and post-individualist eras.
Second, as a confucian political order concerned with the sutra
The political orientation of the scriptures as the Confucian ideal of the heavenly duty of the gentleman has been slightly invented. This emphasis on political orientation is particularly pronounced from a cross-cultural perspective, as it is rarely found in most other civilizational traditions, such as the Christian conception of vocation or the Hindu concept of WTO practice.
Beneath this political orientation lies a Confucian belief, which Dong Zhongshu has the clearest expression of: political order is not only a certain bridge between transcendence and the human world, but also a necessity for the clearest nature of adults. [4] As a result, the primacy of political order over the human world became a deep-seated Confucian idea. In the Song Ming Confucian tradition, the jingshi was one of the few concepts that could be interchanged to characterize the basic concerns of the economic political order.
This article does not attempt to give a complete grasp of the concept of scripture. Cheng Yi, a major Confucian scholar in the Northern Song Dynasty, once distinguished between the basic categories of "governing the body" (or "governing the Tao") and "governing the law", thus exerting a dominant influence on the political thinking of Confucianism in the Song and Ming Dynasties. Therefore, a closer examination of these two basic categories will benefit from a preliminary understanding of the fundamental characteristics of the Song Ming Confucian concept of political order. [5]
For orthodox thinkers of science such as Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, "Taoism" exists in the moral paradigm implied by the University. This moral paradigm is embodied in the opening chapter of The University:
Those who want to be wise and virtuous in the world of the ancient world will rule their country first; those who want to rule their country will first cultivate their homes; those who want to cultivate their homes first cultivate their bodies; those who want to cultivate their bodies must first straighten out their hearts; those who want to straighten out their hearts first be sincere in their intentions; those who want to be sincere in their intentions will first be known; and those who want to know what they want to know; and those who want to know what they want to know. After knowing the qualities, knowing and then knowing the sincerity, sincerity and then the heart, the heart and then the body cultivation, the body cultivation and then the family Qi, the family Qi and then the country rule, the country rule and then the world is peaceful. From the Son of Heaven to the common man, all of them are based on self-cultivation. [6]
The moral idealistic temperament of this paradigm lies in the fact that it regards the cultivation of virtue as the foundation of statesmanship. Combined with the self-evident assumption in Confucianism that only a few people can withstand the arduous practice of virtue, this moral idealism also implies a political elitist orientation. How does this kind of moral idealism and political elitism reconcile with the cosmological kingship, especially given that the latter has always been the ideological foundation of the Confucian political order?
To respond to this question, it is necessary to note two transmutations in the Confucian tradition of the Song Ming Dynasty that arose from its moral idealism. One is the possibility of a "dual order" implicit in moral idealism that gives rise to the hope of breaking through the cosmic monarchy. This transmutation is based on classical Confucianism's belief in the unity of heaven and man, which is the direct channel that gives Confucian gentlemen the right to become one with heaven through the practice of virtue. [7]
By seeing directness to heaven as the ultimate source of earthly authority, the Confucian gentleman potentially developed a moral-spiritual center, or the order of soul, as Eric Voegelin put it, that bridged the gap between transcendence and the mundane independent of the existing socio-political order. The existing socio-political order relies on the cosmic monarchy, whose universal authority depends on the monopoly of the royal power over the Heavenly Dao. [8]
This potential was highlighted by the rise of Confucianism in the Song Dynasty, which tended to form the idea of dual authority through a novel historical interpretation. According to this interpretation, the three generations of Yao Shun achieved the unity of virtue and power, and with the end of this golden age of the Holy King, the ideal order of unity was sadly broken into two traditions. On the one hand, the moral-spiritual truth line survives according to the Tao, and on the other hand, the dynastic tradition is perpetuated by the conferral of rule.
Mainstream thinkers in Song Ming Confucianism, such as Zhu Xi, have repeatedly attacked that the dynastic order of the three generations is degenerate and decadent compared to the moral-spiritual purity of the three generations of Yao Shun. Thus, the concept of the separation of Taoism and governance clearly indicates the competitive significance and center of authority in Song Ming Confucianism towards the scholar group as relative to the rulers of the state. [9]
Although the concept of The parallel establishment of Daoist and ruling systems cultivated the authority of the Song Ming Confucians to ascend to the authority of the "teachers" who were based on Confucianism and guarded the Daoist system, and even made it comparable to the authority of the "Jun", on the whole, the concept of dual authority was not stable in the Song Ming Confucian tradition, and did not become great. Perhaps a major reason for the eventual miscarriage of this trend is that the Confucian "Tao" represents a more of a truncated than a full-scaletranscendence.
As early as pre-Qin Confucianism, there was already a tendency to merge the path of transcendence with the ritual system centered on the cosmic monarchy and universal patriarchy. In Han Dynasty Confucianism, the cosmic myth that existed at the core of its worldview appeared in the form of the "Three Principles", and the practical nature of the Confucian "Tao" became more prominent. According to this belief, cosmic monarchy and universal extended lineage are not only fully integrated into Confucian ethics, but also deeply embedded in the all-encompassing cosmic order. [10]
Since the rise of Neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming Dynasties, perhaps influenced by Mahayana Buddhism and philosophical Daoist thought, its transcendent impulse based on the belief in the unity of heaven and man has become increasingly strong. At the same time, this transcendental impulse has never been strong enough to negate the Three Principles of Faith. It is evident from this that a highly tense relationship arose between the transcendental impulse and the entrenched cosmic myth in Song Ming Confucianism;[11] nevertheless, transcendental realization was never completely overcome.
More importantly, although the binary distinction between Taoism and governance still appears in Confucian texts after the 17th century, the tensions inherent in it have gradually disappeared. In fact, as reflected in the writings of some orthodox Confucian thinkers of the 18th and 19th centuries, Taoism no longer points to an alternative center of meaning and authority, but is completely degenerated into the ideological support of governance. [12] As a result, the evolution of the dualistic authority concept in Song Ming's Confucian thought, which tended to break through the cosmic monarchy, was abandoned.
The moral idealism embodied in the Four Books simultaneously harbors another, more influential tendency. Unlike the foregoing abandoned evolutionary tendency, which contains tension with the cosmic monarchy, this tendency sees the monarchy as its starting point. As a result, a concept of political order was formed based on the cultivation of the elite class that surrounded the System of The Sons of Heaven. The moral transformation of the monarch himself thus became the primary concern of his order. In the course of this trend, Song Ming Confucianism has accumulated a very rich literature, which presents its moral idealistic temperament in the form of "mirror for the Prince".
The most influential of these documents is a 13th-century commentary, The Derivation of the University, which specifically teaches monarchs and their clans the paradigm of virtuous practice of the University. In this commentary on the University, the moral-spiritual classics, which were originally universal, were transformed into the moral manuals of the monarch, thus losing the original critical spirit of the University. The Derivation of the University embodies the typical way in which moral idealism in Song Ming's Confucian political thought is interpreted. [13]
Moral idealism not only marks the way in which the political order in which Song Ming Confucianism believes is formed, but also shapes the goals or objectives envisaged by this political order. According to the university model, the state is not the ultimate community form of the political order. This is why, at least for the mainstream of Song Ming Confucianism, collective wealth and power were not seen as legitimate targets of the dynastic political order. Ultimately, the state is convinced to be only a stage of the political order that itself needs to be transcended in order to seek the implementation of a higher community.
The "supreme goodness" mentioned in the University, a Confucian supreme good, can ultimately be embodied in this ultimate, more transcendent community. When discussing this ultimate community, first-rate thinkers such as Zhang Zai, Zhu Xi, and Wang Yangming often come up with a picture of a moral gemeinschaft that encompasses all the peoples of the world. The political order that Song Ming Confucianism believed in also took on a certain utopian color in this way. [14]
Of course, this kind of utopianism existed in the Confucian tradition long before the rise of Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties. Since the abuse of the pre-Qin Dynasty, Confucianism has regarded the rule of the three ancient saint kings as a model of ideal order. At the same time, this utopian picture depends on the assumption that the three-agent order can be revived in the evolution of later history. Thus, Confucian utopianism is not merely a remembrance of Yao Shun's rule; it is accompanied by hopes for the future.
But this expectation is not the same desperate desire as religious believers, for it is interacted with a pessimistic consciousness of the dissipation of the fortunes of the historical process of the universe over three generations. In fact, as Thomas Metzger put it, Song Ming Confucianism has an inherent sense of distress. Given the frustration and disappointment that comes from its historical consciousness, Confucian moral idealism clings to a hope full of despair. [54]
The utopian picture did not give the political thought of Song Ming Confucianism a slight mark of radical change. As I pointed out earlier, the transcendence inherent in Song Ming Confucianism in the concept of Heavenly Dao is materialized by the infiltration of cosmic mythology. Because, from the point of view of Song Ming Confucianism, the realization of its transcendent concept is often regarded as an intrinsic feature of the reproduction of the prosperous world, so transcendence means that the ideal order reproduced in the future is by no means a fundamental destruction of the institutional order of the present. Thus, in Song Ming Confucianism, futuristic utopianism is not necessarily incompatible with political conservatism.
As we have seen, a distinctive feature of Song Ming Confucianism is the priority of the cultivation of virtue in the cultivation of governing talents. Correspondingly, the mainstream of Confucianism in the Song dynasty often refers to the primacy of the an exemplary center in the evolution of political order. Orthodox thinkers from Zhu Xi to Zeng Guofan have always insisted that the social picture of pure customs can only be realized as a result of the indoctrination of moral-spiritual influence, which derives from the exemplary character of the elite headed by the monarch.
While the emphasis on exemplary centers does not mean a lack of recognition of institutional importance, it does imply a preference for light government. Pre-Qin Confucianism, as explained in the Analects, already presupposes a political center of "inaction," which means relying more on top-down moral-spiritual transformation to cultivate political order than on institutional pressure and manipulation. In the Western Han Dynasty, Confucian scholars eagerly argued and defended this low-profile form of political governance against the interventionist policies of the salt and iron bureaucracy proposed by the Legalist bureaucracy. [16]
This gesture, which Benjamin Schwartz called "optimum noninterference," was revived at the beginning of the rise of Song Studies as a common argument for most Confucian scholars to oppose the famous 11th-century Wang Anshi transformation, the essence of which was to try to solve the major socio-political problems that arose through strong government intervention. The failure of Wang Anshi's reform method more or less resolved this controversy, at least for the mainstream thinkers of Song Ming Confucianism, who generally preferred the principle of small government ruled by arches. It is no accident of history that China was hit by Western culture until the late 19th century, during which time there was no extensive institutional change at its political center.
Nevertheless, the Concept of Vertical Arch rule in Song Ming Confucianism was accompanied by an appreciation of the importance of the institutional order. As Cheng Yi argues, a sound governance process involves a common consideration of the importance of both governance and governance. [17] Thus, in the Confucian tradition of the Song and Ming Dynasties, two commentaries on the University are at the very core.
The 13th-century thinker Zhen Dexiu used the University Derivation to elucidate the exemplary-centered moral philosophy implicit in the University, and then the 15th-century thinker Qiu Jun felt the need to make a separate commentary to elaborate on the ideas of Song Ming Confucianism on institutional arrangements and government functions, which is his "University Derivative Supplement". [18]
In the modern Confucian tradition, these two books are universally revered as complementary texts on the rule of the Tao and the rule of law. According to the view of Song Ming Confucianism, the rule of the Tao takes precedence over the rule of law, and thus receives the primary attention, but the importance of institutional order is always the proper meaning of its title, and this fact cannot be ignored.
As a typical Confucian text on the institutional facilities of the political order, the University Derivative Supplement is almost entirely about the institutional structure of the bureaucratic nature. [19] Although bureaucracy is certainly at the heart of the Institutional Order of Song Ming Confucianism, this is not without controversy. In fact, there is a considerable degree of contradiction within Song Ming's Confucian political thought about the position of bureaucracy in the state.
For many Confucian scholars, the bureaucracy as a meritocracy was undermined by the imperial examination system that lured people to pursue fame and profit, thereby eroding the moral enthusiasm of Confucian officials. In addition, the bureaucracy is considered a system of a large number of Xu officials, whose behavior is often dominated by greed or other immoral motives because they lack a suitable Confucian educational background. [20]
Even more striking with regard to governance is the ongoing debate that took place in the Confucian tradition of the Song ming dynasty about the merits of the county system as opposed to feudalism, through which it was reflected that most Confucian scholars were reluctant to accept the county system, and they actually preferred feudalism. [21] The rich thinking underlying this preference for ancient feudalism is difficult to explore here, but it is certain that it has much to do with the Confucian picture of the political community as a moral and ceremonial society.
Of course, Confucianism must see the practical character of its actions so that it can recognize the functions of coercion and management in the process of government governance. But at the same time, Confucianism also has a fundamental tendency to regard the family as the prototype of the human community. As a result, what Confucianism saw as a hierarchy and structure of authority inherent in the political order must be fused with a family-like, organically coagulated nature.
From this point of view, it is not surprising that feudalism, which is inseparable from the patriarchal system in The chinese historical memory, has a strong attraction to the Confucian mind; at the same time, bureaucracy and its legal origins, ruthless formalism, often prove that its expectations of Confucian moral and ceremonial society are absolutely alienated, if not hostile.
Such expectations may explain why the Confucian institutional order also includes non-bureaucratic institutional facilities such as schools, ancestral halls, local self-government organizations, and clans. From the Confucian point of view, these "soft" and non-bureaucratic institutional facilities are as important as those of "hard" and bureaucratic systems in the evolution of the political order. Since these hard and soft institutional facilities together form an institutional structure, which is embodied in Confucian etiquette, the consideration of etiquette will help us further clarify the concept of Confucian political order.
According to the orthodox Song Ming Confucian concept of political order, the exemplary center cannot exist independently of the rituals prescribed as the Confucian normative order. It is the Liturgy that makes the Son of Heaven at the center of all things. Nevertheless, the ritual as a whole normative order, as Benjamin Schwartz put it, does not operate automatically. [22] It must be done according to others, that is, it needs a moral elite to mobilize and operate it.
If we focus only on the rigid institutional facilities of etiquette, such as law and bureaucracy, then the preferences of big government will emerge. But if one considers the soft institutional apparatus, one finds a center focused on the moral-ritual influence that the monarch exudes through a comprehensive normative order. This center relies not on coercion, but more on induction and collaboration. From this point of view, the exemplary center in the Confucian sense reflects a political order that is unique and difficult to describe as "big" or "small" in the modern Western concept of state.
Third, as a Confucian concept of governance
In discussing Confucian political thought, the previous article has emphasized its preference for moral idealism. At the same time, this preference does not obscure the realism inherent in Confucianism from the beginning. After all, the moral picture in the Confucian scriptures also supports concern for people's livelihood and corresponding efforts to improve them, and thus recognizes the practical needs and expedient legitimacy of human life at the individual and social levels. Moreover, in imperial China, Confucianism was not only a moral-spiritual belief, but also an effective ideology for the ruling elite.
Inevitably, a series of reflections on practical needs and practical matters that may be faced by the state have emerged. In the Confucian tradition of the Song and Ming Dynasties, the practical aspects of Confucianism that consider realpolitik were gradually associated with the concept of scripture. During the Ming and Qing dynasties, works embodying this aspect of Confucianism were often compiled on a large scale in the name of the scriptures.
In the 19th century, Confucian scholars referred to the classics as the exclusive category of the new branch of Confucian scholarship, the "study of the classics," which was devoted to solving the practical problems facing the state and society. [23] It is in this exclusive sense that the word "statecraft" in English is very close to the English word for "statecraft" (the art of statecraft). This article also goes on to attempt to turn to a brief examination of this concept of healing.
In the Song ming Confucian tradition, the evolutions that ultimately nurtured and gave birth to the 19th-century scholastic school should be seen as reactions to the broader context of moral idealism that governs the concept of orthodox political order. According to orthodoxy, there is no need for a specialized discipline called the art of statecraft, for the concepts and values of the goals and organization of the political order can be deduced directly from the moral picture of the self and society, which is self-contained in the Confucian moral philosophy of self-actualization, that is, the study of righteousness. [24]
Nevertheless, almost from the beginning of the Song and Ming Confucian traditions, some Confucian scholars have eschewed these ideas and devoted themselves to arguing that the idea of healing techniques is at least relatively independent. Unlike orthodoxy, statecraft scholars conceive of the political order in a way that focuses on the reality of state governance, and less on the ultimate goal of the political order, the moral perfection of the self and society. The focus of the School of Merit is neither the prosperity of the "three generations" nor its possible reproduction in history, but the opportunity to control the rise and fall of chaos in the actual historical evolution of the Zhou And Qin Dynasties.
Of course, although this group of Confucian scholars shared this realistic aspect of the jingshi concept, the assessment of the degree of independence of the idea of healing was different. For some of these scholars, its independence is rudimentary and ambiguous. For other scholars, it is profound and clear. In the latter, there is even a tendency to clearly try to argue that this pragmatic order is intrinsic to the legitimate value appeal of Confucianism.
In the Northern Song Dynasty thinkers Li Qian and Wang Anshi, the Southern Song Dynasty School of Meritorious Service, the "practical thinkers" Yan Yuan and Li Yuan, and other thinkers in the early Qing Dynasty, their positive defense of the moral legitimacy of wealth and power can be clearly observed. For them and for those with similar minds, the idea of merit is no different from the picture of the Confucian moral community. In fact, the former is a necessary part of the latter. [25]
The political realism of the statecraft school is rooted in a special ethic. In order to define this special ethic, the ethics of absolute ends can be used as a frame of reference, which has a pithy summary in Dong Zhongshu: "Righteousness does not seek its own benefit, and its righteousness does not seek its own merits." [26] Of course, the ethic of absolute purpose has had extreme influence only among the theorists. It is worth mentioning that there is no primitive and pure utilitarian thought in Song Ming Confucianism that has completely slid to the other extreme. [27]
Beyond the orthodox ethics of science, there is more of a restricted ethic of absolute purpose, that is, limited by the tendency to compromise with the reality of life and the world. This trend of compromise continues to develop, culminating in a certain ethical orientation of social consequence. Compared with the diametrically dichotomous ethics and the unconditional moral obligation of the absolute purpose ethics, the ethical orientation of social consequences is morally contradictory and ambiguous.
The ethical orientation of social consequence still recognizes the primacy of the moral ideal pursued by the ethics of absolute ends, but here it is also balanced by a particular knowledge. According to this particular understanding, just as the rule of the three generations of holy kings is difficult to reproduce in the historical situation since the Qin and Han dynasties, the Confucian moral ideal is by no means always feasible in this real world where luck has dissipated. Therefore, social consequential ethics involves a moral scale that takes the actual consequences of human actions and social efficacy as the standard. In a relative sense, it also views immoral factors such as wealth, heroism, and practical merit as purposes of life worth pursuing.
In the Confucian tradition of the Song Ming Dynasty, it is this ethical orientation of social consequences that is behind the idea of merit. The harsh judgment of morality and reality, which orthodox theorists have always emphasized, has become very vague here in the school of merit. Their rhetoric is still inseparable from orthodox moral discourse, such as "king" and "hegemony", "public" and "private", "righteousness" and "profit", "Tao" and "gong", which are familiar to them; but in the minds of Song Dynasty thinkers such as Chen Liang (1143-1194), these dichotomies no longer mean irreconcilable opposition. Chen Liang firmly believes that these seemingly opposing categories can be reconciled with his political philosophy based on the principle of "using both kings and hegemons, and acting in both righteousness and profit". [28]
The particular ambiguity of social consequential ethics is reinforced by the monism of qi, a moral metaphysics that arose in the 15th century. Qi monism emerged from the beginning as a heresy and reaction to the dualistic worldview of the mainstream of Song Ming Confucianism. Unlike the latter, which regards theory and qi as the fundamental composition of the universe, qi monism emphasizes that the root of the universe ultimately lies in qi. As a result of a monistic worldview, this orientation also rejects the orthodox view of the absolute conflict between moral-cosmic principles and human desires.
The Song Ming Confucians, who agree with this orientation, believe that the moral-cosmic principles and human desires are closely intertwined, and that human desires are not only not absolutely evil, but can be completely good. This view inevitably provokes realism and obscures the inherent distinction between the opposing categories emphasized by the orthodoxy of the aforementioned dichotomy. It is for this reason that Gu Yanwu (1613-1682), a brilliant thinker influenced by qi monism, was able to absolutely uphold the way of etiquette while arguing that human selfishness is not necessarily evil, and that in a given context it can be transformed into a positive force to promote the implementation of Confucian virtues. [29]
In the process of implementing the political order of the meritocratic school, the political ethics of its realism are most related to the so-called institutional path. As mentioned earlier, the concept of political order in Song Ming Confucianism is roughly divided into two categories: governing the Tao, emphasizing the moral-spiritual influence of human nature, and governing the law, focusing on the institutional forces that form political order. In the orthodox view, although both are necessary for the maintenance of political order, the way of governance has a clear priority over the law of governance.
And for those scholars who understand the scriptures in the sense of healing, the focus of their dedication is on the law. Although they do not necessarily reject the idea of governance, they either recede into context or become questionable. Over the course of centuries, the institutional path, implicit in the emphasis on the idea of governance, has developed a series of different ideas about institutional arrangements, and what follows is to try to see if a universal description can be presented from it.
In deducing his ideas on governance, meritologists tend to regard monarchies as the basic system. Of course, there is no shortage of anti-authoritarian shi chen in the thinking of curative art. However, they are often limited to the behavior and policies of the monarch or individual bureaucrats, and rarely break through the pattern of dynastic politics, so they cannot challenge the legitimacy of the monarchy. Looking at the ups and downs of the Song Ming Confucian tradition, Huang Zongxi may be the only exception, and his thinking on the institutional arrangement of the political order has broken through to negate imperial power as a system. [30]
If the meritocratic school is weak in its innovation here, it is worth mentioning at least that some of these thinkers have rejected the Confucian tradition's general orientation of arguing for the origin and authority of imperial power through cosmic order. Practical thinkers such as Ye Shi of the Southern Song Dynasty (1150-1223), Gu Yanwu and Huang Zongxi (1610-1695) of the Late Ming Dynasty, all consciously continued Xunzi (298-238 BC) and Liu Zongyuan (773-819) and tried to explain the rise and legitimacy of the monarchy in a "secular" and functional way.
In their view, the monarchy arose mainly due to the practical need for social integration of human groups, and the so-called Mandate of Heaven was secondary. [31] This kind of thinking at least provides the flexibility of thought that the cosmic monarchy cannot tolerate. If some thinkers, such as Gu Yanwu, are able to examine the legitimacy of the monarchy in terms of the need for self-integration of social groups, then at least others may challenge the already dysfunctional monarchy for the same reasons, as huang Zongxi's thought indicates.
As for the reflections of meritorious scholars on the institutional order based on monarchy, only some preliminary observations can be provided here. It is more clear that bureaucracy is at the centre of its concerns. But their recognition of bureaucracy was always plagued by recurring misgivings, which persisted until the 17th century, when the situation eased. This misgiving must be properly explained in the context of the aforementioned debate between feudalism and the county system.
It should be noted that meritorious scholars did not fully support the county system in this controversy. Naturally, they do not share the moral fervor that orthodox theorists had for "feudal utopias." But within their horizons, the debate also involves a practical issue of great concern to them, namely, the question of centralization and decentralization.
Based on this concern, meritorious scholars have reconciled the two, and thus the concept of a "mixed system" of government has been formed. From the background of the times, this concept is to cope with the excessive centralized political trend of the Song and Ming dynasties. Proponents of the hybrid system argue that centralization of power at the center would expose the political order to two major threats. First, it will inevitably lead to a shortage of local military forces, thereby weakening their ability to resist external invasion. More importantly, centralization tends to breed authoritarianism. The best way to curb these two threats is to combine a centralized bureaucracy with some kind of decentralization system similar to feudalism. [32]
The concept of this mixed system was first proposed by the Southern Song Dynasty scholars represented by Chen Liang and Ye Shi. [33] However, it has a stronger historical echo in the political thought of the 17th century. For example, Huang Zongxi once suggested that a system of feudal towns should be established along the frontier in the form of a "governor system" based on the historical experience of the late Tang Dynasty. [34] Gu Yanwu went even further, arguing that local administrators should be given autonomy and hereditary rights, so that they could function to some extent similar to feudal princes. This is also the essence of Gu Yanwu's so-called principle of "living in feudal counties and counties". [35]
The idea of a hybrid system is also reflected in the idea of trying to complement the bureaucracy with large-scale clan organizations. Of course, one of the very old Chinese ideas of regarding clans as the foundations of the socio-political order is also integrated into the Concept of Feudal China. In China, the connotation of feudalism was based on the most mature feudal practice in the Western Zhou Dynasty, and the patriarchal system was structurally integrated into the feudal system of the Zhou Dynasty.
Therefore, from a very early age, patriarchy and feudalism have become more or less identical ideals, symbolizing an ideal society in which the upper and lower levels are orderly and morally unified. Of course, in the tradition of governance, the ideal of patriarchy is not as prominent as its place in the orthodox conception of political order. However, it remained energetic, reflected in the political thought of such famous figures as Fan Zhongyan (989-1052), Gu Yanwu, Gong Zizhen (1792-1841), Feng Guifen (1809-1874), and Chen Qiu (1851-1903). [36]
According to these scholars, the patriarchal system can serve as a tool for social control and in conjunction with bureaucratic organizations to achieve social order and stability. Nevertheless, for Gu Yanwu, the patriarchal system can play a more important function: he sees it as a social organization that can integrate soldiers and doctors. Its purpose, as Gu Yanwu put it, is to "contain feudalism in the scholar-doctor", that is, to cultivate the collective autonomy of the scholar-doctor as a group and make it a social force that balances the monarch's centralization. [37]
The ultimate tendency on which the mixed institutional conception of meritocracy depends is shared with the orthodoxy of science, which is one of the many ways in which they all see bureaucracy as merely a socio-economic political order. Therefore, bureaucracy must be integrated with institutional facilities outside the bureaucracy. After the 17th century, the strong interest of early meritorious scholars in mixed systems may have gradually weakened among later generations, but the idea that bureaucratic and non-bureaucratic institutional facilities complement each other to nurture and foster political order continued into the 19th century, most obviously in the efforts to combine bureaucracy with clan organizations or local self-government organizations such as "township covenants" to promote peace and stability. In this regard, there is no difference between meritorious scholars and theoretical orthodoxy, except that the planning of the former is slightly less moral than that of the latter, while the realistic orientation is more prominent.
Although the above-mentioned reflections on institutional facilities outside the mixed system and bureaucracy are at the center of gravity at certain stages of the evolution of the meritocratic school of thought, the importance of these considerations should not be overestimated in terms of the overall concern of the meritocratic school. Overall, the institutional structure and the functioning of the bureaucracy remain the primary concerns of meritocracy scholars, as seen over time. This is especially true in the final stages of the evolution of the art of healing after the 17th century.
The compilation of literature on the art of governance that emerged from the Ming to the Qing dynasties can mark the trajectory of the evolution of the long-term and growing interest in bureaucratic organization. Compiled in the late 16th century, the Huangming Jingshiwen Compilation was compiled according to the author of the article. However, when the Imperial Qing Dynasty Compilation was compiled, it was systematically arranged according to the division of labor of the six central departments. If this change is to be meaningful, it can only be said that the institutional considerations of meritorious scholars are increasingly taking on the form of bureaucracy. [38]
Over the course of centuries of evolution, the tradition of healing as a whole rarely showed a general tendency to change within the framework of the bureaucracy. Indeed, the early stages of Song Ming Confucianism had a strong impulse to try to rebuild the bureaucracy on a large scale, which was clearly reflected in the reform plans of Fan Zhongyan and Wang Anshi, the pioneers of the Gong School. However, this impulse for reform has almost completely faded in later generations. The early 19th-century Bao Shichen was perhaps the only person who, since the early stages of Confucianism in the Song Dynasty, continued to envisage a broad transformation of the bureaucracy. [39]
A more typical political perspective is embodied in the Imperial Qing Dynasty, which is generally the fine-tuning orientation of bureaucratic organizations. In response to this political vision, the Ming and Qing dynasties emerged with the idea of sporadic reforms, which were reflected in political practices such as the famous whip tax law reform and extensive technical changes related to salt administration and public works affairs.
Such sporadic reforms are often not guided by long-term political goals such as the pursuit of a rich army or a universal moral community. Rather, it exhibits a short-term goal-oriented mindset characterized by ( 1 ) a clear understanding of a limited technical or organizational problem that bureaucratic states may face ; and (2) an estimated cost-benefit assessment based on empirical surveys of related issues. This organizational consideration is very different from that under the concept of mixed institutions.
The latter is often accompanied by a critical awareness of the order of existing bureaucracies of varying degrees, or clear or vague; at the same time, the former, which is oriented toward fine-tuning within the bureaucracy, usually lacks this critical vision. In contrast to the former, which is driven by a considerable degree of instrumental rationality, the latter presents a vision that considers national security and public solidarity. Nevertheless, both have a place in the institutional considerations of the school of merit, which should always be borne in mind.
The concepts and values implicit in the three-layered meaning of the concept of the classics within the Confucian tradition of the Song Ming Dynasty have been comprehensively explored. These ideas and values provide the basis for assessing the socio-political intellectual heritage of Song Ming Confucianism from a variety of different perspectives. A comprehensive assessment is beyond the scope of this article. As a final summary, this article only attempts to provide some reflections simply from a modernization perspective.
As mentioned earlier, the sutras as the Confucian ideal of mandate of heaven exhibit a considerable degree of inner-worldly asceticism. Inevitably, the Weber-esque question arises here: What kind of tension does this vocational ideal create? It is not easy to answer this question.
On the one hand, as noted above, this ascetic spirit is already presupposed in the Confucian concept of self-actualization, which creates tension in the endless struggle for self-conquest of the inner world. On the other hand, the Confucian worldview does not show a driving force for trying to conquer the external world of nature and society. The tension of this orientation is first and foremost limited by the peculiar moral idealism contained in the core Confucian concept of "benevolence."
In the Song ming Confucian tradition, this is also the so-called "unity of heaven and man" world view. This forms a vision that values the harmony of the universe and society, and correspondingly alleviates the tension of externalities when people face nature and society. In other words, the endless drive of the Confucian concept of self-actualization, which seeks to purify the inner world of the self, is not transformed into its vision of dealing with natural and social affairs.
Further, the concept of the classics involves the tendency to define the Confucian concept of life and professional pursuit in a narrow sense. As has been argued, the political orientation emphasized by the Confucian ideal of vocation means that its activist tendencies toward this world are confined to the socio-political sphere. The fact that the Song Ming Confucian tradition systematically inherited the imperial examination system further narrowed the political orientation of the Confucian ideal of vocation to the level of providing bureaucratic political services to the government system and local society. The non-bureaucratic spheres of society and the non-political dimensions of life tend to be more insulated from this world-oriented activist orientation of the worldly conception.
What we can see, then, from the stimulating resources of the Confucian ideal of vocation is a spirit of asceticism inherent in the Confucian legacy that is inherently limited by other factors in the Confucian legacy, and this restriction is both ideological and institutional. In modern China, what confronts the legacy of Confucianism here is that, as Western influences flow in, the role of these limiting factors is weakened, and this ascetic spirit of joining the world is released and directed into other areas of social life. From this perspective, it is possible to observe with certainty the significance of the Confucian recipes for character discipline in a series of social and political actions in modern China.
The ideological legacy of the concept of the world should also be assessed at the level of institutional resources. Confucianism and the bureaucracy had a long symbiotic relationship. But for centuries, it has not evolved the intellectual dynamics that have enabled the general rationalization of bureaucratic organizations. Confucianism presents a limited instrumental rational tendency in this regard, which is reflected in the drive for sporadic reforms that arise from time to time. The underlying problem lies in the relative lack of a vision of a development state.
Here I deliberately use the modifier "relative". In the vision of the meritocratic school, which regards the rich country and the strong army as a reasonable national goal, it is already possible to see some potential for the formation of a vision of development. But this potential is not strong enough to overcome the reviling of this vision by the orthodoxy of science, which is based on the ideal of the moral community. Thus, under the dominance of orthodox moral goals, the ideal of a rich country and a strong army is largely on the fringes of Confucian political thought.
However, in the modern historical situation, as the dominance of orthodox goals has been weakened by the impact of Western influences, the concept of rich countries and strong soldiers, which is originally on the margins, has leapt to become the center of ideological focus. More importantly, this idea has become the main intermediary for the digestion of many novel institutional ideas from the West. These novel institutional ideas, such as nation-states and democratic institutions, will become extremely influential in Twentieth-century China. Here we can also observe another explanation of the important role played by the intellectual heritage of the confucian concept in modern China: the new conceptual resources of institutional reconstruction can be used by new models from the West, and at the same time can be obtained through the transformation of the internal balance of the Confucian heritage, and the two are equally divided.
As previously argued in this article, the intellectual legacy of the Confucian concept of the classics is not merely a motive force for organizational innovation within the framework of the bureaucratic state, but also contains a picture of the institutional order of the non-bureaucratic state, which can be presented as the concept of the feudal utopia of the orthodox or the concept of the mixed system of the meritocratic school. Naturally, it is easy to doubt the transformative potential of these images of alternative orders, after all, they are largely rooted in ancient institutional models under the shroud of cosmic monarchy and patriarchal feudalism, which can be said to be useless to the goal of modernity.
At the same time, however, it is not possible to ignore the possibility of other institutional landscapes behind these notions of alternative order. Here, it refers not only to the dualistic concept of order of Song Ming Confucianism, which enables the tradition of moral-spiritual righteousness to compete with the tradition of the actual power of the state; it also refers to the mixed system concept of the merit school, which attempts to adjust the decentralization within the bureaucracy.
In both cases, Confucian scholars' quest for organizational autonomy independent of the authority of state rule can be perceived. Of course, in the vision of the political order of Song Ming Confucianism, compared with the core of institutional models such as cosmic monarchy and patriarchal feudalism, the above ideas are only auxiliary and their importance is often hidden.
At the same time, as we have seen, these two ideological threads in Song Ming's Confucian political thought that tend to coexist have produced modern ideological transformations from different angles. Chinese encountered Western liberal modernity, which had disenchanted the cosmic monarchy and the feudal patriarchal system. At the same time, this historical situation has also made modern Chinese intellectuals more sensitive to the long-lost phenomenon of dualistic order and the pursuit of the autonomy of scholars and scholars. In turn, the modern revival of this line of thinking has shaped the understanding and acceptance of Western liberal ideas by Chinese intellectuals.
This is particularly true in the unusual moral enthusiasm for democratic ideals shared by radical intellectuals like Fei Xiaotong and cultural conservatives such as Xiong Shili (1885-1968), Liang Shuming (1893-1988), Mou Zongsan (1909-1995), and Xu Fuguan (1903-1982). Here, once again, we can see the subtle ways in which the balanced internal transformation of the Confucian heritage drives China's modern transformation.
Now, with the help of the perspective of modernization, it can be seen more clearly that the social and political thought of Song Ming Confucianism formed around the concept of the world is left with a mixture of concepts and values that include adaptability and non-adaptation. To this day, our understanding of the Confucian tradition is dominated by the non-adaptive factors that fuel the catastrophe of China's modernization.
What is needed now is a more complex and nuanced picture in which we can recognize the important role that adaptive factors as a result of the internal transformation of the Confucian tradition play in driving and shaping China's modern transformation. An in-depth exploration along this line of thinking will help us to gain a more balanced and prudent vision of both Confucian tradition and modern transformation.
exegesis
[1] Zeng Guofan, "Zeng Disheng's Self-Education" (Chongqing: The Commercial Press, 1943), pp. 1-2.
[2] Benjamin Schwartz, "Several Poles in Confucianism," in Nimson and Wright, eds., The Practice of Confucianism (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 54-58.
[3] See De Barry, Learning for Oneself: On the Individual in the Confucian Thought of the Song Dynasty (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), pp. 4, 8, 23, 95, 182. Yu Yingshi, "The Modern Significance of Chinese Culture from the Value System" (Taipei: Times Culture Publishing Co., Ltd., 1984), p. 5.
[4] Xiao Gongquan, A History of Chinese Political Thought (Taipei: Chinese Culture Publishing Committee, 1961), pp. 297-298.
[5] [Qing] Zhang Boxing, Collected Interpretations of Recent Thoughts (Taipei: World Publishing House, 1967), vol. VIII, p. 236.
[6] The New Translation of the Four Books (Taipei: Sanmin Bookstore, 1957), p. 1.
[7] Zhang Hao, "Classical Confucianism and breakthroughs in the Axial Age," in Corvin and Goldman, eds., Concepts Across Cultures: A Collection of Essays on Chinese Thought dedicated to Mr. Schwartz (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Council for East Asian Studies, 1990), pp. 17-18.
[8] Ibid. For Voegelin's concept of "mental order," see Eric Voegelin, New Political Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 52-106.
[9] Zhang Hao, "Transcendent Consciousness and Dark Consciousness", in Zhang Hao, ed., Dark Consciousness and Democratic Tradition (Taipei: Lianjing Publishing Company, 1990), pp. 54-55.
[10] Zhang Hao, "The Cosmic Myth of Confucianism and the Transcendent Spirit of Song Ming Confucianism," in Smith and Guo, eds., Cosmology, Ontology, and the Efficacy of Man (Honnu Nunu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), pp. 11-33.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Zhang Hao, "Transcendent Consciousness and Dark Consciousness," pp. 35-56.
[13] [Song] Zhen Dexiu, The Complete Works of Zhenwen Zhonggong (Taipei: Wenyou Bookstore, 1968), Foreword, 2b-3a. See also DeBray, Taoism and New Learning (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), pp. 79-83.
[14] The University, in The New Translation of the Four Books, p. 1.
[15] [Beauty] Mo Ziji, "Getting Out of the Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and the Evolution of Chinese Political Culture" (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), pp. 49-166.
[16] For a more elaborate description of this controversy, see Tao Xisheng, A History of Chinese Political Thought (Taipei: Chuanmin Publishing Company, 1954), pp. 159–171.
[17] [Qing] Zhang Boxing, Collected Interpretations of The Records of Recent Thoughts, vol. VIII, p. 236.
[18] [Ming] Qiu Jun, "University Yanyi Supplement", quoted from [Qing] Chen Hongmou: "University Yanyi Supplement", source and general purpose. See also Zhu Honglin, Qiu Jun (1421-1495) and: Classical Thought in 15th-Century China (Ann Arbor: American University International Microproducts Corporation (UMI), 1990), pp. 1-284.
[19] Ibid.
[20] In traditional China, the word "official" for low-level bureaucrats is often mixed with its two homophones, "example" and "profit." This fact also implies a very low evaluation of the lower bureaucracy, who is seen as always prioritizing behavior in a despicable and greedy way.
[21] For an overview of this controversy, see Yang Liansheng, "Local Administration in the Ming Dynasty," in He Kai, ed., The Chinese Government of the Ming Dynasty (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), pp. 1-10.
[22] Shi Huaci, "Several Poles in Confucianism," pp. 54-58.
[23] Qian Mu, Academic History of China in the Past Three Hundred Years (Taiwan: The Commercial Press, 1964), p. 317, 628.
[24] This is a latent assumption for both Cheng Zhu and Lu Wang, as evidenced by the commentaries of the two schools on the Four Books.
[25] Xiao Gongquan, History of Chinese Political Thought, pp. 449-469; see also Yang Peizhi, Yan Xizhai and Li Shugu (Wuhan: Hubei People's Publishing House, 1956), pp. 63-91.
[26] Zhou Fucheng: On Dong Zhongshu's Thought (Shanghai: People's Publishing House, 1962), p. 28.
[27] This extreme utilitarianism appeared only in the thinking of the Jurists, which was widely criticized by all Confucian scholars.
[28] Xiao Gongquan, History of Chinese Political Thought, pp. 449-469.
[29] Hou Wailu, General History of Chinese Thought (Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1958), vol. V, pp. 240-241.
[30] [Ming] Huang Zongxi, "Ming Yi To Be Visited" (Shanghai: Zhonghua Bookstore, 1957), p. 2. See also Gao Zhun, A Study of Political Thought in Huanglizhou (Taipei: Dahan Publishing House, 1967), pp. 52-85; [Mei] Debray, "Chinese Absolutism and Confucian Ideals: A Seventeenth-Century Perspective", quoted from [Mei] Fairbank, ed., Chinese Thought and Institutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 163-203; and Debay, "Ming Dynasty Theory and Huang Zongxi's Free Thought", in Chinese Liberal Traditions (Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1983), pp. 67-90.
[31] Xiao Gongquan, History of Chinese Political Thought, pp. 101-120, 408-409, 466-467, 611-617. For Huang Zongxi's own thoughts on this, see [Ming] Huang Zongxi, Ming Yi To Be Visited, p. 5.
[32] Xiao Gongquan, History of Chinese Political Thought, pp. 461–481.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Gao Zhun, A Study of Political Thought in Huanglizhou, pp. 83-86.
[35] Lin Liang, "Outline of Tinglin Thought" (Taipei: Lotte Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 109-111.
[36] Xiao Gongquan, History of Chinese Political Thought, p. 615; [Qing] Gong Zizhen, "Nongzong", quoted in Selected Materials on the History of Chinese Philosophy: Ministry of Modern Times (Beijing: Zhonghua Bookstore, 1959), 1:13-22; [Qing] Feng Guifen, "The Protests of the School of Pinglu" (Taipei: Wenhai Publishing House, 1967), pp. 111-117; and [Qing] Chen Qiu, Zhiping Tonghui (published in unknown place, 1893), pp. 1a-4a.
[37] Xiao Gongquan, A History of Chinese Political Thought, p. 615.
[38] Zhang Hao, "An Examination of Confucian Jingshi Thought Since the Song and Ming Dynasties", cited in Proceedings of the Symposium on Modern Chinese Jingshi Thought in Recent Times (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1984), pp. 16-19.
[39] For the blueprint for a universal institutional reform of the bureaucracy envisaged by Bao Shichen, see [Qing] Bao Shichen, "Speaking of Chu" (Shanghai, 1906).
Editor-in-Charge: Mercy